I am Not a Better Teacher,But Others are Doing Worse: Burnout and Perceptions of Superiority Among Teachers

This study examined differences between teachers high and low in burnout in the perception of being superior to others. Because burnout implies a decline in well-being and because well-being is related to perceived superiority, it was hypothesized that perceived superiority would be reduced among individuals high in burnout. This would be particularly true for superiority with respect to positive behaviors (feeling better than others). As negative behaviors of others are generally highly salient, it was expected that even individuals high in burnout would be able to maintain a sense of negative superiority (feeling less bad than others). One hundred twenty teachers in secondary education were asked to generate information about inferior and superior others. Perceived superiority was assessed by response latencies and the quality of the information generated. As expected, only positive superiority was reduced among teachers high in burnout. Thus, they felt less good, but also less bad than others. Consequences for classroom performance and suggestions for the treatment of burnout are discussed.     

Why We Must Leave Our Organs to Others

Organ procurement presents several ethical concerns (from what constitutes acceptable criteria for death to issues involved in specifically designating to whom an organ can be given), but none is more central than the concern for what are appropriate means for acquiring organs. The following discussion attempts a different perspective on the issue of organ procurement by arguing that, rather than appealing to our charitable consciences or our pocketbooks, relinquishing our organs after death in this day and age is, in fact, obligatory for most people. Each of us is pressed by the growing demand for our organs should we die “rightly,” and that desperate need has risen to such a level that not to release our organs for transplantation would constitute a serious moral wrong.     

Why Simpler Arguments are Better

In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, I argue that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments over less simple ones. I sketch three arguments in support of this claim: an argument from mathematical proofs, an argument from scientific theories, and an argument from the conjunction rule.     

The Time Course of Attention: It Is Better Than We Thought

ABSTRACT— What is the time course of attention? Research using rapid-stimulus streams has suggested that it is rather slow: Attention takes half a second to recover from processing one thing before it can process the next. This period is referred to as the attentional blink , and it is thought to reflect a fundamental bottleneck in conscious processing. If this period does exist, such a limitation would have severe consequences in real-life situations in which multiple events may rapidly succeed each other (e.g., in traffic). However, findings that support the attentional blink are at odds with other findings indicating that attention is not reduced, but enhanced, following potentially important occurrences. The article reviews evidence that these opposite effects are actually closely related. The attentional blink is a consequence of selection mechanisms that are not severely limited, but have an adaptive function: They enhance perception in response to relevant information but suppress perception in response to irrelevant information. It means that humans are better geared for real life than was previously thought.     

Negotiating with Nonlinear Subjective Utilities: Why Some Concessions Are More Equal Than Others

An implicit but unnecessary assumption of the traditional logrolling approach to integrative negotiations is that disputants have linear subjective utility functions. The analysis of bargaining concessions described in this paper uses linear subjective utilities as a point of departure and explores the implications of non-linear subjective utilities for the process of valuing concessions and trade-offs in negotiation exchanges. Several apparent paradoxes are revealed and discussed. The analysis concludes by examining the implications of preference function mutability in light of non-linear subjective utility functions. Implications for negotiation theory and practice are discussed, including the possibility of a "concession evaluation heuristic" by which disputants confuse the relative importance of specific concessions with the relative importance of the issues on which those concessions are given and taken.     

Why Response-Dependence Theories of Morality are False

Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). Since our affective nature is purely contingent, and not necessarily shared by all rational creatures (or even by all humans), response-dependence threatens to lead to relativism. In this paper, I will argue that emotional responses and moral features do not align in the way predicted by the response-dependence theorist who wishes to tie morality to emotional affect. I further argue that since response-dependence accounts that tie morality to any sort of affect (be it an emotion, a desire, a desire to desire, or so on) cannot explain the objectivity and universality of morality; and since we do not need a psychological response to play a truth-constituting role in morality in order to explain the normativity or content of morality, we should reject such response-dependence accounts.     

Why Doomsday Arguments are Better than Simulation Arguments

Inspired by anthropic reasoning behind Doomsday arguments, Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument says: people who think advanced civilisations would run many fully‐conscious simulated minds should also think they're probably simulated minds themselves. However, Bostrom's conclusions can (and should) be resisted, especially by sympathisers with Doomsday or anthropic reasoning. This paper initially offers a posterior‐probabilistic ‘Doomsday lottery’ argument against Bostrom's conclusions. Suggestions are then offered for deriving anti‐simulation conclusions using weaker assumptions. Anti‐simulation arguments herein use more (epistemically and metaphysically) robust reference classes than Bostrom's argument, require no Principles of Indifference, abide better by the total evidence requirement, and yet use empirically plausible priors and likelihoods. However, while Doomsday arguments are probabilistically, epistemically and metaphysically stronger than the Simulation Argument, anthropic reasoning can (and should) refrain from embracing either.     

Why Managerial Women are Less Happy Than Managerial Men

Women with managerial careers are significantly less satisfied with their life than their male counterparts. Why? In a representative German panel dataset (GSOEP) we find biological constraints and substitutive mechanisms determining the subjective well-being of female managers. Women’s terminated fertility has a negative impact on women’s life satisfaction between the ages of 35 and 45, when managerial careers usually take off. Money and spare time can compensate for this biological difference. But to maintain an equivalent level of happiness, women need to be compensated by much more income for each hour of spare time given up than men do. So, in order to reach better gender equality in leadership positions, women must be either paid higher incomes (on average around 10%) or must be incentivized with more spare time than men. In the conclusion, we speculate on a new mix of carrots and sticks for advanced careers in order to boost female representation in leadership positions.     

From Motivation to Activation: Why Engaged Workers are Better Performers

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between work engagement and multiple dimensions of employee performance, as mediated by open-mindedness.

Design/Methodology/Approach

Survey data were obtained from 186 employees of a food processing plant and the findings were cross-validated in an independent convenience sample (N = 308).

Findings

SEM analyses revealed that the more engaged the employees were, the more they displayed extra-role and in-role performance. As expected, these associations were partially mediated by open-mindedness. Results were ambiguous for counterproductive performance showing a direct negative relation between engagement and counter productivity, and an indirect, positive relation through open-mindedness.

Implications

With its systematic look at the relation between engagement and multiple indicators of performance, the current study shows why it is important for both employers and employees to invest in engaged employees: there is a relationship with better performance which can partly be explained by the fact that engagement is associated with open-mindedness. This may help to inform organizations under what circumstances engagement leads to positive or negative forms of performance. Vice versa, a decrease in the multiple indicators of performance may signal organizations to look after their employees' mental health, i.e., engagement.

Originality/Value

This is one of the first studies to include multiple dimensions of employee performance in relation to work engagement. Moreover, it is one of the first studies that focus on the underlying psychological process that might explain for this relationship.

     

Understanding and Integrating Multiple Science Texts: Summary Tasks are Sometimes Better Than Argument Tasks

One of the major challenges of a knowledge society is that students as well as other citizens must learn to understand and integrate information from multiple textual sources. Still, task and reader characteristics that may facilitate or constrain such intertextual processes are not well understood by researchers. In this study, we compare the effects of summary and argument essay tasks when undergraduates read seven different texts on a particular scientific topic, finding that an instruction to write summaries may lead to better understanding and integration than an instruction to write argument essays. We discuss several possible explanations for this result. We also found that beliefs about the certainty of knowledge in some instances can moderate the effect of task on comprehension performance.     

Self-Doubt: Why We are not Identical to Things of Any Kind

There are two fundamental aspects of the notion of a self: (i) it is the owner of one’s experiences, that to which one’s experiences are properly attributed, and (ii) it perceives itself. (ii) is a condition on the self’s being capable of attributing experiences to itself or being introspectively aware of its experiences, which constitutes a third, higher‐order aspect of the self. I claim that it is a common sense assumption, enshrined in the use of ‘I’, that one’s body satisfies the first two aspects. I then argue that these two aspects are not really satisfied by one’s body, which is essentially a human organism. Nor are they satisfied by anything of any other kind. So we are not identical to things of any kind, since one can be identical only to that which is one’s self or is the referent of one’s uses of ‘I’.     

For Better and For Worse: Differential Susceptibility to Environmental Influences

ABSTRACT— Evidence that adverse rearing environments exert negative effects particularly on children presumed "vulnerable" for temperamental or genetic reasons may actually reflect something else: heightened susceptibility to the negative effects of risky environments and to the beneficial effects of supportive environments. Building on Belsky's (1997, 2005) evolutionary-inspired proposition that some children are more affected—both for better and for worse—by their rearing experiences than are others, we consider recent work on child vulnerability, including that involving measured genes, along with evidence showing that putatively vulnerable children are especially susceptible to both positive and negative rearing effects. We also consider methodological issues and unanswered questions in the differential-susceptibility equation.     

自我欺骗：通过欺骗自己更好地欺骗他人

心理学的研究几乎都把自欺看作一种个体特质, 主要探讨自欺对个体自身的作用。而在进化的理论框架中, 自欺是一种人际交往的策略, 目的是为了更好地欺骗其他个体。由于直接欺骗有可能被对方识破, 个体把自己欺骗之后就可以“诚实地”向对方传递错误信息而不被察觉。这就把自欺定义为人际间而非个体内的概念。本文系统地阐述人际间自欺的概念和思路, 并为之在心理学的研究中提出一套理论假设和研究方法。在理论上, 由于难以区别通过自欺的欺骗和直接的欺骗, 本文提出一系列假设和条件来证明自欺的存在, 这些条件包括欺骗双方的地位高低、道德高低、和人数多寡。因为自欺是用来应付高欺骗探测压力的, 上述条件可以反映被骗对象的欺骗探测能力的高低。在方法上, 本文提出采用两次回忆的方式来展现自欺, 第一次回忆时欺骗动机存在, 个体在诚实的状态下提供较少真实信息, 第二次回忆时欺骗动机消失, 个体可以提供较多真实信息, 通过比较两次回忆内容的差异来验证自欺的存在。这一操作方法突破了个体间自欺因缺乏操作定义而无法进行心理学研究的屏障, 为人们探讨人际间自欺提供了一条可行途径。     

For Better and Worse: Social Influences on Coronary Heart Disease Risk

From the neighborhoods we live in to those we marry, other people are a part of our everyday lives. Mounting evidence suggests that these social factors constitute risk and resilience influences for coronary heart disease (CHD). The current aim is to summarize the literature into four representative categories relating to CHD risk: social environments, social roles, social resources, and close relationships. The argument is made that these factors moderate and mediate stress and associated physiological responses constituting a psychosomatic pathway to disease.     

"为什么没有出现学术大师":问题还是伪问题?

19世纪末和20世纪上半叶是中国现代学术的诞生时期,这是一个可以与先秦诸子百家媲美的第二个学术黄金时代.不但在文史和哲学领域,而且在科学领域,大师辈出,群星灿烂.由于众所周知的原因,这个黄金时代过早地结束了.改革开放30年来,我国哲学社会科学事业恢复生机,繁荣发展,学术出版物的数量以不亚于经济增长率的速度快速增长,各类评奖的优秀成果如雨后春笋般茁壮生长.     

False Consensus and False Uniqueness in Estimating the Prevalence of Health-Protective Behaviors

The degree to which people perceive that their health-relevant behaviors are also performed by their peers may influence whether they continue these practices or are susceptible to change. The present paper examined estimates of social consensus for health-relevant behaviors. It was hypothesized that respondents would perceive their own behaviors to be relatively more common than do people not performing them, the so-called False Consensus Effect. However, in terms of the accuracy of consensus estimates, people who behave in undesirable ways will tend to overestimate the actual number of others who behave similarly. In contrast, people who behave in desirable ways will underestimate the actual number of people who behave like themselves (false uniqueness). A group of college-aged males were asked to report about their performance of a series of health-relevant behaviors and to estimate the frequency of each behavior among their peers. The findings strongly supported the first two hypotheses and provided some support for the third. One practical implication of the results is that persons with unhealthy practices may resist public health campaigns and other interventions by overestimating consensus for their own behaviors. Also, individuals who think their undesirable health behaviors are relatively common may believe that they involve few health risks for them. The research suggests the need for further research on social cognitions about health, illness, and health-protective behaviors.     

Rethinking Procreation: Why it Matters Why We Have Children

Attempts to explain the intuitive wrongfulness in alleged ‘wrongful life’ cases commonly do so by attributing harmful wrongdoing to the procreators in question. Such an approach identifies the resulting child as having been, in some sense, culpably harmed by their coming into existence. By contrast, and enlarging on work elsewhere, this paper explores the relevance of procreative motivation, rather than harm, for determining the morality of procreative conduct. I begin by reviewing the main objection to the harm‐based approach, which arises out of Derek Parfit's analysis of the non‐identity problem and its implications for preconception cases. Most attempts to avoid the non‐identity objection adopt either an impersonal harm approach or draw on some version of a metaphysical modal counterpart theory to defend a person‐affecting harm account. But here I develop an alternative view. The proposed account construes the wrongness in the considered cases as ‘evil’ rather than harm, and the type of evil in question as being of a non‐grievance, welfare‐connected, collective kind. Understanding the wrongness in this way offers a basis for the view that it matters morally why we procreate, and not just whether or how we do so.