Otto Rank: beginnings, endings, and current experience

I have traced the theories of Otto Rank as they appeared in his major technical writings. Against this background, I have discussed references to Rank in past and contemporary psychoanalytic literature. This paper describes three important contributions of Rank--his birth trauma theory, leading to his theory of the birth of the self; his emphasis on present experience (forerunner of the current "here-and-now" theory); and his writings about the creative potential of the termination process.     

Telepsychiatry in Chennai, India: the SCARF experience

India, with its huge population and limited mental health resources, must find alternative ways of delivering its mental healthcare services. Telepsychiatry seems to be a promising option even with no regulatory authority in place or specific laws in India that deal with telemedicine practice, there has been a mushrooming of telemedicine services in India. Healthy cooperation between government organizations such as the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and institutions in the non-government and private sectors is another key feature in India. The experience of the Schizophrenia Research Foundation (SCARF), at Chennai, in South India, in running and establishing a telepsychiatry network is presented in this article. We identified the following tasks as essential to ensure an efficient intervention using telemedicine: identifying a suitable technology, a suitable location, and a local collaborator; providing training and creating awareness; establishing peripheral telepsychiatry centers and ensuring case documentation; and accountability.     

Body,environment and adventure: experience and spatiality

The purpose of this article is to investigate human spatiality and perception in general, with the experience of adventure sports as its background. These activities highlight especially our strong relationship with the world when we consider the specific way in which the environment participates in the development of human potential. We first analyse the notions of risk and instability as important elements in adventure sports. Then we explore the notion of experience and spatiality, considering the way in which we establish our relationship with the world. The theoretical background is found in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Bachelard’s phenomenology of imagination to investigate perspectives of space among adventurers. We hold that more than a different range of corporeal techniques, adventure sports can teach us a way of interrogating and looking at the world. They require a peculiar sensibility that allows our body to experience the environment in favour of a corporeal wisdom. Alternative sports indicate the possibility that we have to build up different ways of inhabiting the world and comprehending it.     

Evidence,experience, and externalism

The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing. By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), I hope to show that the Sellarsian dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories. But this reconceived version of the argument does not support coherentism. Instead, I use it to argue for a strongly externalist epistemology.     

Tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states: retrieval,behavior, and experience

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the feeling that accompanies temporary inaccessibility of an item that a person is trying to retrieve. TOTs have been studied experimentally since the seminal work of Brown and McNeill (1966). TOTs are experiences that accompany some failed or slow retrievals, and they can result in changes in retrieval behavior itself, allowing us to study the interplay among experience, retrieval, and behavior. We often attribute the experience of the TOT to the unretrieved target, but TOTs are based on a variety of cues, heuristics, or sources of evidence, such as partial information, related information, and cue familiarity, that predict the likelihood of overcoming retrieval failure. We present a synthesis of the direct-access view, which accounts for retrieval failure, and the heuristic–metacognitive view, which accounts for the experience of the TOT. We offer several avenues for future research and applications of TOT theory and data.     

Evaluation purposes,processes, products,and probity: Some lessons from experience

This paper shares some of the author’s conclusions following more than three decades of experience with evaluation in a range of areas, including agricultural research, health and social development projects, and programs managed by both national and international agencies. It expounds on the purposes, processes and products of evaluation as well as the probity of the evaluators. Evaluations are often expected to achieve multiple objectives in a short time period and with limited resources. The conclusions and recommendations of evaluations often influence a program’s future course, as well as the reputation of program managers and staff. When there is no effective monitoring or internal evaluation system in place, an external evaluation team must rely heavily on the probity and creativity of its members, particularly, the team leader. This paper offers tips on practical aspects of monitoring and evaluation, and provides insights into research and development processes in developing countries. She has served on the boards, review teams, and advisory committees of several centers affiliated with the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. She has done research and has written extensively on social issues involving small-farmer development. She is a senior program adviser for the UPWARD network (User’s Perspective with Agricultural Research and Development).     

Geometry, intuition and experience: From kant to husserl

I take this opportunity to thank my colleagues at ZiF for their very helpful comments and criticisms during the academic year. For the preparation of this paper, I am especially indepted to Michael Hallett, who not only improved my English but also saved me from a number of errors.     

Contemplating spiritual experience: Winnicott's potential space,Tibetan bardo,and liminality

Abstract

In this paper, ways of contemplating and accommodating the unfamiliar, especially the “other” of spiritual experience, are considered. Some concepts from psychoanalysis, such as Winnicott's “potential space” and his notion of “holding,” are helpful in comprehending spiritual experiences that can easily be misunderstood, or “flattened out” to use Bion's phrase. Interesting and rather remarkable confluences in these concepts from psychoanalysis and from Tibetan Buddhism (bardo) and cultural anthropology (liminality) are considered in their functions of both enabling and comprehending these extraordinary and often life-enhancing experiences.     

Affect,perceptual experience,and disclosure

A prominent number of contemporary theories of emotional experience—understood as occurrent, phenomenally conscious episodes of emotions with an affective character that are evaluatively directed towards particular objects or states of affairs—are motivated by the claim that phenomenally conscious affective experience, when appropriate, grants us epistemic access not merely to features of the experience but also to features of the object of experience, namely its value. I call this the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. The aim of this paper is to clarify the sort of assumptions about experience that we ought to avoid if we want to be able to argue that for the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. There are two core arguments in this paper. First, I argue that Mark Johnston’s account of affect as a disclosure of value, due to its naïve realist commitments, relapses into a position that is vulnerable to the same objection put forward by some naïve realists against intentionalist accounts of perceptual experience. Second, I argue that Michelle Montague’s account, due to its phenomenal intentionalist commitments, relapses into a position that is vulnerable to the same objections put forward against qualia theories of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. The upshot of the paper is that the core assumptions embedded in the three dominant models of experience—namely naïve realism, different versions of intentionalism, and qualia theory—are problematic as found in contemporary accounts of affect as a disclosure of value.     

Semantics,experience and time

The computational hypothesis, with its inherent representationalism, and the dynamical hypothesis, with its apparent absence of representations and its commitment to continuous time, stand at an impasse. It is unclear how the dynamical stance can handle representational thought, or how computationalism can deal effectively with a tightly coupled, reciprocally causative agent–environment system in continuous transformation. Underlying this dilemma is the complex relation of mind to time, a relation encoded in the word experience. We must ask if any hypothesis describes a ‘device’ capable of experience? Yet what is an intelligence and its thought without experience? Is a computational device, whether supporting a symbolic processor or connectionist net, intrinsically condemned to a zero degree of experience? What is required of a dynamical device? It is argued here that ‘semantic’ intelligence and thought rests upon experience, fundamentally upon the invariance laws defined over time within conscious perception. The structure of experience is intrinsically unavailable to the computational device, limiting it to a ‘syntactic’ intelligence. An alternative conception of a device is offered, based on Bergson conjoined with Gibson, which supports the qualitative and structural aspects of experience and the semantic. It frames a dynamical model of perception and memory in which invariance laws are intrinsic, creates a deeper notion of situatedness, and supports a concept of semantically based, representative thought founded upon perception.     

Emotionality,distinctiveness, and recollective experience

Two experiments investigated the effects of emotional stimuli on recollective experience in recognition memory. In Experiment 1, words judged to evoke a positive emotional response (e.g., warmth, freedom) or a negative emotional response (e.g., mucus, corpse) were associated with more “remember” responses than emotionally neutral words (e.g., crate, border) when presented in mixed lists. This effect was stronger with negative words than with positive words. In Experiment 2 the effects of emotional stimuli were eliminated when participants studied pure lists of either all emotional or all neutral words. These findings are discussed in relation to Rajaram's (1996) distinctiveness account of recollective experience.     

The near-death experience: An ancient truth,a modern mystery

The near-death experience (NDE), as an experience of whole-ness, an adventure in consciousness, and a metaphoric encounter with light, links theoretical physics with the occult, the Primordial Tradition, and various religious belief systems. Light as image, vehicle, and first cause ties the NDE to mystical experience. Where science sees mystery, religion sees metaphoric truth; the NDE as spiritual quest and physical encounter beckons to both disciplines for explanation.International Association for Near-Death StudiesDr. Fenske is President of the International Association for Near-Death Studies, and is engaged in the private practice of psychotherapy and the integration of psychology and religion. This paper is a revised version of her keynote lecture presented at the International Association for Near-Death Studies First Annual Conference, Rosemont, PA, June 1989.