The meaning of “significance” for different types of research [translated and annotated by Eric-Jan Wagenmakers,Denny Borsboom,Josine Verhagen,Rogier Kievit,Marjan Bakker,Angelique Cramer,Dora Matzke,Don Mellenbergh,and Han L. J. van der Maas]

Adrianus Dingeman de Groot (1914–2006) was one of the most influential Dutch psychologists. He became famous for his work “Thought and Choice in Chess”, but his main contribution was methodological — De Groot co-founded the Department of Psychological Methods at the University of Amsterdam (together with R. F. van Naerssen), founded one of the leading testing and assessment companies (CITO), and wrote the monograph “Methodology” that centers on the empirical-scientific cycle: observation–induction–deduction–testing–evaluation. Here we translate one of De Groot's early articles, published in 1956 in the Dutch journal Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie en Haar Grensgebieden. This article is more topical now than it was almost 60 years ago. De Groot stresses the difference between exploratory and confirmatory (“hypothesis testing”) research and argues that statistical inference is only sensible for the latter: “One ‘is allowed’ to apply statistical tests in exploratory research, just as long as one realizes that they do not have evidential impact”. De Groot may have also been one of the first psychologists to argue explicitly for preregistration of experiments and the associated plan of statistical analysis. The appendix provides annotations that connect De Groot's arguments to the current-day debate on transparency and reproducibility in psychological science.     

Mapping dissociations in verb morphology

Substantial behavioural and neuropsychological evidence has been amassed to support the dual-route model of morphological processing, which distinguishes between a rule-based system for regular items (walk–walked, call–called) and an associative system for the irregular items (go–went). Some neural-network models attempt to explain the neuropsychological and brain-mapping dissociations in terms of single-system associative processing. We show that there are problems in the accounts of homogeneous networks in the light of recent brain-mapping evidence of systematic double-dissociation. We also examine the superior capabilities of more internally differentiated connectionist models, which, under certain conditions, display systematic double-dissociations. It appears that the more differentiation models show, the more easily they account for dissociation patterns, yet without implementing symbolic computations.     

Assertion and safety

Safety is a notion familiar to epistemologists principally because of the way in which it has been used in the attempt to cast light on the nature of knowledge. In particular, some have argued that an important constraint on knowledge is that one knows p only if one believes p safely. In this paper, I use safety for a different purpose: to cast light on the nature of assertion. I introduce what I call the safety account of assertion, according to which one asserts p properly only if one asserts p safely. The central idea is that an assertion’s propriety depends on whether one could easily have asserted falsely in a similar case. I argue that the safety account is well motivated, since it neatly explains our intuitions about a wide range of assertions of different kinds. Of particular interest is the fact that the account explains our intuitions about several kinds of assertions which appear to raise problems for well-known rival accounts.     

What is interdisciplinary communication? Reflections on the very idea of disciplinary integration

In this paper I attempt to answer the question: What is interdisciplinary communication? I attempt to answer this question, rather than what some might consider the ontologically prior question—what is interdisciplinarity (ID)?—for two reasons: (1) there is no generally agreed-upon definition of ID; and (2) one’s views regarding interdisciplinary communication have a normative relationship with one’s other views of ID, including one’s views of its very essence. I support these claims with reference to the growing literature on ID, which has a marked tendency to favor the idea that interdisciplinary communication entails some kind of ‘integration’. The literature on ID does not yet include very many philosophers, but we have something valuable to offer in addressing the question of interdisciplinary communication. Playing somewhat fast-and-loose with traditional categories of the subdisciplines of philosophy, I group some philosophers—mostly from the philosophy of science, social–political philosophy, and moral theory—and some non-philosophers together to provide three different, but related, answers to the question of interdisciplinary communication. The groups are as follows: (1) Habermas–Klein, (2) Kuhn–MacIntyre, and (3) Bataille–Lyotard. These groups can also be thought of in terms of the types of answers they give to the question of interdisciplinary communication, especially in terms of the following key words (where the numbers correspond to the groups from the previous sentence): (1) consensus, (2) incommensurability, and (3) invention.     

Epistemology of AI Revisited in the Light of the Philosophy of Information

Artificial intelligence has often been seen as an attempt to reduce the natural mind to informational processes and, consequently, to naturalize philosophy. The many criticisms that were addressed to the so-called “old-fashioned AI” do not concern this attempt itself, but the methods it used, especially the reduction of the mind to a symbolic level of abstraction, which has often appeared to be inadequate to capture the richness of our mental activity. As a consequence, there were many efforts to evacuate the semantical models in favor of elementary physiological mechanisms simulated by information processes. However, these views, and the subsequent criticisms against artificial intelligence that they contain, miss the very nature of artificial intelligence, which is not reducible to a “science of the nature”, but which directly impacts our culture. More precisely, they lead to evacuate the role of the semantic information. In other words, they tend to throw the baby out with the bath-water. This paper tries to revisit the epistemology of artificial intelligence in the light of the opposition between the “sciences of nature” and the “sciences of culture”, which has been introduced by German neo-Kantian philosophers. It then shows how this epistemological view opens on the many contemporary applications of artificial intelligence that have already transformed—and will continue to transform—all our cultural activities and our world. Lastly, it places those perspectives in the context of the philosophy of information and more particularly it emphasizes the role played by the notions of context and level of abstraction in artificial intelligence.     

Using Structure to Understand Justice and Care as Different Worlds

When read as a theory that is supposed to mirror, represent or fit some collection of historical data, critics argue that Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shift in Structure of Scientific Revolutions fails by cherry-picking and underdetermination. When read as the ground for a socio-epistemological conception of rationality, critics argue that Kuhn’s theory fails by either the naturalistic fallacy or underarticulation. This paper suggests that we need not view Structure as a historian’s attempt to accurately depict scientific theory change or a philosopher’s attempt to suggest, more normatively, the factors we ought to consider in theory choice. Instead, we might use Kuhn’s theory as a metaphilosophical frame through which to better understand the limits of otherwise intractable philosophical debates. We can focus on Kuhn’s theory not as a proposition or model to confirm, but as something we might use as a tool for understanding. Philosophers have discussed the justice and care orientations in ethics as two theories for which there will be some common, constraining set of intuitions to confirm one theory over the other, to demonstrate that protecting rights is fundamentally more valuable that fulfilling needs or that fulfilling needs is fundamentally more valuable that protecting rights. Instead of conceptualizing this conversation as a choice between two theories, this paper looks to Ian Hacking’s interpretation of Kuhn’s paradigm concept to suggest that working in the world of justice is very different than working in the world of care, as each orientation is a paradigm with its own cognitive and contextual standards of theory assessment. To start, after Larry Laudan, each has its own ontology, methodology, aims and values. But moreover, after Ian Hacking, each has an even larger, entrenched collection of projectible predicates. Though Carol Gilligan herself uses the metaphor of gestalt shift in a few places to characterize the move from the justice to the care perspective, the insight—that what many assume to be a standard exercise in theory choice is really more of a paradigm shift—has been under theorized by ethicists and ignored by philosophers of science. This paper brings the full resources of Structure and its secondary literature to this metaethical issue, while making the larger point that Structure has an important pragmatic role to play, when it comes to the understanding philosophical debates, even if we cannot secure the truth of Kuhn’s theory.     

A reexamination of mental arithmetic models and data: A reply to Ashcraft

In a review of the chronometric literature, M. Ashcraft (1982, Developmental Review, 2, 213–236) concludes that adults store each basic arithmetic fact in a table-like retrieval network. In my commentary (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 225–230), I argued that procedural knowledge (stored rules, principles, or heuristics) might be a cognitively more economical basis for generating many number combinations. In this paper, I draw an analogy between this alternative model of number fact representation and how computers efficiently reconstruct arithmetic combinations, note that the research findings do not clearly support any one model of mental arithmetic, and attempt to address Ashcraft's (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 231–235) criticisms of my model.     

Aristotle,Plato and Bhagvad Gita on the “Soul”

This paper broadly aims at examining the idea of the “soul” or “atma” in ancient Greece and in India during the Axial Age. Against the backdrop of this general understanding, an attempt is made at comprehending the idea of the soul in Plato’s Phaedo in the light, on the one hand of Aristotle’s De Anima and on the other of Bhagavad Gita (or Gita in short). It is opined that Socrates’s views, in Phaedo, are closer in spirit to the Hindu ideas of “atma” in the Upanishads and the Gita than to the Greek ideas of the “soul”. An attempt has been made to provide a background for this paradoxical event.

     

On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes

Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us (rather than value simpliciter), has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone’s-sake attitudes can be identified. Moreover, it is argued that one of these kinds is particularly difficult to include in an analysis of value simpliciter but not in an analysis of value for.     

Priming students for whole-class interaction: using interdependence to support behavioral engagement

Student interaction at a whole-class level is tied to learning outcomes, but encouraging students to engage with their peers at a whole-class level is difficult. While little research has sought to promote student engagement with one another at this level, one factor that has been shown to increase student interaction in pairs and small groups is student–student interdependency. Yet, to date, no studies have attempted to examine the impact of prior interdependency at this smaller scale on students’ interactions as a whole-class. The current study tested this relationship in an undergraduate class learning science content (n?=?19) through structuring interdependency (task and resource) during science learning. Students completed six science learning sessions each of which included a science learning activity followed by a whole-class concept mapping task. Students were audio and video recorded during the whole-class task, and then individual student behavior was coded in 10 s intervals during the first 10 min of each session. Generalized regression results showed that adding small group interdependency during learning predicted significantly more student science discussion (R²?=?.05) and supportive interactions (R²?=?.16), while predicting decreased expressions of science misunderstanding (R²?=?.07) during the whole-class task. Additionally, the combination of task and resource interdependency predicted a further decrease in student expressions of misunderstanding (R²?=?.07), but also increased student social distraction in comparison to task interdependency alone (R²?=?.28). Together these findings suggest that prior interdependency can be leveraged to increase student behavioral engagement at the whole-class level.     

The Tacit Epistemology of the GMO Debate: A Case Study

The issue of biotechnology has been chosen in the MIRRORS project in order to analyze the sometimes uneasy relationship between science and society. After analyzing the situation of biotechnology regarding the GMO debate in Spain, France and Italy during a previous MIRRORS Workshop (This MIRRORS Workshop is entitled European Policies and Knowledge Society, held in Catania on December 15th 2008, during the which the undersigned, Anna Benedetta Francese and Cinzia Rizza discussed three papers about this topic [see the MIRRORS website www.mirrors-project.it]), in this essay I have tried to tackle the relationship science–society, focalizing my attention on the epistemological and methodological problems behind the biotechnology debate that are often not clearly expressed, remaining mainly tacitly presupposed. I will take as a starting point some questions about the role of science in society and about the way science is used by policy makers in decision-making processes. These questions are fundamental in order to analyze (and possibly to propose salvation strategies) the existing problems of the relationship between science and society which has assumed, especially nowadays, more conflictual aspects. Our Research Team firmly holds that it is not possible to tackle this topic without an in-depth discussion of the most significant epistemological questions regarding research, discussions, and methods of biotechnology.     

György Lukács 1902–1918: His way to Marx

At the end of his life György Lukács described his intellectual career as ‘my way to Marx’ [mein Weg zu Marx]. By this he meant that his professional life can be interpreted as an attempt to get to the real Marx. In this paper I use this expression in a narrower and more direct meaning: I attempt to present the road at the end of which the young Lukács arrived at a Marxist standpoint.     

Psychotherapie und Internet

The Internet plays an important role in healthcare. Approximately two thirds of Internet users search the medium for, e.g. personal questions of health, including aspects of mental health. In countless discussion forums or blogs mentally stressed people discuss their problems and search for contact to other affected individuals but also to professional helpers. In this article an attempt is made to systematize the interface between Internet and psychotherapy in the narrower and broader sense. In particular five topics and problem areas will be dealt with: (1) as information medium Internet delivers an immense number of resources on mental disorders, which raises the problem of quality assurance. (2) As a communication medium it can provide support for therapeutic interventions. Psychological online counseling has now been proven to be effective. (3) Internet alters the traditional therapeutic relationship in one way or another. In particular e-mail communications supplement a face-to-face treatment. (4) Use of the Internet also brings along clinically relevant problems and because of this patients visit psychotherapeutic practices increasingly more often. (5) Internet can be fruitful for psychotherapy research.     

Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?

Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive the boundary between self and other. However, I argue that (1) the idea of unearthing an exception to the Cartesian thesis is, on further reflection, not a realistic prospect and that (2) this casts doubt on the attempt to conjoin first-person phenomenology and third-person cognitive science in the service of philosophical debates.     

Exploring the complexities of value creation: The role of engagement strength

Regulatory engagement theory (Higgins, E. T. (2006). Value from hedonic experience and engagement. Psychological Review, 113, 439–460; Higgins, E.T. &; Scholer, A.A. (2009). Engaging the consumer: The science and art of the value creation process. Journal of Consumer Psychology) proposes that engagement strength plays a critical role in the creation of value intensity. We discuss the ways in which engagement, in this model, can be distinguished from arousal, motivation to act, and experienced difficulty. We distinguish between the mechanisms and predictions made by regulatory engagement theory versus cognitive dissonance theory and a goal systems approach. We also describe the complexities and conditions under which some sources of engagement strength (e.g., regulatory fit) may relate to value creation. For instance, while regulatory fit has more typically been associated with increased engagement strength, regulatory nonfit may also sometimes increase engagement by serving as an obstacle to be overcome. We review existing evidence and highlight open questions related to the role of engagement strength in creating value.     

Social machines: a philosophical engineering

In Weaving the Web (2000), Berners-Lee defines Social Machines as biotechnologically hybrid Web-processes on the basis of which, “high-level activities, which have occurred just within one human’s brain, will occur among even larger more interconnected groups of people acting as if the shared a larger intuitive brain” (201–202). The analysis and design of Social Machines has already started attracting considerable attention both within the industry and academia. Web science, however, is still missing a clear definition of what a Social Machine is, which has in turn resulted in several calls for a “philosophical engineering” (Halpin 2013; Hendler & Berners-Lee 2010); Halpin et al. 2010). This paper is a first attempt to respond to this call, by combining contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science with epistemology. The idea of philosophical engineering implies that a sufficiently good conception of Social Machines should be of both theoretical and practical advantage. To demonstrate how the present approach can satisfy both objectives it will be used in order to address one of Wikipedia’s (the most famous Social Machine to date) most worrying concerns—i.e., the current and ongoing decline in the number of its active contributors (Halfacker et al. 2012).     

A logistic approach to knowledge structures

Models for quantitative (or numerical) testing like e.g. educational testing have a relatively long tradition in psychology, while the qualitative (or nonnumerical) approach to psychometrics is more recent. The approach presented in this paper can be regarded as an attempt to integrate, to some extent, the numerical and nonnumerical fields. In numerical testing a subject is characterized by some real-valued parameter representing her level or ability. In the nonnumerical approach the knowledge state of an individual is represented by the subset of problems that the individual is capable of solving. We propose a model in which the relationship between the ability levels and the knowledge states is worked out on a probabilistic basis. The central idea is that the ability parameters and the knowledge states are not independent. A logistic model is derived which specifies the probabilities of the knowledge states conditional on the ability levels. We show that the Rasch model arises as a special case of the proposed model.