“Pay the piper”: It helps initially,but motivation takes a toll on self-control

ObjectiveTo investigate the aftereffects of anticipating future self-control and motivation on self-control strength depletion patterns.DesignSingle blind, randomized 2 (autonomy-supportive motivation/controlling motivation) × 2 (anticipation/no anticipation) factorial.MethodParticipants (N = 72) performed four sequential self-control strength challenges: an initial endurance handgrip squeeze followed by the Stroop task and two additional endurance handgrip squeezes. A sequential randomization procedure was used to allocate participants to one of four conditions: anticipation/autonomy-supportive motivation (n = 19), anticipation/controlling motivation (n = 17), no anticipation/autonomy-supportive motivation (n = 18), and no anticipation/controlling motivation (n = 18).ResultsParticipants who anticipated future self-control depletion conserved resources on the second task by completing fewer words on a Stroop task compared to controls. Participants who received autonomy-supportive instructions performed significantly better than controls on a third task (endurance handgrip squeeze), but worse than controls on the fourth task (another endurance handgrip squeeze). There were no significant interactions between anticipation and motivation (p > .05).ConclusionsResults support previous findings reflecting conservation and motivation effects on self-control strength. This was the first study to show that autonomy-supportive instructions may assist self-control performance in the short term but ultimately depletes self-control strength and impairs performance in the long term.     

Bimanual comfort depends on how extreme either hand’s posture is,not on which hand is in the more extreme posture

Psychological Research - Although hand preference is one of the best known features of performance, a recent study of object transfer behavior (Coelho, Studenka, & Rosenbaum, J Exp Psychol...     

The effects of good moods on systematic processing: “Willing but not able,or able but not willing?”

Previous research has indicated that good moods may disrupt systematic processing of persuasive messages (e.g., Worth & Mackie, 1987). Three experiments were conducted to attempt a replication of this disruptive effect and determine whether this effect is attributable either to cognitive capacity deficits (i.e., ability) or to motivational concerns (e.g., mood maintenance, desire to think about something other than the experimental topic). Several similarities were noted across the experiments. First, no interactions between mood and argument strength emerged on measures of message-based persuasion. Similarly, the quantity of message-related thoughts generated by our subjects was not consistently influenced by the manipulation of mood. Most importantly, consistent findings regarding the relationship between polarity of message elaborations and message-based persuasion implied that good moods may have disrupted message processing when (a) the message was low in personal relevance, (b) source information preceded the message itself, or (c) subjects were led to believe that their moods were stabilized by a drug. These results call into question the robustness of the alleged disruptive effect of positive mood on systematic processing, and are incompatible with the view that such effects are attributable to cognitive capacity deficits.Portions of this research were presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Psychological Association, Boston, August 1990, and San Francisco, August 1991. The authors wish to thank Richard E. Petty and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.     

“Remembering” emotional words is based on response bias,not recollection

Recent studies have demonstrated that emotional stimuli result in a higher proportion of recognized items that are “remembered” (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000), leading to greater estimates of recollection by the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994). This result suggests that recognition judgments to emotional stimuli depend on a recollection process. We challenge this conclusion with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve data from two experiments. In both experiments, subjects studied neutral and emotional words. During the recognition test, subjects made old-new confidence ratings as well as remember-know judgments. Four models of remember-know judgments were fit to individual subjects’ data: two versions of a one-dimensional signaldetection-based model (Donaldson, 1996; Wixted & Stretch, 2004), the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994), and the two-dimensional signal-detection-based model known as STREAK (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004). Consistent with the literature, we found that emotion increases subjective reports of “remembering.” However, our ROC analyses and modeling work reveal that the effect is due to response bias differences rather than sensitivity change or use of a high-threshold recollection process.     

“Stony ground but not entirely”

Even though Alain Badiou depicts himself and his philosophy as “militant atheist” there is, as he himself has pointed out, nevertheless several theological notions present in his work. This presence of theological language is not restricted to his book on the Apostle Paul, but can be found throughout his work. This paper focuses on Badiou’s substantial use of the term “grace” as a metaphor for the exceptional occurrence that he defines in philosophical terms as an “event”. The aim of the paper is to identify the context in which Badiou comes to use, and the sources from which he draws the metaphor of “grace”, and thus to contribute to a more precise understanding of what he means by this metaphor. The paper will identify the key instances in which Badiou employs the term “grace” in an effort to clarify how he understands it and what ends he intends it to serve. And in contrast to the existing research concerning the issue of grace, in which there has been a tendency to centre the attention almost entirely on Badiou’s book on Paul, it will consider a number of different instances in which he uses this term.     

Reading “glasses” will prime “vision,” but reading a pair of “glasses” will not

In a lexical decision task with two primes and a target, the target was preceded 300 msec by the second prime (P2) which in turn was preceded by a brief forward and backward masked first prime (P1). When P1 and P2 were unrelated, reaction times were faster when the target was related to P2 (e.g.,wave SALT ... pepper) than when the target was unrelated to P2 (and P1—e.g.,wave LOAN ... pepper). However, this semantic priming effect was reduced to statistically nonsignificant levels when P1 and P2 were repetitions of the same word. That is, priming did not occur forsalt SALT ... pepper relative toloan LOAN ... pepper. This reduction in priming was observed whether P2 and the target were strongly or weakly related. These findings raise problems for current accounts of semantic priming.     

Mental health consumer survey on a shoestring budget — it is possible!

Consumers of service in a decentralized unit of a county mental health services organization were surveyed. Two samples, one of 100 and one of 386 former clients, were selected for a questionnaire survey of satisfaction and perception of ensuing changes. This report is offered as an example of what a busy clinical team can accomplish in the midst of its basic task of providing therapeutic and diagnostic help.     

Precues’ elevation of sensitivity is not only preattentive,but largely monocular

Visual sensitivity can be heightened in the vicinity of an appropriate precue. Experiments with multiple, noninformative precues suggest that this facilitation should not be attributed to focal attention. The number of simultaneously appearing precues seems to be irrelevant; contrast thresholds are lowest for targets that appear in a precued position. Here we report that precues become less effective when they and the target are delivered to different eyes. We conclude that the mechanism responsible for such heightened sensitivity has largely monocular input.     

When disfluency is—and is not—a desirable difficulty: The influence of typeface clarity on metacognitive judgments and memory

There are many instances in which perceptual disfluency leads to improved memory performance, a phenomenon often referred to as the perceptual-interference effect (e.g., Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer, & Vaughn (Cognition 118:111–115, 2010); Nairne (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 14:248–255, 1988)). In some situations, however, perceptual disfluency does not affect memory (Rhodes & Castel (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137:615–625, 2008)), or even impairs memory (Glass, (Psychology and Aging 22:233–238, 2007)). Because of the uncertain effects of perceptual disfluency, it is important to establish when disfluency is a “desirable difficulty” (Bjork, 1994) and when it is not, and the degree to which people’s judgments of learning (JOLs) reflect the consequences of processing disfluent information. In five experiments, our participants saw multiple lists of blurred and clear words and gave JOLs after each word. The JOLs were consistently higher for the perceptually fluent items in within-subjects designs, which accurately predicted the pattern of recall performance when the presentation time was short (Exps. 1a and 2a). When the final test was recognition or when the presentation time was long, however, we found no difference in recall for clear and blurred words, although JOLs continued to be higher for clear words (Exps. 2b and 3). When fluency was manipulated between subjects, neither JOLs nor recall varied between formats (Exp. 1b). This study suggests a boundary condition for the desirable difficulty of perceptual disfluency and indicates that a visual distortion, such as blurring a word, may not always induce the deeper processing necessary to create a perceptual-interference effect.     

It is time for a general comment on children’s spiritual development

Reviewing the general comments by the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the state reports to the CRC reveal a mixed picture. How could a general comment by CRC on the right to spiritual development assist states in their policies and programmes? First, current understandings of spiritual well-being – one’s relationship to oneself, others, nature and the transcendent – encompass all relevant dimensions of meaning-making, enhanced awareness and connectedness. Second, the CRC has elaborated on spiritual development in 16 of its 21 general comments, providing sources from which a comprehensive elaboration can be done. Third, the understanding of the term spiritual is diverse among states. Fourth, a general comment will clarify the term spiritual development and inspire and guide relevant policies and programmes.     

Gain face,but lose happiness? It depends on how much money you have

The purpose of the study was to investigate the effects of face consciousness on happiness and the moderating role of financial situation on this relationship. We first examined our hypotheses in study 1 in a particular setting of consumption, and replicated our findings in study 2 in a more generalized setting of interpersonal situations. The two studies produced essentially consistent results. We found individuals high on face consciousness tend to be less happy, and the negative association between face consciousness and happiness is ameliorated by their financial situation. These results revealed the importance of face consciousness as an individual difference in predicting happiness. The implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

Perirhinal cortex is necessary for acquiring,but not for retrieving object–place paired association

Remembering events frequently involves associating objects and their associated locations in space, and it has been implicated that the areas associated with the hippocampus are important in this function. The current study examined the role of the perirhinal cortex in retrieving familiar object–place paired associates, as well as in acquiring novel ones. Rats were required to visit one of two locations of a radial-arm maze and choose one of the objects (from a pair of different toy objects) exclusively associated with a given arm. Excitotoxic lesions of the perirhinal cortex initially impaired the normal retrieval of object–place paired-associative memories that had been learned presurgically, but the animals relearned gradually to the level of controls. In contrast, when required to associate a novel pair of objects with the same locations of the maze, the same lesioned rats were severely impaired with minimal learning, if any, taking place throughout an extensive testing period. However, the lesioned rats were normal in discriminating two different objects presented in a fixed arm in the maze. The results suggest that the perirhinal cortex is indispensable to forming discrete representations for object–place paired associates. Its role, however, may be compensated for by other structures when familiar object–place paired associative memories need to be retrieved.Remembering an event in space often requires associating objects and their locations. Associating object and place information into a unitary event representation is believed to be a foundation of episodic memory (Cahusac et al. 1989; Gaffan 1994; Davachi 2006). It has been suggested that the hippocampus and its associated regions in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) are essential in this cognitive process, and amnesic patients with damage in the MTL structures exhibit severe deficits in associating object and place information (Smith and Milner 1981; Vargha-Khadem et al. 1997; Stepankova et al. 2004). Animal models produced by localized lesions in the hippocampus and other MTL structures also support the idea by showing that the lesioned animals are impaired in associating objects and places (Parkinson et al. 1988; Gaffan and Parker 1996; Sziklas et al. 1998; Bussey et al. 2001; Gilbert and Kesner 2003, 2004; Malkova and Mishkin 2003; Lee et al. 2005; Bachevalier and Nemanic 2008; Kesner et al. 2008; Lee and Solivan 2008). Although the theoretical importance of the MTL structures in object–place association has been well acknowledged, specific contributions of the MTL structures in object–place associative memory are poorly understood. The current study examined the role of the perirhinal cortex, one of the extra hippocampal regions in the MTL, using a behavioral paradigm previously shown to be dependent on the intact hippocampus (Lee and Solivan 2008).The literature suggests that the role of the hippocampus in the object–place paired-associate task is to put together object and place information into a unified and distinct event representation. It has been suggested that spatial information and nonspatial information (such as object information) may be streamed into the hippocampus in a relatively segregated fashion, the former information mostly fed through the medial entorhinal cortex to the hippocampus via the postrhinal cortex and the latter being fed through the lateral entorhinal cortex via the perirhinal cortex (Mishkin et al. 1997; Suzuki et al. 1997; Burwell 2000; Fyhn et al. 2004; Witter and Amaral 2004; Hafting et al. 2005; Hargreaves et al. 2005; Furtak et al. 2007; Kerr et al. 2007). In our previous study (Lee and Solivan 2008) in which rats were required to discriminate rewarding versus nonrewarding pairs of similar object–place paired associates, the hippocampal lesioned rats demonstrated severe and irrecoverable deficits. The results from the study not only corroborate the long-held view that the hippocampus associates object and place information, but also demonstrate that the hippocampus is critical for disambiguating similar object–place paired associates. However, it requires examining functions of other upstream structures of the hippocampus to conclusively assign the role of associating object and place information to the hippocampus. If, for example, lesions produced in the perirhinal cortex produce similar deficits, it would be premature to conclude that the association between object and place information uniquely occurs in the hippocampus.To elucidate the relative contributions of the MTL structures in the hippocampal-dependent object–place paired-associate task (Fig. 1), we manipulated the perirhinal cortex in the current study, one of the regions implicated as an object-information provider to the hippocampus (Knierim et al. 2006; Eichenbaum and Lipton 2008). Here we tested whether the perirhinal cortex was involved in the acquisition of new object–place paired associations. Importantly, we also tested the perirhinal cortical contributions to retrieving learned paired associates between objects and places. In the current study, the rats needed to pay attention to both object and place information. Therefore, if the perirhinal cortex is unique in its function for providing object information to the hippocampus, it is predicted that lesions in the perirhinal cortex will produce severe deficits as seen in the hippocampal lesioned animals in our previous study. A simple object-discrimination task that did not require spatial information was also employed to further examine the role of the perirhinal cortex only in specific conditions.Open in a separate windowFigure 1.Illustration of the radial arm maze and behavioral paradigms. (A) Phase 1: Two objects (Spider-Man and LEGO block) were presented on arms 3 and 5 in gray color. Only one of the objects was rewarded in arm 3 (Spider-Man) and arm 5 (LEGO block) irrespective of its locations in the choice platform. Possible configuration of objects and appropriate choices are provided for both arms. In each trial, only one arm was open in the maze and objects were available in that open arm. (B) Phase 2: For acquisition of novel object–place paired associations, a pair of new objects (Barney and Girl) was presented on arms 3 and 5. Possible locations of the objects are shown as in A. Each object was rewarded only in a particular arm (Barney in arm 3 and Girl in arm 5) irrespective of its location in the choice platform. (C) Phase 3: Illustration of the task using only one arm (arm 4) in the maze. Two new objects (Mr. Potatohead and Cylinder) were used and the Mr. Potatohead choice was rewarded regardless of its location in the choice platform.     

“I killed her,but I never laid a finger on her” — A phenomenological difference between wife-killing and wife-battering

Based on in-depth interviews conducted in Israel with 18 violent men and 18 men convicted of murdering their female partners, the study examines the validity of the concept which holds that, in terms of motive and emotional dynamics, female partner homicide (“femicide”) is not discrete from other manifestations of violence against a female partner. Findings show that whereas non-lethal violence usually takes place spontaneously, and under diverse circumstances for the purpose of achieving control over the woman, the circumstances surrounding murder are far more distinctive; and in the majority of cases lethal violence is not a spontaneous, but rather a planned and premeditated act motivated by deep despair, which leads to the desire to obliterate another person, even at the price of self-destruction. We suggest that homicide of an intimate female partner is a discrete phenomenon, which differs from non-lethal violence against women in terms of the emotions that trigger it, the circumstances that lead up to it, and the state of mind that characterizes it.     

Reflections on Cure,or “I/Thou/It”

Cure is a topic much on our minds but rarely in focus. This paper probes what systematizes this protean thing called cure, hoping to open it to new meaning. It reveals cure as a moving target; illustrates several ways of putting a working definition together; and, while reflecting on three treatments, considers cure as both state and process. Cure's vernacular definition is not unknown to analysts: recovery from illness, a state of well-being restored. But psychoanalysis also deems the mind's heart a rupture that does not heal: if we are our scars, then there is no return to a state of continuous well-being, because none never existed. In both daily clinical life and the long run, as some clinical examples illustrate, we cannot choose between these two meanings, but must rather operate in the difficult tension, the irony, between them.