Paradigm shift in religious education? A reply to Gearon,or when is a paradigm not a paradigm?

This article responds to Liam Gearon’s reply to my article Misrepresenting Religious Education’s Past and Present in Looking Forward: Gearon Using Kuhn’s Concepts of Paradigm, Paradigm Shift and Incommensurability. In maintaining my critique of Gearon’s use of Kuhn’s terminology, I question his claim that ‘incommensurability’ does not necessarily imply ‘incompatibility’, and challenge his view that ‘faith-based’ approaches to religious education and ‘inclusive’ approaches are incommensurable and deeply incompatible. I also question Gearon’s placement of particular scholars within his constructed paradigms, noting that those identified by Gearon with specific paradigms do not necessarily share the same views concerning the nature of religious education and its pedagogy, and that various scholars, associated by Gearon with particular paradigms, draw on a variety of disciplines in their work. I argue that Gearon’s construction of paradigms is a device he uses for ‘separation’, leading to his misrepresentation of the work of researchers. I argue for the benefits of collaboration, in research, teaching and policy development. Finally, I give reasons for writing the article, which do not result from any engagement in ‘paradigm wars’, and I draw attention to pressing issues relating to the future of ‘inclusive’ religious education which are not addressed by Gearon.     

If This Is My Body … : A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing

I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent of the Doctrine must claim that nothing genuinely belongs to a person, even his own body.     

Thomas Kuhn on the existence of the world

This article argues that Thomas Kuhn's views on the existence of the world have undergone significant change in the course of his philosophical career. In Structure, Kuhn appears to be committed to the existence of the ordinary empirical world as well as the existence of an independent metaphysical world, but realism about the empirical world is abandoned in his later writings. Whereas in Structure the only relative worlds are the scientific worlds inhabited by the practitioners of various paradigms, the later Kuhn puts the non-scientific worlds of particular groups or cultures on the same footing as the paradigm-related scientific worlds. The article shows that, on what Ian Hacking called the “new-world problem”, the later Kuhn has moved to a more radical antirealist position. It is also argued that the earlier and later solutions to the “new-world problem” face insuperable difficulties, which render Kuhn's account of scientific change implausible.     

Seeing the Stove as World: Significance (Bedeutung) in the Early Wittgenstein

What is it to see a stove as world (als Welt) and why does the early Wittgenstein use such a curious example to describe what it means to see something as significant (bedeutend)? I argue that Wittgenstein's odd choice can be best understood in the light of a conceptual relation between value and semantic meaning. To that purpose, I draw attention to his use of the word Bedeutung to denote value, and to the direct connection he draws between seeing as world and seeing with the whole logical space. To see a stove as bedeutend, I conclude, is to see it against the background of the propositional contexts in which a stove figures meaningfully.     

Interpreting Thomas Kuhn as a Response-Dependence Theorist

Abstract

Thomas Kuhn is the most famous historian and philosopher of science of the last century. He is also among the most controversial. Since Kuhn’s death, his corpus has been interpreted, systematized, and defended. Here I add to this endeavor in a novel way by arguing that Kuhn can be interpreted as a global response-dependence theorist. He can be understood as connecting all concepts and terms in an a priori manner to responses of suitably situated subjects to objects in the world. Further, I claim, this interpretation is useful for three reasons. First, it allows us to systematize and defend Kuhn’s views. We can therefore better appreciate him as a thinker in his own right. Second, it deepens our understanding of both the uniqueness of Kuhn’s views and the continuity of those views with those of others. We can therefore better appreciate his place in history. And third, as I explain in the paper, my interpretation affords us the only example of an ethnocentric global response-dependence theory. We can therefore better appreciate the versatility of response-dependence itself.     

Quine's Nihilism

Quine is an important philosopher. The point of departure of his philosophical enterprise is sound: his down to earth naturalism, his scientism and behaviourism. However, he tends to get carried away by it, when he goes to extremes – and ends up in nihilism. It is certainly true that we can never quite rule out the possibility that we have misunderstood another person. And what he or she means is a consequence mainly of two things. It is a consequence of his actual intention with the utterance and also, to some extent, of the way the world actually is. This is not to say, however, that there is no fact of the matter. While there is underdetermination by actual evidence of interpretation there is no such thing as indeterminacy of translation (or interpretation). While there may well exist conflicting empirically adequate theories, there is no room for ontological relativity. Some of these theories may be the right one and the others wrong, even if this is something we cannot even in principle decide on empirical grounds.     

Lost in a Shopping Mall: An Experience With Controversial Research

In the 16th century Bruno asserted that the earth revolves around the sun. This notion violated the Catholic Church's teaching that the earth was the center of the universe, and his suggestion proved he was a heretic. He was promptly burned at the stake. One hundred years later Galileo said the same thing, and provided evidence. He was forced to recant his views, but he gave the world telescopes so that people could learn for themselves. Today, his assertion is held to be fact with little excitement. Many academics live with a myth of protection; that the pursuit of science, conducted ethically and with methodological rigor, is protected from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. Jim Coan's perspective on his experience while an undergraduate student at the University of Washington is important because it sheds light on an unsettling reality; Scientists pursuing unpopular science are no more shielded from attack from scientists and academicians than anyone else. It is particularly worth noting how unpopular science can be attacked in the name of ethics. Although we may be no more enthusiastic about the specific content of the findings than others, ethical academicians and scientists defend unpopular scientific endeavors from attacks leveled on ethical grounds.     

Scientific Revolutions without Paradigm-Replacement and the Coexistence of Competing Paradigms: The Case of Generative Grammar and Construction Grammar

In the Kuhnian and Post-Kuhnian Philosophy of Science, it is widely accepted that scientific revolutions always involve the replacement of an old paradigm by a new paradigm. This article attempts to refute this assumption by showing that there are paradigm-constellations that conform to the relation of a scientific revolution in a Kuhnian sense without a paradigm-replacement occurring. The paradigms investigated here are the linguistic paradigms of Generative Grammar and Construction Grammar that, contrary to Kuhn’s conception of a sequence of paradigm-replacements, are reconstructed as coexisting competing paradigms. By choosing linguistic paradigms, Kuhn’s assumption that paradigm-led research takes place only in the natural sciences is implicitly challenged, and an insight into linguistic theory-construction largely underrepresented in the philosophy of science is given.     

The Social Authority of Paradigms as Group Commitments: Rehabilitating Kuhn with Recent Social Philosophy

By linking the conceptual and social dynamics of change in science, Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions proved tremendously fruitful for research in science studies. But Kuhn’s idea of incommensurability provoked strong criticism from philosophers of science. In this essay I show how Raimo Tuomela’s Philosophy of Sociality illuminates and strengthens Kuhn’s model of scientific change. After recalling the central features and problems of Kuhn’s model, I introduce Tuomela’s approach. I then show (a) how Tuomela’s conception of group ethos aligns with Kuhn’s notion of paradigms as group commitments, and (b) how Tuomela’s distinction between I-mode and we-mode forms of collective intentionality can capture the shifting paradigmatic commitments in Kuhn’s model of change as a cycle of normal and revolutionary science. But Tuomela’s analysis does not rely on meaning holism, and thus does not involve the problematic notion of incommensurability that burdened Kuhn’s analysis.     

"I no longer believe": did Freud abandon the seduction theory?

Recent accounts of the seduction theory and the question of its abandonment have emphasized the continuity of Freud's work before and after the seduction theory, claiming that Freud did not abandon his concern with the event of seduction but rather came to appreciate that an understanding of fantasy was also essential. This claim is challenged. It is shown that Freud did abandon the passionate concerns of his seduction theory for the most part; that he left behind his early interest in reconstructing unconscious infantile incest and focused instead on later, conscious seduction; that he at times clearly reduced apparent paternal incest to fantasy; that he turned away from the phenomenology of incest he had begun to develop; and that he theoretically nullified the value of the difference between real and fantasied seduction. It is also shown that, contrary to a persistent concern in psychoanalytic history, attention to actual seduction need not detract from the essential psychoanalytic concern with fantasy and infantile sexuality. Thinking about incest specifically illuminates the capacity for fantasizing, the core of the Freudian psyche. In this way the intuition of the seduction theory that there is something of distinctive psychoanalytic significance about incest finds support.     

Toward Unity in Psychology: The Experimental Synthesis of Behaviour

The current state of fragmentation of psychology is discussed in the context of Kuhn's paradigms. Schools of psychology are considered analogous to paradigms, although Kuhn would not think of psychology as a paradigmatic science. Schools gave origin to systems of psychology (neo-behaviourism, neo-psychoanalysis, dialectic-materialistic psychology, and humanistic psychology). A unifying paradigm, the experimental synthesis of behaviour, is presented as a programme. It is derived from the experimental analysis of behaviour. It is not an eclectic approach, but a new paradigm with the aim of unifying psychology as a science. Its main characteristics and advantages are discussed.     

Must the bearer of a right have the concept of that to which he has a right?

Stevens critiques what he calls the "conceptual possession requirement" as defined by Michael Tooley in his article, "Abortion and infanticide," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1972 Fall; 2(1): 37-65. Tooley argued that a being has a right to something only if it has the concept of that thing. He claimed that fetuses and infants do not have a serious right to life because they have no concept of a continuing self, and that therefore abortion and infanticide are morally permissible. Stevens contends that the conceptual possession requirement is not valid, offers a counterexample to Tooley's argument, and defends his reasoning against what he presumes might be Tooley's counterarguments.     

What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem*

There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so‐called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non‐basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification.1 If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like) and if it is a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like), then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima facie justified.2 Another reason that some give for rejecting normative foundationalism is that it leads directly to skepticism.3 There is no way, they claim, to move from so‐called basic propositions (typically given as first person introspective reports) to “external world” propositions by employing normatively acceptable principles of reasoning.4 Still others have thought that the invention of a nonrea‐soned reason was as ad hoc as the invention of an unmoved mover.5     

Ecumenism between the world religions

Conclusion We seem then to be left with the fourth position outlined above as the best solution we have to the problem of religious diversity. No doubt this will be far too radical for some religious believers in that, while it allows a believer to hold that his or her religion has some kind of paradigmatic status it also admits that genuine religious developments may take place in other religions. On the other hand it will not be radical enough for other people who will see it as denying the integrity and autonomy of other religious ways and sanctioning some degree of religious exclusivity and intolerance in that, by seeing Christianity as having some essential core of truth that Buddhism lacks, I am claiming superiority for Christianity. And vice versa, if I claim that Buddhism is the privileged way of enlightenment, I am claiming superiority for Buddhismvisà-vis Christianity. Nevertheless, even if this position does notsolve the problem of religious diversity it does at least show which of the alternative solutions are finally untenable, both on religious and philosophical grounds. And it does provide a basis for genuine ecumenical dialogue between the world religions. Indeed, by recognising that a religious believer can hold that genuine developments of religious values may take place in other religions, it makes such dialogue absolutely necessary in much the same way as the Christian Churches have been led to see ecumenical dialogue as not merely an option but a necessity.     

Social preference experiments in animals: strengthening the case for human preferences

Guala appears to take social preferences for granted in his discussion of reciprocity experiments. While he does not overtly claim that social preferences are only by-products that arise in testing environments, he does assert that whatever they are--and how they evolved--they have little value in the real world. Experiments on animals suggest that social preferences may be unique to humans, supporting the idea that they might play a prominent role in our world.     

Saint Thomas Aquinas’ ontological epistemology as clarified realism: The relating of subject to object for ontological knowledge

The Kantian revolution limited the possibility of ontological knowledge, severing subject from thing as is evident in its legacy in both continental and analytic philosophy. Consequently, if a thing cannot be known as it is, the philosophical status of empirical science as a study about existing natural things should be called into question. It could be construed, for instance, that a scientific theory is a construction about something to which the subjective constructor can never have ontological access. But, when empirical scientists develop evidence-based proofs for their theories the assumption of realism usually stands: scientific theories constructed by scientists are actually purported to represent natural entities back to these constructing scientists. Given that there is a danger of philosophy becoming isolated from empirical science, we attempt to bridge the gap between philosophical discourse and science-in-praxis through a recapitulation of Aquinas’ ontological epistemology. Aquinas argued for a clarified realism in which the epistemic is construed as an intersection between the thinking subject and the object. Contrary to naïve realism, then, it will be explicated how Aquinas’ realism was a precursor of “critical realism”, as he discerned the complex interaction of thinking subject and the being of the object as both bearing on the production of knowledge.     

An objection to gareth evans' account of self-identity

In chapter seven ‘Self Identification’ of his challenging book The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans attempts to give an account of how it is that one is able to think about oneself self‐consciously. On Evans’ view, when one attempts to think of oneself self‐consciously that person is having what he calls an ‘I’ thought. Since these ‘I’ thoughts are a case of reference, more specifically self‐reference, Evans thinks that these thoughts can be explained by employing the same theoretical framework that he uses to explain other kinds of reference. Evans thinks all thoughts are essentially structured, and this means that they must fall under his ‘generality constraint’. Since ‘I’ thoughts are also ‘thoughts’ they are essentially structured as well, and they too must be subject to the generality constraint. The radical implication of this is that Evans thinks that if ‘I’ thoughts are subject to the generality constraint, then he can show that self‐reference must be reference to a thing which we can locate on a spatio‐temporal map. In this article I hope to accomplish three things. First, I will spell out in detail the argument Evans uses to arrive at his claim that self‐reference must be reference to something located on a spatio‐temporal map. Second, I will raise an objection, which states that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is not a consequence of the generality constraint. Finally I will argue that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is in fact in tension with the generality constraint, rather than being an implication of it.     

Moral Mistakes

Is it possible to show that a moral claim is mistaken without taking a moral stand with regard to it? A striking number of contemporary metaethicists suppose that it is. In this paper, I argue against a prominent line of support for this supposition. My goal is to cast suspicion on a general tendency to think that the epistemic standing of moral claims is something that can be assessed from outside the practices of making and critically evaluating moral judgements. I do this by focusing on a widely accepted criterion of competence with regard to the use of moral concepts, the moral supervenience criterion (MSC). This criterion holds that someone who judges two acts or events to be morally different without thinking that he has to identify some non‐particular non‐moral difference between them simply doesn't understand what it is to make a moral judgement. I focus on a paradigmatic example of the sort of mistake in moral judgement that is supposed to support the MSC and argue that it provides no support whatsoever. I then offer my own alternative explanation of this sort of mistake in moral judgement. I conclude with a discussion of why advocates of the MSC are inclined to suppose that it is possible to assess the epistemic standing of a moral claim without oneself taking a moral stand with regard to it.