The response of counsellors to apartheid: A comment on nicholas (1993)

In response to Nicholas (1993), it is suggested that more direct confrontation on the response of counsellors to apartheid is needed. The relevance of the debate to counsellors outside South Africa, and the need to deconstruct the implicit political agendas within their own world views, is noted.     

A balanced view of otolithic function: comment on Stoffregen and Riccio (1988)

Stoffregen and Riccio (1988) have presented a theory of orientation that dismisses the role of otolithic information in the perception of the direction of the gravitoinertial force (GIF). Their dismissal of otolithic involvement in GIF perception is not warranted because (a) the logic associated with their analysis is flawed. (b) the underwater experiments they analyzed do not reflect the isolated operation of otolithic function, and (c) they do not cite a large body of relevant evidence on otolithic function.     

Confusion in philosophy: A comment on Williams (1992)

Patricia Williams made a number of claims concerning the methods and practise of cladistic analysis and classification. Her argument rests upon the distinction of two kinds of hierarchy: a divisional hierarchy depicting evolutionary descent and the Linnean hierarchy describing taxonomic groups in a classification. Williams goes on to outline five problems with cladistics that lead her to the conclusion that systematists should eliminate cladism as a school of biological taxonomy and to replace it either with something that is philosophically coherent or to replace it with pure methodology, untainted by theory (Williams 1992, 151). Williams makes a number of points which she feels collectively add up to insurmountable problems for cladistics. We examine Williams' views concerning the two hierarchies and consider what cladists currently understand about the status of ancestors. We will demonstrate that Williams has seriously misunderstood many modern commentators on this subject and all of her five persistent problems are derivable from this misunderstanding.

Nelson (1989, 67).

     

Internally represented forces may be cognitively penetrable: comment on Freyd, Pantzer, and Cheng (1988)

Freyd, Pantzer, and Cheng (1988) provided considerable evidence for the proposition that people can represent underlying forces within static scenes. However, they explicitly assumed that their observed memory shifts were the result of perceptually modular information processing. For several reasons, I suggest herein that this assumption of cognitive impenetrability is a dubious one. The assumption is challenged by recent empirical findings, some theoretical considerations, and calculations that show that the observed effects are minute when compared with those expected by means of physical forces. Three explanations for the evidence are proposed, including the alternative hypothesis that although people do represent static physical forces, these representations can be almost completely overridden by the conscious intention to remember an object's precise location.     

Conscious awareness of methodological choices: A reply to Milberg and McGlinchey (2010)

Milberg and McGlinchey (2010) claim that the conclusions we reach in "Perceptual Grouping Operates Independently of Attentional Selection: Evidence From Hemispatial Neglect" are unwarranted. Specifically, it is asserted that insufficient methodological control was exerted over the attentional status of the patients and that partial attention to the contralesional field could have resulted in the congruency effects we observe. Although we agree with their methodological cautions in general, we argue that our investigation is, in fact, methodologically sound. In particular, we reiterate and highlight that our investigation is unprecedented in the characterization of a patient sample with multiple clinical, psychophysical, and experimental measures; in our use of a stringent, rigidly controlled paradigm specifically designed for investigating perceptual grouping without awareness; in our modification of the experimental procedure to make it even more stringent; and in our specific methodological choices for comparison/control conditions within this experimental paradigm. We also demonstrate that partial attention to the contralesional left cannot support the robust congruency effects we observe. In light of this, we remain confident of our interpretation of our findings and suggest that perceptual grouping can indeed operate in the absence of attention.     

A misleading review of response bias: comment on McGrath, Mitchell, Kim, and Hough (2010)

In the May 2010 issue of Psychological Bulletin, R. E. McGrath, M. Mitchell, B. H. Kim, and L. Hough published an article entitled "Evidence for Response Bias as a Source of Error Variance in Applied Assessment" (pp. 450-470). They argued that response bias indicators used in a variety of settings typically have insufficient data to support such use in everyday clinical practice. Furthermore, they claimed that despite 100 years of research into the use of response bias indicators, "a sufficient justification for [their] use… in applied settings remains elusive" (p. 450). We disagree with McGrath et al.'s conclusions. In fact, we assert that the relevant and voluminous literature that has addressed the issues of response bias substantiates validity of these indicators. In addition, we believe that response bias measures should be used in clinical and research settings on a regular basis. Finally, the empirical evidence for the use of response bias measures is strongest in clinical neuropsychology. We argue that McGrath et al.'s erroneous perspective on response bias measures is a result of 3 errors in their research methodology: (a) inclusion criteria for relevant studies that are too narrow; (b) errors in interpreting results of the empirical research they did include; (c) evidence of a confirmatory bias in selectively citing the literature, as evidence of moderation appears to have been overlooked. Finally, their acknowledging experts in the field who might have highlighted these errors prior to publication may have prevented critiques during the review process.     

A correction and a comment on Craig and Lyle (2001)

In a recent paper, Craig and Lyle (2001) measured tactile spatial acuity on the palm and compared these results with the results from similar measures on the fingertip. The changes in sensitivity between the two sites appeared to be consistent with estimates of the relative density of innervation between the two sites. Rather than compare their results with changes in the density of innervation, Craig and Lyle should have compared them with changes in the spacing between receptors. On this basis, psychophysical performance is much poorer on the palm than one would predict on the basis of the spacing between receptors. Some possible reasons are offered for the difference between the psychophysical results and the predictions based on receptor spacing.     

Causal and conditional inferences: A comment on Cummins (1995)

Cummins (1995) offers an analysis of causal and truthfunctional sufficiency and necessity to predict and explain the effects on conditional inferences of two pragmatic factors: alternative causes and disabling conditions. However, the justification of these predictions is inconsistent. This note offers a modified analysis which puts her predictions on a sounder base: it is proposed that alternative causes and disabling conditions affect judgments of argument validity under three different models for the causal conditional.     

A study of orientation errors in response to Kohs-type figures(1)

In order to elucidate the nature of the orientation errors encountered when subjects are required to reproduce Kohs-type figures, subjects drawn from a culture where such errors are reported to be relatively common were required to reproduce orientation of simple figures. It was found that the responses made in the case of square figures showed a definite drift towards a “stable” orientation; the drift observed in the case of circular stimuli was too weak to permit an unambiguous interpretation. The relevance of these data to previous data on cross-cultural differences in responses to Kohs-type stimuli is briefly examined.     

The triple response approach to assessment: a conceptual and methodological reappraisal

Despite its positive effects on the increased use of multiple assessments and improved assessment validity, the triple-response concept has led to some conceptual and practical confusion. This is mainly due to two problems: (1) a confounding of the content and method of assessment; and (2) an imprecise and vague use of the 'verbal-subjective mode' which has been expanded to include cognitive elements since the introduction of cognitive-behavioural theories and treatments. A new matrix is proposed that clearly distinguishes content and method of assessment. It also defines a separate cognitive/information-processing content area and introduces affect as an additional content area. Thus, four content areas are suggested: behavioural, physiological, cognitive, and affective, which can be measured in three different ways: by means of self-report, observation, and instruments or technical equipment. We point out the implications of these changes for (1) a more appropriate selection of assessment procedures and outcome measures in clinical research; (2) a more adequate individualization of treatment through matching individual response profiles to specific treatments; and (3) an improved understanding of the interrelationship between behavioural, physiological, cognitive, and affective processes in anxiety and depression. Finally, we suggest that the lack of agreement between measures of physiological, cognitive, behavioural and affective changes in some studies may be as much a reflection of the lack of agreement arising from spurious sources of variance within content areas as it is a reflection of the operation of different processes and systems.     

A further comment on the construct validity of laboratory aggression paradigms: A response to giancola and chermack

Giancola and Chermack responded to our criticisms of laboratory paradigms for studying aggression by arguing that two existing laboratory procedures circumvent the problems raised, and they provide evidence for the validity of these procedures. We argue that Giancola and Chermack do not succeed in their defense of existing paradigms for both conceptual and methodological reasons.     

Advance specification and programming interactions: A reply to Rosenbaum,Barnes, and Slotta (1988)

Summary Choice reaction time often depends on the relation between the responses from which subjects have to choose. Rosenbaum, Barnes, and Slotta (1988) criticized the interpretation of a particular set of such effects which can be observed when subjects have to choose between left-hand and right-hand responses that have same or different spatio-temporal patterns. This set of effects had been interpreted in terms of a programming interactions (PI) hypothesis rather than in terms of the more popular advance specification (AS) hypothesis which is the foundation of a major portion of motor-programming research. It is made clear that the controversy is not about whether the one or the other hypothesis is correct in general, but about whether there are exceptions which cannot be interpreted in terms of the AS hypothesis. Further it is argued that the particular set of effects represents such an exception. It is shown that Rosenbaum et al. claim that the data are consistent with the AS hypothesis and inconsistent with the PI hypothesis is untenable.Supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grant He 1187/3-1)     

Religiosity and social desirability: A response to Eysenck (1999)

Recent studies have shown that delusion-like experiences (DLEs) are common among general populations. This study investigates whether the prevalence of these experiences are linked to the embracing of New Age thought. Logistic regression analyses were performed using data derived from a large community sample of young adults (N = 3777). Belief in a spiritual or higher power other than God was found to be significantly associated with endorsement of 16 of 19 items from Peters et al. (1999b Peters, ER, Joseph, SA and Garety, PA. 1999b. Measurement of delusional ideation in the normal population: Introducing the PDI (Peters et al. Delusions Inventory). Schizophrenia Bulletin, 25(3): 553–576. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) Delusional Inventory following adjustment for a range of potential confounders, while belief in God was associated with endorsement of four items. A New Age conception of the divine appears to be strongly associated with a wide range of DLEs. Further research is needed to determine a causal link between New Age philosophy and DLEs (e.g. thought disturbance, suspiciousness, and delusions of grandeur).     

Challenging assumptions about habit: A response to Hagger (2019)

Widely cited literature assumes habits to be: (1) specific and rigid behavioral responses; (2) in response to location- and timing-stable, external contexts, (3) goal-independent, and (4) enacted without conscious awareness. Hagger (2019) recently reviewed this literature as it applies to the physical activity domain. The purpose of this article is to challenge these assumptions in favor of a habit conceptualization that is more applicable to physical activity: (1) behavioral instigation and/or execution can be habitual, allowing for variable responses to cues; (2) stable contexts can be internal or functional (cued by a preceding action) but may vary in timing and physical location; (3) a shift from external to internal goal dependence may characterize habit development; and (4) types of automaticity other than purely nonconscious enactment may characterize habitual action. I present theory and research that supports these alternative characterizations and discuss their ramifications for physical activity adoption and maintenance via habit.     

Resolving conflict: A response to Martin and Cheng (2006)

Martin and Cheng (2006) report the results of an experiment aimed at disentangling the effects of association strength from those of competition on performance on a verb generation task. Their experiment is situated at the center of a putative debate regarding the function of the left inferior frontal gyrus in language processing (see, e.g., Wagner, Paré-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001). Following in this tradition, Martin and Cheng purport to contrast two processes—selection between competing representations and controlled retrieval of weak associates—that we argue can be reduced to the same mechanism. We contend that the distinction between competition and association strength is a false dichotomy, and we attempt to recast this discussion within a Bayesian framework in an attempt to guide research in this area in a more fruitful direction.