Beard's concept of neurasthenia and Freud's concept of the actual neuroses

Beard's concept of neurasthenia and Freud's concept of the actual neuroses are described and evaluated critically. Despite differences in the content of their theories, especially in the role of sexual factors and sexual mechanisms, there are important formal and logical similarities. Both Beard and Freud incorrectly identified the causes of the neuroses being studied; both used inadequate methods of assessing the strengths of the causal factors; and the central theoretical concepts of both were equally vacuous. Freud adopted the same method of study as did Beard, but does not seem to have been influenced directly by him.     

Know-how and concept possession

We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can be generalized via reflection on the cognitive nature of intentional action and the potential of certain misunderstandings to undermine know-how even when the corresponding abilities and associated propositional knowledge are in place. Such considerations make explicit the intimate relation between know-how and understanding, motivating a general intellectualist analysis of the former in terms of the latter.     

Life satisfaction and sex-role concept

The purpose of the present survey study was to investigate the relationship between life satisfaction and sex-role concept. Two hundred and seventeen respondents completed a two-part questionnaire, which consisted of the Life Satisfaction Survey, designed by the authors, and the Bem Sex Role Inventory. General satisfaction with life was found to be a function of the level of satisfaction derived from various aspects of life, particularly aspects chosen as the most important. Consistent with previous studies, general satisfaction with life is positively associated with education level, income level, and being married. In contrast to previous findings, age is not negatively correlated with overall satisfaction, and a significant difference between males and females showed up. As predicted, sex-role concept was found to be a useful construct in explaining the differential importance of various domains of life as well as the relative contribution of those domains to the individual's overall satisfaction with life. Psychologically masculine people choose as important and enjoy more the instrumental aspects of life; psychologically feminine people choose as important and enjoy more the socioemotional aspects of life; psychologically androgynous people choose as important and enjoy more both the instrumental and socioemotional aspects of life.The research presented here was supported by NSF Grant 77-160107, principal investigator Morton Deutsch. The authors wish to thank Morton Deutsch and Gary Bridge for their guidance and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The assistance of Gidi Shichman. Kenneth Kressel, Joan Grosser, Lotti Tartell, Derry Ann Moritz, and Trinity Church on the Green—New Haven is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Object concept and sleep regulation

The association between infants' cognitive development and sleep regulation was investigated in 83 infants not at risk. It was found that 9-mo.-old infants with a more advanced object concept had significantly fewer sleep difficulties compared to infants with lower level of object permanence.     

Twin-earth externalism and concept possession

It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.     

Incorrect understanding and concept possession

Tyler Burge has argued that an incorrect understanding of a word can be sufficient for possessing the concept the word literally expresses. His well-known ‘arthritis’ case involves a patient who understands ‘arthritis’ incorrectly, but who nevertheless, according to Burge, possesses the concept arthritis. Critics of Burge have objected that there is an alternative concept that best matches the patient's understanding and that this, therefore, is the patient's concept. The paper first argues that Burge's response to this objection is unconvincing. A better response is then developed. It is argued that there is no alternative concept that matches the incorrect understanding, since the patient thinks he has a partial understanding. This, together with points about ordinary psychological explanation and modes of presentations of concepts, establish that it is impossible to undermine Burge's social externalism by appealing to the idea that an alternative concept matches the incorrect understanding.     

Jung's psychoid concept and Bion's proto‐mental concept: a comparison

Jung and Bion both developed theoretical concepts propounding a deeply unknowable area of the psyche in which body and mind are undifferentiated and the individual has no distinct identity, from which a differentiated consciousness arises. In Jung's case, this is enshrined in his psychoid concept and the associated notion of synchronicity and, in Bion's case, in his proto‐mental concept and his ideas on group dynamics. It is by means of these two concepts that Jung and Bion approach and locate a combined body‐mind, a monism, in which body and mind are seen as different aspects of the same thing. This paper reviews the claim that although the two concepts are associated clinically with very different situations, their commonality may arise from a similar intellectual basis: both men appear to have been influenced by the same source of vitalist ideas in philosophy including Henri Bergson, and Jung's ideas also exerted a direct influence on Bion.     

Radical concept nativism

Radical concept nativism is the thesis that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. Notoriously endorsed by Jerry Fodor, radical concept nativism has had few supporters. However, it has proven difficult to say exactly what's wrong with Fodor's argument. We show that previous responses are inadequate on a number of grounds. Chief among these is that they typically do not achieve sufficient distance from Fodor's dialectic, and, as a result, they do not illuminate the central question of how new primitive concepts are acquired. To achieve a fully satisfactory response to Fodor's argument, one has to juxtapose questions about conceptual content with questions about cognitive development. To this end, we formulate a general schema for thinking about how concepts are acquired and then present a detailed illustration.     

Secondary attachments and adolescent self concept

This study examined the popular notion that crushes or secondary attachments to celebrity figures are an important aspect of self-concept development during adolescence. In a repeated measures design, 79 male and female 5th, 8th, and 11th graders and college sophomores completed a set of personality scales, first describing themselves and later, describing the favorite celebrity. Repeated measures multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) analysis of self-object congruence revealed no significant main or interaction effects for the type of attachment, gender, or age of subject. Significant within subject effects were obtained for the repeated measures factor (self-object congruence). Overall, students perceived their attachment objects to be more agentic, yet less expressive and emotionally vulnerable than themselves. MANOVA analyses indicated that males and older students perceived their attachment objects to be higher in agency than expressivity, whereas females and younger students perceived their attachment objects to be higher in expressivity than agency. These data indicate that the function served by secondary attachments in the development of self-concept may be quite similar for adolescent males and females.