Don’t say that!

According to pragma-dialectical methodology, a party in an argumentative discussion can be assumed to manoeuvre strategically between dialectical and rhetorical objectives. One confrontational form of strategic manoeuvring occurs when a critic charges an arguer with advancing a standpoint that has socially harmful consequences. In special situations this form of manoeuvring can be dialectically sound, for example when the standpoint is advanced in a way that damages the dialectical process. The boundary between fallacious and dialectically sound applications of this form of manoeuvring is examined by looking for the manoeuvring’s soundness conditions.     

Internalists Relax: We Can’t All Be Amoralists!

Philosophia - In “Internalists Beware – We Might All Be Amoralists!” Gunnar Björnsson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [henceforth B&O] offer an original objection to...     

Don’t interrupt me! Task interruption depletes the self’s limited resources

It is a common occurrence in daily life to be interrupted prior to completing a task. Such interruptions may have deleterious effects for limited self-resources, especially if they occur just prior to task completion. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments. In the first two, participants initially engaged in a card sorting task, and then subsequently performed a self-control task. In Experiment 3, participants first engaged in a word search task and then worked on an executive function task. In all instances, participants who were interrupted just prior to attaining their goal of completing the initial task, but not those who were stopped earlier in the task or who were allowed to finish, showed evidence of impairment on the subsequent measures. The findings suggest that the desire to pursue a goal increases as goal attainment draws nearer, and that the amount of self-control needed to stop working on a task is modified by situational variables such as goal distance.     

Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don’t!

This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of any interest or power.

Aging: I don’t want to be a cyborg!

Examination is made of a range of cyborg solutions to bodily problems due to damage, but here with particular reference to aging. Both technological and animal implants, transplants and prosthetic devices are phenomenologically analyzed. The resultant trade-off phenomena are compared to popular culture technofantasies and desires and finally to human attitudes toward mortality and contingency. The parallelism of resistance to contingent existence and to becoming a cyborg is noted.     

What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt You,Unless You Don’t Know You’re Wrong

The purpose of this investigation was to determine the impact of students’ background knowledge and how they utilized “don’t know” affordances to comprehend and learn from text. In two studies, over 8,000 middle and high school students interacted with a content-area learning environment in which they answered a series of background knowledge questions before they completed a unit on the same topic. Students were given the opportunity to indicate they “did not know” the answers to the knowledge questions. Higher knowledge was related to higher understanding, and the use of the “don’t know” option further explained variability in students’ understanding of the sources beyond background knowledge. When responding to knowledge questions, students who selected incorrect options before the task understood less and were less likely to learn content when given the opportunity compared to students who indicated they did not know. Thus, low knowledge students were still able to comprehend and learn as long as they acknowledged they lacked background knowledge. One’s comprehension and learning can be facilitated or impaired, depending upon the veracity of their knowledge, and whether students choose to acknowledge their lack of background knowledge. Implications of this work are discussed in terms of learning and instruction.     

I won’t do it! Self-prediction,moral obligation and moral deliberation

This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of ‘won’t’ claims (i.e., claims that an agent won’t Φ), the question is separated into two different issues: firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations, and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to be appropriate in deliberation. The discussion illuminates an interesting and significant tension between agency and prediction.     

Seeds aren’t anchors

Exposure to a few task-relevant numerical facts (seed facts) often improves subsequent numerical estimates. We performed two experiments to investigate the mechanism that produces these seeding effects. In Experiment 1, participants estimated national populations; in Experiment 2, they estimated between-city distances. In both, items were selected so that the actual value of the seed facts (SA) was, on average, below participants' initial estimates for those items (S1) and above the initial estimates for the transfer items (T1). Given this configuration, the anchoring position predicts that the postseeding transfer estimates should be greater than the preseeding transfer estimates (T2 > T1), whereas the feedback/induction position predicts the opposite (T2 < T1). In both experiments, the latter pattern of results emerged, supporting the conclusion that seeds aren't anchors.     

Cheat and you Lose! Don’t Cheat and you Lose! Reflections and Analysis of Accounting Student Data

During 2012 students enrolled in a Master’s management accounting unit were invited to complete a compulsory class quiz, which was arranged to include a mild form of deception allowing them an opportunity to cheat. Prior to the test students were coached concerning the importance of the ICMA code of ethical conduct, which formed the basis of the quiz. Following the test, students were made aware of the deception and asked to judge the propriety of their actions using a research instrument based on moral intensity theory (Jones in The Academy of Management Review, 16(2), 366–395, 1991). Academic dishonesty, in its many forms is endemic in universities and in this study a significant number of students take advantage of an opportunity to maximise test scores and earn an advertised reward by cheating. Others adopted a virtuous position and opted not to use the information. As reported from an earlier investigation, Woodbine and Amirthalingam (2013) again demonstrate the effect of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) although previously the research instrument did not clearly differentiate between respondent types. A logistic regression of subsequent data establishes that high achievers (in terms of their test scores) are more likely to take advantage of the disclosed information to maximise scores and that this is somewhat offset by aspects of their moral character. Immediately following the field experiment, students met to reflect on their actions. A summary of their responses is provided, which tends to support prior evidence that many are somewhat blasé in their attitude to this form of opportunistic behaviour. These findings have ramifications in terms of the way tertiary institutions emphasise academic excellence before moral development, while acting to manage the incidence of misbehaviour.     

I Didn’t Have Time! A Qualitative Exploration of Misbehaviors in Academic Contexts

Journal of Academic Ethics - Students display resistance, including academic dishonesty, at all educational levels. In the present study, we qualitatively examined the extent and incidence of...     

Boys Just Don’t! Gender Stereotyping and Sanctioning of Counter-Stereotypical Behavior in Preschoolers

Sex Roles - Although children start to adopt gender stereotypes by the age of three, there is less evidence about how early they start to sanction other children’s counter-stereotypical...     

‘Strange epoch!’

The present era is one of disarray. The familiar ways of knowing, representing and reading have changed unrecognisably, but there is no agreement as to the new direction in which either Western culture or Western philosophy is heading. A main reason for this situation is Heidegger's criticism of modern philosophy which shatters the very foundations of modern philosophy, without establishing the hoped for continuity. This paper examines Heidegger's critique of modern philosophy and evaluates the rereading of the history of philosophy that he undertakes in developing his critique, showing that it is incomplete in that his reconstruction of traditional philosophy has left some important chapters untouched, and that he has overlooked the ethical realm. Following this, the paper briefly ex-plores Levinas' relation to the tradition and his efforts to fill in the ethical and historical gaps that Heidegger had left.     

Don’t Blame the Idealizations

Idealizing conditions are scapegoats for scientific hypotheses, too often blamed for falsehood better attributed to less obvious sources. But while the tendency to blame idealizations is common among both philosophers of science and scientists themselves, the blame is misplaced. Attention to the nature of idealizing conditions, the content of idealized hypotheses, and scientists’ attitudes toward those hypotheses shows that idealizing conditions are blameless when hypotheses misrepresent. These conditions help to determine the content of idealized hypotheses, and they do so in a way that prevents those hypotheses from being false by virtue of their constituent idealizations.     

What Fitness Can’t Be

Recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics. To accommodate examples from the population genetics literature they conclude that fitness is better defined broadly as a family of propensities rather than the propensity to contribute descendants to some future generation. We argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples they cite. These examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that determine fitness. We go on to argue for the more general thesis that no account of fitness can satisfy the desiderata that have motivated the propensity account.     

What you don’t know can’t hurt you: realism and the unconceived

Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006, Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper, I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.

‘My Senses Couldn’t Always Deceive Me’

Philosophia - Gilbert Ryle and a number of other philosophers have argued that Descartes’ claim his senses could always deceive him is false. Ryle’s argument is the well-known...     

Don’t Know,Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance,Culpability, and Caution

This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.

How Many there Are Isn’t

Philosophia - A world where there exists exactly n concrete things is a count-determinate world. The orthodox assumption is that count-determinacy is necessary; if to be is to be the value of a...     

What ontological arguments don’t show

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Daniel Dombrowski contends that: (1) a number of versions of the ontological argument [OA] are sound; (2) the deity whose existence is most well...