信仰理性·认知理性·反思理性--理性"天然合法性"的根据何在

人类文明的发展,经过了"信仰理性"、"认知理性"的支配阶段后,将进入一个"人性自主一反思理性"的时代.在已往的历史中,理性并没有真正握有自主权,它更多地充当了一种工具化的角色.信仰理性是"本性在外"的理解方式,理智理性是"本性对外"的理解方式,二者均未达到人性的自主.反思理性作为理性的自我反省,是向生成自身的那个人性根基的回归.理性的"天然合法性"的根据即在理性自身.反思理性使"理性自洁"的功能得以发挥,它一定能够解决理性自身造成的问题."反思理性"将成为新世纪人类文明的主导理性.     

Reason

ReasonJean Piaget wrote three short papers shortly before his death in 1980

Paper I: Scientific Report on Work during 1978-1979.Paper II: Reason as Objective of the Understanding.Paper III: Reason: Introduction.Each is probably incomplete, Papers II and III definitely so. These papers were intended as a contribution to his 1979-1980 research project “Reason,” here translated into English for the first time. Their central argument is distinctive. It amounts to Piaget's final statement of his empirical model of normative reason as a mechanism intrinsic to the construction of knowledge during children's cognitive development.     

Reason Internalism

Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the truth of one's belief must obtain in the world outside of one's mind in order for one to have knowledge (or justified belief) about the world, then there is no good intellectual motivation for taking up the traditional project. This results stands even if we accept the traditional theses that knowledge requires justified belief and that justified belief requires the ability to provide good reasons for one's belief.     

Within Reason

Philosophia - Recently, thinkers not known for their relativist or sceptical tendencies have raised serious doubts about the objectivity of rule-following judgements. While they may not have given...     

Hume's Reason

Book Information Hume's Reason. By D. Owen. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. x + 234. Hardback, £30.00.     

Gendered Reason: Sex Metaphor and Conceptions of Reason

Reason has regularly been portrayed and understood in terms of images and metaphors that involve the exclusion or denigration of some element—body, passion, nature, instinct—that is cast as “feminine.” Drawing upon philosophical insight into metaphor, I examine the impact of this gendering of reason. I argue that our conceptions of mind, reason, unreason, female, and male have been distorted. The politics of “rational” discourse has been set up in ways that still subtly but powerfully inhibit the voice and agency of women.     

Without Reason?

The argument for modal collapse is partly responsible for the widespread rejection of the so‐called Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in recent times. This paper discusses the PSR against the background of the recent debate about grounding and develops principled reasons for rejecting the argument from modal collapse.     

Reason with Baggage

In this article I show that David Novak's natural law theory precedes his encounter with Judaism. That is to say, the theory is the product of a theological viewpoint consisting of three components—createdness, commandedness, and response—that is then found by Novak in a number of areas of Jewish thought and practice that admit of the same three parts. As a result of this interpretation, I posit that Paul Nahme, who argues for a pragmatic reading of Novak's theory, as well as Martin Kavka and Randi Rashkover, who offer a political understanding of it, do not account for the theological richness and metaphysical basis of Novak's natural law theology.     

Faith with Reason

Book Information Faith with Reason. By Paul Helm. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xvi + 185.     

Transcendence and Reason

Nussbaum argues for a (limited) transcendence through contemplation which is compatible with practical reasoning and aspiration towards other human goods. This paper raises difficulties for this account based on a) the relation of thinking to human freedom, and b) the self-constitutive nature of human thinking. It explores connections Thomas Aquinas makes between contemplation, transcendence and happiness, and explains the relation between (unlimited) transcendent experience and rationality by considering individuals who lack rational judgement but do seem capable of contemplation (young children, certain mentally disordered persons). What contemplation by these individuals and by rational, mature adults have in common is awareness (by the less than perfectly rational) of the possibility of a life of unlimited rationality. I claim this awareness does not come naturally to us but is made possible by some super-natural cause acting in a way that does not violate human nature but rather perfects our contemplative faculty and enables our happiness.     

Against Right Reason

I argue against ‘right reason’ style accounts of how we should manage our beliefs in the face of higher‐order evidence. I start from the observation that such views seem to have bad practical consequences when we imagine someone acting on them. I then catalogs ways that Williamson, Weatherson, and Lasonen‐Aarnio have tried to block objections based on these consequences; I argue all fail. I then move on to offer my own theoretical picture of a rational ‘should believe,’ and show that, if such a picture is right, it can neatly explain why right reason isn't. I close by arguing that the extent to which anti‐luminosity arguments motivate right reason has been overstated; the positive picture developed here, despite rejecting right reason, is nonetheless consistent with luminosity failures.     

Vice and Reason

Aristotle's account of vice presents a puzzle: (1) Viciouspeople must be guided by reason, since they act on decision(prohairesis), not on their non-rational desires. (2) And yet theycannot be guided by reason, since they are said to pay attention totheir non-rational part and not to live in accordance with reason. Wecan understand the conception of vice the reconciles these two claims,once we examine Aristotle's account of (a) the pursuit of the fine andof the expedient; (b) the connexion between vice and the pursuit ofpleasure; (c) the particular kind of regret to which the vicious personis subject.     

生存与理性

传统哲学与现代存在主义哲学都没有合理地理解人的生存与理性的内在关联传统哲学把理性与生存的关系看成是"纯粹理性"对"实存"的逻辑生成;而现代存在主义则把人的生存直接看成了非理性问题.非理性作为"能够自我意识到的本能",本是构成生存理性以及理性地阐释人生存的关键环节.理性对人生存的内在规定性具体体现在第一,理性理解人的生存,理性是人生存的具体的、历史性的表现,它本身就经历了从实存性向生存性的提升.第二,理性作为内蕴于人生存活动中的具有对象性功用的属性,又对人生存起着反省及评价的双重作用.第三,作为对生存性及生存意义的理解,理性必然从总体上引导着人的现实的生存活动.