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1.
Mark van de Vall 《Knowledge, Technology, and Policy》1991,4(3):41-57
In the discussion about “enlightenment” or “utilization” in program evaluation, it is increasingly clear that the discussants
implicitly refer to different professional contexts. Weiss, in Alkin (1990), using the “scientist” approach appears to reflect
upon the academic context of the traditional university, where, beyond the land grant institutions, “enlightenment” is the
honored objective. In contrast, Patton (Alkin, 1990) speaks from the clinical perspective of the organization consultant,
with “utilization” the essential element in the evaluator-client relationship. Yet, those contextual differences notwithstanding,
each party defends its case on the implicit assumption ofone methodological procedure of program evaluation—equally shared by both. Correcting this assumption, this article articulates
major principles and methods of the “clinical” approach in program evaluation. The method has been tested in the field in
western Europe and the United States. Its characteristic difference with the academic tradition is that in clinical evaluation,
improving the program is part of the method.
Mark van de Vall is professor of Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam and adjunct professor at SUNY / Buffalo. 相似文献
2.
Josh Corngold 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(1):67-84
This paper offers a critique of the “democratic state of education” proposed by Amy Gutmann in her influential book Democratic Education. In the democratic state of education, educational authority is shared among the state, parents and educational professionals;
and educational objectives are geared toward equipping future citizens to participate in what Gutmann calls “conscious social
reproduction”—the collective shaping of the future of society through democratic deliberation. Although I agree with some
of Gutmann’s broad recommendations for civic education, I have misgivings about the centrality that she gives to conscious
social reproduction in her theory of education. I argue that in focusing so intently on the facilitation of conscious social
reproduction, Gutmann’s theory makes insufficient room for the basic interests of individual children, and in particular,
their prospective interest in autonomy. Gutmann’s considered position on sex education policy—specifically, her willingness
to allow local communities to deny their children access to sex education—exemplifies the shortcomings of her theory. Ultimately,
her democratic state of education fails to acknowledge the fundamental moral importance of individual flourishing, and the
contribution that education can and should make to it. 相似文献
3.
Richard Tieszen 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):31-52
In 1928 Edmund Husserl wrote that “The ideal of the future is essentially that of phenomenologically based (“philosophical”)
sciences, in unitary relation to an absolute theory of monads” (“Phenomenology”, Encyclopedia Britannica draft) There are references to phenomenological monadology in various writings of Husserl. Kurt G?del began to study Husserl’s
work in 1959. On the basis of his later discussions with G?del, Hao Wang tells us that “G?del’s own main aim in philosophy
was to develop metaphysics—specifically, something like the monadology of Leibniz transformed into exact theory—with the help
of phenomenology.” (A Logical Journey: From G?del to Philosophy, p. 166) In the Cartesian Meditations and other works Husserl identifies ‘monads’ (in his sense) with ‘transcendental egos in their full concreteness’. In this
paper I explore some prospects for a G?delian monadology that result from this identification, with reference to texts of
G?del and to aspects of Leibniz’s original monadology. 相似文献
4.
Herkert JR 《Science and engineering ethics》2001,7(3):403-414
Three frames of reference for engineering ethics are discussed—individual, professional and social—which can be further broken
down into “microethics” concerned with individuals and the internal relations of the engineering profession and “macroethics”
referring to the collective social responsibility of the engineering profession and to societal decisions about technology.
Few attempts have been made at integrating microethical and macroethical approaches to engineering ethics. The approach suggested
here is to focus on the role of professional engineering societies in linking individual and professional ethics and in linking
professional and social ethics. A research program is outlined using ethics support as an example of the former, and the issuance
of position statements on product liability as an example of the latter.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Symposium on Technology and Society 2000 (ISTAS 2000),
Rome, Italy, 7 September 2000.
Joseph R. Herkert directs a dual-degree program in engineering and humanities/social sciences and is editor of Social, Ethical, and Policy Implications of Engineering (Wiley/IEEE Press). 相似文献
5.
According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational
content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.”
According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing
an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency
thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First,
I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory
qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can
vary despite constancy in representational content. 相似文献
6.
Robert C. Pinto 《Argumentation》2010,24(2):227-252
This paper challenges the view that arguments are (by definition, as it were) attempts to persuade or convince an audience
to accept (or reject) a point of view by presenting reasons for (or against) that point of view. I maintain, first, that an
arguer need not intend any effect beyond that of making it manifest to readers or hearers that there is a reason for doing some particular thing (e.g.,
for believing a certain proposition, or alternatively for rejecting it), and second that when an arguer is in fact trying
to induce an effect above and beyond rendering a reason manifest, the effect intended—the use to which his or her argument is put—need not be that hearers “do” what the stated reasons are reasons for “doing.” Where the actual or intended effect of making a reason
R for “doing X” manifest is something other than “doing X,” I call it an oblique—as opposed to a direct—effect of making that reason manifest. The core of the paper presents an overview or map of the main categories of effect
which arguments can have, and the main sub-types within each category, calling attention to the points at which such effects
can be indirect or oblique effects. The purpose of that typology is to make it clear (i) how oblique effects can come about
and (ii) how important a role they can play in the conduct of argumentation. 相似文献
7.
Robert Oakes 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(3):155-160
Many philosophers have contended that (traditional) theism or supernaturalism suffers from what can properly be called the
Problem of Divine Hiddenness (the PDH). [See Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002]. Moreover, it is the contention of many proponents of the PDH that this “problem,” if, indeed, not just a component of the “problem of evil,” bears a striking similarity to the latter. Specifically, at the heart of this ostensible difficulty for theism is that Divine “Hiddenness,” like pain
and suffering—or at least pain and suffering in the amount that the world contains—is precisely the opposite of what one would
expect if there existed a (maximally great) supernatural Person. Accordingly, it is maintained by proponents of the PDH that supernaturalism is disconfirmed by the relevant “problem.” The aim of this essay is to establish that there is more than ample metaphysical warrant (of a
sort overlooked thus far) for maintaining that the “hiddenness” of God is exactly what should be expected if theism is true. Thus, the conclusion we hope to secure is that the PDH has considerably less to recommend it than its proponents have thought, and, accordingly, that it fails to constitute an
effective threat to supernaturalism. 相似文献
8.
崔大华 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(3):309-321
The Confucian idea of “ming 命 (destiny)” holds that in the course and culmination of human life, there exists some objective certainty that is both transcendent
and beyond human control. This is a concept of ultimate concern at the transcendental theoretical level in Confucianism. During
its historical development, Confucianism has constantly offered humanist interpretations of the idea of “destiny”, thinking
that the transcendence of “destiny” lies inherently within the qi endowment and virtues of human beings, that the certainty of “destiny” is in essence contingency at the beginning of life
and linear irreversibility towards its end, and that to live in light of ethics and physical rules — having a “commitment
to human affairs” — means putting “destiny” into practice. As all these facts show, the Confucian ultimate concern regarding
human life is full of rational awareness.
__________
Translated by Huang Deyuan from Kongzi yanjiu 孔子研究 (Study on Confucius), 2008, (2): 4–11 相似文献
9.
A. David Smith 《Synthese》2008,160(3):313-333
It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual
experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as
a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share
with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short,
it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of
any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses
on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality. 相似文献
10.
David Bittner 《Journal of religion and health》2010,49(4):603-619
In this article, David Bittner explodes the myth, restated in Brideshead
Revisited (1945), that Polynesians are “happy and harmless.” He does so for the same reason that Evelyn Waugh does: “the grim invasion of
trader, administrator, missionary, and tourist” has changed all that (p. 174). Touring Hawaii in July of ’09, Bittner was
interested to discover some unusual bits of American heritage, but saddened to see how “civilization” and “Americanization”
actually seem to have eroded the Hawaiian people’s rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Bittner’s dual religious
heritage—Judaism by birth and upbringing and Catholicism by choice in mid-life—has given him the perspective to apply the
lessons of Hawaiian history to his own personal issues, particularly forgiveness. 相似文献
11.
黄玉顺 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2008,3(2):177-193
In traditional Chinese expressions, guannian 观念 (ideas) are results of guan 观 (viewing). However, viewing can be understood to have two different levels of meanings: one is “viewing things,” that is,
viewing with something to view; another is “viewing nothing,” that is, viewing with nothing to view. What are viewed in “viewing
things” are either physical beings—all existing things and phenomena—or the metaphysical being (for example, the “Dao as a thing”). In both cases, something is being viewed. What is viewed in “viewing nothing” is the being itself, or “nothing,”
in which there is nothing to view. According to Confucianism, the existence of “nothing” manifests itself as life sentiments,
especially the sentiment of love, which is the very root and source of benevolence; moreover “viewing nothing” is, in essence,
a perception of life. Life sentiments or the perception of life is “the thing itself ” prior to any being or any thing.
Translated by Liu Huawei from Sichuan Daxue Xuebao 四川大学学报 (Journal of Sichuan University), 2006, (4): 67–74 相似文献
12.
13.
Thomas J. Misa 《Synthese》2009,168(3):357-375
In this paper, I outline several methodological questions that we need to confront. The chief question is how can we identify
the nature of technological change and its varied cultural consequences—including social, political, institutional, and economic
dimensions—when our different research methods, using distinct ‘levels’ or ‘scales’ of analysis, yield contradictory results.
What can we say, in other words, when our findings about technology follow from the framings of our inquiries? In slightly different terms, can we combine insights from the fine-grained “social shaping of technology”
as well as from complementary approaches accenting the “technological shaping of society?” As a way forward, I will suggest
conducting multi-scale inquiries into the processes of technological and cultural change. This will involve recognizing and
conceptualizing the analytical scales or levels on which we conduct inquiry (very roughly, micro, meso, macro) as well as
outlining strategies for moving within and between these scales or levels. Of course we want and need diverse methodologies
for analyzing technology and culture. I find myself in sympathy with geographer Brenner (New state spaces: urban governance
and the rescaling of statehood, 2004, p. 7), who aspires to a “theoretically precise yet also historically specific conceptualization
of [technological change] as a key dimension of social, political and economic life.” 相似文献
14.
Michael Davis Ph.D. 《Science and engineering ethics》1999,5(4):463-478
Many outside science and engineering, especially social scientists and “rhetoricians”, claim that rhetoric, “the art of persuasion”,
is an important part of technical communication. This claim is either trivial or false. If “persuasion” simply means “effective
communication”, then, of course, rhetoric is an important part of technical communication. But, if “persuasion” has anything
like its traditional meaning (a specific art of winning conviction), rhetoric is not an important part of technical communication;
indeed, its use in technical communication would be unethical.
[By] an advocate is meant one whose business it is to smooth over real difficulties, and to persuade where he cannot convince.
—Thomas Henry Huxley, Man’s Place in Nature
1 (p. 238) As a profession, engineers frown on persuasiveness and find it suspect.
—Dorothy A. Winsor, Writing Like an Engineer
2 (p. 12), A
Michael Davis’s research interests are in the areas of engineering ethics and the social contract. Recent published books
include Thinking Like an Engineer, 1998, Oxford, and Ethics and the University, 1999, Routledge. 相似文献
15.
In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous
motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account
for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate
the deontic axiom that “ought” implies “can”, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason,
and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving “conflicting motives” and “motivational over-determination”.
In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view.
This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in
each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible. 相似文献
16.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2008,164(3):385-400
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem
of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between
Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools
of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed
by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine. 相似文献
17.
Kirsten Jacobson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(3):355-373
Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home”
is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar
notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity
that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially
an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for
our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way
of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature
of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving. 相似文献
18.
Patrick Hutchings 《Sophia》1995,34(1):49-64
Conclusion It is not the case that God is interestingly like the unavailable transcendental signified in being unavailable. God always
was absconded. The signified may not even really have gone away at all. And if it has, it is not God; it is only like Him
in having gone away. And it has gone away, if it has, in a different mode of ‘going away’.
To use a Turneresque metaphor: God is and will always be another, far, range behind the misty-but-glittering and absconded
signifieds, which leave only the trace which is the play of signifiers in the immediate foreground.
One is free to attend to whichever range one wishes, or one may attend only to the foreground. But the dazzlingsublime
12 of the foreground, “That change of cloud and light, never-ending and agitating itself into kaleidoscopic patterns, the play
of signifiers”, is—and never could be—quite like the “sublime” of the far, far range whose Inhabitant is said to be, “From
everlasting to everlasting”. His “play” is said to be not of signifiers, butof all there is; it is notsemiological butontological. And He is altogether beyond the sublime, for with Him, or with the Beatific Vision of Her,there would be no critical problem left.
The Logos is not a signifier.
—shakes a dust Of the doctrine, flavours thence, he well knows how, The narrative of the novel,—half believes All for the
book's sake… Robert Browning 相似文献
19.
Søren Overgaard 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):307-330
In various publications, Stanley Cavell and Stanley Rosen have emphasized the philosophical importance of what they both call
“the ordinary.” They both contrast their recovery of “the ordinary” with traditional philosophy, including the phenomenological
philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In this paper, I address Rosen’s claims in particular. I argue that Rosen turns the real situation
on its head. Contra Rosen, it is not the case that the employment of Husserl’s epoché distorts the authentic voice of “the” ordinary—a voice
that is clearly audible only from within everyday life. For (pace both Cavell and Rosen) there is no single “voice” of the ordinary: There are many such “voices,” not all of which are to be relied upon. Therefore, if we want to achieve
an adequate grasp of ordinary experience, and Rosen does want this, we precisely need the epoché to curtail the misleading
messages of certain other “voices of the ordinary.” Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, this positive evaluation of the Husserlian
epoché finds support in Heidegger’s writings from the twenties. I argue that Heidegger, too, believed that the epoché was
an indispensable tool for the philosophical attempt to capture ordinary experience. 相似文献
20.
Jürgen Oelkers 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2000,19(1-2):3-19
In 20th century’s European theory of education there was little interest in philosophy ofdemocracy. John Dewey’sDemocracy and Education was translated in nearly every European language but did not become the center of discussion. Even “radical education” was
much more childcentered than open to radical questions of political democracy. This article discusses the problem in two respects,
first the tension between neo-liberalism’s concept of individuality and public education, and second the future problems of
a theory of “democratic education”after Dewey. The aim is to overcome traditional European dualisms like that of “citizen”or “man” i.e. to pave the way for a post-Rousseauian theory of education.
Inaugural lecture upon taking office at the University of Zurich on 22nd November 1999. 相似文献