Just the facts or just for fun? Children's understanding of and sensitivity to retelling contexts

Adults appear to recognize that different memory sharing contexts, such as telling a story to a friend at a party versus providing eyewitness testimony, vary in their accuracy demands and adjust their retellings accordingly. There is less evidence that children are able to make the same distinctions. In the present two‐part experiment, we first tested 6–8‐year‐old children's beliefs about the accuracy requirements of different memory sharing contexts that varied on the listener's implicit expectation about accuracy. Children were then read a short story and were given retelling instructions that emphasized accuracy or entertainment. Results from the first task indicated that children evidence a significant truth bias, suggesting that they believe accurate retellings are preferred regardless of context. Despite this, children did appear to adjust their retellings as a function of context, with retellings in the high accuracy condition including more verbatim and less error statements. Finally, children who evidenced a stronger truth bias were less likely to employ the language of storytelling by producing lower‐quality narratives. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does testing with feedback help grade-school children learn key concepts in science?

Testing effects have been well-established across a variety of studies involving school-age children. Specifically, children's test performance improves when they are given the opportunity to practice retrieval prior to the final test as compared to when practice involves only study. The current investigation focused on the influence of testing with feedback on fifth graders’ learning of science concepts. Across two experiments, 65 students studied twenty key concept definitions. After study, the definitions were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: control, test only, study only, and test plus feedback. Concepts assigned to the latter three conditions were presented again (either for test only, study only, or test plus feedback) during two separate sessions, and a final test was administered during a separate session. At the final test, students were asked to provide the definition for each of the twenty key concepts. Final test performance was best for definitions that had been tested with feedback, followed by recall for those that had only been tested or only restudied, with lowest performance for those that did not receive additional practice. Despite multiple sessions spaced across several days, however, performance for all conditions was low, which may have resulted from the ineffective use of feedback. In summary, testing followed by feedback can boost younger students learning of science concepts, but mastery will require the use of other strategies as well.     

Children's understanding of the earth in a multicultural community: mental models or fragments of knowledge?

Children's understanding of properties of the earth was investigated by interviewing Asian and white British classmates aged 4?8 years (N = 167). Two issues were explored: whether they held mental models of the earth ( Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992 ) or instead had fragmented knowledge ( di Sessa, 1988 ); and the influence of the children's different cultural backgrounds. Children selected from a set of plastic models and answered forced‐choice questions. Using this methodology, there were no significant differences in the overall performance of Asian and white children after language skills were partialled out. Even young children showed an emerging knowledge of some properties of the earth, but the distributions of their combinations of responses provided no evidence that they had mental models. Instead, these distributions closely resembled those that would be expected if children's knowledge in this domain were fragmented. Possible reasons for the differences between these findings and those of previous research are discussed.     

Why do we eat? Children's and adults' understanding of why we eat different meals

In this study the author examined why children and adults think they need to eat. Preschoolers through adults were provided with physiological, social, psychological, and routine causes for eating breakfast, lunch, snack, and dinner, and were asked to either agree or disagree with the causal responses provided. A 4 Reason x 4 Meal repeated measures analysis of variance revealed significant main effects for meals and reasons, as well as significant Meal x Reason and Meal x Reason x Grade interactions. The effect sizes ranged from 0.1 to 0.7. Across all age groups, participants acknowledged physiological needs and desires (fulfilling hunger and needs to stay healthy) and routine (e.g., it is dinner time) as the primary causes for eating breakfast, lunch, and dinner. However, for snack physiological needs were the primary reason. Second-grade students onward spontaneously produced biological justifications such as the need for energy and nutrition as important reasons for food consumption. These results lend support to the developmental model that children's and adults' understanding of eating changes in middle childhood.     

Determinants of academic self-efficacy in different socialization contexts: investigating the relationship between students’ academic self-efficacy and its sources in different contexts

Social Psychology of Education - The present study examined the four sources of self-efficacy (mastery experience, vicarious experience, verbal and social persuasion, and physiological state) and...     

Does Children's Colour Use Reflect the Emotional Content of their Drawings?

When children draw in clinical contexts, clinicians sometimes rely on children's colour use to make inferences about their emotional reaction to the subject of the drawing. Here, we examined whether children use colour to portray emotion in their drawings. In Experiment 1, children indicated their colour preferences and then coloured in outlines of figures characterized as nasty or nice. Children also drew complex, multi‐coloured pictures about their own happy or sad experiences. In Experiment 2, hospitalized children drew about being worried or scared in hospital and about their positive experiences. In both experiments, we examined the relation between children's colour use and their colour preferences. Three‐ to 10‐year‐old children used more preferred colours to colour in the nice outline. Although they were more likely to use non‐preferred colours to colour in the nasty outline, they tended to used a mix of preferred and non‐preferred colours. When both normal and hospitalized children produced drawings about positive and negative events, there was no relation between children's colour choices and their colour preferences; children primarily used preferred colours. These data suggest that clinicians should exercise extreme caution when interpreting the meaning of colour in children's drawings. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's and adults’ understanding of the “disgust face”

By the age of 4 years, children (N=120) know the meaning of the word disgust as well as they know the meaning of anger and fear; for example, when asked, they are equally able to generate a plausible cause for each of these emotions. Yet, in tasks involving facial expressions (free labelling of faces, deciding whether or not a face expresses disgust, or finding a “disgust face” in an array of faces), a majority of 3- to 7-year-old children (N=144) associated the prototypical “disgust face” with anger and denied its association with disgust (25% of adults on the same tasks did so as well). These results challenge the assumption that all humans easily recognise disgust from its facial expression and that this recognition is a precursor to children's understanding of the emotion of disgust.     

What's in a cue? The role of cue orientation in object displacement tasks

The current study looked at two theoretical proposals explaining toddlers’ abilities to use cue information for recovering a hidden object that had rolled down a ramp behind an occluded screen. These two approaches, the theory of object directed attention and a landmark-based account, make different predictions regarding the efficacy of an obliquely aligned cue to object position. Accordingly, the search by forty 24-month olds, forty-two 30-month olds, and forty-one 36-month olds for a hidden toy that was cued using either a short versus a long cue, or a vertically aligned versus an obliquely aligned cue, were compared. Analyses of search accuracy revealed that children were more successful when faced with short as opposed to long cues, and when using vertical as opposed to oblique cues. These findings support a landmark-based approach, as opposed to an object-directed attention account, and are discussed with reference to their implications for spatial orientation more generally.     

Does the non-identity problem block a class of arguments against cloning?

One class of argument against cloning human beings in the contemporary literature focuses on the bad consequences that will befall the clone or "later-twin." In this paper I consider whether this line of argumentation can be blocked by invoking Parfit's non-identity problem. I canvass two general strategies for solving the non-identity problem: a consequentialist strategy and non-consequentialist, rights based strategy. I argue that while each general strategy offers a plausible solution to the non-identity problem as applied to the cases most frequently discussed in the non-identity problem literature, neither provides a reason for putting aside the non-identity problem when applied to cloning. I conclude (roughly) that the non-identity problem does serve to block this class of argument against cloning.     

Does the Subject of Experience Exist in the World?

In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. the subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence neither of change nor of motion. the subject cannot therefore be identified with any neural process, function, or location since whatever goes on in the CNS is necessarily objective and part of the temporal flux. However this does not imply any form of dualism for experiences exist only for the subject whose experiences they are and hence they have no objective reality.     

Does transfer of training help children learn juggling?

The effectiveness of four different learning sequences in teaching juggling to 5th grade students was investigated. Practice schedules using combinations of scarves, weighted scarves, beanbags, and balls allowed both identical task elements and learners' time-on-task to be varied during a 3-wk. practice period. The exclusive use of beanbags for practice, prior to testing with balls, resulted in significantly better juggling scores than did the other combinations. While transfer of training occurred for other groups, the amount of students' time-on-task during practice appeared to be a strong influence on final performance.     

Learner control of the pacing of an online slideshow lesson: Does segmenting help?

How can we improve the instructional effectiveness of an online slideshow lesson? In the present study, college students received a 12‐slide multimedia slideshow lesson on how a geographic information system works. In a 2 × 2 design, the lesson was presented one complete slide at a time (large segment) or added one section of the slide at a time (small segment) when the student pressed the CONTINUE key, and the words were presented in printed form (text) or spoken form (voice). Students performed significantly better on a transfer posttest when the lesson was paced in small segments rather than large segments (d = 0.34); there was no effect or interaction involving modality. The small‐segment version was rated as less difficult than the large‐segment version (d = 0.43). The segmenting principle was supported in the context of online slideshows.     

Children's concepts of illness: Towards an alternative to the “Stage” approach

Abstract

Research concerned with the development of children's beliefs about health and illness has practical implications for educating children about their illness, treatment and hospital admission. Previous research has suggested that beliefs about health and illness develop through a series of systematic stages, and that children are unable to understand explanations in advance of their own cognitive level. Alternative theories which give greater emphasis to the role of experience are considered, and some implications for clinical practice drawn.     

The problem of religious evil: Does belief in god cause evil?

Daniel Kodaj has recently developed a pro-atheistic argument that he calls “the problem of religious evil.” This first premise of this argument is “belief in God causes evil.” Although this idea that belief in God causes evil is widely accepted, certainly in the secular West, it is sufficiently problematic as to be unsuitable as a basis for an argument for atheism, as Kodaj seeks to use it. In this paper I shall highlight the problems inherent in it in three ways: by considering whether it is reasonable to say that “belief in God” causes evil; whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God “causes” evil; and whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God causes “evil.” In each case I will argue that it is problematic to make such claims, and accordingly I will conclude that the premise “belief in God causes evil” is unacceptable as it stands, and consequently is unable to ground Kodaj’s pro-atheistic argument.     

Self-control and cooperation: different concepts, similar decisions? A question of the right perspective

Conflicts between an individual's long-term and short-term goals (i.e., self-control conflicts) and conflicts between individual and collective interests (mixed-motive situations) share some interesting features. In this article both types of conflicts are approached from a perspective hypothesis. The hypothesis holds that a decision maker's perspective on his or her decision determines whether either the long-term goals (the collective interests) or the short-term goals (the individual interests) will guide behavior. The hypothesis also implies that factors known to enhance cooperative choices in mixed-motive situations should also facilitate self-control. Three such factors are evaluated: group identification, self-efficacy, and mutual trust. We conclude that the perspective in which choice is considered part of an identifiable series of behaviors is most likely to result in cooperation or self-control.     

Does activating justice help or hurt in promoting forgiveness?

Do justice values promote or obstruct forgiveness? This question has received virtually no empirical attention, even though past theorizing suggest two different answers. The literature on forgiveness suggests that justice constitutes a barrier to forgiveness, suggesting that the activation of justice values should decrease the probability of forgiveness. Conversely, the literature on justice and human values indicates that justice and forgiveness are positively associated, suggesting that the activation of justice should enhance the probability of forgiveness. Consistent with the latter line of reasoning, three studies, using complementary priming methods, provide converging evidence for the prediction that the activation of justice promotes (rather than obstructs) forgiveness. Implications for extant theory regarding forgiveness and justice are discussed.     

Does coping help? A reexamination of the relation between coping and mental health

In a longitudinal community survey of 291 adults, we explored the relation between coping strategies and psychological symptoms. Respondents completed the revised Ways of Coping Scale (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985) for a self-named stressful episode. Factor analysis produced eight coping factors: three problem focused, four emotion focused, and one (support mobilization) that contained elements of both. Multiple regression analyses indicated bidirectionality in the relation between coping and psychological symptoms. Those in poorer mental health and under greater stress used less adaptive coping strategies, such as escapism, but coping efforts still affected mental health independent of prior symptom levels and degree of stress. We compared main versus interactive effects models of stress buffering. Main effects were confined primarily to the emotion-focused coping scales and showed little or negative impacts of coping on mental health; interactive effects, though small, were found with the problem-focused scales. The direction of the relation between problem-focused scales and symptoms may depend in part on perceived efficacy, or how the respondent thought he or she handled the problem. Implications for the measurement of adaptive coping mechanisms and their contextual appropriateness are discussed.