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1.
There is an old but powerful argument for the claim that exhaustive divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A crucial ingredient in this argument is the principle of the “Fixity of the Past” (FP). A seemingly new response to this argument has emerged, the so-called “dependence response,” which involves, among other things, abandoning FP for an alternative principle, the principle of the “Fixity of the Independent” (FI). This paper presents three arguments for the claim that FI ought to be preferred to FP.
相似文献2.
ISHTIYAQUE HAJI 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2005,86(3):321-339
Abstract: A vital presupposition of an influential argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian free action is that free action requires alternative possibilities. A recent, noteworthy challenge to this presupposition invokes a “Divine Frankfurt‐type example”: God's foreknowledge of one's future actions prevents one from doing otherwise without having any responsibility‐undermining effect on one's actions. First, I explain why features of God's omniscience cast doubt on this Frankfurtian response. Second, even if this appraisal is mistaken, I argue that divine foreknowledge is irreconcilable with moral obligation if such foreknowledge eliminates alternatives. 相似文献
3.
Raphael van Riel 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2017,55(4):500-520
Recently, a time‐honored assumption has resurfaced in some parts of the free will debate: (A) if past divine beliefs or past truths about what we do depend on what we do, then these beliefs and truths are, in a sense, up to us; hence, we are able to act otherwise, despite the existence of past truths or past divine beliefs about our future actions. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a novel incompatibilist argument that rests on (A). This argument is interesting in itself, for it is independent of a number of assumptions about the nature of God that have played an essential role in the classical defense of incompatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human free will. Moreover, the argument enables us to identify a difficulty compatibilists encounter when employing (A) to block incompatibilism. 相似文献
4.
Garrett Pendergraft 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):249-266
Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism
obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle
that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological
principle, arguing that it is not always capable of explaining our inability to do otherwise. In response to this challenge,
I point out that this principle is part of a defense against the charge that local miracle compatibilists are committed to
outlandish claims. Thus it is not surprising that the principle, by itself, will often fail to explain our inability to do
otherwise. I then suggest that in many situations in which we are unable to do otherwise, this can be explained by the compatibilist’s
analysis of ability, or his criteria for the truth of ability claims. Thus, the failure of his nomological principle to explain
the falsity of certain ability claims is no strike against local miracle compatibilism. 相似文献
5.
Leigh C. Vicens 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(2):145-155
In this paper I consider the view, held by some Thomistic thinkers, that divine determinism is compatible with human freedom,
even though natural determinism is not. After examining the purported differences between divine and natural determinism,
I discuss the Consequence Argument, which has been put forward to establish the incompatibility of natural determinism and
human freedom. The Consequence Argument, I note, hinges on the premise that an action ultimately determined by factors outside
of the actor’s control is not free. Since, I argue, divine determinism also entails that human actions are ultimately determined
by factors outside of the actors’ control, I suggest that a parallel argument to the Consequence Argument can be constructed
for the incompatibility of divine determinism and human freedom. I conclude that those who reject natural compatibilism on
the basis of the Consequence Argument should also reject divine compatibilism. 相似文献
6.
Jason Wyckoff 《Sophia》2010,49(3):333-341
I argue that the simple foreknowledge view, according to which God knows at some time t
1
what an agent S will do at t
2
, is incompatible with human free will. I criticize two arguments in favor of the thesis that the simple foreknowledge view
is consistent with human freedom, and conclude that, even if divine foreknowledge does not causally compel human action, foreknowledge
is nevertheless relevantly similar to other cases in which human freedom is undermined. These cases include those in which
certain human actions are logically, rather than causally, foreclosed. 相似文献
7.
Tina Talsma 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2013,73(3):209-219
The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists, that free will requires alternatives possibilities, then it looks as if God’s omniscience is incompatible with our free will. One solution to this problem, introduced and defended by David Hunt, draws on the source incompatibilist position in the secular free debate. According to source incompatibilists, free will does not require alternative possibilities but is also not compatible with causal determinism. Hunt argues that because God’s foreknowledge does not eliminate future alternatives through causal means, it is compatible with free will. In this paper, I challenge Hunt’s position using Kevin Timpe’s distinction between “wide” and “narrow” source incompatibilists. I argue that if one wishes to be an incompatibilist concerning free will and causal determinism, one must accept that alternatives are required for free will. And if one must accept that alternatives are a necessary condition for free will, then Hunt’s solution to the foreknowledge dilemma will not succeed. 相似文献
8.
Raphael van Riel 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2014,75(2):119-135
In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a solution to the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge, it is concluded that Ockhamism fails. 相似文献
9.
Richard M. Glatz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):257-272
Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible
for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an
agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent
lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism
and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the
grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening
of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative
to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically
fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle
to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability
to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that
Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.
相似文献
Richard M. GlatzEmail: |
10.
William Lane Craig 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》1986,20(2-3):65-91
Conclusion In conclusion, then, the notion of temporal necessity is certainly queer and perhaps a misnomer. It really has little to do with temporality per se and everything to do with counterfactual openness or closedness. We have seen that the future is as unalterable as the past, but that this purely logical truth is not antithetical to freedom or contingency. Moreover, we have found certain past facts are counterfactually open in that were future events or actualities to be other than they will be, these past facts would have been different as a consequence. God's beliefs about the future are such past facts. Moreover, the effects of actions which God would have taken had He believed differently are also such past facts. Oddly enough, then, virtually any past fact is potentially counterfactually open, and the only necessity that remains is purely de facto. We, of course, do not in general know which events of the past depend counterfactually on present actions, and those cases we do know about seem rather trivial. Our intuitions of the necessity, unalterability, and unpreventability of the past as opposed to the future stem from the impossibility of backward causation, which is precluded by the dynamic nature of time and becoming. But the counterfactual dependence of God's beliefs on future events or actualities is not a case of backward causation: rather future-tense propositions are true in virtue of what will happen, given a view of truth as correspondence, and God simply has the essential property of knowing all and only true propositions. With regard to the future, virtually all facts are counterfactually open, and therefore future-tense propositions are not temporally necessary. Propositions thus move from being temporally contingent to being temporally necessary when all the opportunities to affect things counterfactually have slipped by. Hence, the mere fact that an event is past is no indication that it is counterfactually closed. This is especially evident in the case of God's foreknowledge. If we say that God foreknows that I shall do x and therefore I cannot refrain from doing x, lest I change God's past foreknowledge, we are being deceived by a modality which has nothing to do with my power or freedom. All that is impossible is the conjunction of God's foreknowledge that p and of ~ p; but this modality in sensu composito has no bearing on my ability to act such that ~ p would be true and God would have foreknown differently. Temporal necessity, then, turns out to be only obliquely temporal and modally weak, certainly no threat to freedom or divine foreknowledge. 相似文献
11.
Philosophical Studies - In several writings, John Martin Fischer has argued that those who deny a principle about abilities that he calls ‘the Fixity of the Past’ are committed to... 相似文献
12.
Peter B. M. Vranas 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(2):167-216
I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a
given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity
to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential
actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the bulk of the paper I address six objections to
OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts
with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. 相似文献
13.
Wes Morriston 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(1):1-10
People who do not believe that there is a God constitute an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral
obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands.
This makes it hard to see how a divine command theory can offer a completely general account of the nature of moral obligation.
The present paper takes a close look at this issue as it emerges in the context of the most recent version of Robert Adams’
modified divine command theory. I argue that, despite a valiant attempt to do so, Adams does not succeed in giving an adequate
account of the moral obligations of non-believers. More generally, I claim that if divine commands are construed as genuine
speech acts, theists are well advised not to adopt a divine command theory. 相似文献
14.
William L. Rowe 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(1):37-48
Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover summarize the essence of their paper as follows: “We argue that divine responsibility is sufficient
for divine thankworthiness and consistent with the absence of divine freedom. We do this while insisting on the view that
both freedom and responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism.” In this response I argue that while it makes sense
for believers to be thankful that God exists, it makes no sense for them to thank him for doing the best act he can, given
the circumstances. 相似文献
15.
Timothy Sansbury 《Zygon》2007,42(1):111-122
The causal indeterminacy suggested by quantum mechanics has led to its being the centerpiece of several proposals for divine action that does not contradict natural laws. However, even if the theoretical concerns about the reality of causal indeterminacy are ignored, quantum‐level divine action fails to resolve the problem of ongoing, responsive divine activity. This is because most quantum‐level actions require a significant period of time in order to reach macroscopic levels whether via chaotic amplification or complete divine control of quantum events. Therefore, quantum‐level divine action either requires divine foreknowledge of purportedly free or random events or imposes such limitations on divine actions that they become late, potentially impotent, and confused. I argue that the theological problem of divine action remains; even at its most promising, quantum mechanics offers insufficient resolution. This failure suggests a reexamination of the assumptions that God is temporal and lacks foreknowledge of future contingencies. 相似文献
16.
Christian List 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2014,48(1):156-178
I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence, and thus different actions can be “agentially possible”. The agential perspective is supported by our best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer to what an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical phenomenon, but a higher‐level one on a par with other higher‐level phenomena such as agency and intentionality. 相似文献
17.
Andrew Law 《Philosophical Issues》2023,33(1):110-123
Let (leeway) incompatibilism be the thesis that causal determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. Several prominent authors have claimed that incompatibilism alone can capture, or at least best captures, the intuitive appeal behind Jorge Luis Borges's famous “Garden of Forking Paths” metaphor. The thought, briefly, is this: the “single path” leading up to one's present decision represents the past; the forking paths that one must decide between represent those possible futures consistent with the past and the laws of nature. But if determinism is true, there is only one possible future consistent with the past and the laws and, hence, only one path to choose from. That is, if determinism is true, then we are not free to do otherwise. In this paper, I argue that this understanding of the Garden of Forking Paths faces a number of problems and ought to be rejected even by incompatibilists. I then present an alternative understanding that not only avoids these problems but still supports incompatibilism. Finally, I consider how various versions of (leeway) compatibilism fit with the Garden of Forking Paths as well as the broader question of whether metaphors, however intuitive, have any dialectical force in the debates over freedom. 相似文献
18.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《The Journal of Ethics》2017,21(1):37-61
I motivate a dilemma to show that nothing can be obligatory for anyone regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism (the falsity of determinism) is true. The deterministic horn, to which prime attention is directed, exploits the thesis that obligation requires freedom to do otherwise. Since determinism precludes such freedom, it precludes obligation too. The indeterministic horn allows for freedom to do otherwise but assumes the burden of addressing whether indeterministically caused choices or actions are too much of a matter of luck to be obligatory for anyone. I critically discuss a response to the deterministic horn that invokes the distinction between alternatives compatible with determinism (weak alternatives) and those incompatible with determinism (strong alternatives). 相似文献
19.
Christina M. Gschwandtner 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(3):231-249
In this article I examine Jean-Luc Marion's two-fold criticism of Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of other and self, namely that
Levinas remains unable to overcome ontological difference in Totality and Infinity and does so successfully only with the notion of the appeal in Otherwise than Being and that his account of alterity is ambiguous in failing to distinguish clearly between human and divine other. I outline
Levinas’ response to this criticism and then critically examine Marion's own account of subjectivity that attempts to go beyond
Levinas in its emphasis on a pure or anonymous appeal. I criticize this move as rather problematic and turn instead back to
Levinas for a more convincing account of the relations between self, human other, and God. In this context, I also show that
Levinas in fact draws quite careful distinctions between human and divine others. 相似文献
20.
Taylor W. Cyr 《Philosophical explorations》2017,20(3):308-321
In this paper, I argue that it is open to semicompatibilists to maintain that no ability to do otherwise is required for moral responsibility. This is significant for two reasons. First, it undermines Christopher Evan Franklin’s recent claim that everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility. Second, it reveals an important difference between John Martin Fischer’s semicompatibilism and Kadri Vihvelin’s version of classical compatibilism, which shows that the dispute between them is not merely (or even largely) a verbal dispute. Along the way, I give special attention to the notion of general abilities, and, though I defend the distinctiveness of Fischer’s semicompatibilism against the verbal dispute charge, I also use the discussion of the nature of general abilities to argue for the falsity of a certain claim that Fischer and coauthor Mark Ravizza have made about their account (namely that “reactivity is all of a piece”). 相似文献