The eyes have it: a perceptual investigation of eyespots

Previous work with non-human species has shown that eyespots function as sign stimuli for defensive behaviour. But it is unknown to what extent eyespots are a dominant feature of objects for human perceptual responses. We examined whether young children perceive eyespots as a dominant object feature. One hundred and nineteen children from the first, second, and third grades were presented with small manikins, called "Joopes" that varied in the number, type, and arrangement of facial features. Four kinds of Joope heads were used: single element (eyes, mouth, or beak only), monovalent (spatially concordant eyes and mouth, or eyes and beak), ambivalent (asymmetrical eyes and beak, or eyes and mouth), and cyclopean (single eye with orthogonal beak). Two task groups (Peepers and Gobs) 'helped' the Joopes to either 'see' their food or 'eat' it, by placing food in one of 24 feeding dishes. Results indicated that responses made to the ambivalent Joopes differed, with greater 'drift' shown by the 'eating' group towards the 'seeing' responses than by the 'seeing' group towards the 'eating' responses. The dominant role of eyespots was thus confirmed for children in the second and third grades, but response inconsistencies in the youngest group suggested difficulties in handling incongruent stimuli. The implications of these results for understanding basic perceptual processes are discussed.     

The stroop effect: It is not the robust phenomenon that you have thought it to be

Five experiments demonstrate that context has a powerful effect on the ease with which people can name (Experiments 1-3) or categorize (Experiments 4-5) a stimulus while ignoring another stimulus, irrelevant or conflicting with the target. Selectivity of attention to the target dimension was gauged through Stroop and Garner effects. When the stimulus values along the target dimension and the to-be-ignored dimension were correlated over the experimental trials, large effects of Stroop and Garner influenced performance. However, when random allocation of values created zero dimensional correlation, the Stroop effects vanished. These results imply that when the nominally irrelevant dimension is in fact correlated with the relevant dimension, participants then attend to the irrelevant dimension and thus open themselves up to Stroop interference. Another variable of context, the relative salience of the constituent dimensions, also affected performance with the more discriminable dimension disrupting selective attention to the less discriminable dimension. The results demonstrate the importance of context in engendering the failure of selective attention and challenge traditional automaticity accounts of the Stroop effect.     

It is not how much you have but how you use it: toward a rational use of simulation to support aviation training

One of the most remarkable changes in aviation training over the past few decades is the use of simulation. The capabilities now offered by simulation have created unlimited opportunities for aviation training. In fact, aviation training is now more realistic, safe, cost-effective, and flexible than ever before. However, we believe that a number of misconceptions--or invalid assumptions--exist in the simulation community that prevent us from fully exploiting and utilizing recent scientific advances in a number of related fields in order to further enhance aviation training. These assumptions relate to the overreliance on high-fidelity simulation and to the misuse of simulation to enhance learning of complex skills. The purpose of this article is to discuss these assumptions in the hope of initiating a dialogue between behavioral scientists and engineers.     

The (non-)benefit of choosing: If you get what you want it is not important that you chose it

Self-Determination Theory argues that autonomy plays a major role in intrinsic motivation. Autonomy can be operationalized as choice. Whether positive effects on motivation are caused by the mere act of choosing or by confounding variables is still unclear. In this study (N?=?299, M_age?=?13.1?±?0.6 years), students could work with two polarizing animals. The first group was allowed to choose (choosing & match), two groups were not. In these groups, the teacher allocated the animals to the students resulting in a second group that received the wanted animal (no choosing & match), and a third group that received the unwanted animal (no choosing & no match). Situational motivation and flow experience were assessed. Regarding intrinsic motivation and flow, students in the no choosing & match treatment scored the highest, students of the no choosing & no match group the lowest. In conclusion, matching and not choosing made the difference.     

If you can't grab it,it won't grab you: The effect of restricting the dominant hand on target evaluations

This research examines whether and how holding one object influences evaluations of another. Across four studies, we find that occupying the dominant (vs. non-dominant) hand leads to lower evaluations of the target object; further, process data suggests that this effect occurs because dominant hand restriction impairs the ease with which the perceiver simulates holding the target. Boundary conditions that document effect attenuation and reversal are also consistent with this premise. Collectively, the studies offer support for a circular chain of influence between the perception and action systems.     

The eyes have it!: an fMRI investigation

For the past several years it has been thought that cues, such as eye direction, can trigger reflexive shifts in attention because of their biological relevance and their specialized neural architecture. However, very recently, reported that other stimuli, such as arrows, trigger reflexive shifts in attention in a manner that is behaviourally identical to those triggered by eyes. Nevertheless these authors speculated that reflexive orienting to gaze direction may be subserved by a neural system-the superior temporal sulcus (STS)-that is specialized for processing eyes. The present study presents fMRI data that provide direct and compelling empirical support to this proposal. Subjects were presented with fixation stimuli that, based on instruction, could be perceived as eyes or as another type of directional cue. Both produced equivalent shifts in reflexive attention, replicating Ristic et al. However, the neural systems subserving the two forms of orienting were not equivalent-with the STS being engaged exceptionally when the fixation stimulus was perceived as eyes.     

If you have a choice,you have trouble: Stimulus valence modulates presentation‐order effects in preference judgment

It is well known that the presentation order of choice options often affects decision outcomes to a significant degree. However, despite the significance and wide occurrence of the effects, they are ignored in most preference models. Furthermore, psychophysical findings of stimulus‐magnitude dependent presentation‐order effects have not been acknowledged previously in the cognitive literature on preference judgments. Thus, the potential moderating effect of the level of stimulus magnitude (here, valence) on the direction and size of order effects in preference judgment has not been investigated previously. In two experiments, participants (117 and 204, respectively) rated their preference for pairs of everyday‐type objects and phenomena (e.g., apple–pear, headache–stomachache). Stimuli were spaced horizontally, and each participant received them in one of two opposite within‐pair presentation orders. Participants also rated the stimuli's valence on a scale from very bad to very good. The results showed a positive correlation between the rated valence and the tendency to prefer the first‐mentioned (left) stimulus; that is, the effect was greatest, and opposite, for choices between the most attractive and the most unattractive options, respectively. In terms of Hellström's ( 1979 ) sensation‐weighting model, the positive correlation is caused by a higher weight (i.e., impact on the preference judgment) for the left stimulus than for the right, which is possibly due to the left stimulus being compared to the right. The results suggest that researchers may have failed previously to find important moderators of presentation‐order effects in preference judgment due to the failure to use sufficiently attractive or unattractive stimuli. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Visual recognition: as soon as you know it is there, you know what it is

What is the sequence of processing steps involved in visual object recognition? We varied the exposure duration of natural images and measured subjects' performance on three different tasks, each designed to tap a different candidate component process of object recognition. For each exposure duration, accuracy was lower and reaction time longer on a within-category identification task (e.g., distinguishing pigeons from other birds) than on a perceptual categorization task (e.g., birds vs. cars). However, strikingly, at each exposure duration, subjects performed just as quickly and accurately on the categorization task as they did on a task requiring only object detection: By the time subjects knew an image contained an object at all, they already knew its category. These findings place powerful constraints on theories of object recognition.     

Object detection and basic-level categorization: Sometimes you know it is there before you know what it is

A tight temporal coupling between object detection (is an object there?) and object categorization (what kind of object is it?) has recently been reported (Grill-Spector &; Kanwisher, 2005), suggesting that image segmentation into different objects and categorization of those objects at the basic level may be the very same mechanism. In the present work, we decoupled the time course of detection and categorization through two task manipulations. First, inverted objects were categorized significantly less accurately than upright objects across a range of image presentation durations, but no significant effect on object detection was observed. Second, systematically degrading stimuli affected categorization significantly more than object detection. The time course of object detection and object categorization can be selectively manipulated. They are not intrinsically linked. As soon as you know an object is there, you do not necessarily know what it is.     

If you suffer from a headache, then you have a brain tumour: domain-specific reasoning 'bias' and hypochondriasis

We explored whether hypochondriacal patients selectively search for threat-confirming information when asked to judge the validity of conditional rules in the context of general and health threats. We also explored several factors that may underly participants' information selection (e.g., believability of the rule). Hypochondriacal patients (n = 20) and healthy controls (n = 20) were presented with modified Wason Selection Tasks (WSTs). The WSTs contained safety rules and danger rules. In the context of general threat, both groups of participants adopted a verificationistic strategy in the case of danger rules and a Popperian strategy in the case of safety rules. Importantly, only hypochondriacal persons showed a similar threat-confirming reasoning pattern in the context of health threat. The latter finding contrasts with the earlier study of de Jong et al. (1998) [de Jong, P. J., Haenen, M.-A., Schmidt, A., & Mayer, B. (1998a). Hypochondriasis: the role of fear-confirming reasoning. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 65-74; de Jong, P. J., Mayer, B., van der Hijden, B., B?gels, S., & van den Hout, M. (1998b). Better safe than sorry: reasoning with conditionals in the context of threat. Submitted for publication.] in which both hypochondriacs and healthy controls showed a threat-confirming strategy in the domain of health threat. The WSTs in that study however, contained a (unintended) worry manipulation ("after hearing this, you get worried"), which might have induced a reasoning strategy in controls that is normally restricted to hypochondriacs. Taken together, the present results sustain the idea that the perception of threat activates a better safe than sorry strategy. In the case of phobic threats, such a reasoning strategy immunizes against refutation of phobic convictions.     

Now you see it, now you don't: repetition blindness for nonwords

Repetition blindness (RB) for nonwords has been found in some studies, but not in others. The authors propose that the discrepancy in results is fueled by participant strategy; specifically, when rapid serial visual presentation lists are short and participants are explicitly informed that some trials will contain repetitions, participants are able to use partial orthographic information to correctly guess repetitions on repetition trials while avoiding spurious repetition reports on control trials. The authors first replicated V. Coltheart and R. Langdon's (2003) finding of RB for words but repetition advantage for nonwords (Experiment 1). When all participants were encouraged to utilize partial information in a same/different matching task along with an identification task, a repetition advantage was observed for both words and nonwords (Experiment 2). When guessing of repetitions was made detectable by including non-identical but orthographically similar items in the experiments, the repetition advantage disappeared; instead, RB was found for both words and nonwords (Experiments 3 and 4). Finally, when experiments did not contain any identical items, participants almost never reported repetitions, and reliable RB was found for orthographically similar words and nonwords (Experiments 5 and 6).     

The eyes have it: visual pop-out in infants and adults

Visual search studies with adults have shown that stimuli that contain a unique perceptual feature pop out from dissimilar distractors and are unaffected by the number of distractors. Studies with very young infants have suggested that they too might exhibit pop-out. However, infant studies have used paradigms in which pop-out is measured in seconds or minutes, whereas in adults pop-out occurs in milliseconds. In addition, with the previous infant paradigms the effects from higher cognitive processes such as memory cannot be separated from pop-out and selective attention. Consequently, whether infants exhibit the phenomenon of pop-out and have selective attention mechanisms as found in adults is not clear. This study was an initial attempt to design a paradigm that would provide a comparable measure between infants and adults, thereby allowing a more accurate determination of the developmental course of pop-out and selective attention mechanisms. To this end, we measured 3-month-olds' and adults' saccade latencies to visual arrays that contained either a + among Ls (target-present) or all Ls (target-absent) with set sizes of 1, 3, 5 or 8 items. In Experiment 1, infants' saccade latencies remained unchanged in the target-present conditions as set size increased, whereas their saccade latencies increased linearly in the target-absent conditions as set size increased. In Experiment 2, adults' saccade latencies in the target-present and target-absent conditions showed the same pattern as the infants. The only difference between the infants and adults was that the infants' saccade latencies were slower in every condition. These results indicate that infants do exhibit pop-out on a millisecond scale, that it is unaffected by the number of distractors, and likely have similar functioning selective attention mechanisms. Moreover, the results indicate that eye movement latencies are a more comparable and accurate measure for assessing the phenomenon of pop-out and underlying attentional mechanisms in infants.     

Now you see it,now you don't: The context dependent nature of category-effects in visual object recognition

In two experiments, we test predictions regarding processing advantages/disadvantages for natural objects and artefacts in visual object recognition. Varying three important parameters—degree of perceptual differentiation, stimulus format, and stimulus exposure duration—we show how different category-effects can be provoked in normal subjects on the same task. We interpret the results in light of the Pre-semantic Account of Category Effects (PACE; Gerlach, 2009), and conclude that category-effects do not reflect absolute processing differences between categories. Rather, category-effects are products of common operations which are differentially affected by the structural similarity among objects (with natural objects being more structurally similar than artefacts). The potentially most important aspect of the present study is the demonstration that category-effects are very context dependent; an aspect which has been neglected in earlier literature on category-specificity. PACE provides a useful framework in this respect, as it specifies how category-effects are influenced by changes in task and stimulus characteristics.     

Now you see it, now you don't: feminist training in family therapy

This article describes the state of feminist training in family therapy. Methods of assessment include questionnaires to all programs accredited by COAMFTE in universities and institutes and to leading institutes not accredited; interviews with editors of the Journal of Feminist Family Therapy; interviews with many who pioneered the feminist critique in family therapy; inspection of two major national conferences; and a search of publications. Although most program directors describe their programs as feminist and judge their training to be sufficient, their report contrasts with the perspectives of many of the journal editors and pioneers, with the small amount of training in gender issues at national conferences, and with the small number of publications. The authors offer discussion of the findings and recommendations.     

Now you see it; now you don't: inhibiting recall and recognition of scenes

Postevent misleading information can distort people's memories by altering and adding scenes. But can you also inhibit the retrieval of information from memory? In two studies we show that postevent information can make memory for a scene less accessible. In both studies participants first saw an event (e.g. a restaurant scene displayed in slides, or a drunk‐driving incident shown via a video clip). Later they were shown the same event without a critical scene and were told either to use this to generate a story (Experiment 1) or to imagine the event (Experiment 2). Finally they were tested. Relative to controls, this postevent omission led to fewer people reporting the critical scene in free recall and in recognition. Thus, we demonstrated that it may be possible to inhibit memories. This finding has important implications for eyewitness testimony and the recovered memory debate. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory for disguised same- and cross-race faces: The eyes have it

According to research on the cross-race effect, through experience, observers learn which diagnostic facial features are important for recognizing same-race compared to cross-race faces. These diagnostic facial features differ across racial groups; whereas the upper facial region is more diagnostic for White faces, the lower facial region is more diagnostic for Black faces. We tested how disguises at encoding (sunglasses [upper region] or bandana [lower region]) affect White and Black observers’ recognition memory for White and Black faces. We found that disguises override the diagnosticity of race-specific regions and have similar effects on recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Relative to no disguise, recognition memory was impaired more by disguising upper (sunglasses) than lower (bandana) facial regions. This supports the hypothesis that facial features trump race-specific diagnostic regions, and the eye region provides relatively more diagnostic information than lower facial features.