Spinoza on the Essences of Modes

This paper examines some aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics of the essences of modes.2 ²I would like to thank John Carriero, Calvin Normore, Eliot Michaelson, Eileen Nutting, Paul Nichols, Alexi Patsaouras, Rachel Johnson and Sarah Jansen for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this paper. I situate Spinoza's use of the notion of essence as a response to traditional, Aristotelian, ways of thinking about essence. I argue that, although Spinoza rejects part of the Aristotelian conception of essence, according to which it is in virtue of its essence that a thing is a member of a kind, he nevertheless retains a different part of such a conception, according to which an essence is some structural feature of a thing which causally explains other, non-essential features. I go on to develop an account of Spinoza's metaphysics of essence, according to which essences, what he sometimes calls formal essences, are produced by the divine essence prior to and independent of the creation of finite modes, and according to which essences are the formal or exemplar causes of finite modes. I then argue that finite modes, in virtue of the formal essences which they actualize, are genuine causal relata. Finally, I offer some speculations about Spinoza's answer to the question, ‘Why, in a necessitarian cosmos filled with formal essences, should there be temporal finite modes at all?’     

The First Antinomy and Spinoza

Scholars commonly assume that Kant never seriously engaged with Spinoza or Spinozism. However, in his later writings Kant argues several times that Spinozism is the most consistent form of transcendental realism. In the first part of the paper, I argue that the first Antinomy, debating the age and size of the world, already reflects Kant's confrontation with Spinozist metaphysics. Specifically, the position articulated in the Antithesis – according to which the world is infinite and uncreated – is Spinozist, not Leibnizian, as commonly assumed. In the second part of the paper, I raise the chief Spinozist challenge to the Antinomy, arising from Spinoza's reliance on a cosmological `totum analyticum' – an infinite whole which is prior to its parts. In conclusion, I begin to elaborate a defence of the Kantian position, confronting Spinoza's infinite whole with Kant's account of the absolutely infinite in his discussion of the sublime.     

Spinoza on Lying and Suicide

Spinoza is often taken to claim that suicide is never a rational act, that a ‘free’ person acting by the guidance of reason will never terminate his/her own existence. Spinoza also defends the prima facie counterintuitive claim that the rational person will never act dishonestly. This second claim can, in fact, be justified when Spinoza's moral psychology and account of motivation are properly understood. Moreover, making sense of the free man's exception-less honesty in this way also helps to clarify how Spinoza should, and indeed does, recognize the possibility of rational suicide.     

Wisdom as a Meditation on Life: Spinoza on Bacon and Civil History

In letter 37 to Johannes Bouwmeester, Spinoza identifies a historiola mentis à la Bacon as an important tool for distinguishing more easily between adequate and inadequate ideas. This paper contends that Spinoza's advice is to take into account Baconian-style ‘Civil History’ as providing instructive material for contemplating the variety, complexity, and persistency of human passionate behaviour. Specifically, it argues that Baconian civil history forms an integral part of Spinoza's reflections on provisional morality. Although for Spinoza, philosophical beatitude ultimately demands understanding affects through their first causes – the intuitive perception of things sub specie aeternitatis – in the realm of everyday Spinoza allows for a different, more pragmatic approach to morality. This paper argues at this stage that a philosophical understanding of the mind and its affections is not needed. Spinoza, following Bacon, holds that conduct of practical affairs is particularly improved when those so engaged acquire historical knowledge of the human condition and apply it. Specifically, both authors place special emphasis on a history of men's characters, actions, and vices as providing the material basis for concrete, directly applicable moral and civil precepts.     

Freedom from and Freedom for: Luther's Concept of Freedom for the Twenty‐First Century

This article examines Martin Luther's two fundamental claims around Christian freedom. Drawing on Luther, I suggest three primary characteristics of Christian freedom that should be recovered and championed in our twenty‐first‐century context: it is relational, it is a gift; and it contains within it an ethical imperative for the sake of the neighbor. Together, these three characteristics point to the fact that in a Christian understanding, “freedom” is never considered by itself, but only in the larger context of “freedom from” and “freedom for.”     

The errant name: Badiou and Deleuze on individuation,causality and infinite modes in Spinoza

Although Alain Badiou dedicates a number of texts to the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza throughout his work—after all, the author of a systematic philosophy of being more geometrico must be a point of reference for the philosopher who claims that “mathematics = ontology”—the reading offered in Meditation Ten of his key work Being and Event presents the most significant moment of this engagement. Here, Badiou proposes a reading of Spinoza’s ontology that foregrounds a concept that is as central to, and celebrated in, his philosophy as it is strictly excluded by Spinoza: the void. In nuce, Badiou contends that for all of Spinoza’s efforts to offer an ontology of total plenitude, the void returns in his philosophy under the (at first sight) unlikely name of infinite mode. The presence of this errant name in Spinoza’s philosophy bears witness to the failure of his most profound intellectual endeavour. However striking Badiou’s reading of Spinoza, this paper argues that it fails to adequately grasp Spinoza’s metaphysics, particularly with respect to the central concept of modal essence, a concept which does not appear at all in the Badiouian text. By introducing a consideration of this concept, it becomes able to resolve the status of infinite modes, and to account for the move across the notorious finite–infinite divide. Thus the argument turns to the reading of Spinoza offered by Gilles Deleuze for a more thorough-going and nuanced approach, much superior to Badiou’s procrustean critique.

Intellectual Freedom and Economic Sufficiency as Educational Entitlements

This paper explores the historic philosophical contributions ofMill and Marx toward a comprehensive conception of intellectual freedomas a basic educational entitlement. In a perhaps surprising confluence,Marx's theory of a material base for freedom of thought is then extendedin a discussion of contemporary freedoms including, importantly,academic freedom and its implication for teaching, the profession andits training.     

Three Arguments For Scientific Freedom

The principle of scientific freedom is usually taken forgranted; few attempts have been made to justify it systematically. The present paper discusses three “classic” arguments, which are used to justify this principle. However, it will become clear that (a) each argument refers to a different understanding of science and therefore justifies a different type of science, and that (b) each of them is based on assumptions which are not always consistent with the social reality of scientific research; the profound changes science has undergone since its inception are not sufficiently taken into account.     

Freedom and Borderline Experience

In–depth interviews with 52 diverse informants about their experience of freedom reveal a devaluation of freedom relative to money and power. The way in which many of these informants conceptualize freedom has a borderline quality to it—a term that refers to borderline personality disorder, but which is conceptualized here as a cultural construct similar to that of the culture of narcissism, as Christopher Lasch called it. The conclusion speculates about why informants see the world in this way.     

绝对与人类自由--谢林《自由论》探析

本文集中探讨谢林的《自由论》及其在西方哲学史上的意义,作者在指出这部著作不足的同时,充分肯定谢林对自由及与之相关问题的发问,并认为这是近现代西方哲学对人类自身命运的一次重要思考。     

英国的健康促进与个人自由

从英国的3种自由观——消极自由、积极自由和赋权自由出发,论述了健康促进和个人自由的关系。通过比较不同自由观的特征以及其对健康促进的影响,得出结论:当今英国政府主张的赋权自由,尊重和维护了公众的个人选择,提高了公众在健康教育过程中的参与性,有助于健康促进的开展。     

Varieties of Epistemic Freedom

When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.     

庄子与史铁生的自由精神之比较

“乘物以游心”的庄子在乱世以自由逍遥的精神追求探究人生意义,执着的行魂史铁生处盛世思接远古,以个体的自由精神彰显生命本色。前者的自由精神是在时代之匣里对必然人生命运的结果性追求,后者的自由精神是于个体的偶然命运之殇里传递过程的美好。二者穿越时空对自由精神的多向度诉求使得人类的普世价值历久弥新。     

Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Autonomy

The libertarian view of freedom has attracted considerable attention in the past three decades. It has also been subjected to numerous criticisms regarding its nature and effects on society. G. A. Cohen's recent book, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, continues this attack by linking libertarian views on freedom to their view of self-ownership. This paper formulates and evaluates Cohen's major arguments against libertarian freedom and self-ownership. It contends that his arguments against the libertarian rights definition of freedom are inadequate and need modification. Similarly, Cohen's defense of restrictions on self-ownership on behalf of autonomy are also found wanting. Finally, I argue that the thesis of self-ownership (whether in its full or partial version) ought to be rejected.     

斯宾诺莎与预定论

“预定论”是新教神学中的基本教义,也是新教神学家解决恩典、救赎等问题的根本途径。作为一个与新教颇具渊源的哲学家,斯宾诺莎构建了一种与预定论多有相似之处的决定论理论。以这些相似性为契机,有研究者认为斯宾诺莎是在新教预定论的基础上提出了他的决定论思想,有人甚至把他视为一个新教哲学家。然而,通过对这两种理论进行对比,我们发现,无论在精神气质、思想前提,还是在具体内涵等方面,二者均有深刻差异。斯宾诺莎所坚持的并非预定论思路上的决定论,也不以新教的预定论作为其直接的理论渊源。     

Ethics, Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure

Universities can and have existed without academic freedom and academic tenure. But academic freedom is necessary for a university dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge in a democratic society. Both academic freedom and academic tenure are not only rights but also carry with them moral obligations. Furthermore academic tenure is the best defense of academic freedom that American universities have found. Academic tenure can be successfully defended from the many contemporary attacks to which it is being subjected only insofar as it is necessary to defend academic freedom, and only if all involved in the system of tenure observe the ethical requirements that the system demands.     

Freedom,Love, and Justice

This article starts from love as being a fundamental value, guiding modes of behaviour that establish a reliable framework and basis for the recognition of the rights and dignity of everyone in the community. The affirmation of justice and freedom based on love leads to corrective and transformative action in cases where life is threatened and rights are being violated. Drawing on the experience and witness of Martin Luther King Jr, the article underlines that love empowers the oppressed to stand up and becomes a moral imperative for change, against the background of the many forces promoting conflict and violence, division, and polarization. The power of love is a message to the world, to the powerful, and to the powerless – to all who long for a different reality from what we see in today’s world. This needs to be expressed in the quest for the unity of the church and the unity of humankind, serving the sustainability and unity of God’s creation.     

马克思的自由观及其当代意义

马克思的哲学中,艺术活动始终是人类自由生存的典范状态。在其早期思想中,由于视生产劳动本质上是一种类似于艺术的活动,马克思认为消除了异化的生产实践便是人的自由的实现?而在其晚年思想中,由于认识到物质生产领域始终是一个必然性王国,自由王国便被置于这一必然王国的彼岸,自由的实现也便只能存在于艺术活动之中,但这一自由王国的繁荣又依赖于必然王国借助生产率的提高所提供的自由时间的增长。马克思的这一自由观对于当代人类的自我理解仍有重要的意义。     

Subjectivity,Reflection and Freedom in Later Foucault

Abstract

This paper proposes a new reading of the interaction between subjectivity, reflection and freedom within Foucault’s later work. I begin by introducing three approaches to subjectivity, locating these in relation both to Foucault’s texts and to the recent literature. I suggest that Foucault himself operates within what I call the ‘entanglement approach’, and, as such, he faces a potentially serious challenge, a challenge forcefully articulated by Han. Using Kant’s treatment of reflection as a point of comparison, I argue that Foucault possesses the resources to meet this challenge. The key, I contend, is to distinguish two related theses about reflection and freedom: Foucault’s position is distinctive precisely because he accepts one of these theses whilst rejecting the other. I conclude by indicating how this reading might connect to the longstanding question of Foucault’s own right to appeal to normative standards.