Action and Variation in Perception

In her paper, ‘Action and Self‐location in Perception’, Susanna Schellenberg argues that perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, such as its size and shape, requires a capacity to act. More specifically, Schellenberg argues that, to have a perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, a subject needs to have a certain practical conception of space, or a spatial know‐how. That, in turn, requires self‐locating representations, which locate the subject, relative to the perceptual object, as a perceiver and an agent, viz., someone who has a capacity for actions. She also makes two objections, viz., the unification objection and the sentient statue objection, to Alva Noë's sensorimotor view, a different account of how perceptual experience depends on actions. I will argue that her objections jointly render problematic not only Noë's but also her own view.     

Updating a progic

This paper presents a progic, or probabilistic logic, in the sense of Haenni et al. [8]. The progic presented here is based on Bayesianism, as the progic discussed by Williamson [15]. However, the underlying generalised Bayesianism differs from the objective Bayesianism used by Williamson, in the calibration norm, and the liberalisation and interpretation of the reference probability in the norm of equivocation. As a consequence, the updating dynamics of both Bayesianisms differ essentially. Whereas objective Bayesianism is based on a probabilistic re-evaluation, orthodox Bayesianism is based on a probabilistic revision. I formulate a generalised and iterable orthodox Bayesian revision dynamics. This allows to define an updating procedure for the generalised Bayesian progic. The paper compares the generalised Bayesian progic and Williamson's objective Bayesian progic in strength, update dynamics and with respect to language (in)sensitivity.     

Learned changes in the sensitivity of stimulus representations: Associative and nonassociative mechanisms

Central to associative learning theory is the proposal that the concurrent activation of a pair of event representations will establish or strengthen a link between them. Associative theorists have devoted much energy to establishing what representations are involved in any given learning paradigm and the rules that determine the degree to which the link is strengthened. They have paid less attention to the question of what determines that a representation will be activated, assuming, for the case of classical conditioning, that presentation of an appropriately intense stimulus from an appropriate modality will be enough. But this assumption is unjustified. Ipresent the results of experiments on the effects of stimulus exposure in rats that suggest that mere exposure to a stimulus can influence its perceptual effectiveness—that the ability of a stimulus to activate its representation can be changed by experience. This conclusion is of interest for two reasons. First, it supplies a direct explanation for the phenomenon of perceptual learning—the enhancement of stimulus discriminability produced by some forms of stimulus exposure. Second, it poses a theoretical challenge in that it seems to require the existence of a learning mechanism outside the scope of those envisaged by current formal theories of associative learning. I offer some speculations as to how this mechanism might be incorporated into such theories.     

The effects of schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects

We examined how the schema affects recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects. First, participants watched consecutive slides that described a man in the kitchen. In the slides, the man performed schema‐consistent actions and schema‐inconsistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects and schema‐inconsistent objects were left in the kitchen space. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. For objects, the discrimination between targets and distracters was more accurate for schema‐inconsistent items than for schema‐consistent items, owing to perceptual, thought, and emotional recollections for schema‐inconsistent object targets. For actions, schema‐consistent targets were more frequently recognized than schema‐inconsistent targets, with more remember judgments based on perceptual and contextual recollections. While item‐specific information of schema‐inconsistent targets could be elaborated for objects, the perceptual details and the contextual relationship of schema‐consistent targets could be elaborated for actions. We also found less false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters than for schema‐consistent object distracters. The retrieval of the perceptual details of schema‐consistent action targets could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.     

Perception as evidence accumulation and Bayesian inference: insights from masked priming

The authors argue that perception is Bayesian inference based on accumulation of noisy evidence and that, in masked priming, the perceptual system is tricked into treating the prime and the target as a single object. Of the 2 algorithms considered for formalizing how the evidence sampled from a prime and target is combined, only 1 was shown to be consistent with the existing data from the visual word recognition literature. This algorithm was incorporated into the Bayesian Reader model (D. Norris, 2006), and its predictions were confirmed in 3 experiments. The experiments showed that the pattern of masked priming is not a fixed function of the relations between the prime and the target but can be changed radically by changing the task from lexical decision to a same-different judgment. Implications of the Bayesian framework of masked priming for unconscious cognition and visual masking are discussed.     

Causal attributions, sanctions, and normal mood variations

The causal-locus hypothesis (CLH) asserts that persons making internal attributions for failure and external attributions for success experience more negative postoutcome moods than persons making the opposite attributions. Three experiments assessed the CLH. Although outcomes consistently affected moods and attributions, attributions did not affect moods. Significant correlations consistent with the CLH were also infrequently obtained. Another theory, the sanctioned-object hypothesis (SOH), was proposed for understanding how causal attributions lead to mood changes. This hypothesis asserts that the application of positive or negative sanctions to objects in the perceptual field is a central determinant of mood and that attributions affect mood when their content and salience activate sanctioning processes. A fourth experiment evaluated the competing theories. The results supported the SOH but not the CLH. The findings are discussed in terms of their implications for understanding mood variations and the effects that moods have on the construction of attributions and for adopting methodological alternatives that may be valuable for future laboratory research studying mood variations.     

Did Tom Kuhn actually Meet Tom Bayes?

Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change. In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change.

The Epistemological Status of Vision and its Implications for Design

Computational theories of vision typically rely on the analysis of two aspects of human visual function: (1) object and shape recognition (2) co-calibration of sensory measurements. Both these approaches are usually based on an inverse-optics model, where visual perception is viewed as a process of inference from a 2D retinal projection to a 3D percept within a Euclidean space schema. This paradigm has had great success in certain areas of vision science, but has been relatively less successful in understanding perceptual representation, namely, the nature of the perceptual encoding. One of the drawbacks of inverse-optics approaches has been the difficulty in defining the constraints needed to make the inference computationally tractable (e.g. regularity assumptions, Bayesian priors, etc.). These constraints, thought to be learned assumptions about the nature of the physical and optical structures of the external world, have to be incorporated into any workable computational model in the inverse-optics paradigm. But inference models that employ an inverse optics plus structural assumptions approach inevitably result in a naïve realist theory of perceptual representation. Another drawback of inference models for theories of perceptual representation is their inability to explain central features of the visual experience. The one most evident in the process and visual understanding of design is the fact that some visual configurations appear, often spontaneously, as perceptually more coherent than others. The epistemological consequences of inferential approaches to vision indicate that they fail to capture enduring aspects of our visual experience. Therefore they may not be suited to a theory of perceptual representation, or useful for an understanding of the role of perception in the design process and product.     

Perceiving expressions of emotion: What evidence could bear on questions about perceptual experience of mental states?

What evidence could bear on questions about whether humans ever perceptually experience any of another’s mental states, and how might those questions be made precise enough to test experimentally? This paper focusses on emotions and their expression. It is proposed that research on perceptual experiences of physical properties provides one model for thinking about what evidence concerning expressions of emotion might reveal about perceptual experiences of others’ mental states. This proposal motivates consideration of the hypothesis that categorical perception of expressions of emotion occurs, can be facilitated by information about agents’ emotions, and gives rise to phenomenal expectations. It is argued that the truth of this hypothesis would support a modest version of the claim that humans sometimes perceptually experience some of another’s mental states. Much available evidence is consistent with, but insufficient to establish, the truth of the hypothesis. We are probably not yet in a position to know whether humans ever perceptually experience others’ mental states.     

Dialectical Contradictions and Classical Formal Logic

A dialectical contradiction can be appropriately described within the framework of classical formal logic. It is in harmony with the law of noncontradiction. According to our definition, two theories make up a dialectical contradiction if each of them is consistent and their union is inconsistent. It can happen that each of these two theories has an intended model. A number of examples of this are to be found in the history of science.     

Distance perception during self-movement

The perception of distance in open fields was widely studied with static observers. However, it is a fact that we and the world around us are in continuous relative movement, and that our perceptual experience is shaped by the complex interactions between our senses and the perception of our self-motion. This poses interesting questions about how our nervous system integrates this multisensory information to resolve specific tasks of our daily life, for example, distance estimation. This study provides new evidence about how visual and motor self-motion information affects our perception of distance and a hypothesis about how these two sources of information can be integrated to calibrate the estimation of distance. This model accounts for the biases found when visual and proprioceptive information is inconsistent.     

Objective Bayesianism,Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism

Objective Bayesianism has been criticised on the grounds that objective Bayesian updating, which on a finite outcome space appeals to the maximum entropy principle, differs from Bayesian conditionalisation. The main task of this paper is to show that this objection backfires: the difference between the two forms of updating reflects negatively on Bayesian conditionalisation rather than on objective Bayesian updating. The paper also reviews some existing criticisms and justifications of conditionalisation, arguing in particular that the diachronic Dutch book justification fails because diachronic Dutch book arguments are subject to a reductio: in certain circumstances one can Dutch book an agent however she changes her degrees of belief. One may also criticise objective Bayesianism on the grounds that its norms are not compulsory but voluntary, the result of a stance. It is argued that this second objection also misses the mark, since objective Bayesian norms are tied up in the very notion of degrees of belief.     

Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution

In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one ‘me’ and that is the one that is conscious. This means that ‘singularity’ is a defining aspect of ‘consciousness’. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspace and Recurrent Processing theory, are generally not very clear on this issue. These theories have traditionally relied heavily on neuropsychological observations and have interpreted various disorders, such as anosognosia, neglect and split-brain as impairments in conscious awareness without any reference to ‘the singularity’. In this review, we will re-examine the theoretical implications of these impairments in conscious awareness and propose a new way how to conceptualize consciousness of singularity. We will argue that the subjective feeling of singularity can coexist with several disunified conscious experiences. Singularity awareness may only come into existence due to environmental response constraints. That is, perceptual, language, memory, attentional and motor processes may largely proceed unintegrated in parallel, whereas a sense of unity only arises when organisms need to respond coherently constrained by the affordances of the environment. Next, we examine from this perspective psychiatric disorders and psycho-active drugs. Finally, we present a first attempt to test this hypothesis with a resting state imaging experiment in a split-brain patient. The results suggest that there is substantial coherence of activation across the two hemispheres. These data show that a complete lesioning of the corpus callosum does not, in general, alter the resting state networks of the brain. Thus, we propose that we have separate systems in the brain that generate distributed conscious. The sense of singularity, the experience of a ‘Me-ness’, emerges in the interaction between the world and response-planning systems, and this leads to coherent activation in the different functional networks across the cortex.     

Influence of semantic consistency and perceptual features on visual attention during scene viewing in toddlers

Conceptual representations of everyday scenes are built in interaction with visual environment and these representations guide our visual attention. Perceptual features and object-scene semantic consistency have been found to attract our attention during scene exploration. The present study examined how visual attention in 24-month-old toddlers is attracted by semantic violations and how perceptual features (i. e. saliency, centre distance, clutter and object size) and linguistic properties (i. e. object label frequency and label length) affect gaze distribution. We compared eye movements of 24-month-old toddlers and adults while exploring everyday scenes which either contained an inconsistent (e.g., soap on a breakfast table) or consistent (e.g., soap in a bathroom) object. Perceptual features such as saliency, centre distance and clutter of the scene affected looking times in the toddler group during the whole viewing time whereas looking times in adults were affected only by centre distance during the early viewing time. Adults looked longer to inconsistent than consistent objects either if the objects had a high or a low saliency. In contrast, toddlers presented semantic consistency effect only when objects were highly salient. Additionally, toddlers with lower vocabulary skills looked longer to inconsistent objects while toddlers with higher vocabulary skills look equally long to both consistent and inconsistent objects. Our results indicate that 24-month-old children use scene context to guide visual attention when exploring the visual environment. However, perceptual features have a stronger influence in eye movement guidance in toddlers than in adults. Our results also indicate that language skills influence cognitive but not perceptual guidance of eye movements during scene perception in toddlers.     

言语理解中的知觉符号表征与命题符号表征

采用移动窗口技术探讨言语理解中信息表征的方式。被试为华南师范大学本科生96名。实验材料按照探测图画中物体的形状跟先前阅读的句子中描述的物体的隐含形状的关系总体上分为两类,一类是匹配版本,一类是不匹配版本。采用相关样本t检验分别对两种条件下图画再认的反应时间和正确率进行统计分析。实验1中被试读完句子以后马上进行图画探测任务,结果表明这时被试头脑中进行的是知觉符号表征。实验2中被试的阅读任务难度增大,结果表明这时被试头脑中进行的是命题符号表征。实验3中被试阅读的关键信息进入长时记忆以后再进行图画探测任务,结果表明这时被试头脑中进行的也是命题符号表征。总的实验结果表明言语理解中既存在知觉符号表征,也存在命题符号表征,知觉符号表征是信息表征的一种早期状态,人类头脑中最终的信息表征形式主要是命题符号表征。     

Retrospective Frequency Formats Promote Consistent Experience‐Based Bayesian Judgments

On the basis of their experiences with pregnant patients in their practice, obstetrician/gynecologists estimated the posterior probability of Down syndrome given a positive screening result. They also estimated the base rate of Down syndrome in their practice, along with the hit and false alarm rates for the screening test; for each subject, these numbers were combined to calculate a posterior probability to which the initial estimated posterior probability could be compared. Physicians gave highly consistent estimates when asked to think about their past experiences in terms of event frequencies. However, those told to respond using single event probabilities or to use past experiences to predict prospective frequencies gave inconsistent Bayesian estimates. Thus, when making Bayesian judgments based on real life experience, natural frequency formats only lead to better judgments, compared with single event probability formats, if people think retrospectively, not when using past experiences to make prospective predictions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

New evidence for the perceptual precedence of global information

Two experiments are reported investigating the order in which global and local information of visual forms is processed. Subjects were presented with compound stimuli and were asked to identify the local level, always consisting of small letters. At the global level, the stimuli could be either large letters, consistent or inconsistent with the local level, or meaningless patterns derived from the large letters by modifying the spatial relations among segments. Results showed that inconsistent stimuli were responded to more slowly than both consistent stimuli and meaningless patterns, which did not differ from each other. This was true both when letters and patterns were presented intermixed, as in experiment 1 or separately, as in experiment 2. The pattern obtained accords well with predictions derived from the perceptual precedence hypothesis which states that global information becomes available at a faster rate than local information. No support for the alternative, post-perceptual, hypothesis was found.     

性别刻板印象的人际传播特点研究——基于社会认同理论或社会支配理论?

为探讨性别刻板印象的传播更符合社会认同理论还是社会支配理论的假设,采用单一复述故事法来研究不同性别的传播者、故事主人公和听众在传播一致性性别刻板印象信息和不一致性别刻板印象信息的过程中所表现出的特点。结果发现:男性更少地传播不利于维持阶层差异的不一致性刻板印象,女性更多地传播打破现有阶层划分的男性不一致刻板印象。这些传播特点都较为支持社会支配理论的假设。。     

On the development of color naming in young children: data and theory

Among the semantics of different common attributes of the environment, consistent and correct color naming seems to develop paradoxically late in children, for even young infants discriminate and categorize colors well, color is a salient feature of the child's world, and children are aware of color as a separate domain, know color terms, and respond to color questions with color names. Several specific anomalies characterize early linguistic development in this domain: Errors in beginning color naming are perseverative or random, there seems to be a minimum age for correct and consistent color naming, developmental rate shows wide individual differences, and acquisition among girls is generally faster than among boys. This essay reviews data that support these observations, and evaluates three traditional explanations for them--including the perceptual salience of color for children, experience and learning in the child, and cognitive development--against a fourth new possibility. It is hypothesized that appropriate color naming may depend on the maturation and integration of specific cortical neurological structures; among several interpretations, the neurological one accounts best for diverse characteristics of early color naming.