Transcendence, Symbolic Immortality and Evil

Ernest Becker’s work addresses the implications that arise from being aware of our own mortality. Like Sartre, Becker recognises that human beings have the potential to transcend and look beyond their immediate situation, but his work also confronts the darker aspects of human existence that arise from our self-awareness. The aim of the paper is to provide an overview of Becker’s work and to show the potential of Becker’s theory of evil to inform a number of contemporary debates in the social sciences. Although Becker’s work directly examines why human beings can act so inhumanly towards one another, his theory is not altogether pessimistic. The paper concludes by arguing that Becker’s theory intended to create new possibilities for living in more creative and humane world.     

Death,Immortality, and Meaning in Life: Precis and Further Reflections

The Journal of Ethics - I offer an overview of the book, Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life, summarizing the main issues, arguments, and conclusions (Fischer 2020). I also present some new...     

Future Generations, Locke's Proviso and Libertarian Justice

Abstract  Libertarian justice arguably permits much that is harsh. It might plausibly be thought to generate only minimal obligations on the part of present people toward future generations. This turns out not to be so, at least on Nozick's version of libertarian justice, which is among the most thoroughly worked-out versions. Nozickian justice generates extensive obligations to future people. This provides an indirect argument for environmentalist policies such as resource conservation and wilderness preservation. The basis for these obligations is Nozick's use of Locke's proviso, which is spelled out using the notion of the baseline. This paper explains how the extensive obligations are implied by the core ideas of Nozickian justice. There is also a discussion of some of the difficulties involved in understanding the notion of the baseline. However, these difficulties do not destroy the theoretical basis for obligations to future generations contained within Nozickian justice. Provided that libertarian justice involves some such device as Locke's proviso the enforcement of substantial environmentalist policies comes within the ambit of the libertarian minimal state.     

神意、理性与权利——一种关于洛克自然法理论的解读

洛克对自然法的性质进行了详细的阐述,得出了自然法具有神意法和理性法双重属性的结论.这种性质界定具有模糊性,而且神意法与理性法在一定程度上是互相冲突的,因此受到后来学者的诟病;但洛克自然法理论中的这种模糊性源自其对于由理性所开启的现代性进程之谨慎态度.尽管洛克在一定程度上似乎更重视理性的作用,但理性也存在诸多问题:自然法是人类理性无法独证的,对于理性的偏执会在认识论上因缺乏根基而显得武断,而且自然法在政治上的应用及其说服力,仅仅依靠理性推演也是不够的.这些考虑最终使洛克走向一种谨慎的平衡策略-自然法既是神意法,也是理性法.此外,洛克还从上帝存在这一基本背景出发,引申出了人类应当服从的三类自然法义务,并从这三类自然法义务中推导出了人类的三大基本权利:生命、财产与自由,近代权利思想实发轫于此.     

老庄、黄老、仙道——《抱朴子》思想的再认识

老庄道家是道教的理论来源之一,道教学者葛洪总体上对老庄持维护态度,但也在生命观和政治观上对老庄提出了批评。通过认真辨析《抱朴子》中"道家"和"黄老"的内涵,以及葛洪对老庄道家的态度,可以看到葛洪的道教仙学既批判地继承了黄老之学,同时也在一定程度上偏离了黄老之学,这是葛洪道教仙学的独特性所在。     

The Dark Side of Desire: Nietzsche,Transhumanism, and Personal Immortality

Nietzsche has become embroiled in two interesting twenty‐first century debates about advancing technology and its impact on human life, especially its meaning/value. The first focuses on Nietzsche himself and is concerned with the extent to which his views align with those of transhumanism. The second involves the not so blatantly Nietzsche‐centric question of whether or not immortality, or radical life‐extension, is desirable. Given that the desire for immortality, or at least some more feasible (but not so permanent) approximation of it, is strongly associated with transhumanism, it seems that these two debates have some fairly significant overlap. Establishing what Nietzsche ultimately believes about such a core transhumanist issue will go a long way toward determining how sympathetic he would be to the transhumanist cause in general. I argue that while his views do not commit him to an all‐encompassing disdain for immortality, his intolerance for immortality‐seekers means that he might only be open to some of the more fringe understandings of transhumanism.     

Materialism: Matters Of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction

How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.