Schools,identity and the conception of the good. The denominational tradition as an example

The Dutch education system relies upon a large number of publicly-subsidized, denominational schools. The authors defend the importance of schools that educate children within a specific — including denominational — conception of the good by arguing for the importance of such a conception for the development of the child's identity. An essential component of this developmental process is critical reflection, conceived as crucial to the formation of moral autonomy.     

The importance of examples for moral education: An Aristotelian perspective

The paper develops and contrasts two views about the role of examples in moral education — one based on R.M. Hare's recent two-level conception of moral reasoning and one based on Aristotle's conception ofphronesis. It concludes that a Harean view leads to a harmful and impoverished form of moral education by encouraging children to ignore or distort the complexity of particular moral judgments. It also concludes that an Aristotelian view, by emphasizing the importance of rich examples such as those found in literature, enables children to develop and exercise a capacity for moral judgment that is sensitive to the complexities of particular moral judgments. Finally, the role of examples in public moral education in liberal pluralist societies is examined.     

Social epistemology and reflexivity: Two versions of how to be really useful

This essay argues that the really useful character of reflexivity is that it enables a radical critique of representation and its conventional material and rhetorical practices. It is uniquely able to produce paradox and thus disrupt discourses by undermining authorial privilege. Because Fuller's social epistemology is insensitive to its own reflexive implications, and limits itself to normative questions about knowledge policy, it is too limited — and limiting — to provide a context that can nurture reflexivity.     

Challenging the Limits of Critique in Education Through Morin’s Paradigm of Complexity

The position adopted in this paper is inspired by Edgar Morin’s paradigm of complexity and his critique of scientific and philosophical forms of reductionism. This paper is based on research focusing on the diversity of conceptions of critique developed in academic discourses. It aims to challenge the fragmentation and the reduction framing the understanding of this notion in educational sciences. The reflection begins with the introduction of some of Morin’s assumptions concerning the paradigm of complexity. The next section provides a definition of the idea of critique and explores some limits associated with contemporary references framing this notion. Theories of critique are at the core of several educational theories. Based on the literature identified in French-speaking and English-speaking critical traditions in education, several factors determining the way the idea of critique is reduced in education are highlighted. Stressing the tacit character of those variables challenges the limits of traditional conceptions of critique in contemporary education. The position adopted denounces therefore the fact that the current development of theories of critique in education does not provide a framework considering more systematically their conditions of emergence, their own limitations, as well as the antagonistic, complementary and contradictory relationships, which connect them to one another. Based on this position, this paper finally suggests that a distinction be made between “hypocritique” and “hypercritique” as a semantic artifact, stressing the importance of challenging existing theories of critique in education according to the level of complexity that one may attribute to them.     

Towards a Sociological turn in Contextualist Moral Philosophy

Contextualist moral philosophers criticise hands-off liberal theories of justice for abstracting from the cultural context in which people make choices. Will Kymlicka and Joseph Carens, for example, demonstrate that these theories are disadvantageous to cultural minorities who want to pursue their own way of life. I argue that Pierre Bourdieu's critique of moral reason radicalises contextualist moral philosophy by giving it a sociological turn. In Bourdieu's view it is not enough to provide marginalised groups or subgroups with equal access to public institutions and specific cultural rights—in some cases this may in fact be detrimental. He contends that scientists, politicians and other intellectuals have a duty to take seriously the social presuppositions of free deliberate choice and public opinion and to support cultural minorities with instruments to liberate themselves from their often precarious situation.     

Critique,Finitude and the Importance of Susceptibility: A Rossian Approach to Interpreting Kant on Pleasure

In this paper, I take Philip Rossi’s robust interpretation of critique as an interpretive guide for thinking generally about how to interpret Kant’s texts. I reflect first upon what might appear to be a minor technical issue: how best to translate the term Fähigheit when Kant utilizes it in reference to the human experience of pleasure and displeasure. Reflection upon this technical issue will, however, end up being a case study in how important it is when we are interpreting Kant’s texts to have Rossi’s focus on human finitude in the background. The terrain for these reflections on human finitude will be the realm of feelings of pleasure and displeasure. And the result will be that, counter to recent interpreters, like Elizondo (2014), who have suggested that Kant could welcome a thoroughly active conception of rational feeling, we must instead, as guided by Kant’s commitment to human finitude (and really his commitment to Transcendental Idealism itself), remember that every feeling for Kant—even the most rational of feelings, like the moral feeling of respect, or the pleasure he notes that we take in the proper functioning of one’s virtuous rational self—must be understood within the purview and constraints of the finite and sensibly-affected human being. I hope, then, that this brief reflection can be taken as one small piece of that larger story Rossi so aptly describes in his book, the story which answers the question of “What is critique?” in a way that insists upon but also simultaneously celebrates the centrality of finitude in human existence.

     

Power on the margins: A new place for intellectuals to be

This paper is concerned with rethinking the nature of social life in terms of how it appears — not to us academics at the centre of it, as consisting in a system, or a plurality of systems -but how it might appear from a position more in on the margins, at those moments when ordinary people must relate themselves to each other, unsystematically and practically. To do this, we must also rethink the nature of language and thought as possessing within these moments, a formative or creative character — for it must have the ability to create practical connections between aspects of people's lives, as required, on the spot. This is to privilege the role of rhetoric in these regions over that of logic. This also leads to a rethinking of ideology and power: as being to do with, not ideas, but the practical shaping (or not) — in moments when in practical communication with others — of collective, sharable forms of life. Where it is in such moments, in which different people meet each other in socially constructing their lives together, that political struggles are their most intense, and where ideology can be detected at work.     

Reification as dependence on extrinsic information

Marx criticized political economy for propounding an inverted, mystical view of economic reality. But he went beyond asserting the falsity and apologetic character of the doctrine to characterize it as reflecting a social practice of inversion or mystification — an inverted social world — in which individuals incorporate their own actions into a process whose dynamic lies beyond their control. Caught up in this process, individuals confront aspects of their own agency in the alien or reified form of a given, determining reality. Marx leaves unclear exactly how the process exerts and maintains its hold on agents, the nature of the reasons they might have for wanting to free themselves of it, and under what conditions they could do so. However, it is possible to abstract somewhat from Marx's specific concerns and to model a self-reproducing practice of reification that works through the informational environment of decision. Though of wider interest, this more general conception can shed light on the nature and critique of Marx's inverted world. It draws on conceptual resources from decision theory, game theory and general equilibrium theory.The author wishes to thank Christopher Ake, Daniel Hausman, Carl Hedman, Mark Kaplan, John Koethe, Marc Linder and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments or suggestions. Work on this paper was supported by the National Science Foundation and by The Graduate School and The Center for Twentieth Century Studies of the University of Wisconsin — Milwaukee.     

Situationism and Confucian Virtue Ethics

Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors that influence behavior. Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications for ethics, and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents an empirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, they argue that situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as a foundation for ethical behavior and moral development. I offer a response from moral psychology using an interpretation of Xunzi—a Confucian virtue ethicist from the Classical period. This Confucian account serves as a foil to the situationist critique in that it uncovers many problematic ontological and normative assumptions at work in this debate regarding the prediction and explanation of behavior, psychological posits, moral development, and moral education. Xunzi’s account of virtue ethics not only responds to the situationist empirical challenge by uncovering problematic assumptions about moral psychology, but also demonstrates that it is not a separate empirical hypothesis. Further, Xunzi’s virtue ethic responds to the theoretical challenge by offering a new account of moral development and a ground for ethical norms that fully attends to situational features while upholding robust character traits.     

Moralism and the good

It is often held that moral considerations take precedence over considerations of other kinds in determining what we ought to do. I contend that this claim is ambiguous and argue that objections to each interpretation of it can be met only by rejecting the other. One surprising consequence of my argument is that no deontic moral theory can effectively guide action unless it is conjoined with a theory of the good. Another interesting consequence is that the deontologists' favorite objection to teleological theories — the objection from injustice — does not go through.     

The rejection of origin: Derrida's interpretation of Husserl

Conclusion Derrida's Husserl thinks of meaning as self-presence and of self-presence as transparent and complete presence of meaning to the mind. Expression and thought are but particular modes or media of the more englobing relation of a self-acquainted life. Reflection is the highest form and telos of the other forms of presence.In contrast, the — by no means complete — Husserl who has begun to appear in my interpretation does not unconditionally subscribe to the value of presence. Not only is an important part of intentional life directed towards objects which it does not possess in their plenitude — hence its emptiness —, this part of intentional life is also blind towards itself. Reflection tries to fill this gap by grasping what is not present to a life immersed in its world. But a retreat from life is the price of presence, a presence, in addition, whose power is essentially limited by the fluidity of its material and by the limits of its bearers.And yet Husserl maintains, passionately maintains, the claim and value of reflection and of a scientific attitude which Derrida rejects with equal passion. May they not have a positive function in a frame which is no longer that of presence metaphysics? As deconstruction has evolved its philosophy of anti-presence, it has brushed away the reflexive potential of Phenomenology and chosen to reject its own origin.     

Ethics and Counseling Decisions

Although some behavioral scientists and practitioners contend that man has no genuine moral choices to make, common sense and philosophical reflection ineluctably affirm the moral nature of man. When young people are faced with moral decisions, they often seek the assistance of a counselor. Although such counselors are routinely expected to aid clients in making decisions about their education and their careers, there is considerably less agreement about their responsibility for helping students to make moral choices. The central thesis of this article is that a knowledge of ethical theories, the practical principles which flow from them, and the method of decision-making which they indicate will enable the counselor to assist his clients with their moral problems.     

Response to Strenger

Despite certain apparently common values, Strenger's critique is addressed largely to an inaccurate account of my views. It is also internally contradictory in various ways. On one hand, for example, Strenger favors a dialectic of science and the humanities as they bear on psychoanalysis; on the other hand, he declares science to be the exclusive psychoanalytic “metaphysic.” Remarkably, he claims that my critique of technical rationality is tantamount to advocating a passive reflective stance on the analyst's part, precluding anything akin to “coaching” to foster change. But I've written consistently about the dialectic of proactive therapeutic influence and critical reflection on that very influence and its implications. What's unacceptable about technical rationality is its positivist confidence about the effectiveness of prescribed interventions based on allegedly scientific evidence. With his lengthy survey of extra-analytic studies, Strenger evades engaging my specific arguments since they are strictly about the unwarranted privileging of the findings of psychoanalytic process and outcome research relative to clinical experience. He mistakenly equates my repudiation of such privileging with rejection of the value of “science” altogether for psychoanalysis. Finally, Strenger's claim that my “dialectical constructivism” eschews formulating universal truths about human nature ignores my consideration of human potentials for both denying and confronting mortality and the associated challenge of human agency. Embracing that challenge constitutes a moral position for psychoanalysis that is unequivocally opposed to uncritical compliance with culturally shaped demands for various types of therapeutic services.     

A Discourse on Educational Leadership: Global Themes,Postmodern Perspectives

Epistemology mirrors reality but notperfectly, and in the process molds reality butnot exactly as intended or anticipated. Horizontal interconnections also exist betweenand among epistemology, ideology, theory andpraxiology. However, these relations areneither deductive nor deterministic in naturebut are merely resonant, and then unclear,ambiguous and confounded. In this paper, thepoint is made that we need a grand reflectionon both our paradigms of reality and ourpredicaments of life as lived, to deal with thediscontent of humanity at this moment of thehistory of our civilization, and to engage inpraxis ``to act on our world and to reconstructit' to make it moral, just and more humane. Toundertake such a grand reflection, we need apractical philosophy of knowledge – that is, apractical epistemology – to bridge across themultiple epistemological approaches nowcrowding our discussions. An epistemictriangle formed by systems thinking,constructivist thinking, and dialecticalthinking is offered to serve as the startingpoint of crystallization for building a commonground for epistemologies. It is shown how suchan epistemological diagram could be first usedto develop a minimum ideological consensus andthen to bring orderliness to the chaos ofcontemporary themes of our civilization andissues of education and culture within andacross nations. Finally, an agenda foreducational leadership for educational practiceis offered to fit the needs of the globalcommunity of nations as we enter thetwenty-first century.     

A critique of the Flynn Effect: massive IQ gains, methodological artifacts, or both?

The Flynn Effect proposed by Flynn (1984; 1987) is reviewed and evaluated. Even in the presence of a skeptical and critical scrutiny of the effect, it appears that there is more than just methodological artifact to be explained. But the acceptance of the effect has been too quick. The proper explanations for the effect will not be meaningful until the nature of the effect is much better understood than it is now. Six questions are raised that have not been adequately answered. Two criticisms of the logic underlying the Flynn Effect are presented — one showing that even if IQ and SAT are highly correlated, their secular means will not necessarily track one another; the second showing that results by Flynn, (1984) are as consistent with a changing IQ variance as with a changing mean. The second of these is empirically evaluated with a re-analysis of a subset of the sources of Flynn's original 1984 data. Finally, 10 research strategies and designs are suggested that would help us better understand the effect. The critique is developed with the goal of clarifying the nature, meaning and causes of the Flynn Effect. The author hopes that this critique will stimulate both healthy skepticism about the Flynn Effect and careful research into its actual causes.     

Towards the concerned study of religion: Exploring the double power–play disparity

Increasing numbers of students of religion, from various disciplines, address issues of public interest, going beyond documentation and analysis, taking the quality of human life in religion and society as a criterion for their recommendations. Accordingly, systematic reflection on the concerned study of religion is gaining relevance. The approach chosen in this article is to focus on one particular aspect, in this case the double – cognitive and moral – disparity in religious contexts between forms of power and play.Power is viewed as the human capacity to influence other people’s behaviour, even against their will. Play is defined here as the human capacity to deal simultaneously with different realities. Power and play represent two human capacities that in themselves are neutral but in combination may change from means, a situation of parity, into goal, a situation of disparity. A first type of disparity is cognitive in nature. It stems from the reduction of the potential open dynamic meaning-making that the power–play constellation could stimulate as well. A second disparity is of a moral nature. It stems from the fact that the power–play set may come to interfere with the quality of human life. As a set, power and play thus move between the roles of being either subservient means or self-fulfilling goal, between a soft and a hard version.Religion is one field in which the gift for play is applied, resulting in the relationship with a sacred or divine reality. Whereas religions cannot survive without some form of power, the form given to the power–play set marks out a religion’s identity. Within our time the critical study of the double disparity of hard power and play has gained urgency. Global society faces severe problems of poverty, violence, pollution and miscommunication. Religions may act as a cause, but also as problem solver.Students of religion are invited to form multidisciplinary teams to study the double disparity in its actual form, while simultaneously exploring prospects for the promotion of both open meaning-making and the quality of human life, with power and play in a relationship of parity. This turn would necessitate a reappraisal of the research agenda for Religious/World-view Studies. It demands an identity change for this study field, both in the selection of themes for research and funding, and in the explicitly applied nature of scholarly work.     

Moral Motivation Pluralism

Motivational externalists and internalists of various sorts disagree about the circumstances under which it is conceptually possible to have moral opinions but lack moral motivation. Typically, the evidence referred to are intuitions about whether people in certain scenarios who lack moral motivation count as having moral opinions. People’s intuitions about such scenarios diverge, however. I argue that the nature of this diversity is such that, for each of the internalist and externalist theses, there is a strong prima facie reason to reject it. That much might not be very controversial. But I argue further, that it also gives us a strong prima facie reason to reject all of these theses. This is possible since there is an overlooked alternative option to accepting any of them: moral motivation pluralism, the view that different internalist and externalist theses correctly accounts for different people’s concepts of moral opinions, respectively. I end the paper with a discussion of methodological issues relevant to the argument for moral motivation pluralism and of the consequences of this view for theories about the nature of moral opinions, such as cognitivism and non-cognitivism.     

A critical examination of Michael Polanyi's conception of skills

In this paper I will consider some of the main issues in Michael Polanyi's discussion of ‘Skills’ from Chapter 4 of his book Personal Knowledge published in 1958.The concept of ‘skill’ features prominently in psychological theories of human performance in activities such as games, gymnastics, swimming and dance; such theories are often applied to other spheres of human activity in which issues about skill acquisition arise. It is not surprising to discover that skill theory is considered to be essential to the study of human movement and physical education. Physical education teachers in schools have consistently maintained that ‘skill acquisition’ is a major objective for the P.E. curriculum — see Kane 1974. Yet concepts such as ‘skill’, ‘ability’ and ‘know-how’ are constituent features of practical knowledge therefore the notion of ‘skill acquisition’ on its own will not do as a curriculum objective since all instances of skill and practical knowledge are specific to their contexts, namely, to different practical activities. If particular activities are valued in schools in the pursuit of children's learning and education it seems necessary to clarify the epistemological features of such activities in order to understand what it means to teach them and what it means for children to learn and know-how to perform them successfully. It is in these respects that the concept of ‘skill’ in different human activities should attract the interest of physical education students. In order to draw attention to major features of Polanyi's thesis on the nature of ‘skill’ I shall consider the relevance of his ideas about skill and knowledge in relation to human action theory. I suggest that misconceptions may arise in teaching and learning theories relating to ‘playing soccer’ if the basic underlying ideas about ‘skill’ in human activities are inconsistent with ideas about human action or, say, practical reasoning. It is this issue that is not, in my view, attended to by Polanyi in his discussion of ‘skill’. Thus, if my criticisms of Polanyi's ideas are shown to be valid it will be necessary, by implication that is, to exercise caution before any attempt is made to use his thesis as a basis from which to formulate ideas about teaching skills and skill acquisition. The extensive use I make of quotations from Polanyi's writings is necessary because it is towards Polanyi's use of language in his explanation of ‘skills’ that much of my criticism is directed. It is hoped that what follows may provide students of human movement and physical education with an insight into Polanyi's view of ‘skills’ in particular and to issues related to skill theory and human action in general.     

A critique of Dennett

This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views.In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense.In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency.     

Higher Education,Knowledge for Its Own Sake,and an African Moral Theory

I seek to answer the question of whether publicly funded higher education ought to aim intrinsically to promote certain kinds of “blue-sky” knowledge, knowledge that is unlikely to result in “tangible” or “concrete” social benefits such as health, wealth and liberty. I approach this question in light of an African moral theory, which contrasts with dominant Western philosophies and has not yet been applied to pedagogical issues. According to this communitarian theory, grounded on salient sub-Saharan beliefs and practices, actions are right insofar as they respect relationships in which people both share a way of life, or identify with one another, and care for others’ quality of life, or are in solidarity with each other. I argue that while considerations of identity and solidarity each provide some reason for a state university to pursue blue-sky knowledge as a final end, they do not provide conclusive reason for it to do so. I abstain from drawing any further conclusion about whether this provides reason to reject the Afro-communitarian moral theory or the intuition that blue-sky knowledge is a proper final end of public higher education. I do point out, however, that the dominant Western moral theories on the face of it do no better than the African one at accounting for this intuition.