NON-DISCURSIVE EXPRESSIVE ELEMENTS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING IN THE ANALYTICAL SITUATION

The author discusses the role of non‐discursive expressive elements in the construction of the analytical situation, using three examples to illustrate the problems with which he is concerned. His claim is that the issue in question necessarily involves the subject of affects, and he proceeds to discuss the difficulties associated with this subject. In addition, he considers the contributions of Green and Imbasciati, and Kleinian developments of this theme, including also the contributions of Bion—in particular the latter's theories concerning thought, in which emotion comes to assume an essential place in the origin of thinking. The author resumes the discussion by taking up his clinical examples, using them to put forward the view that non‐discursive expressive elements may well play a decisive role in the construction of meaning in the analytical situation. He suggests also that the meaning of an emotional experience may be thought of as a construction contributed to by a number of symbolic forms which both interfere with and interact with the symbolic system of language. Following examination of his third example, the author reflects on ‘musicality’, a notion sometimes referred to informally in clinical data in connection with the ‘emotional climate’ of the session. He proposes that the complex problem of meaning in music be extended to cover the construction of meaning in the psychoanalytic setting, and in so doing returns to ideas put forward by Suzanne Langer. His underlying view here is that essential elements of the musical phenomenon and essential elements of particular forms of emotional life give rise to the same emotional matrices—perhaps to what Meltzer calls ‘musical deep grammar’. Finally, the author considers various symbolic forms that contribute to the particular configuration of analytical situations, suggesting that the mental condition of ‘free‐floating attention’ requires the broad availability to the analyst's mind of a multiplicity of symbolic forms, his conversion of these into new expressions of meaning, and the possibility of their verbal communication by him to the patient.     

BEING AS THE GROUND OF TRUTH IN AQUINAS

Although St. Thomas Aquinas holds that the transcendentals are convertible with being, one may question whether they all follow upon the metaphysical principles of a creature in the same way. Aquinas raises the question when he says that creatures are one by essence but good only by being. This paper examines the ground of truth according to Aquinas, considering his distinction between types of truth as well as his distinguishing kinds of knowers. To advance this investigation the essay compares truth and goodness; it also includes a discussion of unity. Clearly there is a close parallel between goodness and ‘the truth of a thing’, but must the truth of the intellect – truth in the primary sense – be grounded in the extramental being of a creature? This paper argues that, for Aquinas, human knowledge of composite beings is attained through encounters with their real instances and is reflected in necessarily true yet nonanalytic statements about these creatures, statements that can be explained by St.Thomas's theory of predication, to which the theory of an influential contemporary thinker is strikingly similar. God's knowledge of finite essences, and hence truth concerning them, does not assume the actual existence of their instantiations from all eternity, but it does assume their real existence at some time. The requirement of real existence for the human mode of knowing, and, as explained, for divine knowing, underscores the value of finite being and thus harmonizes with Aquinas's claims that composite beings, as what they are, possess being more truly in themselves than as in the mind of God, and they are known properly by God only when grasped as actually existent particulars.     

THE TRUTH OF TRIPARTITION

Since the arguments that Plato provides in the Republic for the thesis that the human soul consist of three parts (reason, spirit, appetite) are notoriously problematic, I propose other reasons for accepting tripartition: reasons that we too could endorse, or at least entertain with some sympathy. To wit, (a) the appetitive part of Plato's divided soul houses desires and tendencies we have because we are animal bodies programmed to survive (as individuals and as a species) in disequilibrium with a variegated, often varying environment, (b) the spirited middle part houses status concerns that belong to us as social animals, while (c) what makes us rational animals is a faculty of reason, conceived in strikingly non-Humean terms, which determines what is best all things considered. Other psychic tendencies may then be explained in terms of the education and mutual interaction of the three parts we are 'programmed' for from birth.     

THE TRUTH IN ETHICAL RELATIVISM

Ethical relativism is the thesis that ethical principles or judgments are relative to the individual or culture. When stated so vaguely relativism is embraced by numerous lay persons and a sizeable contingent of philosophers. Other philosophers, however, find the thesis patently false, even wonder how anyone could seriously entertain it.
Both factions are on to something, yet both miss something significant as well. Those who whole-heartedly embrace relativism note salient respects in which ethics is relative, yet erroneously infer that ethical values are noxiously subjective. Those who reject relativism do so because they think ethics is subject to rational scrutiny, that moral views can be correct or incorrect. But in rejecting objectionable features of relativism they overlook significant yet non-pernicious ways in which ethics is relative.
In short, each side harps on the opponent's weaknesses while overlooking its own flaws. That is regrettable. We are not forced to choose between relativism and rationality. We can have both. There are ways in which ethical principles and behavior vary legitimately from culture to culture and individual to individual. That we must recognize. However this in no way suggests we cannot reason about ethics. Rather we should strive for a rational yet relativistic ethic which emphasizes the exercise of cultivated moral judgment rather than the rote application of extant moral rules. Or so I shall argue.     

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION IN BARGAINING

This essay classifies, reviews, and critiques the current literature on the role of communication in the bargaining process. As such, it provides an up-to-date review of the research findings within four areas: communication opportunity, information exchange, message strategies, and categories of interaction. These areas illustrate three different perspectives of communication: the mechanistic, the psychological, and the pragmatic views. Integration of this literature reveals that bargaining interaction differs from group problem solving in the types of messages used and in the evolution of bargaining stages, and that communication patterns distinguish between the initial and the latter stages of bargaining.     

汉语词汇产生中语义、语音层次之间的交互作用

采用3种方法考察汉语词汇产生中语义激活（词条选择）和音位编码这两个阶段之间的关系。实验一、二分别采用图片命名法和干扰字命名法,发现目标图片（“牛”）的语义相关词（“羊”）的语音信息得到了激活,说明汉语词汇产生中存在多重语音激活,音位编码在词条选择完成之前既已开始。实验三采用语义范畴判断法,考察语音信息的激活是否会向上反馈到词条和语义层次,发现目标图片（“羊”）的同音字（“阳”）不会促进对图片的语义判断。研究表明,多重语音激活与语音激活向词条和语义层次反馈是两个独立的,可以分割的问题。虽然实验一和二的结果符合相互作用理论,实验三的结果符合模块化观点,但就总体而言,本研究更加支持词汇产生中的模块化观点     

心理学为提高企业素质服务

心理学为社会主义建设服务,这是当前的一项重要任务。为发展生产、改进经营管理服务则是我们近年来探索的一个重点。因为管理的改革十分需要心理学工作者参加解决与人的因素有关的问题。在现代管理学中行为科学起着日益为人重视的作用。 提高企业素质是当前我国管理研究中的一个中心课题。邓小平同志说,从“六五”计     

輻合在大小知觉恒常性中的作用

問題 謝切諾夫在很早以前便提出知觉是反射活动的观点,并且強調了网膜视象和眼肌的紧张在大小知觉中的作用。他說:“网膜中映象的实际大小和使眼睛适应远近距离的肌肉的紧张程度,是对用一只眼睛看的各种对象的大小的真正表象的基础。謝切諾夫的这种天才思想,为知觉的反射活动的研究提供了基础。继謝切諾夫之后,巴甫洛夫进一步把大小知觉看作是网膜視象、眼肌运动的刺激組合与物体的触觉刺激經过多次联系所形     

在不同感觉的记忆活动中海马作用的探讨

本文旨在探讨在视、听觉与味、嗅觉这些不同感觉的记忆活动中海马的作用。发现电刺激海马显著地阻抑了兔以声音为条件信号的条件性防御反应的建立,但对以气味为条件信号的条件性防御反应的建立则无明显的影响;电损毁海马对大鼠建立以灯光为条件信号的条件性防御反应有明显的障碍作用,可是对建立以甜味为条件信号的条件性味觉厌恶反应却无明显的影响;还有,电损毁海马对大鼠上述的两种条件反应的保持均无明显的影响。这表明海马在不同感觉的记忆活动中其作用是不同的。对味、嗅觉的记忆海马的参与是不重要的,而在视、听觉记忆形成的早期阶段,海马却起着重要的作用。本文对此进行了讨论,并从系统发生及个体发育的角度进行分析,认为存在上述差异是可以理解的。