Praying for Rain?: A Rastafari Perspective from Zimbabwe

Climate change remains one of the most enigmatic questions that humanity urgently needs to address. Emanating from the ecological crisis, climate change threatens the survival of some species (including humanity) and the depletion of natural resources. The situation is deplorable, but arguably religion/spirituality can contribute to meeting the challenge. This study explores a Zimbabwean Rastafari perspective on praying for rain against the backdrop of climate change. The article posits that praying for rain is integral to Rastafari “livity” and liturgical life. Among other pertinent questions, the study asks: What is the value Rastafarians accord to nature? How do Rastafarians pray for rain? Do they take responsibility for the environment? The research concludes that Rastafarians operate as post–20th‐century Nazarenes, where prayer is a practical and tangible manifestation of work that is crucial to living harmoniously with nature. Rastafari “green philosophy” is a practical spiritual consciousness that decisively complements global efforts of shared responsibility for nature in the context of the climate change crisis.     

Mental Health Diagnostic Considerations in Racial/Ethnic Minority Youth

Misdiagnoses of racial/ethnic minority youth’s mental health problems can potentially contribute to inappropriate mental health care. Therefore, we conducted a systematic review that focuses on current theory and empirical research in an attempt to answer the following two questions: (1) What evidence exists that supports or contradicts the idea that racial/ethnic minority youth’s mental health problems are misdiagnosed? (2) What are the sources of misdiagnoses? Articles were reviewed from 1967 to 2014 using PsychINFO, PubMed, and GoogleScholar. Search terms included “race”, “ethnicity”, “minority”, “culture”, “children”, “youth”, “adolescents”, “mental health”, “psychopathology”, “diagnosis”, “misdiagnosis”, “miscategorization”, “underdiagnosis”, and “overdiagnosis”. Seventy-two articles and book chapters met criteria and were included in this review. Overall, evidence was found that supports the possibility of misdiagnosis of ethnic minority youth’s emotional and behavioral problems. However, the evidence is limited such that it cannot be determined whether racial/ethnic differences are due to differences in psychopathology, mental health biases, and/or inaccurate diagnoses. Cultural and contextual factors that may influence misdiagnosis as well as recommendations for research and practice are discussed.     

The clinical psychologist as program consultant: When is enough enough?

One of the most influential roles clinical psychologists play in health care settings is as consultant to medical colleagues. The psychologist consultant typically approaches either clinical or programmatic questions intending to tap both empirical research and clinical judgment perspectives in trying to answer them. This paper describes a specific “program consultation case,” a not atypical consultation situation in which graduate medical education directors asked for advice about their residency training program. The purpose is to use this example to generate ideas and provoke discussion about such consultation processes and their usefulness in the health care training and service delivery world. The psychologist may be faced with questions that have meaningful implications beyond the specific consultation. What if the concerns being posed by this particular program are concerns which have been raised before, have been researched before, and have generated reasonable suggestions, conclusions, and strategies for improvement? And what if no one has paid attention, so that the questions are being raised again? When empirical and clinical data consistently combine to identify problems within health-related training or service delivery systems, and when suggestions or alternatives for their solutions have been presented and, also presumably, ignored, what does the clinical psychologist consultant do next?     

ŚŪNYATĀ AND KOKORO: SCIENCE–RELIGION DIALOGUE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT

When we read books or essays about the dialogue between “religion and science,” or when we attend conferences on the theme of “religion and science,” we cannot avoid the impression that they actually are dealing, almost without exception, not with a dialogue between “religion and science,” but with a dialogue between “Christianity and science.” This could easily be affirmed by looking at the major publications in this field. But how can the science–religion dialogue take place in a world where conventional Christian concepts of God, religion, and science are foreign and unfamiliar? Is the critique that the scientist plays God still valid when there is no “God” at all? This article tries to answer the questions mentioned above, and seeks to sketch out some aspects of the science–religion dialogue in Japan which I believe could contribute a new paradigm for understanding and describing ultimate reality.     

Clarifying the task

Those who would enquire into therelationship between “health conceptions” and “health care consequences” are faced with a formidable task. In order to make this challenge manageable it is necessary to define the scope of the task as precisely as possible. Are we, for instance, faced with a purely theoretical challenge; a task for applied philosophy, or must we employ multi-disciplinary methods? This paper argues that while philosophy has a central clarifying role, inquiry into the relationship between “health conceptions” and “health care organisation” can be done properly only through the combined efforts of several disciplines. Unless we are to be concerned only with abstract models it is essential to take account of the reality of health care situations. Given this it is suggested that the study of “health conceptions” is only a part of a greater task (unless all conceptions are to count as “health conceptions”). What is needed is understanding of the possible and actual purposes of health care, and detailed study of their practical implications.     

Public Space

“Public space” is the space where individuals see and are seen by others as they engage in public affairs. Hannah Arendt links this space with “public freedom.” The being of such freedom, she asserts, depends on its appearing. It consists of “deeds and words which are meant to appear, whose very existence hinges on appearance.” Such appearance, however, requires the public space. Reflecting on Arendt’s remarks, a number of questions arise: What does the dependence of freedom on public space tell us about the nature of freedom? How does public freedom relate to the freedom of a private individual? Does the latter also depend on its appearing? Which is generatively prior: freedom or public space, i.e., the actions that publicly manifest freedom or the space required for their appearance? How does public power shape this space? In this article, I approach these questions through a phenomenological study of public space.     

Responsibility and Visioneering—Opening Pandora’s Box

The number of publications that highlight the influence of visions and futuristic narratives on the development of emerging technologies increases. Toolboxes such as “Hermeneutical Technology Assessment” and “Vision Assessment” provide methodological considerations on how to assess techno-futuristic narratives, their proponents, and their impact on technological development. Because of their contributions to the technoscientific discourse, a special responsibility for technological processes is attributed to the “visioneers” of such narratives. While such a claim naturally follows from an agential role in a process, it is not clear whether visioneers should be held responsible. Some problems of this attribution will be addressed in the present paper. Particularly the following questions will be considered: Which role does autonomy play for responsibility? Is causation sufficient for the attribution of responsibility? Which role do intentions and alternatives play for the responsibility of visioneers? These questions will be discussed against the backdrop of contemporary approaches to the responsibility of visioneering and classic philosophical works in the field. Furthermore, the problem of accountability will be considered. Socio-technical systems are highly complex, which makes it hard to trace back the origins of particular developments. It will be argued that it is currently unreasonable to give visioneers the status of an important player. The article will shed light on the several dimensions of responsibility and provide a more nuanced understanding of responsibility in the context of new and emerging technologies.     

How Should What Economists Call “Social Values” Be Measured?

Most economists and some philosophers distinguish individual utilities from interpersonal social values. Even if challenges to that conceptual distinction can be met, further philosophically interesting questions arise. I pursue three in this paper, using, as context for the discussion, health economics and its attempt to discern empirically a social welfare function to help guide rationing decisions. (1) To discern these utilities and values in a manner that is morally appropriate if they are to influence rationing decisions, who should be queried? To discern individual health state utilities, persons in precisely those states should be asked (generically, “patients”), but for social values, representatives of the general public should be. (2) To discern social values, what should representatives of the public be asked? They should be asked “person trade-off” (PTO) questions that encompass their own self-interest, not PTO questions that focus only on others. (3) What must public representatives understand before they respond to such questions? Despite the philosophically complex problem of patient adaptation, they should understand (among other things) the health state utilities elicited from actual patients with the conditions at issue.     

Fishing: Finding One’s Way to the Unconscious

By imagining ourselves to be fishing in the deep waters of the unconscious, we consider here many questions about the meeting of the personal ego and the powerful unknown energies that lie below—questions ranging from “Why should we even want to connect with such forces?” to “What’s the best way of doing it?” There are many more questions to ask, such as how does the unconscious express itself and when should we avoid a direct meeting with it and why?

As individuals and as cultures, we have long histories with the unconscious, sometimes welcoming it, sometimes trying to wall it off, sometimes being overwhelmed by it. In this article the author emphasizes the necessity of becoming aware of the unconscious, knowing it as something that is always active in us, recognizing that it is not under our control, and realizing that it is not of our own making.     

Diagnosis by Documentary: Professional Responsibilities in Informal Encounters

Most work addressing clinical workers' professional responsibilities concerns the norms of conduct within established professional–patient relationships, but such responsibilities may extend beyond the clinical context. We explore health workers' professional responsibilities in such “informal” encounters through the example of a doctor witnessing the misdiagnosis and mistreatment of a serious long-term condition in a television documentary, arguing that neither internalist approaches to professional responsibility (such as virtue ethics or care ethics) nor externalist ones (such as the “social contract” model) provide sufficiently clear guidance in such situations. We propose that a mix of both approaches, emphasizing the noncomplacency and practical wisdom of virtue ethics, but grounding the normative authority of virtue in an external source, is able to engage with the health worker's responsibilities in such situations to the individual, the health care system, and the population at large.     

Two faces of desert

There are two broadly competing pictures of moral responsibility. On the view I favor, to be responsible for some action is to be related to it in such a way that licenses attributing certain properties to the agent, properties like blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Responsibility is attributability. A different view understands being responsible in terms of our practices of holding each other responsible. Responsibility is accountability, which “involves a social setting in which we demand (require) certain conduct from one another and respond adversely to one another’s failures to comply with these demands” (Watson, Philos Top 24:227–248, 1996). My concern here is the relation between moral responsibility and desert. Plausibly, if someone is morally responsible for something wrong then they deserve blame, and it is on the basis of them being morally responsible and its being wrong that they deserve blame. In this paper, I try to make progress toward understanding why it would follow that being morally responsible for something supports a desert claim. I propose to do this by exploring how the “two faces” of responsibility should proceed. An important upshot is that we gain a new currency by which to evaluate extant theories of responsibility that might favor one or the other conception: do they carry plausible desert commitments? To illustrate this benefit, I argue that accountability theory carries implausible implications for deserved praise.     

The Orthodox Understanding of Marriage in the Ecumenical Context

This article deals with interchurch and interreligious marriage as a challenge to Orthodox theology and its self-conscience. The canons of the church came into being at a time when the church identified itself with history, and the Empire with the kingdom of God. Their purpose was to strengthen the historical construction of the church and the Empire. In such a context, the “other” was a threat to the historical existence of the church. Eschatology offers a different perspective, seeing the whole world as a church “in becoming.” Mixed marriages pose the following questions: How do we understand ourselves? How do we understand others? Our tradition has been challenged with new events and new realities, demanding bravery to solve them.     

Playing God during the Pandemic

According to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in extraordinary situations, when the accepted norms of ethics do not provide clear-cut answers and even prevent responsible action, human beings must act freely in conformity to the incarnate, crucified, and risen Christ. Being conformed to his incarnation means being involved fully and vicariously in the life and struggles of the world; being conformed to his crucifixion means identifying with the suffering of the victims and being in solidarity with the oppressed; and being conformed to his resurrection means living and acting in hope for the sake of future generations. In seeking to express the love of Christ in the midst of our present-day pandemic, we are called to act in response to the question “Who is Jesus Christ for us today?” In this way, “Christ’s love moves the world to reconciliation and unity,” not just during a pandemic such as we have experienced, but also at this time in world history when enmity and discord have once again become rampant.     

Extended cognition,personal responsibility,and relational autonomy

The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC)—that many cognitive processes are carried out by a hybrid coalition of neural, bodily and environmental factors—entails that the intentional states that are reasons for action might best be ascribed to wider entities of which individual persons are only parts. I look at different kinds of extended cognition and agency, exploring their consequences for concerns about the moral agency and personal responsibility of such extended entities. Can extended entities be moral agents and bear responsibility for actions, in addition to or in place of the individuals typically held responsible? What does it mean to be “autonomous” when one’s cognition is influenced and supported by a milieu of environmental factors? To answer these questions, I explore strong parallels between HEC’s critique of individualism in cognition, and feminist critiques of individualist accounts of self, agency, and autonomy. This relational and social conception of autonomous agency, as scaffolded and supported (or undermined and impaired) by a milieu of social, relational, and normative factors, has important lessons for HEC. Drawing together these two visions of distributed and decentralized aspects of personhood highlights how cognition, action, and responsibility are inextricably linked. It also encourages a reconceptualization of all cognition and all concerns about responsibility for actions, not simply as sometimes “extended” around individuals, but as fundamentally communal, social, and normative, with individual cognition and individual moral responsibility being derivative special cases, not the paradigm examples. Individuals are merely one of many possible loci of cognition, action, and responsibility.     

Exploring the impact of dimensional comparisons in health contexts

“Did I exercise enough this week?” “Should I eat that last donut?” “Am I in good shape?” Due to the ambiguity and difficulty of answering such questions, people often use comparison-based information to contextualize their standing, inform self-evaluations, and guide behavior. For example, to ascertain whether they have exercised enough, people can make social comparisons to peers (e.g., “Have I exercised more than my friends?”) or temporal comparisons of the present to the past (e.g., “Have I exercised more this week than last week?”). While ample research has examined the relevance and impact of social and temporal comparisons in a range of health contexts (e.g., health behaviors, risk perceptions), the overarching goal of the present review was to explicate the potential relevance and impact of a third type of comparison standard—dimensional comparisons—in health contexts (with an emphasis on health behaviors like exercise). First, we discuss how social and temporal comparisons shape self-evaluations in both health and non-health contexts. Second, we provide an overview of research conducted on dimensional comparisons in non-health contexts and discuss how comparison sources shape self-evaluations and self-concept formation. Third, we explore the potential impact and relevance of dimensional comparisons on self-evaluations in health behavior contexts. Fourth, and finally, we highlight potential future directions and considerations for advancing our knowledge of the relevance and influence of dimensional comparisons in health contexts.     

Three Naive Questions: Addressed to the Modern Educational Optimism

This paper aims to question anew the popular and supposedly self-evident affirmation of education, in its modern incarnation as in its historical notion. The “naive” questions suggest that we have recently taken for granted that education ought to be for the masses, that it ought to be upbringing, and that it is better than ignorance. Drawing on the tradition that calls such an understanding of education into question, the author shows that the hidden costs of disregarding such reflection end up, camouflaged and smuggled, taxing the current debates regarding generally accepted education strategies. The characteristic feeling of the currently accepted model of education being in chronic crisis is less a testament to an absence of alternative approaches than to a lack of thorough self-reflection.     

Sollen Psychoanalytiker Psychotherapeuten ausbilden?

With respect to the radical changes in psychotherapeutic education as a consequence of the Law for Psychotherapy that has been put into force, the author elaborates on political, medical and strategic aspects. It is of special interest whether psychoanalysts having had the “monopoly” of training in depth psychological therapy should further take responsibility for the training in and the development of this method. Meanwhile, other therapeutic schools are claiming depth psychological psychotherapy for themselves and they deny the essential role of psychoanalysis as a foundation of it. In addition, the psychoanalytic institutes themselves do not agree on this issue. A further aspect of the question is that of marketing strategies: in order to survive, it is for psychoanalytic institutes at a time of lessening interest in standard psychoanalytic training important to offer training in depth psychological therapy with its comparatively less expensive and less extensive curriculum. But the essential question remains: should psychoanalysts train psychotherapists and take responsibility for an independent depth psychological therapy, or not? The author calls for a separate profound education in depth psychology taught by psychoanalysts in order to maintain a positive atmosphere for psychoanalysis e.g. in clinical institutions. He agrees with the IPV that this would help to solve “the crisis of the psycho analysis”. Finally, some of the most important, unsolved questions referring to a separate and profound education in depth psychology are presented and possible solutions are offered. It is of crucial importance to take up again the discussion within the psychoanalytical associations and to adjust their medical as well as political attitude to the new ways depth psychology is taught at psychoanalytical institutes.     

Ethics and public health emergencies: encouraging responsibility

The three primary ethical challenges in preparing for public health emergencies - addressing questions of rationing, restrictions and responsibilities - all entail confronting uncertainty. But the third, considering whether people and institutions will live up to their responsibilities in a crisis, is perhaps the hardest to predict and therefore plan for. The quintessential example of a responsibility during a public health emergency is that of health care professionals' obligation to continue caring for patients during epidemics. Historically, this 'duty to treat' has sometimes gone unrecognized or ignored, but it has also famously been adhered to, including during the recent SARS epidemic. And non-crisis examples of health professionals working in the face of personal risk are very common. The duty to treat should be circumscribed by several considerations, including the levels or risk and benefit at issue, the degree of public reliance on health professional action, and the nature of the individual health professional's acceptance of greater than usual risk. Examining the professional duty to treat and the legitimate questions it raises can provide insight into other actors' responsibilities. Public health ethics as well as professional ethics can help frame answers to some key questions: How strong are ethical responsibilities during crises? To whom do they apply? Should they be more explicit - and hence more circumscribed - or less explicit and hence largely aspirational? And how can public health policies encourage responsible actions?     

CHEMISTRY: WHAT DOES ONE NEED TO KNOW?

Abstract. The general knowledge and understanding that every teacher of religion and science should have relative to chemistry can be found in the answers to three major questions. In my own response to the first question, How did chemistry emerge as a discipline? I trace the origins, establishment, and subsequent historical significance of cosmology. I contend that chemistry is “the obvious, oldest science” and, as such, has played a key role among the sciences in agelong human efforts to understand reality. In my response to the second question, How do chemists currently view (cosmic) reality? I outline three prominent examples in support of my contention that chemistry, despite being “the obvious, oldest science,” is seen by some as playing only a tacit role in current efforts to (re)integrate religion and science. In my response to the third question, How do chemists currently view ultimate reality and meaning? I argue that “unifiers” in chemistry can also now play a key role in a reality revolution that is pointing humankind not only toward a possible historical (re) integration of religion and science but also toward a return to cosmology.     

Lernen im Team

The recent rapid changes of the economic conditions in the health care system have lead to a sense af crisis especially in mental health care organisations. The goal of high quality health care is in conflict with the economic necessity of cost cutting and profitability. The demand for rapid change processes collides with a special need for stability in mental health care organisations. In treating this dilemma, we can observe a marked inclination for splitting as a defence, which is acted out especially between leadership and work force, as well as between the management and the therapeutic part of the institutions. This danger of splitting can be counteracted with an attitude of integrating and balancing the different needs and by orientating the organisation at the principles of a ?learning organisation“ (Senge 1990). Such an organization can use the capacity of self-management in treating the above mentioned dilemma. In addition, the capacity of ?learning from experience“ (Bion 1962) proves as an essential asset in the survival of mental health care organizations. In such organizations, work and learning is primarily organized in the structure of teams — this article will therefore discuss how teams organize learning and how they treat the dynamics of stability and change.