Metacognitive myopia and the overutilization of misleading advice

Previous research on advice taking has explained the failure to exploit collective wisdom in terms of the egocentric underweighting of advice provided by independent others. The present research is concerned with an opposite and more radical source of irrational advice taking, namely, the failure to critically assess the validity of advice due to metacognitive myopia. Participants could use the advice of one or two experts when estimating health risks. They read sketches of the study samples that experts had drawn to estimate conditional probabilities (e.g., of HIV‐given drug addiction). Whether samples were valid or seriously biased, subsequent judgments were strongly affected by any advice (Experiment 1). Uncritical reliance on any advice persisted when participants were sensitized to the contrast of valid and invalid advice in a repeated measures design (Experiment 2), when participants themselves believed advice not to be valid (Experiment 3), and even after full debriefing about invalid advice (Experiment 4). Lay advice exerted a similar influence as expert advice (Experiment 5). Although these provocative results are independent of numeracy and consensus (Experiment 6), they highlight the impact of metacognitive myopia as an impediment of social rationality.     

The Interference of Introversion–Extraversion and Depressive Symptomatology with Reasoning Performance: A Behavioural Study

The objective of this study was to investigate the link between the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) scores and depressive symptomatology with reasoning performance induced by a task including valid and invalid Aristotelian syllogisms. The EPQ and the Zung Depressive Scale (ZDS) were completed by 48 healthy subjects (27 male, 21 female) aged 33.5 ± 9.0 years. Additionally, the subjects engaged into two reasoning tasks (valid vs. invalid syllogisms). Analysis showed that the judgment of invalid syllogisms is a more difficult task than of valid judgments (65.1% vs. 74.6% of correct judgments respectively, p < 0.01). In both conditions, the subjects’ degree of confidence is significantly higher when they make a correct judgment than when they make an incorrect judgment (83.8 ± 11.2 vs. 75.3 ± 17.3, p < 0.01). Subjects with extraversion as measured by EPQ and high sexual desire as rated by the relative ZDS subscale are more prone to make incorrect judgments in the valid syllogisms, while, at the same time, they are more confident in their responses. The effects of extraversion/introversion and sexual desire on the outcome measures of the valid condition are not commutative but additive. These findings indicate that extraversion/introversion and sexual desire variations may have a detrimental effect in the reasoning performance.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

Betting on conditionals

A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B, and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B. The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional—true, false, or void for indicative conditionals and win, lose, or void for conditional bets. The participants were presented with an array of chips in two different colours and two different shapes, and an indicative conditional or a conditional bet about a random chip. They had to make judgements in two conditions: either about the chances of making the indicative conditional true or false or about the chances of winning or losing the conditional bet. The observed distributions of responses in the two conditions were generally related to the conditional probability, supporting the first hypothesis. In addition, a majority of participants in further conditions chose the third option, “void”, when the antecedent of the conditional was false, supporting the second hypothesis.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lottery attractiveness and presentation mode of probability and value information

The attractiveness of lotteries that vary in p (probability) and o (outcome) depends on the presentation mode of p and o information. Extending previous findings on temporally experienced p, we manipulate the numerically stated versus spatially experienced format of both p (graphical presentation of a distribution of lottery tickets in an urn) and o (distribution of money notes). Lottery attractiveness ratings were sensitive to the expected value (EV), but p received more weight than o at constant EV levels (p‐dominance). Both EV sensitivity and p‐dominance were enhanced for experienced p and numerical o. This format particularly revealed the unattractiveness of low‐p lotteries. Experiencing p was functional in terms of accuracy and high‐risk avoidance, but only when the task environments rendered p diagnostic of EV. The presentation mode manipulations did not affect the initial perception stage but the relative weighting of p and o in the final judgment integration stage. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.     

Metacognitive illusions can be reduced by monitoring recollection during study

Prior work has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) are prone to an auditory metacognitive illusion such that loud words are given higher predictions than quiet words despite no differences in recall as a function of auditory intensity. The current study investigated whether judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs)—judgments that focus participants on whether or not recollective details will be remembered—are less susceptible to such an illusion. In Experiment 1, participants studied single words, making item-by-item JOLs or JORKs immediately after study. Indeed, although increased volume elevated judgement magnitude for both JOLs and JORKs, the effect was significantly attenuated when JORKs were elicited. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and additionally demonstrated that participants making JORKs were less likely than participants making JOLs to choose to restudy quiet words relative to loud words. Taken together, these results suggest that JORKs are impacted less—in terms of both metacognitive monitoring and control—by irrelevant perceptual information than JOLs. More generally, these data support the contention that metacognitive illusions can be attenuated by simply changing the way metacognitive judgments are solicited, an important finding given that subjective experiences guide self-regulated learning.     

Humean Moral Knowledge

I develop resources from Hume to account for moral knowledge in the qualified sense developed by Bernard Williams, according to which the proper application of thick ethical terms constitutes moral knowledge. By applying to moral discernment the criteria of the good aesthetic critic, as explained in Hume's “Of the Standard of Taste”, we can see how Humean moral knowledge might be possible. For each of these criteria, an analogous trait would contribute to moral discernment. These traits would enable moral judges to distinguish valid from invalid uses of thick moral terms. The deliverances of such judgments constitute mitigated moral knowledge, as opposed to knowledge in the stricter sense that Hume clearly says cannot be had of moral distinctions. This account has the potential to explain how moral judgments may be valid or invalid without appealing to unique operations of the understanding and how moral knowledge might escape the threat, identified by Williams, of reflective destruction.     

The same but different: an empirical investigation of the reducibility principle

According to classical utility theory the valuation of any lottery should depend only on its outcomes and their respective probabilities, and should not be affected by the nature, complexity and structure of the chance mechanism. Previous research has documented systematic violations of this principle. For example, most subjects prefer lotteries in which the payoffs are contingent on the joint occurrence of multiple (high probability) events to simple lotteries, and lotteries in which the earlier stages offer higher probabilities than the later stages. We review the various violations of this principle and suggest a classification into two major types associated with misunderstanding of chance mechanisms and attitude towards the chance mechanism and process. In the present study 40 subjects were presented with 30 pairs of binary gambles. In any given pair the lotteries had identical outcomes and equal ‘reduced’ probabilities (and thus equal expected values). However, the chance mechanisms varied along a variety of factors such as the size of the sample space, the number of stages, temporal ordering, order of probabilities, their transparency and time constraints. Half the subjects saw lotteries involving gains and the other half considered only losses. After choosing one lottery in each pair, the subjects were asked to explain and justify their choices. The findings revealed systematic violations of the reducibility principle: subjects displayed a preference for lotteries with larger sample spaces, and for lotteries that allow quicker resolutions in the earlier stages. A clear distinction between some patterns of preferences in the gains and loss domains was revealed. In gambles involving gains subjects preferred to have the highest probability on the first stage (and the lowest probability on the last stage), but displayed the opposite preferences for losses. A content analysis of the subjects' stated reasons for their choices identified eight major categories. The most frequently invoked were hope, fun, simplicity, stress and time. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Fluency Signals Truth: Prior Successful Reliance on Fluency Moderates the Impact of Fluency on Truth Judgments

Repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true. One position relates this so‐called “truth effect” to metacognitive experiences of fluency, suggesting that repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true because they are processed more fluently. Although most prior research focused on why repetition influences truth judgments, considerably less is known about when fluency is used as information. The present research addresses this question and investigates whether reliance on fluency is moderated by learning experiences. Specifically, we focus on changes in the reliance on fluency over the course of time. A series of experiments reveals that fluency is more likely to be used in truth judgments when previous reliance on fluency has resulted in valid judgments, compared with when previous reliance on fluency was misleading. These findings suggest that reliance on fluency in judgments is a finely tuned process that takes prior experiences with fluency‐based judgments into account. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The center and range of the probability interval as factors affecting ambiguity preferences

Ambiguous decision situations are characterized as having probabilities that are uncertain. The uncertainty is due to the common, real-world deficiency of information about the process by which the outcomes are determined. Thirty lotteries having uncertain probabilities were constructed by varying the centers and the ranges of the intervals within which the imprecise probabilities of winning could lie. Pairs of the lotteries were presented as choice alternatives to subjects, with each pair having lotteries with the same interval center but differing interval ranges. Ambiguity avoidance, the selection of the less ambiguous option, was found to increase with the interval center C, with ambiguity indifference occurring for values of C ? 0.40. No evidence of ambiguity seeking as the prevalent behavior was obtained. Ambiguity avoidance did not significantly increase with the interval range R, but an interaction effect between C and the ranges R₁ and R₂ of the choice pair was obtained. This effect of the ranges could not be described simply by knowledge of the difference R₁ ? R₂; knowledge of both individual values was necessary. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Is there a logic of incoherence?

What should we do when we discover that our assessment of probabilities is incoherent? I explore the hypothesis that there is a logic of incoherence—a set of universally valid rules that specify how incoherent probability assessments are to be repaired. I examine a pair of candidate‐rules of incoherence logic that have been employed in philosophical reconstructions of scientific arguments. Despite their intuitive plausibility, both rules turn out to be invalid. There are presently no viable candidate‐rules for an incoherence logic on the table. Other ways of dealing with incoherence are surveyed, and found either to be unsatisfactory or to rely on a logic of incoherence in the end. The resolution of these antagonistic conclusions is left to future researchers.     

Parallels in Preschoolers' and Adults' Judgments About Ownership Rights and Bodily Rights

Understanding ownership rights is necessary for socially appropriate behavior. We provide evidence that preschoolers' and adults' judgments of ownership rights are related to their judgments of bodily rights. Four‐year‐olds (n = 70) and adults (n = 89) evaluated the acceptability of harmless actions targeting owned property and body parts. At both ages, evaluations did not vary for owned property or body parts. Instead, evaluations were influenced by two other manipulations—whether the target belonged to the agent or another person, and whether that other person approved of the action. Moreover, these manipulations influenced judgments for owned objects and body parts in the same way: When the other person approved of the action, participants' judgments were positive regardless of who the target belonged to. In contrast, when that person disapproved, judgments depended on who the target belonged to. These findings show that young children grasp the importance of approval or consent for ownership rights and bodily rights, and likewise suggest that people's notions of ownership rights are related to their appreciation of bodily rights.     

Self‐Enhancement on a Self‐Categorization Leash: Evidence for a Dual‐Process Model of First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

Research suggests that first‐ and third‐person perceptions are driven by the motive to self‐enhance and cognitive processes involving the perception of social norms. This article proposes and tests a dual‐process model that predicts an interaction between cognition and motivation. Consistent with the model, Experiment 1 (N = 112) showed that self‐enhancement drove influence judgments when messages were normatively neutral—people reported first‐person perceptions for in‐group‐favoring messages and third‐person perceptions for out‐group‐favoring messages. Experiment 2 (N = 208) showed an additive effect when social norms were also in‐group‐enhancing, but showed a decreased effect when social norms and group‐enhancement were discordant. The findings are hard to reconcile with pure motivational or cognitive explanations, but are consistent with the proposed dual‐process model.     

Risk Perception: Using Conditional Versus General Base Rates for Risk Communication1

In general, people judge their chance of experiencing a health risk as being less than the general base rate because of their favorable status on risk factors (e.g., history of stroke). Presenting base rates for high and low risk groups (conditional base rates) were hypothesized to lessen people's tendency to adjust downward from the base rate because risk factors are included in conditional base rates (CBRs). Young (M= 19 years) and older women (M= 46 years) were presented with either a general base rate (GBR) or CBRs for high‐ and low‐risk groups for 5 health risks. The CBR groups were significantly less likely to adjust their probability judgments from the base rate for the risk group that they believed applied to them (e.g., smoker vs. nonsmoker). The CBR effect was replicated in a second experiment in which women (M = 19 years) were informed of either a GBR, a CBR for a high‐risk group, or a CBR for a low‐risk group. The findings suggest that people might estimate subjective probabilities by considering both the base rate for a health risk and self‐assessments on risk factors. Biases about one's status on risk factors, however, may limit people's identification with relevant risk groups and warrant further investigation.     

Implicit personality theory: Is it illusory?1

Several studies have found a substantial association between subjects' judgments about the co-occurrence of personality items and the items' actual co-occurrence, lending support to the validity of implicit personality theory. This work has recently been called into question by an investigation of Mirels (1976) that reported a nonsignificant relationship between judged probabilities of item pairs and the pairs' empirical coendorsement probabilities (actually calculated conditional probabilities) derived from self-report responses. Using Mirels' data as well as new data, an appreciable and highly significant association between judgments of behavioral co-occurrence and empirical coendorsement was found, when the latter was measured by correlational-type indexes instead of conditional probability. This outcome indicates that the divergent results in the Mirels investigation were due to its use of the conditional probability index as a measure of empirical coendorsement. These findings add to the accumulating body of evidence pointing to the validity of implicit personality theory.     

Dysphoria and the prediction and experience of emotion

Depression and dysphoria have been characterised by dampened positive emotional experiences. However, it remains unclear whether dysphoria is also characterised by dampened expectancies about positive emotional experiences. In the present study, participants with (dysphoric group; n=36) and without (non-dysphoric group; n=36) dysphoria reported on their expected and actual emotional responses to winning and losing money in a computer task. Results showed the dysphoric group predicted and experienced less happiness and contentment after winning money than the non-dysphoric group. Results also showed the dysphoric group predicted and experienced as much negative emotion after losing money as the non-dysphoric group. Moreover, the dysphoric group predicted they would experience more happiness after winning money than they actually did, whereas the non-dysphoric group experienced as much happiness as they had predicted. Results suggest that disturbances in positive emotional responding are characteristic of people experiencing dysphoria.