The role of desires in sequential impulsive choices

The present research provides evidence for a sequential mitigation effect, which is the phenomenon that participation in a prior impulsive choice task significantly reduces the decision maker’s likelihood of choosing impulsively in a subsequent task. The results of five experiments: (a) provide evidence for the Sequential Mitigation Effect using different study materials and contexts (Experiments 1–3), (b) show that prior impulsive (as opposed to non-impulsive) choice is required for the effect to occur (Experiment 4), and (c) find that the decision maker’s chronic sensitivity to positive and negative outcomes moderates the effect (Experiment 5). The results support the notion that desire for impulsive options functions as a limited motivational resource, and being consumed in the first task, is experienced to a lesser extent in the second task. The sequential mitigation effect may be characterized as a motivational contextual influence on decision making, complementing existing research showing that cognitive context effects influence sequential choices.     

Children's utilization of emotion expectancies in moral decision‐making

This study investigated the relevance of emotion expectancies for children's moral decision‐making. The sample included 131 participants from three different grade levels (M = 8.39 years, SD = 2.45, range 4.58–12.42). Participants were presented a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and asked to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonists' shoes. Overall, it was found that the anticipation of moral emotions predicted an increased likelihood of moral choices in antisocial and prosocial contexts. In younger children, anticipated moral emotions predicted moral choice for prosocial actions, but not for antisocial actions. Older children showed evidence for the utilization of anticipated emotions in both prosocial and antisocial behaviours. Moreover, for older children, the decision to act prosocially was less likely in the presence of non‐moral emotions. Findings suggest that the impact of emotion expectancies on children's moral decision‐making increases with age. Contrary to happy victimizer research, the study does not support the notion that young children use moral emotion expectancies for moral decision‐making in the context of antisocial actions.     

Dispositional optimism,self‐framing and medical decision‐making

Self‐framing is an important but underinvestigated area in risk communication and behavioural decision‐making, especially in medical settings. The present study aimed to investigate the relationship among dispositional optimism, self‐frame and decision‐making. Participants (N = 500) responded to the Life Orientation Test‐Revised and self‐framing test of medical decision‐making problem. The participants whose scores were higher than the middle value were regarded as highly optimistic individuals. The rest were regarded as low optimistic individuals. The results showed that compared to the high dispositional optimism group, participants from the low dispositional optimism group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self‐frame, and tended to choose the radiation therapy with high treatment survival rate, but low 5‐year survival rate. Based on the current findings, it can be concluded that self‐framing effect still exists in medical situation and individual differences in dispositional optimism can influence the processing of information in a framed decision task, as well as risky decision‐making.     

Reflections of the self: how self‐esteem determines decision framing and increases risk taking

Historically, research examining the influence of individual personality factors on decision processing has been sparse. In this paper we investigate how one important individual aspect, self‐esteem, influences imposition and subsequent processing of ambiguously, negatively or positively framed decision tasks. We hypothesized that low self‐esteem individuals would impose a negative frame onto ambiguous decision problems and would be especially sensitive to negatively framed decision tasks. In Study 1 we utilized a self‐framing procedure and demonstrated that HSE participants were evenly divided in the hedonic valence they self‐imposed whereas LSE participants were more likely to self‐impose a negative frame. When these differences were accounted for, HSE and LSE participants were equivalent in risk seeking/avoiding choices. Study 2 used a risky‐choice framing task and found that LSE individuals were especially sensitive to the negative frame. Study 3, provided converging evidence and generalization of these findings to a reflection tasks involving money. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of impulses in shaping decisions

This paper explores the extent to which decision behavior is shaped by short‐lived reactions to the outcome of the most recent decision. We inspected repeated decision‐making behavior in two versions of each of two decision‐making tasks, an individual task and a strategic one. By regressing behavior onto the outcomes of recent decisions, we found that the upcoming decision was well predicted by the most recent outcome alone, with the tendency to repeat a previous action being affected both by its actual outcome and by the outcomes of actions not taken. Because the goodness of predictions based on the most recent outcome did not diminish as participants gained experience with the task, we conclude that repeated decisions are continuously affected by impulsive reactions. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision Pattern Analysis as a General Framework for Studying Individual Differences in Decision Making

This paper investigated decision pattern analysis (DPA) as a general and standard framework for studying individuals' consistent decision making behavior within and between contexts. DPA classifies decisions on the basis of judgement accuracy and the goal orientation of the decided‐upon action. Over repeated decisions, patterns of individuals' decision behavior are described by five variables: competence, optimality, recklessness, hesitancy and decisiveness. A fictitious medical decision making test and three standard cognitive ability tests (extended with confidence ratings and a ‘submit answer for marking’ decision) were used to investigate the psychometric properties of these DPA variables. Internal consistency of the decision patterns ranged from good to excellent. Convergent validity was assessed via cognitive abilities, metacognitive confidence and a control criterion imposed on confidence that determines the decision to be made: the point of sufficient certainty. Personality variables were included to assess discriminant validity. As hypothesised, cognitive abilities showed positive correlations with competence and optimality. High confidence, low points of sufficient certainty and a greater discrepancy between them were associated with higher decisiveness and recklessness, and lower hesitancy. Personality measures showed mixed and generally weak correlations with the DPA variables. These convergent and discriminant results also held after controlling for all variables in regression. The results provide preliminary psychometric support for DPA as a general framework of behavioral decision making. DPA has the potential to be exploited in many contexts for uses that, to date, have been unachievable in a psychometrically valid manner. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Once a Utilitarian,Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment via the Robustness of Individual Differences

Although individual differences in the application of moral principles, such as utilitarianism, have been documented, so too have powerful context effects—effects that raise doubts about the durability of people's moral principles. In this article, we examine the robustness of individual differences in moral judgment by examining them across time and across different decision contexts. In Study 1, consistency in utilitarian judgment of 122 adult participants was examined over two different survey sessions. In Studies 2A and 2B, large samples (Ns = 130 and 327, respectively) of adult participants made a series of 32 moral judgments across eight different contexts that are known to affect utilitarian endorsement. Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near‐perfect consistency. Results support the view that on at least one dimension (utilitarianism), people's moral judgments are robustly consistent, with context effects tailoring the application of principles to the particulars of any given moral judgment.     

Beliefs in moral luck: When and why blame hinges on luck

Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.     

An effort based analysis of the paradoxical effects of incentives on decision‐aided performance

This study examines the effect of incentives on decision‐aided performance. In particular, the study provides further insight into whether, when, and how incentives affect task performance in the presence of decision aids by (1) replicating previous research showing the negative effects of incentives on performance; (2) investigating whether this effect generalizes to a more realistic scenario in which decision makers have access to additional contextual information not captured by the decision aid; and (3) applying an effort‐based framework to explain the link between incentives and performance. In contrast to the findings of prior research, our study shows that incentives do not necessarily decrease performance in the presence of decision aids. Rather, we demonstrate that the effect of incentives on decision‐aided performance depends on other contextual factors such as the absence or presence of additional contextual information. By further specifying the conditions under which incentives result in increases or decreases to decision‐aided task performance, our results have implications for both future research and the design of incentive systems in practice. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cheating: One common morality for gains and losses but two components of morality itself

Previous studies show that decision makers (DMs) lie more to avoid a loss than achieve a gain. Two compelling mechanisms might explain this observation. One assumes that lying is a risky activity and relates to the shape of the monetary value function described by prospect theory, which assumes (a) increased risk taking for loss frames and (b) an asymmetry between the perceived values of losses and gains. The other relates to the importance of self-esteem functions as expressed in self-concept maintenance models, self-esteem issues being weighed against monetary issues. This alternative explanation assumes that a loss frame serves as a factor lowering moral considerations. We report an experimental study presenting sets of lotteries to DMs, once in a moral context and once in a traditional probabilistic context. The results show that DMs take less risk when lotteries are presented in a moral context. It is also shown that DMs take more risk for losses than gains, this holding for both the moral and probabilistic contexts. This latter result suggests that loss/gain asymmetry can be completely explained by prospect theory factors, and framing makes no difference to the valuing of moral considerations.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social cues and verbal framing in risky choice

We examined how people use social and verbal cues of differing priorities in making social decisions. In Experiment 1, formally identical life – death choice problems were presented in different hypothetical group contexts and were phrased in either a positive or negative frame. The risk‐seeking choice became more dominant as the number of kin in an endangered group increased. Framing effects occurred only in a heterogeneous group context where the lives at risk were a mixture of kin and strangers. No framing effect was found when the same problem was presented in the context of a homogeneous group consisting of either all kin or all strangers. We viewed the framing effects to be a sign of indecisive risk preference due to the differential effects of a kinship cue and a stranger cue on choice. In Experiment 2, we presented the life – death problem in two artificial group contexts involving either 6 billion human lives or 6 billion extraterrestrial lives. A framing effect was found only in the human context. Two pre‐conditions of framing effects appear to be social unfamiliarity of a decision problem and aspiration level of a decision maker. In Experiment 3, we analyzed the direction of the framing effect by balancing the framing. The direction of the framing effect depended on the baseline level of risk preference determined by a specific decision context. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Priming modernity and work experiences strengthens the association between fairness/harm concerns and anger in China

According to the CAD model of emotional responses to immorality, if an event violates the moral foundations of justice and harm, people will feel angry. However, the model is silent on whether the strength of association between anger and perceived injustice/harm is context‐dependent. Using a contextual priming paradigm, the current research shows that in China, the association between anger and perceived injustice/harm is stronger when work (vs family) and modern (vs traditional) contexts are primed. Specifically, we primed modernity versus traditionality (Experiment 1) and work experiences (Experiment 2) and measured the strength of association between justice/harm concerns and anger. The results show that: (i) the linkage between justice/harm concern and anger was stronger in the modernity priming condition than in the tradition priming or control conditions; and (ii) the linkage between justice/harm concern and anger was stronger in the work experience priming condition than in the control condition. In short, priming modern and work contexts strengthens the association between justice/harm concerns and anger, suggesting the strength of the morality–emotion link is context‐dependent.     

The Job Demands and Resources Decision Making (JD-R-DM) Model

This study explores the effects of nurses’ daily job characteristics (i.e., job demands and resources) and general work engagement on their daily decision making (i.e., analytical and intuitive) and consequently their daily performance (i.e., task and contextual). Participants completed a baseline questionnaire and a diary for five consecutive days. Results reveal a positive influence of the job demands “work pressure” and “predictability” on analytical decision making. In turn, analytical decision making promotes task performance. Work pressure also negatively influences intuitive decision making which, in turn, stimulates task and contextual performance. However, the job resource (i.e., autonomy) had a nonsignificant relationship with decision making. General work engagement had positive effects on analytical decision making and moderated the relationship between intuitive decision making and contextual performance. For those high on work engagement, the relation was stronger compared to their counterparts low on work engagement. Results corroborate that expanding and testing decision-making theories can increase understanding on how the work environment and engagement influence employee decision making and performance.     

Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from Others during Decision Making

Decision making is rarely context‐free, and often, both social information and non‐social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision making? Participants (N = 245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision making task that involved the presentation of either non‐social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 105) completed either the ostracism non‐social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non‐social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared with included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual but overweighed non‐social information during decision making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On undesirable consequences of thinking: framing effects as a function of substantive processing

Three studies investigate the impact of effortful constructive processing on framing effects. The results replicated previous findings: Participants avoided the risky option when the scenario was framed in terms of gains, but preferred this option when the scenario was framed in terms of losses. Importantly, framing effects were most pronounced when conditions allowed for an effortful constructive processing style (i.e., substantive processing). This impact of decision frames varied when decision time served as an indicator for the elaboration extent (Study 1), and also when processing motivation (accountability; Study 2) and processing ability (decision time; Study 3) were manipulated. Moreover, effortful processing did not increase framing effects when contextual cues reduced the necessity for constructive thinking (Study 1). We suggest that decision frames may take on very different roles as a function of the ambiguity of the decision problem, and the degree and style of processing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Normative and Descriptive Models of Military Decisions to Deploy Precision Strike Capabilities

Precision strike capabilities represent a significant and highly controversial part of present day military operations. And yet, there is a surprising dearth of empirical research on military decision making in this domain. In this article, we therefore review different psychological perspectives on how these decisions can be made. Specifically, we compare the application of normative models of judgment and choice against the empirical research on human decision making, which suggests that people are more likely to employ heuristic strategies. We suggest that several features of decision tasks in the precision strike domain evoke the use of intuitive (heuristic) decision making whereas other features such as the sometimes unfamiliar (or novel) nature of the decision task requires analytic strategies to generate good solutions. Therefore, decisions about precision strike capabilities are best made with a mixture of intuitive and analytic thought, a mode of thinking known as quasirationality.     

Prospect theory analysis of guessing in multiple choice tests

The guessing of answers in multiple choice tests adds random error to the variance of the test scores, lowering their reliability. Formula scoring rules that penalize for wrong guesses are frequently used to solve this problem. This paper uses prospect theory to analyze scoring rules from a decision‐making perspective and focuses on the effects of framing on the tendency to guess. In three experiments participants were presented with hypothetical test situations and were asked to indicate the degree of certainty that they thought was required for them to answer a question. In accordance with the framing hypothesis, participants tended to guess more when they anticipated a low grade and therefore considered themselves to be in the loss domain, or when the scoring rule caused the situation to be framed as entailing potential losses. The last experiment replicated these results with a task that resembles an actual test. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Past Normative Behaviors Predictive of Future Behavioral Intentions?

We acknowledge the limitations in measures of moral reasoning and pursue an alternative technique by investigating past behaviors as they relate to present behavioral intentions. Our purpose is to evaluate the merits of patterned normative behavior for predicting present and future, morally relevant outcomes. Participants (N = 177) completed a policy capturing experimental design responding to questions that orthogonally varied the situational nature of the decision context. Results indicate that past normative behaviors are significantly and directly related to ethical behavioral intentions. Moreover, they moderate the relationships between situational factors and intended outcomes as well as moral reasoning and intended outcomes.