恐惧管理对道德五基准及道德判断的影响

本研究探讨恐惧管理理论对道德五种基本准则以及道德判断的影响。85名被试随机分配到实验组与控制组。全部被试首先完成道德五基准问卷。实验组被试接受死亡凸显提示后观看短片并完成一系列道德两难问题的判断;控制组接受一般负性事件提示。研究结果显示,相对于控制组而言,实验组被试倾向于作出直觉而非理性判断,并且死亡凸显对道德直觉判断的影响受到厌恶情绪的中介作用。同时,当故事情节发生转换时,实验组被试倾向于作出与原有道德直觉规范相一致的道德判断。本研究从恐惧管理理论出发,为道德判断的情理之争提供了启示。     

Potential negative consequences of mindfulness in the moral domain

Mindfulness is a state of paying conscious and nonjudgmental attention to present-moment experiences. Previous research relates this state to more effective emotion regulation and less emotion reactivity. We therefore hypothesized an attenuating effect of a mindfulness exercise on moral reactions that usually results from a bad conscience when having caused harm. Across five studies, we experimentally induced mindfulness via a short breathing exercise and then assessed harm-based moral reactions. As hypothesized, participants in the mindfulness (vs. control) exercise condition showed (i) attenuated repair intentions after having read a scenario in which participants caused harm to a friend (Study 3) and (ii) attenuated intentions to change harm-causing eating habits (Study 4). Results of Studies 1, 2 and 5 did not provide evidence for our hypothesis. A following meta-analysis across all five studies yielded an overall significant effect of mindfulness in the harm-condition, providing preliminary evidence for a potential downside to mindfulness.     

无处不在的伤害:二元论视角下的道德判断

道德二元论认为人际伤害是道德认知的典型模板.道德判断由规范违反,消极情感,感知到的伤害结合产生, 并经由二元比较与二元完型, 完成从下至上,从上至下的认知加工.道德失声现象的产生源于混淆了主客观伤害; 电车难题剥离了道德二元模型, 有趣但可能不符合普遍的道德认知; 不同领域的道德判断皆可在二元论的框架下得到解释.未来的研究可以考虑:意图与痛苦影响道德判断的实证; 跨文化研究的开展; 统一认知系统与模块化认知系统的辩证; 伤害的人际与非人际划分以及其他相关因素的检验.     

Understanding of moral emotions and social exclusion in pre-schoolers and third graders

Abstract

This study examined whether children use information about moral emotions when judging peer exclusion. Japanese pre-schoolers and third graders (N = 110) listened to stories featuring characters who felt happy or sad after engaging in immoral behaviour or avoiding immoral behaviour (pushing a child off a swing and stealing another child’s doughnuts). In study 1, participants judged the extent to which characters who felt happiness, guilt, and pride would be socially excluded. In study 2, participants judged whether characters who felt guilt, no guilt, pride, and no pride would be socially excluded. Participants believed that characters would be socially excluded based on moral emotions. Characters who did not feel guilt or pride were excluded more frequently relative to those who did; however, children found it easier to judge exclusion based on guilt rather than pride, especially in the case of pre-schoolers. Moreover, pre-schoolers had difficulty explaining their reasoning.     

Easy on the mind, easy on the wrongdoer: Discrepantly fluent violations are deemed less morally wrong

The present experiment tested the hypothesis that discrepancies in processing fluency influence the perceived wrongness of moral violations. Participants were presented with numerous moral violations in easy or difficult to read font. For some violations experienced perceptual fluency was consistent with the fluency associated with previous violations, whereas for others it was more fluent or more disfluent. Results show that, across multiple vignettes, participants rated moral violations that were processed with discrepant fluency as less morally wrong than those processed with discrepant disfluency. The current work highlights the importance of metacognitive experiences in moral judgment and contributes to the emerging literature on the role of experiential factors in moral judgment.     

Adolescents' reasoning about exclusion from social groups

Ninth- and 11th-grade students (N = 379) were surveyed regarding their evaluations of excluding someone from a social group solely on the basis of his or her social reference group membership. Individuals evaluated exclusion in ambiguous and nonambiguous situations. Judgments and reasoning about exclusion were compared with judgments and reasoning about a more prototypically moral situation (denial of resources). Overall, participants evaluated exclusion as less wrong than denial of resources and used fewer moral and more conventional reasons to justify their judgments. Participants relied more on their group knowledge or stereotypes in evaluating ambiguous situations and more on their personal knowledge in evaluating nonambiguous situations. Age- and gender-related differences in evaluations, reasoning, and use of stereotypes were also found.     

Reason and emotion,not reason or emotion in moral judgment

One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question assumes that reason and emotion are two fully independent cognitive faculties, whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that moral judgments are caused by a complex interplay of psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, but in a way that is not simply a function of the independent causal contributions of reason and emotion. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for metaethics.     

Psychopaths and Filthy Desks

Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can be happy to accept the necessity-thesis. My argument draws on the idea that emotions play the same role for moral judgment that perceptions play for ordinary judgments about the external world. I develop a rationalist interpretation of the sufficiency-thesis and show that it can successfully account for the available empirical evidence. The general idea is that the rationalist can accept the claim that emotional reactions are sufficient for moral judgment just in case a subject’s emotional reaction towards an action in question causes the judgment in a way that can be reflectively endorsed under conditions of full information and rationality. This idea is spelled out in some detail and it is argued that a moral agent is entitled to her endorsement if the way she arrives at her judgment reliably leads to correct moral beliefs, and that this reliability can be established if the subject’s emotional reaction picks up on the morally relevant aspects of the situation.     

道德判断中心理状态和事件因果关系的作用:兼对道德判断双加工过程理论的检验

考察青少年儿童和成人在道德判断中利用心理状态和事件因果关系信息的差异,并验证道德判断双加工过程理论.以道德判断中“行为坏的”程度和“应担负的道德责任程度”作为判断问题类型,共有10～11岁和13～15岁的青少年儿童及大学生各120名,完成道德判断测试任务.结果表明在不同的道德判断问题类型下,事件中他人愿望和信念、因果关系信息的作用模式是不同的,支持道德判断双加工过程理论.10～11岁儿童和13～15岁青少年在判断行为坏的程度时,利用心理状态信息和因果关系信息与成人类似.在判断应担负的道德责任程度时,10～11岁儿童更注重行为结果,并且不能综合应用心理状态信息和事件的因果关系信息.13～15岁青少年的道德判断中心理状态信息和事件因果关系信息的作用与成人的情况类似,但在进行应担负的道德责任程度判断时,还不能融合信念与因果关系信息进行道德判断.研究结果为道德判断双加工过程理论提供了支持,而且表明从儿童青少年到成人,利用心理状态和因果关系信息进行道德判断存在不断发展和成熟的过程.     

Expanding the moral circle: Inclusion and exclusion mindsets and the circle of moral regard

The human tendency to draw boundaries is pervasive. The ‘moral circle’ is the boundary drawn around those entities in the world deemed worthy of moral consideration. Three studies demonstrate that the size of the moral circle is influenced by a decision framing effect: the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy. Participants who decided which entities to exclude from the circle (exclusion mindset) generated larger moral circles than those who decided which to include (inclusion mindset). Further, people in an exclusion mindset showed “spill-over” effects into subsequent moral judgments, rating various outgroups as more worthy of moral treatment. The size of the moral circle mediated the effects of mindset on subsequent moral judgment. These studies offer an important first demonstration that decision framing effects have substantial consequences for the moral circle and related moral judgments.     

Interpersonal Moral Conflicts Between Couples: Effects of Type of Dilemma, Role, and Partner's Judgments on Level of Moral Reasoning and Probability of Resolution

Forty-two male–female couples completed Kohlberg's test of moral development and made moral judgments about the most recent interpersonal moral conflict they had experienced in their everyday lives. Participants made lower stage moral judgments about their interpersonal moral conflicts than about the dilemmas on Kohlberg's test. The type of interpersonal moral conflict participants experienced and their role in the conflict were related to the types of moral judgments they made. Participants who reported philosophical conflicts made more mature moral judgments than participants who reported antisocial conflicts, especially if their role in the antisocial conflict was that of a transgressor. Conflicts were most likely to be resolved when partners' moral judgments about their conflict were similar in moral maturity. The implications of these findings for models of moral judgment are discussed.     

Societal rule evaluations: Adolescent offenders' reasoning about moral,conventional, and personal rules

This study investigated adolescent offenders' (81 felons and 83 misdemeanants) evaluations of three types of societal rules (moral, conventional, and personal) on dimensions pertaining to importance, sanctions, authority, and individual choice. In addition, participants selected the acts which should be under personal jurisdiction. Participants provided reasons (i.e., justifications) to support their evaluations. The judgment evidence suggests that the moral rules were considered the most important, the transgressions the most wrong, the violators the most deserving of punishment, and the acts the least acceptable when permitted by an authority. With regard to these same dimensions, conventional rules and violations were ranked second; whereas, the personal rules were ranked third. Offender status differences were obtained for importance ratings and for deservedness of punishment. Justifications for moral events reflected reasoning from both the moral (e.g., other's welfare) and conventional (e.g., social order) domains. Reasoning about conventions involved both conventional and personal concerns; whereas, justifications about personal issues focused on individual prerogatives. The implications of these data are discussed. © 1996 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Moral judgment and conduct disorder intensity in adolescents involved in delinquency: matching controls by school grade

Most studies that have found associations between delinquency and moral judgment generally compare incarcerated juveniles with adolescents in normal schooling. However, this comparison is subject to two criticisms. First, a large number of adolescents in school who are not charged with any crime in the legal system are still involved in unlawful behaviour. Second, adolescents involved with delinquency often have difficulties at school. The aim of the present study was to measure this association by matching a sample of adolescents involved with delinquency (n=18, M age=15.8, SD=1.1) to adolescents not involved in delinquency (n=42, M age=15.8, SD=0.8) according to their school grade and Conduct Disorder Intensity as measured by a self-report index using DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. Participants who met four or more criteria were assigned to the High Conduct Disorder group (n=28), and the rest were assigned to the Low Conduct Disorder group (n=32). Their level of moral judgment was evaluated with the French version of the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form by Gibbs, Basinger, and Fuller, inspired by Kohlberg's model of moral development. Findings demonstrate that in both samples, adolescents in the High Conduct Disorder group presented moral judgment that was significantly less mature than that of adolescents in the Low Conduct Disorder group. However, the majority of participants in the Low Conduct Disorder group also scored low on the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form, suggesting more immature moral judgment. The bias introduced by the mode of recruitment in most comparisons of adolescents involved with delinquency to adolescents with no delinquency problems is discussed, and an argument is made for the importance of analysing moral judgment development within a framework of general cognitive development.     

左右侧颞顶联合区对道德意图信息加工能力的共同作用——基于经颅直流电刺激技术

行为人的意图动机是我们对日常行为的对错做出判断的重要依据。以往研究表明,左右侧颞顶联合区(TPJ)都可能与信念意图的整合加工能力相关,尤其是近年来越来越多的神经刺激研究为TPJ区域与心理状态归因能力之间的因果关系提供了证据。然而,这些研究在实验任务的选取,实验设计的优化,实验结论的稳健性上仍然有改进的空间。基于此,本研究开展了两个在设计上互相补充的实验。实验中被试的TPJ区域会接受一段时间的经颅直流电刺激,并完成一系列的道德判断任务,任务是由意图和结果,以及负性和中性2×2双变量构成的4种条件的故事:无伤人、伤人未遂、意外伤人和伤人成功,被试要对故事主角的行为做出谴责程度的道德判断。结合道德判断的谴责程度和决策时间数据发现,当人们在处理信念意图信息时,左右侧TPJ区域可能是协同互动、共同发挥作用的。在激活右侧TPJ并限制左侧TPJ的情况下,人们对负性结果的谴责程度变高,人们变得更加依赖于行为结果做出道德判断;而在限制右侧TPJ并激活左侧TPJ的情况下,人们对负性意图的谴责程度变高,人们变得更加依赖于行为者的动机做出道德判断。     

Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination

There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems. These thought experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios. Across seven studies (N = 968), we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a particular outcome. Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn influence moral judgments. Our findings demonstrate that intuitive likelihoods are one critical factor in moral judgment, one that is not suspended even in moral dilemmas that explicitly stipulate outcomes. Features thought to underlie moral reasoning, such as intention, may operate, in part, by affecting the intuitive likelihood of outcomes, and, problematically, moral differences between scenarios may be confounded with non‐moral intuitive probabilities.     

Cognitive parallels between moral judgment and modal judgment

A central question in the study of moral psychology is how immediate intuition interacts with more thoughtful deliberation in the generation of moral judgments. The present study sheds additional light on this question by comparing adults’ judgments of moral permissibility with their judgments of physical possibility—a form of judgment that also involves the coordination of intuition and deliberation (Shtulman, Cognitive Development 24:293–309, 2009). Participants (N = 146) were asked to judge the permissibility of 16 extraordinary actions (e.g., Is it ever morally permissible for an 80-year-old woman to have sex with a 20-year-old man?) and the possibility of 16 extraordinary events (e.g., Will it ever be physically possible for humans to bring an extinct species back to life?). Their tendency to judge the extraordinary events as possible was predictive of their tendency to judge the extraordinary actions as permissible, even when controlling for disgust sensitivity. Moreover, participants’ justification and response latency patterns were correlated across domains. Taken together, these findings suggest that modal judgment and moral judgment may be linked by a common inference strategy, with some individuals focusing on why actions/events that do not occur cannot occur, and others focusing on how those same actions/events could occur.     

特征整合与加工深度对道德概念容器隐喻联结的影响

提出了隐喻提取假说将隐喻联结的形成和提取进行分离, 并通过3个实验探究了道德概念与容器空间的隐喻联结及其受知觉加工深度和特征整合程度的影响。实验1采用空间Stroop范式, 实验2a和实验2b均采用启动范式, 实验3a和实验3b均采用加入任务要求的Stroop范式。结果发现：(1)在经典Stroop范式中未发现道德概念与容器空间的隐喻联结; (2)在启动范式中发现, 较深知觉加工深度下道德概念与容器空间存在较弱的隐喻联结; (3)在较高特征整合程度的Stroop任务中, 道德概念与容器空间存在较强的隐喻联结。结果表明：道德概念与容器空间存在道德为内、不道德为外的隐喻联结, 这种隐喻联结在映射上表现为双向性, 并且受到特征整合程度和知觉加工深度的影响, 同时也为隐喻提取假说提供了证据支持。     

The cost of callousness: regulating compassion influences the moral self-concept

It has often been argued that compassion is fundamental to morality. Yet people often suppress compassion for self-interested reasons. We provide evidence that suppressing compassion is not cost free, as it creates dissonance between a person's moral identity and his or her moral principles. We instructed separate groups of participants to regulate their compassion, regulate their feelings of distress, or freely experience emotions toward compassion--inducing images. Participants then reported how central morality was to their identities and how much they believed that moral rules should always be followed. Participants who regulated compassion-but not those who regulated distress or experienced emotions--showed a dissonance-based trade-off. If they reported higher levels of moral identity, they had a greater belief that moral rules could be broken. If they maintained their belief that moral rules should always be followed, they sacrificed their moral identity. Regulating compassion thus has a cost of its own: It forces trade-offs within a person's moral self-concept.