Confucius and Aristotle on the Goods of Friendship

This essay discusses the goods of friendship as they are articulated by Confucius, Mencius, and Aristotle. It is argued that since Confucius and Mencius tend to conceive personal relationships in hierarchical terms, they do not directly address the goods of symmetrical friendships. Using Aristotle’s account of friendship, I argue that friendship is necessary for the cultivation of virtue outside the family. This is supported by discussing the virtues of generosity, trust, and wisdom as they develop within family life and then are refined in friendships. Lastly, as Confucius, Mencius, and Aristotle agree that the good friendship is necessarily a virtuous one, I consider what value aesthetic friendships have.     

德性与幸福：康德对亚里士多德

本文译自《难以描述的日常性:哲学的可能性之研究》(The elusiveness of the ordinary:Studies in the possibility of philosophy,Yale University Press,2002)第三章:"康德和海德格尔:对亚里士多德的先验替换".作者认为,亚里士多德及其后继者非常关心幸福或至福,把它当作人类努力的最高实现,康德在这点上与亚里士多德具有内在的一致性,尽管他以配享幸福来代替幸福.但是,虽然他承认幸福是人类努力的一个基本目标,他对幸福论的攻击则为19世纪突显的诸如以满足(黑格尔)与工作(尼采)来替代古典的幸福观作了准备.我们可以满足于我们已尽了最大努力以配享幸福,即便我们不能肯定因而也不是真正幸福的.满足无疑低于幸福,而工作则意味着在无尽劳作这有限意义上的满足.在20世纪,幸福被代之以焦虑(克尔凯郭尔已经讨论过并把它从属于宗教的拯救或永福)与本真性(海德格尔).作者认为,幸福观的这种没落史与实践哲学的持续败坏,和它在现代数学与经验科学图景下的转型有关,而加速其没落的,则是本体论与认识论的兴盛,更不用说行为理论与更时髦的人工智能哲学了.在这一章中,作者让亚里士多德分别与康德和海德格尔这两位现代大哲对质,意在让我们看到完全免于先验论或本体论意图的对日常生活的理解如何不同于先验论或本体论意图的理解.亚里士多德与康德的对质点在于从日常或前理论生活中形成出德性的方式不同,而另一对质的要点则在于把日常生活变形为本体论,伦理与政治于是从对"日常性"的考虑中被清除掉了.译者认为,作者所努力的方向,即把现代大师放在更广大的背景特别是古典的视野中进行考察,对于我们如何以适当方式继承自康德以来的现代哲学传统,意义重大.本文所翻译的是这一章的前半部分,题目是译者所拟.     

Personality, Self-Disclosure and Friendship Between Chinese University Roommates

The present study examined the relations among personality perceptions, self-disclosing behavior, and friendship strength between Chinese roommates. These variables are rarely measured together and, when jointly assessed, allow for the disentanglment of personality factors from the social behavior of self-disclosure, making it possible to assess the role of self-disclosure behavior in the nexus of personality perceptions relating to friendship. One hundred and thirty-one university students rated their own and their roommate's personality, their self-disclosing behavior, and the strength of their friendship six months after being assigned to room together. It was found that self-ratings on the personality dimension of application were related both to one's friendship ratings and one's self-disclosing behavior, suggesting that personality variation is responsible for some of the well-established (Collins and Miller, 1994) links between self-disclosure and friendship strength. After controlling for self-rated application, it was found that both the respondent's and the roommate's self-disclosing behavior contributed separately to increasing the respondent's friendship ratings, as has also been found in Western research. Surprisingly, respondent self-disclosure was unrelated to how respondents perceived their roommates. However, the perceived roommate qualities of helpfulness and intellect were associated with the respondent's friendship ratings, suggesting that other, unmeasured social behaviors are being exchanged between roommates to enhance their friendship. Future research should examine these other behavioral mediators of friendship, so that we can develop a behavioral topology for this important social relationship and link these behaviors to dimensions of interpersonal perception.     

From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant

This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of "moral marriage" based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong-headed. The paper further argues that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. Finally, the paper argues that this friendship model of marriage does not obscure the important ways in which marriages and friendships differ.     

The Motive of Society: Aristotle on Civic Friendship, Justice, and Concord

My aim in this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of the Aristotelian notion of civic friendship to contemporary political discussion by arguing that it can function as a social good. Contrary to some dominant interpretations of the ancient conception of friendship according to which it can only be understood as an obligatory reciprocity, I argue that friendship between fellow citizens is important because it contributes to the unity of both state and community by transmitting feelings of intimacy and solidarity. In that sense, it can be understood as an important relationship predicated on affection and generosity, virtues lacking from both contemporary politics and society that seem to be merely dominated by Post-Enlightenment ideals. For Aristotle, friendship is important for society because it generates concord, articulating thus a basis for social unity and political agreement.     

Friendship, Justice, and Aristotle: Some Reasons to Be Sceptical

It is sometimes held that modern institutionally-focussed conceptions of social justice are lacking in one essential respect: they ignore the importance of civic friendship or solidarity. It is also, typically simultaneously, held that Aristotle’s thought provides a fertile ground for elucidating an account of civic friendship. I argue, first, that Aristotle is no help on this score: he has no conception of distinctively civic friendship. I then go on to argue that the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is more useful than talk of civic friendship in capturing the non-institutional demands of social justice.     

Self-Disclosure and Vulnerability

Abstract

Based on the theoretical assumption and clinical observation that projective identification is a natural, constant element in human psychology, clinical material is used to illustrate how projective identification centered transference states create situations where acting out of the patient's phantasies and conflicts by both patient and therapist is both common and unavoidable. Because they are more obvious, some forms of projective identification encountered in clinical practice are easier for the analyst to notice and interpret. Other forms are more subtle and therefore difficult to figure out. Finally, some forms, whether subtle or obvious, seem to create a stronger pull on the analyst to blindly act out.

In some psychoanalytic treatments, one form of projective identification might embody the core transference. In other cases, the patient might shift or evolve from one level of this mechanism to another. Some patients attempt to permanently discharge their projective anxiety, phantasy, or conflict into the analyst. There is a patent resistance to re-own, examine, or recognize this projection. Some of these patients are narcissistic in functioning, others are borderline, and many attempt to find refuge behind a psychic barricade or retreat (Steiner 1993). In other forms of projective identification, the patient enlists the analyst to master their internal struggles for them. This occurs through the combination of interpersonal and intra-psychic object relational dynamics. This “do my dirty work for me” approach within the transference can evoke various degrees of counter-transference enactments and transference/counter-transference acting out.

Another form of projective identification, common in the clinical setting, is when a patient wants to expand the way of relating internally, but is convinced the analyst needs to validate or coach the patient along. This is why such a patient may stimulate transference/counter-transference tests and conduct practice runs of new object relational phantasies within the therapeutic relationship. Over and over, the patient may gently engage the analyst in a test, to see if it is ok to change their core view of reality. Depending on how the analyst reacts or interprets, the patient may feel encouraged to or discouraged from continuing the new method of relating to self and object. The patient's view of the analyst's reactions is, of course, distorted by transference phantasies, so the analyst must be careful to investigate the patient's reasoning and feelings about the so-called encouragement or discouragement. This does not negate the possible counter-transference by the analyst in which he or she may indeed be seduced into becoming a discouraging or encouraging parental figure who actually voices suggestions and judgment.

All these forms of projective identification surface with patients across the diagnostic spectrum, from higher functioning depressive persons to those who are more disturbed paranoid-schizoid cases. Whether immediately obvious or more submerged in the therapeutic relationship, projective identification almost always leads to some degree of acting out on the part of the analyst. Therefore, it is critical to monitor or use the analyst's counter-transference as a map towards understanding the patient's phantasies and conflicts that push them to engage in a particular form of projective identification.     

Self-Disclosure in Psychotherapy

No abstract available for this article.     

Intergroup Interaction and Self-Disclosure1

Two studies were designed to test hypotheses concerning self-disclosure during initial interactions with ingroup or outgroup strangers. Based on intergroup anxiety theory it was predicted that ingroup members would disclose less to outgroup strangers than to ingroup strangers. One study involved interaction with handicapped and nonhandicapped confederates and one involved interaction with Caucasian and Black confederates. It was found that on some dimensions there was less self-disclosure to outgroup than ingroup strangers during initial interactions. Additional data suggested that high levels of public self-awareness and perceived dissimilarity also reduced some aspects of self-disclosure.     

Aristotle on Predication

A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the view that subjects and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle's core semantic notion is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution. For example, the predication ‘All men are mortal’ expresses a true thought, in Aristotle's view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals.     

文化差异与性的自我表露

性的自我表露(sexual self-disclosure)是自我表露中最亲密的形式。它是一个亲密的二人关系中一方把他(她)的性事表露给伴侣的程度。出乎意料的是, 和对于大量关于其他方面的自我表露相比, 学界对这方面的研究很少。在这些为数不多的研究中, 一些研究发现：性的自我表露和人们的性满意度是相关的。因此研究性的自我表露或许有助于了解或增益人们的性生活。过去的研究从未调查过文化是否影响人们对性的自我表露。在不同的文化中, 人们性的自我表露的程度和内容都应该会有所差异。现有的关于人们自我表露中的文化差异的理论研究对未来研究性的自我表露受文化差异的影响提供了方向。