Folk Concepts, Natural Language, and Psychological Constructs: The California Psychological Inventory and the Five-Factor Model

ABSTRACT Both the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1987) and the five-factor model of personality have roots in folk concepts of personality. The present article offers a conceptual analysis of CPI scales in terms of the five-factor model. In the first study, judges rated the item content of CPI scales in terms of the five factors. In the second, CPI scales were correlated with the factors as measured by the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI; Costa & McCrae, 1985b) in a sample of 348 men and women ages 19 to 92. Both studies showed meaningful links between CPI scales and four of the factors; Agreeableness appeared to be underrepresented in CPI scales. The utility of systematic rational item analysis in terms of the five factors and the evolving relation of folk concepts to psychological constructs are discussed.     

心理学解释的层次与衔接问题

心理学解释(psychological explanation)及其相关问题的探讨,是当代心理学哲学的一个重要论域,也是心理学方法论的核心理论问题。对心理现象的本质、特征及其作用机制的探讨,历来是哲学家与科学家孜孜以求的共同事业。在从不同视角、基点、逻辑理路对心灵及其与大脑的关系进行探析的过程当中,形成了不同的研究范式、概念框架和解释原则。我们既可以从较高的、个人的解释层次     

Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation

According to many philosophers, psychological explanation canlegitimately be given in terms of belief and desire, but not in termsof knowledge. To explain why someone does what they do (so the common wisdom holds) you can appeal to what they think or what they want, but not what they know. Timothy Williamson has recently argued against this view. Knowledge, Williamson insists, plays an essential role in ordinary psychological explanation.Williamson's argument works on two fronts.First, he argues against the claim that, unlike knowledge, belief is``composite' (representable as a conjunction of a narrow and a broadcondition). Belief's failure to be composite, Williamson thinks, undermines the usual motivations for psychological explanation in terms of belief rather than knowledge.Unfortunately, we claim, the motivations Williamson argues against donot depend on the claim that belief is composite, so what he saysleaves the case for a psychology of belief unscathed.Second, Williamson argues that knowledge can sometimes provide abetter explanation of action than belief can.We argue that, in the cases considered, explanations that cite beliefs(but not knowledge) are no less successful than explanations that citeknowledge. Thus, we conclude that Williamson's arguments fail both coming andgoing: they fail to undermine a psychology of belief, and they fail tomotivate a psychology of knowledge.     

朴素物理观和朴素心理观--进化心理学视角

人类在进化过程中解决生存与繁衍问题需要适应物理环境和社会环境。进化心理学认为人类适应物理环境与社会环境的心理机制分别称为朴素物理观和朴素心理观。文章首先阐述了朴素物理观和朴素心理观的有关内容,并指出两性差异的一个重要方面在于移情和系统化的不同组合,同时对其进化意义做了分析。     

Social Psychological Benefits of Gay Games Participation: A Social Identity Theory Explanation

Abstract

Research examining sexual orientation in sport settings has been limited in scope and lacked theoretical frameworks. To extend this body of research, the current study was framed within social identity theory and examined the impact of Gay Games participation on: (a) social identity, self-esteem, and collective esteem; and (b) expected subsequent social change activities following the Games. One hundred and twenty-five lesbian and bisexual athletes competing in Gay Games V participated in this investigation. The athletes completed a demographic profile and an open-ended questionnaire that asked about their Gay Games experience as well as expected social change activities after the Games. A content analysis of the responses revealed themes consistent with social identity theory. Specifically, these individuals identified the role of the Gay Games on social categorization, personal and social identity, and self and collective esteem. Additionally, these women revealed that following the Gay Games they felt more likely to work towards social change by becoming more out, educating others, and working through political channels.     

A Poetics of Psychological Explanation

Intentional, 'commonsense,' or 'folk' psychology is, as Jerry Fodor has remarked, ubiquitous. Explanations of what we say and do in terms of our reasons for acting are the stock in trade of intentional psychology. But there is a question whether explanations in terms of reasons are properly explanatory. Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, to name two, have defended intentional psychology and its reason-explanations. Still, many philosophers – including Fodor, Davidson and Dennett – fail to pay due attention to the narrative basis of such agent-centered accounts of action. In this paper, I argue that psychological explanation is an agent-centered, narrative-based interpretive practice. To make my case, I present a poetics of psychological explanation: seven elements which collectively describe what makes psychological explanations work. Narrative form allows us to represent the temporal arc of agents' actions – as well as the temporal arc of their reasoning about their actions, both prospective and retrospective. It allows us to negotiate between the canonical and the exceptional in human experience, and thus to account for actions that strike us as puzzling or unusual – whether the puzzle originates in our suboptimal understanding or the agent's suboptimal reasoning. And it allows us to juxtapose different perspectives on any action. Such juxtapositioning gives us a mechanism for coming to see how an action that strikes us as misguided might have been construed by the agent as reasonable given her understanding of her circumstances. After establishing the seven elements of the poetics, I address the objection that narrative-based accounts of intentional action are not properly explanatory.     

Simulation, Theory and Collapse

Recent philosophical discussions of our capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings, and to produce accurate predictions and informative explanations of their behavior which make reference to the content of those states have focused on two apparently contrasting ways in which we might hope to account for these abilities. The first is that of regarding our competence as being under-girded by our grasp of a tacit psychological theory. The second builds on the idea that in trying to get a grip on the mental lives of others we might be able to draw on the fact that we are ourselves subjects of mental states in order to simulate their mental processes. Call these the theory view and the simulation view. In this paper I wish to discuss an argument—which I shall call Collapse—to the effect that if our capacities can be explained in the way that the simulationist supposes then they can also be explained along lines that the advocate of the theory view favours. I am not the first person with simulationist sympathies to have addressed this argument. However, my response is somewhat less concessive than others in the literature: while they attempt to soften its force by attempting to reformulate the simulationist view in a way that evades the conclusion of the argument, I attempt to meet it head on and to show that it does not even succeed in refuting the version of simulationism which it takes as its target.

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Interrogatives and Contrasts in Explanation Theory

Philosophical Studies -     

From Folk Devils to Folk Heroes: Rethinking the Theory of Moral Panics

Comparatively little work on folk devils and moral panics has focused on mirror image phenomena of collective joy, celebration, and hope. By introducing a theory of “moral euphoria” and the concept of “folk heroes,” and focusing on processes of “deification,” this article provides a fresh perspective within the moral panic literature, showing how certain actors may go from “folk hero” fame to “folk devil” infamy. Using the examples of Tony Blair and Barack Obama, the article shows how politicians are particularly significant sociological actors in this regard. The conclusion suggests wider implications for the role of academics in demonization and deification processes.     

心理学研究本土文化取向的理论与实践

经由本地化研究建立本土心理学的呼声,自20世纪80年代以来,在两岸三地即已时有所闻．惟对“本土”或“本地化”的概念并不明确。到90年代末期台湾部分心理学家提出三地论的概念^[3],认为港、台、大陆三地因长期隔离,社会形态各异,故而主张三地华人社会的心理学者应各自建立自己的本土心理学(台湾本土心理学、大陆本土心理学、香港本土心理学)。此种纯以地区为前提的心理学研究取向有待商榷．原因是如将心理学视为研究人性特质的科学。并将心理与行为视为人性特质的表徽。显而易见的是,影响心理与行为的文化因素大于地区因素。基于此义．本文提出采用心理学研究本土文化取向的建议．并试从心理学思想的演变中分析探讨此一建议的合理性。一得之愚尚请学界先进批评指教。     

复杂性理论在心理学研究中的价值

复杂性哲学和复杂性研究为科学研究开辟了一条蹊径,使得人们能够以一种全新的、复杂性的视角来重新认识他们所“熟知、熟悉”的人类世界。复杂性理论的世界观为当前心理学的转向提供了理论支持,而且它的一些具体的研究方法如“黑箱”的方法以及功能模拟方法已经在心理学研究中体现出其价值。可以说,复杂性理论为心理学摆脱当前困境及实现整合开启了一扇光明之门。     

心理资本与工作绩效的关系:基于本土心理资本理论的视角

采用问卷调查法,以445名企业员工和MBA学员为调查对象,考察了本土心理资本与适应性绩效的关系。结果表明:(1)本土心理资本对任务绩效和周边绩效均有显著的预测作用;其中事务型心理资本对任务绩效的预测作用较强;而人际型心理资本对周边绩效的预测作用较强。(2)本土心理资本对适应性绩效有显著的正向预测作用;其中事务型心理资本主要影响了压力与应急管理、创新问题解决、岗位持续学习等维度,而人际型心理资本则主要影响了人际与文化适应和岗位持续学习等维度。(3)适应性绩效在事务型和人际型心理资本与周边绩效间起部分中介作用,在事务型心理资本与任务绩效间也起部分中介作用。(4)在控制事务型心理资本的前提下,人际型心理资本对适应性绩效和周边绩效仍有显著的预测作用,显示人际型心理资本的构念具备实证效度。     

Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth

According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.