Perceptual and motor inhibition of return: components or flavors?

The most common evidence for inhibition of return (IOR) is the robust finding of increased response times to targets that appear at previously cued locations following a cue?Ctarget interval exceeding ~300?ms. In a variation on this paradigm, Abrams and Dobkin (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 20:467?C477, 1994b) observed that IOR was greater when measured with a saccadic response to a peripheral target than with that to a central arrow, leading to the conclusion that saccadic responses to peripheral targets comprise motoric and perceptual components (the two-components theory for saccadic IOR), whereas saccadic responses to a central target comprise a single motoric component. In contrast, Taylor and Klein (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 26:1639?C1656, 2000) discovered that IOR for saccadic responses was equivalent for central and peripheral targets, suggesting a single motoric effect under these conditions. Rooted in methodological differences between the studies, three possible explanations for this discrepancy can be found in the literature. Here, we demonstrate that the empirical discrepancy is rooted in the following methodological difference: Whereas Abrams and Dobkin (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 20:467?C477, 1994b) administered central arrow and peripheral onset targets in separate blocks, Taylor and Klein (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 26:1639?C1656, 2000) randomly intermixed these stimuli in a single block. Our results demonstrate that (1) blocking central arrow targets fosters a spatial attentional control setting that allows for the long-lasting IOR normally generated by irrelevant peripheral cues to be filtered and (2) repeated sensory stimulation has no direct effect on the magnitude of IOR measured by saccadic responses to targets presented about 1?s after a peripheral cue.     

Perceptual and motor congruency effects in time–space association

It is well established that temporal events are represented on a spatially oriented mental time line from left to right. Depending on the task characteristics, the spatial representation of time may be linked to different types of dimensions, including manual response codes and physical space codes. The aim of the present study was to analyze whether manual response and physical space codes are independent of each other or whether they interact when both types of information are involved in the task. The participants performed a temporal estimation task with two lateralized response buttons in four experiments. In the first experiment, the target stimuli were presented on the left side, at the center, or on the right side of the space, whereas the reference stimuli were always presented centrally. The reverse situation was presented in the second experiment. In the third experiment, both stimuli were presented in opposite spatial positions (e.g., left–right), whereas in the last experiment, both stimuli were presented in the same spatial position (e.g., left–left). In all experiments, perceptual and motor congruency effects were found, but no modulation of the congruency effects was found when both the perceptual and motor components were congruent. The results indicated that physical, spatial, and manual response codes are independent from each other for time–space associations, even when both codes are involved in the task. These results are discussed in terms of the “intermediate-coding” account.     

Within-category discrimination of musical chords: Perceptual magnet or anchor?

Recent speech research has begun to evaluate the internal structure of categories. In one such study, Kuhl (1991) found that discrimination was poorer for vowel stimuli that were more representative of the category (prototype, or P, set) than it was for less representative stimuli (nonprototype, or NP, set). This finding was interpreted as indicating that a category prototype may function as a “perceptual magnet,” effectively decreasing perceptual distance, and thus discriminability, between stimuli. The present study examines the function of prototypes in a musical category—another natural, but nonspeech category. Paralleling the Kuhl study, representative (P) and less representative (NP) sets of major triad stimuli were constructed, based on equal temperament. Musically experienced subjects rated the stimuli in each set for goodness as a major triad, with the highest rated stimulus serving as a prototype standard for a subsequent discrimination task. Results from the discrimination task demonstrated better performance in the P context than in the NP context. The current nonspeech results indicate that a prototype functions as an anchor rather than a magnet. In addition to providing a natural, nonspeech standard for comparison with speech findings, the results provide some important insights into the nature of musical categories.     

Perceptual access reasoning: developmental stage or system 1 heuristic?

In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained by the PAR hypothesis but pose challenges for the two dominant views. I argue against an alternate hypothesis which is proposed by Anika Fiebich in a recent paper. According to Fiebich, PAR is not a distinct transitional stage in children’s theory of mind development, but is a fast and frugal System 1 heuristic which fades once children become fluent in social reasoning. However, I point out a number of problems with Fiebich’s proposal and argue for the superiority of the PAR hypothesis. I also present five reasons to be skeptical about the findings of Perner and Horn which purportedly show that 4- and 5-year-olds can pass the 3-location false belief task when suitably modified. This is a further difficulty for Fiebich’s proposal, since she relies on these findings in her fluency theory. Finally, I sketch a dual systems theory of mind account based upon the PAR hypothesis which is different from Fiebich’s.     

Transcortical motor aphasia: One or two aphasias?

The name "transcortical motor aphasia" has been used to refer to two different types of language alterations: damage in the left supplementary motor area and Luria's dynamic aphasia. It is proposed that they represent two types of language disturbances different enough to be considered two different forms of aphasia.     

Grounding Perceptual Dogmatism: What are Perceptual Seemings?

Perceptual Dogmatism (PD) holds that if it perceptually seems to S that p, then S has immediate prima facie justification for the belief that p. Various philosophers have made the notion of a perceptual seeming more precise by distinguishing perceptual seemings from both sensations and beliefs to accommodate a) the epistemic difference between perceptual judgments of novices and experts, and, b) the problem of the speckled hen. Using somewhat different terminology, perceptual seemings are supposed to be high‐level percepts instead of low‐level sensations. I argue that although it is right that perceptual seemings should not be identified with sensations, they should also not be identified with percepts. There is no strong reason to assume that sensations and percepts exist as separate conscious states, and it appears therefore best to identify perceptual seemings simply with perceptual experiences interpreted as entities incorporating aspects from both sensations and percepts. However, even with this plausible identification in hand, the speckled hen will remain problematic for PD.     

Motivation to inflate performance ratings: Perceptual bias or response bias?

In a laboratory experiment support was found for the idea that inflated performance evaluations may be due to a self-serving bias — the tendency for raters to highly evaluate subordinates' performance so that they may themselves appear to be successful. Two hundred sixteen students evaluating another's work gave higher ratings of performance quantity and quality to employees they counseled about their work than to others with whom they had either only social contact or no contact at all. This effect remained even when raters were not being evaluated by an authority figure, suggesting that the inflated ratings were the result of an interest in enhancing one's own self-image (a perceptual bias) rather than cultivating the favorable impression of another (a response bias). The conceptual and practical implications of these findings are discussed.The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Robert Heneman on an earlier draft of this article. A preliminary report of this experiment was presented at the meeting of the Academy of Management, San Diego, August 1985. This work was supported, in part, by grant INT-8304375 from the National Science Foundation.     

The face inhibition effect: Social contrast or motor competition?

This research examined the relative importance of encoding and retrieval contexts to the demonstration of concreteness effects in memory. Predictions from relational-distinctive and dual-code positions were evaluated. In the first two experiments, concreteness and recall task (free recall or cued recall) were manipulated following a relational semantic orienting task. The results showed an interaction between concreteness and recall type only when distinctive information could be accessed both within and between pairs. The third experiment showed that concreteness effects appeared under a relational, non-semantic orienting task. In the fourth experiment, we reexamined the magnitude of the concreteness effect following semantic versus non-semantic tasks and relational versus item-specific processing. Overall, the findings were inconsistent with both dual code theory and distinctiverelational view accounts of concreteness effects. An alternative "bidirectionality hypothesis" is suggested.     

Emotive concept nouns and motor responses: Attraction or repulsion?

We carried out three experiments aimed at testing whether hand posture affects the compatibility effect that Chen and Bargh (1999) found between a word’s emotional connotation and arm movement direction. In the present study, participants responded by pressing two buttons: one placed near their body, the other far away. In Experiment 1, in which they pressed the response button with their hand open, RTs were shorter when participants pressed the far button for positive words and the near button for negative words, as if they simulated reaching for something good and avoiding something bad. However, in Experiments 2 and 3, in which participants pressed the response button with a tennis ball in their hand, RTs were shorter when participants pressed the near button for positive words and the far button for negative words, as if they simulated drawing a good thing closer and pushing a bad thing away. Results are discussed within the framework of theories on concept grounding in emotion and action systems.     

The sensory match effect in recognition memory: Perceptual fluency or episodic trace?

The sensory match effect in recognition memory refers to the finding that recognition is better when the sensory form in which an item is tested is the same as that in which it was studied. This paper examines the basis for the sensory match effect by manipulating whether a studied fragmented picture is tested with the same or a complementary set of fragments in a recognition memory test (Experiment 1) and in a fragment-identification test (Experiment 2). Assuming that fragment identification is a direct measure of perceptual fluency, we expected identical patterns of results across the two tests if perceptual fluency accounted for the sensory match effect in recognition memory. Instead, recognition memory showed a robust overall sensory match effect (the same fragmented image was recognized better than the complementary image), whereas fragment identification showed no overall sensory match effect (the same fragmented image was identified no better than the complementary fragmented image). Experiments 3 and 4 combined the two responses and showed that the basis for the sensory match effect in recognition memory was a subject’s ability to recognize the matching fragments in the absence of conceptual information (when the test stimulus could not be identified), supporting the idea that the episodic trace of the sensory code is responsible for the sensory match effect in recognition memory. Experiment 5 demonstrated that subjects are able to use this sensory code as the sole basis for recognition memory.     

Developmental recall lag in learning-disabled children: Perceptual deficit or verbal mediation deficiency?

To investigate the development of mediational deficiencies in verbal and non-verbal visual short-term memory of learning disabled children, the recall task of Atkinson, Hansen, and Bernback was administered to learning disabled children in two experimental conditions. In Experiment 1 no significant diferences on nonverbal short-term memory recall between normal and learning-disabled children were found. Similar recall responses (e.g., middle response bias, primacy effects, and recency effects) were found for both groups. Non-verbal recall was comparable for disabled and normal children as suggested by stimulus content and association scores/. Experiment 2 found that while the effects of overt rehearsal on pretrained labels on learning disabled children's recall was negligible, labels provided superior recall for normal children. Results suggested that learning disabled children suffer from a verbal mediational deficiency consistent with Flavell's (1970) mediation deficiency hypothesis.The research herein was supported by a faculty research grant at the University of Northern Colorado. Appreciation is due to the Albuquerque (New Mexico) Public School System and the Richland 1 School District, Columbia, South Carolina.     

Perceptual reference points for form and orientation in young infants: anchors or magnets?

In some domains, certain stimuli are especially salient and efficiently encoded and are referred to as reference points. One current issue concerns whether reference points are associated with regions of increased or decreased discriminability and function as either perceptual anchors or magnets. In two experiments utilizing the familiarization/novelty-preference procedure, the question of whether 3- to 4-month-old infants' representations of form and orientation information are structured by perceptual reference points and whether such reference points serve as anchors or magnets is examined. In Experiment 1, infants displayed above-chance discrimination performance for pairs of form stimuli that were equivalently distinct on a physical basis, but only when one member of each pair was a "good" form (i.e., diamond, square, or triangle). In Experiment 2, infants displayed above-chance discrimination performance for pairs of stimuli differing by 7.5 degrees of orientation, but only when one member of each pair was either horizontal or vertical. The combined results from the two experiments suggest that "simple" gestalts and main axes (i.e., horizontal and vertical) serve as perceptual anchors in young infants' representations of form and orientation information.     

Action comprehension in non-human primates: motor simulation or inferential reasoning?

Some argue that action comprehension is intimately connected with the observer's own motor capacities, whereas others argue that action comprehension depends on non-motor inferential mechanisms. We address this debate by reviewing comparative studies that license four conclusions: monkeys and apes extract the meaning of an action (i) by going beyond the surface properties of actions, attributing goals and intentions to the agent; (ii) by using environmental information to infer when actions are rational; (iii) by making predictions about an agent's goal, and the most probable action to obtain the goal given environmental constraints; (iv) in situations in which they are physiologically incapable of producing the actions. Motor theories are, thus, insufficient to account for primate action comprehension in the absence of inferential mechanisms.     

Perceptual restoration of a "missing" speech sound: auditory induction or illusion?

This study investigated whether the apparent completeness of the acoustic speech signal during phonemic restoration derives from a process of auditory induction (Warren, 1984) or segregation, or whether it is an auditory illusion that accompanies the completion of an abstract phonological representation. Specifically, five experiments tested the prediction of the auditory induction (segregation) hypothesis that active perceptual restoration of an [s] noise that has been replaced with an extraneous noise would use up a portion of that noise's high-frequency energy and consequently change the perceived pitch (timbre, brightness) of the extraneous noise. Listeners were required to compare the pitch of a target noise, which replaced a fricative noise in a sentence, with that of a probe noise preceding or following the speech. In the first two experiments, a significant tendency was found in favor of the auditory induction hypothesis, although the effect was small and may have been caused by variations in acoustic context. In the following three experiments, a larger variety of stimuli were used and context was controlled more carefully; this yielded negative results. Phoneme identification responses collected in the same experiments, as well as informal observations about the quality of the restored phoneme, suggested that restoration of a fricative phone distinct from the extraneous noise did not occur; rather, the spectrum of the extraneous noise itself influenced phoneme identification. These results suggest that the apparent auditory restoration which accompanies phonemic restoration is illusory, and that the schema-guided process of phoneme restoration does not interact with auditory processing.     

Perceptual restoration of a “missing” speech sound: Auditory induction or illusion?

This study investigated whether the apparent completeness of the acoustic speech signal during phonemic restoration derives from a process of auditory induction (Warren, 1984) or segregation, or whether it is an auditory illusion that accompanies the completion of an abstract phonological representation. Specifically, five experiments tested the prediction of the auditory induction (segregation) hypothesis that active perceptual restoration of an [s] noise that has been replaced with an extraneous noise would use up a portion of that noise’s high-frequency energy and consequently change the perceived pitch (timbre, brightness) of the extraneous noise. Listeners were required to compare the pitch of a target noise, which replaced a fricative noise in a sentence, with that of a probe noise preceding or following the speech. In the first two experiments, a significant tendency was found in favor of the auditory induction hypothesis, although the effect was small and may have been caused by variations in acoustic context. In the following three experiments, a larger variety of stimuli were used and context was controlled more carefully; this yielded negative results. Phoneme identification responses collected in the same experiments, as well as informal observations about the quality of the restored phoneme, suggested that restoration of a fricative phone distinct from the extraneous noise did not occur; rather, the spectrum of the extraneous noise itself influenced phoneme identification. These results suggest that the apparent auditory restoration which accompanies phonemic restoration is illusory, and that the schema-guided process of phoneme restoration does not interact with auditory processing.     

Perceptual Learning in the Rat: Stimulus Differentiation or Latent Inhibition of Common Elements?

Preexposure to an unreinforced stimulus facilitates learning (perceptual learning) under some conditions, but it can have the opposite effect (latent inhibition) under other conditions. Researchers have suggested that perceptual learning depends on a change of context, whereas latent inhibition is usually context specific. The associative theory explains both phenomena within a single framework. The authors report 4 experiments that show that perceptual learning does not depend on a context change. The experiments suggest that latent inhibition, unlike perceptual learning, depends on passive exposure. Thus the results do not support the associative theory. They are more consistent with Gibson's stimulus-differentiation theory.     

Perceptual learning in the rat: stimulus differentiation or latent inhibition of common elements?

Preexposure to an unreinforced stimulus facilitates learning (perceptual learning) under some conditions, but it can have the opposite effect (latent inhibition) under other conditions. Researchers have suggested that perceptual learning depends on a change of context, whereas latent inhibition is usually context specific. The associative theory explains both phenomena within a single framework. The authors report 4 experiments that show that perceptual learning does not depend on a context change. The experiments suggest that latent inhibition, unlike perceptual learning, depends on passive exposure. Thus the results do not support the associative theory. They are more consistent with Gibson's stimulus-differentiation theory.     

Recognition Memory in Pigeons for Stimuli Presented Repeatedly: Perceptual Learning or Reduced Associative Interference?

Todd and Mackintosh (1990) found that recognition memory of pigeons for pictures was better when the same pictures were used each session (a recency task) than when different slides were used (a novelty task); they attributed the superior performance on the recency task to perceptual learning. Three experiments explored two alternative accounts. One was that their use of a within-subject design could have allowed the strategy adopted in the recency task to influence adversely the strategy used in the novelty task. This possibility was ruled out by Experiment 1, which showed superior performance in the recency task when a between-subject design was used. A second account proposes that slide-reward associations formed (in both tasks) during first presentations of slides interfere with appropriate performance during second presentations (associative interference); in the recency task, however, the high long-term associative strength of the slides restricts the consequence of a single slide-reward pairing to a short-term effect, and associative interference occurs at short retention intervals only. This account was explored in Experiment 2, which found no evidence that increases in retention interval resulted in reduction of associative interference in the recency task, and in Experiment 3, where associative interference was shown to occur but was of comparable magnitude in the recency and novelty tasks. By elimination, the results support a perceptual learning interpretation.     

Sex differences in motor performance of young children: Fact or fiction?

Prepubescent boys and girls who had participated for one or more years in a coeducational physical education program were classified by grade (3, 4, and 5) and year (1977, 1978, and 1979). Scores from the AAHPER Youth Fitness Test were analyzed for differences. Results indicated that females at prepubescent ages may be expected to perform at similar levels to boys of the same age on most test items. While differences were not significant, girls in 1979 were actually better than boys of the same age from the two previous years.