Asking the how questions: quantifying group processes behaviors

The authors analyzed the group work behaviors of 132 grade school students to assess behavioral manifestations of group processes. The authors coded videotapes of students working together on a math-learning task to quantify the incidence of microbehaviors associated with process loss and process gain (I. D. Steiner, 1972). Factor analysis of 11 categories of coded behaviors revealed 3 factors that accounted for 67% of the explained variance. The factors were interpretable as process gain (PGV), process loss behavior directed outside the group (PLV-out), and process loss behavior directed into the group (PLV-In). The authors discuss correlations among variables derived from the factors and with other measures. Results support this method of quantifying group processes. The authors considered implications for the broader study of group processes.     

On experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy: a reply to Sorell

In this paper, we reply to Tom Sorell’s criticism of our engagement with the history of philosophy in our book, The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy. We explain why our uses of the history of philosophy are not undermined by Sorell’s criticism and why our position is not threatened by the dilemma Sorell advances. We argue that Sorell has mischaracterized the dialectical context of our discussion of the history of philosophy and that he has mistakenly treated our use of the history of philosophy as univocal, when in fact we called on the history of philosophy in several different ways in our text.     

儒家的自我理念:论儒家哲学中的修己与自由意志

如何规划自我以应对构建良好社会与正义政府之需求,是儒家哲学始终关切的重心。"自我"概念蕴含时间的与超越的、参与的与反思的两个面向,中国语境下的"自己",其中"自"与"己"则分别指代这两个不同的面向。但"自己"并非意味着自我的二分,相反,它充分展现了自我是如何动态地、充满活力地在"自"与"己"的相互调适和相互转化中变化着自身的,而这正是儒家心、性观念的题中之义。可以说,儒家以"尽心(心智)"为核心的修己,端赖其对于人心和人性的体察;儒家独特的被人性自觉接纳的自由意志,是其自我理念中道德成立的根基。因此,我们可以把儒家的自由意志观称为"自由意志的自我决定论",以区别于以"软决定论"为基本特征的"自由意志的非自我决定论"。     

Asking questions changes behavior: mere measurement effects on frequency of blood donation.

OBJECTIVE: This research examined the impact of completing a questionnaire about blood donation on subsequent donation behavior among a large sample of experienced blood donors. DESIGN: Participants (N=4672) were randomly assigned to an experimental condition that received a postal questionnaire measuring cognitions about donation or a control condition that did not receive a questionnaire. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Number of registrations at blood drives and number of successful blood donations were assessed using objective records both 6 months and 12 months later. RESULTS: Findings indicated that, compared to control participants, the mean frequency of number of registrations at blood drives among participants in the experimental group was 8.6% greater at 6 months (p<.0.007), and was 6.4% greater at 12 months (p<.035). Significant effects were also observed for successful blood donations at 6 months (p<.001) and 12 months (p<.004). CONCLUSION: These findings provide the first evidence that the mere measurement is relevant to promoting consequential health behaviors. Implications of the research for intervention evaluation are discussed.     

Speaking freely: on free will and the epistemology of testimony

Peter Graham has recently given a dilemma purportedly showing the compatibility of libertarianism about free will and the anti-skeptical epistemology of testimony. In the first part of this paper I criticize his dilemma: the first horn either involves a false premise or makes the dilemma invalid. The second horn relies without argument on an implausible assumption about testimonial knowledge, and even if granted, nothing on this horn shows libertarianism does not entail skepticism about testimonial justification. I then argue for the incompatibility of (i) a view entailed by Open Theism, viz., that there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, (ii) a popular form of process reliabilism about justification and knowledge, and (iii) a weak anti-skepticism about testimonial justification and knowledge. I conclude that there is a costly tension between certain views about testimony and about free will.     

The complex tapestry of free will: striving will,indeterminism and volitional streams

The aim of this paper is to respond to recent discussion of, and objections to, the libertarian view of free will I have developed in many works over the past four decades. The issues discussed all have a bearing on the central question of how one might make sense of a traditional free will requiring indeterminism in the light of modern science. This task involves, among other things, avoiding all traditional libertarian appeals to unusual forms of agency or causation (uncaused causes, noumenal selves, non-event agent causes, etc.) that cannot be accounted for by ordinary modes of explanation familiar to the natural and human sciences. Doing this, I argue, requires piecing together a “complex tapestry” of ideas and arguments that involve rethinking many traditional assumptions about free will. The paper also argues that one cannot get to the heart of historical debates about free will without distinguishing different kinds of freedom, different senses of will, and different notions of control, among other distinctions. I especially focus here on different notions of freedom and control that are necessary to make sense of free will.

     

On the very concept of free will

Determinism seems to rule out a robust sense of options but also prevent our choices from being a matter of luck. In this way, free will seems to require both the truth and falsity of determinism. If the concept of free will is coherent, something must have gone wrong. I offer a diagnosis on which this puzzle is due at least in part to a tension already present in the very idea of free will. I provide various lines of support for this hypothesis, including some experimental data gathered by probing the judgments of non-specialists.     

Inducing disbelief in free will alters brain correlates of preconscious motor preparation: the brain minds whether we believe in free will or not

The feeling of being in control of one's own actions is a strong subjective experience. However, discoveries in psychology and neuroscience challenge the validity of this experience and suggest that free will is just an illusion. This raises a question: What would happen if people started to disbelieve in free will? Previous research has shown that low control beliefs affect performance and motivation. Recently, it has been shown that undermining free-will beliefs influences social behavior. In the study reported here, we investigated whether undermining beliefs in free will affects brain correlates of voluntary motor preparation. Our results showed that the readiness potential was reduced in individuals induced to disbelieve in free will. This effect was evident more than 1 s before participants consciously decided to move, a finding that suggests that the manipulation influenced intentional actions at preconscious stages. Our findings indicate that abstract belief systems might have a much more fundamental effect than previously thought.     

The formalising tendency in philosophy and experimental psychology

This paper is an exercise in the phenomenology of science. It examines the tendency to prefer formal accounts in a familiar body of experimental psychology. It will argue that, because of this tendency, psychologists of this school neglect those forms of human cognition typical of the humanities disciplines. This is not a criticism of psychology, however. Such neglect is compatible with scientific rigour, provided it does not go unnoticed. Indeed, reflection on the case in hand allows us to refine the characterisation of the formalising tendency.     

Sublating the free will problematic: powers,agency and causal determination

Synthese - I argue that realism about causal powers (which, loosely following Brian Ellis, I refer to as ‘anti-passivism’) sublates the passivist, Humean-inflected free will...