Social change in the aftermath of successful minority influence

This chapter describes a programme of research on group dynamics in the aftermath of successful minority influence that reverses minority and majority positions within a group. Supporting the authors' gain - loss asymmetry model of change, converging evidence suggests that loss of the majority position generates strong disidentification from the superordinate group whereas gaining the majority position does not yield comparable identification. This overall decrease in identification is associated with a general increase in hostility, reduced helpfulness, and a desire to exit the group. Thus groups may be especially fragile following internal changes in the majority - minority positions. Additional research suggests that such a pattern of reactions to majority - minority change is a specifically group phenomenon (versus aggregates of individuals) and occurs when majority - minority reversals follow the attitude change of existing group members (versus an influx of new members). New majorities will increase their identification with the group when converts provide genuine support or when their new majority position persists over time. Implications of these findings for intra-group relations in the aftermath of social change are discussed.     

Knowledge does not necessarily make the heart grow fonder: The moderating role of knowledge on accessibility experiences

Accessibility experiences have been a subject of interest since Tversky and Kahneman (1973) published their account of the availability heuristic—specifically, individuals often utilize the phenomenological experience of ease or difficulty of recall in constructing a judgment (Schwarz, 1998). The reported studies contribute further to work in this area by examining the moderating role of knowledge on accessibility experiences and their use in evaluative judgments. We argue that knowledgeable individuals are more likely to experience interference effects in early stages of recall. This would result in a reversal of the usual phenomenon such that while low knowledge individuals would find recalling larger sets effortful, which would lead them to form more negative evaluations when recalling larger amounts of information, high knowledge individuals would find recalling smaller sets effortful and would form more negative evaluations when recalling smaller amounts of information. We discuss potential explanations and draw attention to the distinction between generating a response and the appropriateness of the response in accessibility experiences.     

The Sounds of Silence: Inferences from the Absence of Word‐of‐Mouth

While past work has explored some of the reasons why people themselves may remain silent in a group, almost no research has examined the mirror image of this question: How do consumers construe the silence of others? Do they project the opinions of the speakers in a conversation onto the silent individuals, assuming that silence signals agreement? Do they have a usual or “default” naïve theory of silence that they use to explain it across multiple contexts—i.e., “silence usually signals disagreement?” Or does silence act as a mirror, reflecting observers’ own opinions back at them? Three experiments contrasted perceivers’ estimates of conversational silence with their estimates of unknown opinions outside the conversation. Estimates of opinions outside the conversation generally followed an agreement‐with‐the‐speakers rule—the more an opinion was expressed in the group, the more consumers assumed others would support it too. In contrast, silence inside the conversation was interpreted very differently, serving as a mirror for participants’ own thoughts, even when the vocal majority favored the opposite position. Results suggest a process whereby observers project the reason they personally would have been silent in the group (given their opinion) onto silence, leading to an inference that the silents agree with the self.     

Interdependent sampling and social influence

Most explanations of social influence focus on why individuals might want to agree with the opinions or attitudes of others. The authors propose a different explanation that assumes the attitudes of others influence only the activities and objects individuals are exposed to. For example, individuals are likely to be exposed to activities that their friends enjoy. The authors demonstrate that such influence over sampling behavior is sufficient to produce a social influence effect when individuals form attitudes by learning from experience. Even if the experiences of 2 individuals, when they sample an object or event, are independent random variables, their attitudes will become positively correlated if their sampling processes are interdependent. Interdependent sampling of activities thus provides a different explanation of social influence with distinct empirical and theoretical implications.     

The phenomenology of minority–majority status: Effects on innovation in argument generation

In three experiments, we manipulated participants' perceived numerical status and compared the originality and creativity of arguments generated by members of numerical minorities and majorities. Independent judges, blind to experimental conditions, rated participants' written arguments. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that participants assigned to a numerical minority generated more original arguments when advocating their own position than did numerical majorities. In Study 3, an equal‐factions control group was included in the design, and all participants were instructed to argue for a counter‐attitudinal position. Those in the numerical minority generated more creative arguments than those in both the majority and equal‐factions conditions, but not stronger arguments. We propose cognitive and social processes that may underlie our obtained effects and discuss implications for minority influence research. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of consensus requirements and multiple decisions on mock juror verdict preferences

After watching a simulated rape trial, prerecorded on videotape, mock jurors either did or did not expect to sentence a defendant following deliberation with or without a group verdict required. Both sentencing expectation and verdict requirement significantly elevated jurors' preference for conviction (and average ratings of guilt likelihood). Closer analyses of personal changes (before and after deliberation) in the distribution of opinions suggested that majorities favoring not guilty were more influential than guilty-favoring majorities; and, somewhat unexpectedly, minorities in juries which deliberated without a verdict required were more likely to change personal opinions than minorities in juries required to render a verdict. The overall social decision scheme confirmed earlier observations about the importance of the initial majority in determining the verdict; but the majority did not always prevail and there was a marked asymmetry (“defendant protection”) in its action.     

Long-term memory for the emotional gist and the emotional essence of an experience

We investigated accuracy in recalling past emotional behaviours and emotionality. Male couples discussed the history of their relationship, and coders rated the extent to which each partner engaged in behaviours such as complimenting or criticising. These ratings were combined into dimensions representing the deeper, emotional essence of that partner's discussion (expressions of We-ness, Fondness, Negativity, and Disappointment). Four years later, participants accurately recalled some of their own and some of their partner's emotional gist-level behaviours, but their answers indicated that they also remembered the emotional essence of the conversation. We conclude that individuals can retain the emotional essence of an experience for a long time, and that they may use this memory to infer, in part, gist-level details of the experience.     

Long-term memory for the emotional gist and the emotional essence of an experience

We investigated accuracy in recalling past emotional behaviours and emotionality. Male couples discussed the history of their relationship, and coders rated the extent to which each partner engaged in behaviours such as complimenting or criticising. These ratings were combined into dimensions representing the deeper, emotional essence of that partner's discussion (expressions of We-ness, Fondness, Negativity, and Disappointment). Four years later, participants accurately recalled some of their own and some of their partner's emotional gist-level behaviours, but their answers indicated that they also remembered the emotional essence of the conversation. We conclude that individuals can retain the emotional essence of an experience for a long time, and that they may use this memory to infer, in part, gist-level details of the experience.     

Holding your place: Reactions to the prospect of status gains and losses

This paper examines individuals’ reactions to the prospect of gaining or losing status in groups. The results of three experiments provide evidence that individuals attach greater value to status when recalling the risk of status loss than when recalling the potential for status gain (Experiment 1), are willing to pay more to avoid a status loss than to achieve a status gain (Experiment 1), and put forth greater effort when striving to prevent status loss than when striving to gain status (Experiment 2). Finally, individuals who risk losing status allocate more resources toward personal status concerns (and away from group interests and potential monetary gain) than do individuals who have a chance of gaining status (Experiment 3). We discuss the implications of this research both in terms of individuals’ psychological experience of their status, as well as status attainment and maintenance concerns in groups.     

Effect of environmental factors and individual differences on subjective evaluation of human-like and conventional automated vehicle controllers

Achieving optimal performance in human-machine systems, such as highly automated vehicles, relies, in part, on individuals’ acceptance and use of the system, which is in turn affected by their enjoyment of engaging with, or experiencing, the system. This driving simulator study investigated individuals’ real-time subjective evaluation of four different Automated Vehicle (AV) driving styles, in different environmental contexts. Twenty-four participants were recruited to manually drive a contextually rich simulator environment, and to experience human-like and non-human-like AV driving styles, as well as the automated replay of their own manual drive. Their subjective real-time feedback towards these driving styles was analyzed. Our results showed that participants gave higher positive feedback towards the replay of their own drive, compared to the other three controllers. This difference was statistically significant, when compared to the high-speed controller (named as Fast), particularly for sharp curves. With respect to the replay of their own drive, participants gave higher negative feedback when navigating an Urban environment, compared to Rural settings. Moreover, changes in roadside furniture affected individuals’ feedback, and this effect was more prominent when the vehicle was driving closer to the edge of the road. Based on our results, we conclude that individuals’ perception of different AV driving styles changes based on different environmental conditions, including, but not limited to, road geometry and roadside furniture. These findings suggest that humans prefer a slower human-like driving style for AV controllers that adapts its speed and lateral offset to roadside objects and furniture. Investigating individual differences in AV driving style preference showed that low Sensation Seeking individuals preferred the slower human-like controller more than the faster human-like controller. Consideration of this human-centered feedback is important for the design of future AV controllers, to enhance individuals’ ride experience, and potentially improve acceptance and use of these vehicles.     

Developmental changes in application of the majority rule in group decisions

This study examined age-related changes in the child's application of the principle of majority rule in group decisions. Following a problem posed by Moessinger (1981), we enquired whether children routinely apply the majority rule when the majority consists of a shifting (variable) set of members across decisions, and alternate between majority and minority when the majority and minority is fixed, i.e. consists of the same individuals each time. In Geneva, Moessinger found that 8-year-olds failed to discriminate between fixed and shifting majorities, while most 13-year-olds (75 per cent) did so. An altered replication was conducted in Australia modifying Moessinger's procedure to control for extraneous variables such as ‘set’ and the need for variety in choice. It was found that on the task 7 per cent of 8-year-olds, 20 per cent of 10-year-olds, 32 per cent of 12-year-olds, and 39 per cent of 14-year-olds discriminated on a behavioural criterion between fixed and shifting majorities. Ten per cent of 8-year-olds, 40 per cent of 10-year-olds, 52 per cent of 12-year-olds, and 55 per cent of 14-year-olds made the discrimination on Moessinger's cognitive ‘reason’ criterion. The results show that development of the conceptual distinction between fixed and shifting majorities is gradual and continuous.     

Political-economic values and the relationship between socioeconomic status and self-esteem

Values concerning the distribution of wealth are an important aspect of identity for many Americans, and such values may therefore influence how Americans experience their own socioeconomic status (SES). Based on this proposition, the present research examines political-economic values as a moderator of the relationship between SES and self-esteem. Results supported the hypothesis that there is a stronger relationship between SES and self-esteem among individuals who report relatively inegalitarian values than among individuals who report relatively egalitarian values. This result was replicated using both objective and subjective measures of SES. Implications of the present findings for the study of values and well-being, psychological conflict, and the influence of economic factors on self-esteem are discussed.     

预期如何影响人们对不愉快事件的体验?

本研究以味觉和痛觉两种感觉通道的体验为对象,探讨预期效价和预期信心如何影响知觉体验的结果及其作用机制。通过基于味觉和痛觉的两个实验,发现预期会影响即时知觉体验,并且预期信心在其中起到调节作用——对预期充满信心时,即时体验和对结果的预期保持一致,预期越积极即时体验越好,预期越消极即时体验越差;而对预期缺乏信心时,即时体验和预期之间呈现背离趋势,预期越积极即时体验越差,预期越消极即时体验则越好。研究结果阐明了预期影响即时体验的机制,对我们理解身心关系也具有重要的理论意义。     

The paradox of the political maverick

Attitudes about political mavericks (politicians who cross party lines to “vote their conscience”) depend on whether people construe them in general terms or at the level of specific policy proposals. Three studies examined this hypothesis. In Study 1, participants expressed more positive views of political mavericks described generally than when prompted to consider a maverick of their own political party. Study 2 found that mavericks described in personality trait terms were evaluated more favorably than “party-line” politicians, even when the maverick was of the participant’s own political party. Study 3 found that when participants were provided with specific policy stances, a similarity-attraction pattern was found: opposing party mavericks were evaluated more positively, but same party mavericks were evaluated more negatively, than their party-line counterparts. Politicians challenging participant’s own party on a moral issue were evaluated particularly harshly. Implications of these findings for political perceptions and strategy are discussed.     

Prejudiced attitude measurement using the Rasch Rating Scale model

There have been two basic approaches for the study of minority group prejudice against the majority: to adapt instruments from the majority group, and to use qualitative techniques by analyzing the content of the discourse of the groups involved. Neither of these procedures solves the problem of measuring intergroup attitudes of majorities and minorities in interaction. This study shows the result of a prejudice scale which was developed to measure the attitude of both the minority and majority groups. Prejudice is conceived as an attitude which requires the beliefs or opinions about the out-group, the emotions it elicits, and the behavior or intentional behavior toward it to be known for its evaluation. The innovation in this work is that the psychometric development of the scale was based on the item response theory, and more specifically, the rating scale model.     

The momentary realist

Research suggests that people initially take their subjective experience of an object as an accurate reflection of the object's properties, and only subsequently, occasionally, and effortfully consider the possibility that their experience was influenced by extraneous factors. The two studies reported here demonstrate that this is true even when the extraneous factors are the person's own dispositions. Dispositionally happy and unhappy participants were falsely told that they had been subliminally primed with words that might have influenced their moods, and were then asked to identify those words. Dispositionally happy participants were more likely than dispositionally unhappy participants to conclude that they had been primed with positive words, but only when they made these judgments under time pressure. The results are discussed in terms of correction models of human judgment.     

A Puzzle About Free Speech, Legitimacy, and Countermajoritarian Constraints

This paper argues that there is a tension between two central features of Dworkin’s partnership conception of democracy. The conception holds, on the one hand, that it is a necessary condition of the legitimacy of the decisions of a political majority that every member of the political community has a very robust right to publicly criticize those decisions. A plausible interpretation of this argument is that free political speech constitutes a normatively privileged vehicle for political minorities to become majorities, and therefore in the absence of freedom of speech minorities could not be rightfully compelled to comply with majority decisions. On the other hand, the partnership conception holds that properly exercised constraints on majority rule do not incur any moral costs. The no-moral-costs thesis is argued for on the basis that nothing of significance is lost when individuals’ influence on political decisions is diminished. However, the legitimacy argument for free speech assumes the significance of individual political influence, which the no-moral-costs thesis denies. Hence the tension.     

Paradoxical effects of categorization in minority influence: When being an outgroup is an advantage

In a 2 × 2 factorial design, 165 high school girls gave their opinions about abortion (direct influence) and about contraception (indirect ifluence) after reading a message advocating abortion said to have been written by either an ingroup (same sex) or an outgroup (opposite sex) minority and explicitly opposed by the majority opinion of either the ingroup or the outgroup. Results show that there is less direct influence when the ingroup majority is opposed to the minority, and more direct influence when the process of identification is less involved. Indirect influence appears in an intergroup context where categorization of majority and minority into different groups is superimposed on their ideological dissent, which has the effect of allowing recognition of the minority's distinctiveness and validity over and above the discrimination that appears at the direct influence level. In discussing the results, a theoretical integration of social comparison and validation processes is proposed as a step towards explaining the diversity of minority influence phenomena.     

Minority Opinions: Antecedents and Benefits of Expression

A great deal of social psychological research has focused on antecedents of conformity to the majority. The present article, however, reviews the various conditions under which people express minority opinions. First, minority opinion expression is especially pronounced among individuals who hold either strong attitudes or attitudes that deviate from the majority in a direction consistent with the desirable group attitude. Second, minority opinion expression increases to the extent that highly‐identified group members believe that expressing minority opinions will promote their group’s welfare, or to the extent that one’s membership in a particular social category entitles him/her to speak up. Third, minority opinion expression increases when people’s motives to have a unique or clearly defined sense of self are salient. It is argued that these sources of minority opinion expression can help shed light on the functional value of such opinions for individuals.     

Priming virtue: Forgiveness and justice elicit divergent moral judgments among religious individuals

Forgiveness and justice are related virtues but they may exert divergent effects on moral judgments. Participants were primed with either forgiveness or retributive justice and made moral judgments of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that religious participants recalling an experience of forgiveness reported more favorable attitudes toward moral transgressors than did those recalling an experience of retributive justice. Experiment 2 replicated the priming effect on moral judgments using a subtle prime of either forgiveness or justice (word search) and a different dependent measure. Experiment 3 employed a more religiously diverse sample and revealed the moderating role of religious commitment. These results suggest that salience of forgiveness leads to more favorable evaluations of moral transgressors compared to retributive justice for religious individuals.