A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion

Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition.

Tests of the DRYAD theory of the age-related deficit in memory for context: not about context, and not about aging

Older adults exhibit a disproportionate deficit in their ability to recover contextual elements or source information about prior encounters with stimuli. A recent theoretical account, DRYAD, attributes this selective deficit to a global decrease in memory fidelity with age, moderated by weak representation of contextual information. The predictions of DRYAD are tested here in three experiments. We show that an age-related deficit obtains for whichever aspect of the stimulus subjects' attention is directed away from during encoding (Experiment 1), suggesting a central role for attention in producing the age-related deficit in context. We also show that an analogous deficit can be elicited within young subjects with a manipulation of study time (Experiment 2), suggesting that any means of reducing memory fidelity yields an interaction of the same form as the age-related effect. Experiment 3 evaluates the critical prediction of DRYAD that endorsement probability in an exclusion task should vary nonmonotonically with memory strength. This prediction was confirmed by assessing the shape of the forgetting function in a continuous exclusion task. The results are consistent with the DRYAD account of aging and memory judgments and do not support the widely held view that aging entails the selective disruption of processes involved in encoding, storing, or retrieving contextual information.     

Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency

There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the "comparator model". In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able to explain either. Rather, we argue for a two-step account: a multifactorial weighting process of different agency indicators accounts for the feeling of agency, which is, in a second step, further processed by conceptual modules to form an attribution judgement. This new framework is then applied to disruptions of agency in schizophrenia, for which the comparator model also fails. Two further extensions are discussed: We show that the comparator model can neither be extended to account for the sense of ownership (which also has to be differentiated into a feeling and a judgement of ownership) nor for the sense of agency for thoughts. Our framework, however, is able to provide a unified account for the sense of agency for both actions and thoughts.     

The time windows of the sense of agency

The sense of agency depends on some internal cues that derive from action control, as well as external cues like contextual information and prior information (degree of contingency between an action and is effect). We assessed whether external agency cues are combined with internal agency cues to affect the sense of agency. In two experiments participants performed a movement (button press) that elicited, after a varying delay, an effect (ball appearing on a screen), and reported their sense of agency over the effect (full, partial or no-agency) while internal cues (premotor information) and external cues (contextual and prior information) were manipulated. We assessed the effect of agency cues on the delays at which the sense of agency varied. The delays were increased with premotor signals but were decreased with contextual information. These findings favour a model of integration of internal and external agency cues over time.     

Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?

The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend.     

You can say what you think: vindicating the effability of our thoughts

The thesis of Ineffability has it that no proposition can be fully expressed by a sentence, this meaning that no sentence-type, or even sentence-token whose indexicality and ambiguities have been resolved, can fully encode a proposition. The thesis of the propositionality of thoughts has it that thoughts are propositional. An implication of the joint endorsement of these two theses is that thoughts are ineffable. The aim of this paper is to argue that this is not the case: there are effable thoughts, and we can even safely say that, generally, thoughts are effable. In order to defend this insight, I first counter the thesis of the propositionality of thought by bringing some counterexamples to it, which amount to cases of non-fully propositional thought. I then argue that, if thoughts can be and often are non-fully propositional, they can be expressed by sentences that fail to fully express a proposition. I also show that the propositional thoughts that we can entertain are after all effable (in a suitable, relevant sense) and resist some alleged examples of insurmountable ineffability.     

Using a feminist lens in contextual therapy

Both contextual and feminist therapy have not been given the attention they deserve in the field of MFT. We believe that not only do these approaches have undiscovered merit but also, when integrated, they provide a useful framework for conducting therapy that addresses marginalized voices and raises social consciousness. In this article, we “layer” feminist theory onto contextual therapy and argue that the constructs of contextual therapy may relate well to many women's experiences in families. We then illustrate our combined feminist‐contextual therapy with two case examples. This integration broadens the scope and sensitivity of contextual therapy to address issues of gender.     

Using suggestion to model different types of automatic writing

Our sense of self includes awareness of our thoughts and movements, and our control over them. This feeling can be altered or lost in neuropsychiatric disorders as well as in phenomena such as “automatic writing” whereby writing is attributed to an external source. Here, we employed suggestion in highly hypnotically suggestible participants to model various experiences of automatic writing during a sentence completion task. Results showed that the induction of hypnosis, without additional suggestion, was associated with a small but significant reduction of control, ownership, and awareness for writing. Targeted suggestions produced a double dissociation between thought and movement components of writing, for both feelings of control and ownership, and additionally, reduced awareness of writing. Overall, suggestion produced selective alterations in the control, ownership, and awareness of thought and motor components of writing, thus enabling key aspects of automatic writing, observed across different clinical and cultural settings, to be modelled.     

Active control as evidence in favor of sense of ownership in the moving Virtual Hand Illusion

The sense of ownership, the feeling that our body belongs to ourselves, relies on multiple sources of sensory information. Among these sources, the contribution of visuomotor information is still debated. We tested the effect of active control in the sense of ownership in the moving Virtual Hand Illusion. Participants reported sense of ownership and sense of agency over a virtual arm in which we manipulated the morphological congruence of the hand and the visuomotor information. We found that congruent active control enhanced and maintained the reported sense of ownership over a hand that appeared detached from the body, but not in a morphological congruent limb. Also, incongruent active control, achieved by adding noise to the trajectory of the movement, decreased both reported sense of agency and ownership. Overall, our results are consistent with a framework in which active control acts as evidence for eliciting a sense of ownership.     

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Gun Ownership

This question on how religious beliefs shape attitudes about guns has received little attention in the literature. We use the religious concept of supernatural evil, or beliefs about Satan, Hell, Armageddon, and demons, to provide context for ideas about gun ownership and the development of attitudes toward gun policy. While this has been explored quantitatively using national survey data, we argue that an in-depth qualitative approach provides necessary nuance. As part of an ongoing ethnography in Northeastern Kansas, we conducted interviews with 55 women and 7 men who own and shoot guns. For this paper, we report on a religion module subsample that probes religiosity, spirituality, and gun ownership. Based on the rich contextual information from the interviews, we illuminate a package of beliefs that come together as an ethic, a set of moral principles guiding gun ownership for a subset of gun owners. We suggest the spirit of gun ownership is a bundle of duties that guide individual gun owners to stress the need to protect, be diligent, and defend. Moreover, belief in supernatural evil is bound up in policy attitudes that protect or expand gun rights.     

Context Memory in Korsakoff’s Syndrome

Memory for contextual information and target-context integration are crucial for successful episodic memory formation and are impaired in patients with Korsakoff's syndrome. In this paper we review the evidence for the notion that a context memory deficit makes an important contribution to the amnesia in these patients. First, we focus on anterograde memory for contextual (spatial and temporal) information. Next, the use of contextual cues in memory retrieval is examined and their role in retrograde amnesia and confabulation. Evidence on the role of contextual cues and associations in working memory is discussed in relation to the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms and their dissociation from long-term encoding. Finally, we focus on implicit learning of contextual information in Korsakoff patients. It can be concluded that Korsakoff patients are impaired in the explicit processing of contextual information and in target-context binding, both in long-term (retrograde and anterograde) memory and in working memory. These results extend the context memory deficit hypothesis. In contrast, implicit contextual learning is relatively preserved in these patients. These findings are discussed in relation to evidence of dysfunction of the extended diencephalic-hippocampal memory circuit in Korsakoff's syndrome.     

Direct and indirect measures of contextual information: Older versus young adult subjects

Abstract

Several reports in the literature suggest that older adults have impaired memory for contextual information. Support for this approach was derived from studies that tested different aspects of contextual information by direct measures of memory (i.e., recall or recognition). the purpose of the present study is twofold: first, to test the possibility that contextual information, although inaccessible via direct measures, may be evident via indirect measures of memory; and second, to evaluate the contribution of duration of exposure to direct and indirect memory measures of contextual information. Two groups of subjects participated in the present study, 35 younger and 30 older subjects. Duration of exposure was not found to have a differential effect on the groups, in either direct or indirect memory tasks. As predicted, age-related differences emerged when direct, but not indirect, measures of contextual memory were tested. These findings argue against the context-memory deficit hypothesis in elderly sbjects, and are interpreted in terms of the theoretical distinction between implicit and explicit memory, where the former is found to be preserved in older adult subjects.     

Reconstructing the minimal self,or how to make sense of agency and ownership

We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual reading of the two that allows for various blends of SO and SA. Such an approach not only provides us with a richer phenomenology but also with a more parsimonious view of the minimal self.     

On the origins of endogenous thoughts

Endogenous thoughts are thoughts that we activate in a top-down manner or in the absence of the appropriate stimuli. We use endogenous thoughts to plan or recall past events. In this sense, endogenous thinking is one of the hallmarks of our cognitive lives. In this paper, I investigate how it is that we come to possess endogenous control over our thoughts. Starting from the close relation between language and thinking, I look into speech production—a process motorically controlled by the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Interestingly, IFG is also closely related to silent talking, as well as volition. The connection between IFG and volition is important given that endogenous thoughts are or at least greatly resemble voluntary actions. Against this background, I argue that IFG is key to understanding the origins of conscious endogenous thoughts. Furthermore, I look into goal-directed thinking and show that IFG plays a key role also in unconscious endogenous thinking.     

Thought suppression in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Social cognition research has indicated that attempts to suppress thoughts can lead to a paradoxical increase in the frequency of that thought. This phenomenon has been a central component of cognitive-behavioural models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD); however, research has yet to demonstrate deficient thought suppression ability in OCD patients. We examined whether individuals with OCD (OCs) exhibit a deficit in the ability to suppress thoughts. In Experiment 1, attempted thought suppression led to a paradoxical increase in self-reported thoughts for OCs, but not for nonanxious controls (NACs) or anxious controls (ACs). In order to rule out self-report biases, in Experiment 2 we utilized a lexical decision paradigm that measured priming strength of a target word under thought suppression conditions. Results paralleled those of Experiment 1: OCs showed decreased lexical decision latency of the 'suppressed' thought (thought to reflect either increased priming strength or disrupted processing of nonsuppressed thoughts), thus exhibiting a paradoxical effect of thought suppression. This effect was not seen in NACs or ACs. These findings suggest that deficits in cognitive inhibitory processes may underlie the intrusive, repetitive nature of clinical obsessions.     

The role of working memory capacity in autobiographical retrieval: individual differences in strategic search

Remembering previous experiences from one's personal past is a principal component of psychological well-being, personality, sense of self, decision making, and planning for the future. In the current study the ability to search for autobiographical information in memory was examined by having college students recall their Facebook friends. Individual differences in working memory capacity manifested itself in the search of autobiographical memory by way of the total number of friends remembered, the number of clusters of friends, size of clusters, and the speed with which participants could output their friends' names. Although working memory capacity was related to the ability to search autobiographical memory, participants did not differ in the manner in which they approached the search and used contextual cues to help query their memories. These results corroborate recent theorising, which suggests that working memory is a necessary component of self-generating contextual cues to strategically search memory for autobiographical information.     

Information and representation in autonomous agents

Information and representation are thought to be intimately related. Representation, in fact, is commonly considered to be a special kind of information. It must be a special kind, because otherwise all of the myriad instances of informational relationships in the universe would be representational — some restrictions must be placed on informational relationships in order to refine the vast set into those that are truly representational. I will argue that information in this general sense is important to genuine agents, but that it is a blind alley with regard to the attempt to understand representation. On the other hand, I will also argue that a different, quite non-standard, form of information is central to genuine representation. First, I turn to some of the reasons why information as usually considered is the wrong category for understanding representation; second, to an alternative model of representation — one that is naturally emergent in autonomous agents, and that does involve information, but not in standard form; and third, I return to standard notions of informational relationships and show what they are in fact useful for.     

Processing ambiguous verbs: evidence from eye movements

In 2 eye-tracking experiments, participants read verbs that had 2 (unrelated) meanings or 2 (related) senses in contexts that disambiguated before or after the verb, to the dominant or subordinate interpretation. A 3rd experiment used unambiguous verbs. The results indicated that the language processor used information about context in the early stages of resolving meaning ambiguities but only during integration for sense ambiguities. Effects of preference were delayed for both types of verbs. The results contrast with findings concerning the processing of nouns (e.g., K. Rayner & S. A. Duffy, 1986). For meaning ambiguities, the authors argue that delays in resolution allow both meanings to reach a high level of activation, thus reducing effects of frequency. For sense ambiguities, the authors argue that the processor does not access multiple senses but activates one underspecified meaning and uses context to home in on the appropriate sense.     

Synchronous stimulation in the rubber hand illusion task boosts the subsequent sense of ownership on the vicarious agency task

The relationship between sense of agency and sense of ownership remains unclear. Here we investigated this relationship by manipulating ownership using the rubber hand illusion and assessing the resulting impact on self-experiences during the vicarious agency illusion. We tested whether modulating ownership towards another limb using the rubber hand illusion would subsequently influence the illusory experience of ownership and agency towards a similar-looking limb in the vicarious agency task. Crucially, the vicarious agency task measures both sense of agency and sense of ownership at the same time, while removing the confounding influence of motor signals. Our results replicated the well-established effects of both paradigms. We also found that manipulating the sense of ownership with the rubber hand illusion influenced the subsequent vicarious experience of ownership but not the vicarious experience of agency. This supports the idea that sense of agency and sense of ownership are, at least partially, independent experiences.     

Spatial Location Memory in Amnesia: Binding Item and Location Information Under Incidental and Intentional Encoding Conditions

Items located within an array were presented to alcoholic Korsakoff and nonalcoholic mixed-etiology amnesics and to alcoholic and normal controls. Recognition memory for the locations of items was tested after incidental and intentional encoding. When equated on item recognition, neither Korsakoff amnesics nor alcoholic controls benefited from intentional, relative to incidental, encoding instructions. Furthermore, Korsakoff amnesics showed neither disproportionately impaired incidental nor intentional location recognition memory relative to alcoholic controls. In contrast, mixed-etiology amnesics profited significantly from intentional location acquisition relative to incidental instructions, and were impaired somewhat in incidental, but not intentional, location memory relative to normal controls. We discuss these data in relation to Mayes' (1992) contextual memory deficit hypothesis and Hirst's (1982) automatic encoding deficit account, and propose an alternative framework in which the location memory deficit observed in mixed-etiology amnesics is interpreted as a disruption to the ability to bind item and location information.