The role of recollection in source memory: an examination of schizophrenia patients and their first-degree relatives

Source recognition memory deficits have repeatedly been observed in people with schizophrenia (SZ), and have also recently been observed in their first-degree relatives. These deficits have been hypothesized to result, at least in part, from impairments in the conscious recollection process. Although other processes are clearly also affected in SZ, it has been proposed that impairments in the conscious recollection process could be a parsimonious explanation for the source memory deficits observed in their relatives. Here, we tested 25 patients with SZ and 34 of their non-affected parents, as well as two groups of matched healthy controls, on a short-term associative memory task that shares the characteristics of standard source recognition tasks but minimizes the need for recollection of stored information from memory. This task was administered in order to determine if deficits can still be observed in these people when involvement of the conscious recollection process is minimized. We observed deficits on our short-term source memory task in people with SZ, but their first-degree relatives did not share this deficit. These results support the idea that multiple memory processes supporting associative/source memory are affected in SZ, whereas the source memory deficits previously observed in relatives of SZ seem specific to tasks that rely on the conscious recollection process.     

Effects of context on recollection and familiarity experiences are task dependent

The influence of test context on reports of recollection and familiarity depends on how these subjective recognition experiences are conceptualized and measured. Bodner and Lindsay (2003) found that critical items elicited more remember judgments but fewer know judgments in a less (vs. more) memorable context. In contrast, Tousignant and Bodner (2012) found that independent ratings of recollection and familiarity were both higher in a less memorable context. We replicated the dissociative pattern with judgments using recollect/familiar labels (Experiment 1), and in a novel R/F/B task that added a “both” option to eliminate the mutual exclusivity between the recollect and familiar options (Experiment 2). Adding a “guess” option eliminated these context effects (Experiment 3), however whether allowing guesses “cleans up” or “desensitizes” recollection and familiarity judgments remains unclear. Determining which task variants provide appropriate measures of subjective recognition experiences will require an examination of additional dissociations and triangulation with other measures.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

Subjective qualities of memories associated with the picture superiority effect in schizophrenia

Patients with schizophrenia (n = 24) matched with 24 normal subjects were presented with both words and pictures. On a recognition memory task, they were asked to give remember, know, or guess responses to items that were recognized on the basis of conscious recollection, familiarity, or guessing, respectively. Compared with normal subjects, patients exhibited a lower picture superiority effect selectively related to remember responses. Unlike normal subjects, they did not exhibit any word superiority effect in relation to guess responses; this explains why the overall picture superiority effect appeared to be intact. These results emphasize the need to take into account the subjective states of awareness when analyzing memory impairments in schizophrenia.     

Non-monotonic relationships between emotional arousal and memory for color and location

Recent research points to the decreased diagnostic value of subjective retrieval experience for memory accuracy for emotional stimuli. While for neutral stimuli rich recollective experiences are associated with better context memory than merely familiar memories this association appears questionable for emotional stimuli. The present research tested the implicit assumption that the effect of emotional arousal on memory is monotonic, that is, steadily increasing (or decreasing) with increasing arousal. In two experiments emotional arousal was manipulated in three steps using emotional pictures and subjective retrieval experience as well as context memory were assessed. The results show an inverted U-shape relationship between arousal and recognition memory but for context memory and retrieval experience the relationship was more complex. For frame colour, context memory decreased linearly while for spatial location it followed the inverted U-shape function. The complex, non-monotonic relationships between arousal and memory are discussed as possible explanations for earlier divergent findings.     

The level of subjective visibility at different stages of memory processing

Recent research suggests that the content of iconic memory (IM) and fragile visual short-term memory could be associated with a similar level of conscious accessibility as working memory (WM). The results of our studies, in which we used a subjective visibility scale in a partial-report change detection paradigm, indicate that it is possible to distinguish separate stages of memory based on both discriminative accuracy and conscious accessibility. The highest scores were associated with IM and the lowest with WM, while somewhere in the middle there was fragile memory. Based on classical assumptions, WM accessibility should be greater than the other two types of memory; however, our study showed that this might not always be the case. We discuss the potential sources of this outcome, of which one may be the task construction, as we only tested items that were directly in the focus of attention.     

Gender differences in memory for objects and their locations: a study on automatic versus controlled encoding and retrieval contexts

Object-location memory is the only spatial task where female subjects have been shown to outperform males. This result is not consistent across all studies, and may be due to the combination of the multi-component structure of object location memory with the conditions under which different studies were done. Possible gender differences in object location memory and its component object identity memory were assessed in the present study. In order to disentangle these two components, an object location memory task (in which objects had to be relocated in daily environments), and a separate object identity recognition task were carried out. This study also focused on the conditions under which object locations were encoded and retrieved. Only half of the participants were aware of the fact that object locations had to be retrieved later on. Moreover, by applying the 'process dissociation procedure' to the object location memory assessments and the 'remember-know' paradigm to the object identity measure, the amount of explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) retrieval was estimated for each component. In general, females performed better than males on the object location memory task. However, when controlled for object identity memory, females no longer outperformed males, whereas they did not obtain a higher general object identity memory score, nor did they have more explicit or implicit recollection of the object identities. These complicated effects might stem from a difference between males and females, in the way locations or associations between objects and locations are retrieved. In general, participants had more explicit (conscious) recollection than implicit (unconscious) recollection. No effect of encoding context was found, nor any interaction effect of gender, encoding and retrieval context.     

The recollective experience of cross-modality confusion errors

There are at least two qualitatively different types of subjective experience that can accompany accurate recognition memory. Sometimes recognition is accompanied by conscious recollection of the learning episode (i.e., it isremembered), and in other cases it is not (i.e., it is simplyknown that the item is old). In the present study, we assessed the subjective experience that accompanies crossmodality confusion errors (misidentifying words as pictures) by measuring the extent to which subjects claimed toremember versusknow that the item was presented as a picture. The results of two experiments demonstrate that cross-modality confusion errors are often accompanied by conscious recollection, although not to the same extent as accurate memories. The findings also show that there is considerable overlap in the recollective experience that accompanies accurate and erroneous memories. Finally, the results support the contention that recollective experience cannot be directly inferred from test performance.     

Environmental context and recognition: the role of recollection and familiarity

Evidence for effects of changed environmental context on recognition has been equivocal. Using 3 experiments, the author investigated the role of environmental context from a dual-processing approach. Experiment 1 showed that testing word recognition in a novel context led to a reliable decrement but only for recognition accompanied by conscious recollection, with familiarity-based recognition judgments being unaffected. This was replicated in Experiment 2 using stimuli that were novel to the participants (nonwords). Experiment 3 showed that the decrement in recollection also occurred when the changed-context condition involved presenting items in a different but familiar context. The results suggest that effects of environmental context will only be found when recognition is accompanied by conscious recollection and that this effect is due to a specific item-context association.     

Expertise and recollective experience: recognition memory for familiar and unfamiliar academic subjects

Two experiments investigated whether expertise effects in recognition memory could be found for different academic subjects. The roles of subjective experience and repetition on such effects were also explored. Experiment 1 showed that overall recognition memory was greater for familiar than for unfamiliar academic words (the expertise effect). Additionally, this effect was attributable to the subjective experience of remembering rather than knowing. Experiment 2 showed that repetition of stimulus items at study eliminated these expertise effects. Previous research has generally failed to find expertise effects in overall recognition memory. The present findings show that expertise effects do occur in overall recognition memory and are associated with the richer memorial experience of remembering rather than knowing. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subjective experience guides betting decisions beyond accuracy: evidence from a metamemory illusion

The goal of this research was to test whether subjective memory experiences drive accuracy regulation decisions above and beyond objective memory indices. In four experiments (n?=?115) subjective recollection (i.e., reporting “Remember” in the Remember-Know task) was dissociated from memory accuracy by manipulating retrieval during a two-alternative forced-choice recognition task: in the Match condition the distracter was a novel exemplar of the target (e.g., a studied and an unstudied toaster) and in the Non-match condition the distracter was a novel exemplar of another studied but untested item (e.g., a studied toaster and an unstudied birdhouse). Participants were more accurate on Match trials, but reported subjective recollection more frequently on Non-match trials. Critically, participants also bet more often on Non-match trials to the detriment of their score (Experiment 1). This pattern persisted when participants were additionally required to retrieve details about items (Experiment 2) and when confidence assessments were collected (Experiment 3). Finally, participants bet more on Non-match trials even when subjective judgments were not elicited, suggesting that the decision process does not require reporting on subjective experience (Experiment 4). These results indicate that subjective memory experiences guide decision-making independent of objective accuracy and thus are critical to accuracy regulation.     

The role of extralist associations in false

The finding that new items are judged as remembered in the remember-know paradigm presents a challenge to traditional process and systems accounts of memory. In three experiments, we demonstrated that false remember responses can be caused by misattributing recollection to a context other than the study list. In Experiments 1 and 2, false remember responses to distractors that were unrelated to studied words increased if they were encountered in a “preexposure” phase a few minutes or even a few days prior to the studied list. A third experiment demonstrated that remember responses to preexposed distractors increased when they were encoded in a manner similar to studied items, despite the more similar items being of weaker overall memory strength. We propose a source misattribution account of false remembering to explain these data, suggesting that all remember judgments reflect conscious recollection of contextual details, but false remember judgments are partly the result of recollection of details from an extralist context (i.e., from a source other than the study list).     

Walking through doorways differentially affects recall and familiarity

Previous research has reported that walking through a doorway to a new location makes memory for objects and events experienced in the previous location less accurate. This effect, termed the location updating effect, has been used to suggest that location changes are used to mark boundaries between events in memory: memories for objects encountered within the current event are more available than those from beyond an event boundary. Within a computer‐generated memory task, participants navigated through virtual rooms, walking through doorways, and interacting with objects. The accuracy and their subjective experience of their memory for the objects (remember/know and confidence) were assessed. The findings showed that shifts in location decreased accurate responses associated with the subjective experience of remembering but not those associated with the experience of knowing, even when considering only the most confident responses in each condition. These findings demonstrate that a shift in location selectively impacts recollection and so contributes to our understanding of boundaries in event memory.     

Examining the basis for illusory recollection: The role of remember/know instructions

Curiously, studies using the remember/know paradigm to measure recollective experience show that people often vividly remember events that never occurred, a phenomenon referred to asillusory recollection. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that false remember responses in the converging associates, or Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, reflect accurate memory for the study episode, rather than false recollection of critical lures. To test this hypothesis, we used standard remember instructions that emphasized recollection of the study context by allowing participants to use memory of surrounding list items as evidence for recollection, or we used modified instructions that did not include memory for surrounding list items as a basis for recollection. Results showed that, as compared with the standard instruction condition, the modified instructions selectively reduced reports of false remember responses to critical lures, but did not affect remember responses to studied items. By contrast, remember responses to critical lures were unaffected by an instruction condition that excluded the use of voice information as evidence for remembering. These results suggest that remember responses to falsely recognized items are driven partly by retrieval of studied items, rather than illusory recollection of the critical lures themselves. They further point to the importance of instructions in influencing subjective reports.     

Memory monitoring and the control of stereotype distortion

We propose a framework for investigating the role of conscious experience in regulating stereotype-based memory distortions. Memory biases are mediated by multiple memory processes, including forms of discriminability and response biases. Different psychological interpretations of these processes depend on how they relate to subjective experiences (e.g., conscious recollection vs. implicit accessibility processes). The ability to control memory distortions, in turn, depends on the psychological meaning attached to these parameters. In Experiment 1 we found that confidence was positively related to discriminability but uncorrelated with stereotype-consistent bias. In Experiment 2 participants were allowed to selectively control when they responded. Because of the asymmetry in monitoring ability, participants were able to increase overall accuracy, but were not able to reduce the stereotype bias. Discussion focuses on the conditions in which subjective experience may provide a valid basis for controlling biases, and when subjective experience may prove deceptive, exacerbating biases.     

Test context affects recollection and familiarity ratings: implications for measuring recognition experiences

The binary remember/know task requires participants to dichotomize their subjective recognition experiences into those with recollection and those only with familiarity. Many variables have produced dissociative effects on remember/know judgments. In contrast, having participants make independent recollection/familiarity ratings has consistently produced parallel effects, suggesting the dissociations may be artifacts of using binary judgments. Bodner and Lindsay (2003) reported a test-list context effect with binary judgments: Increased remembering but decreased knowing for a set of critical items tested with a set of less-memorable (vs. more-memorable) items. Here we report a parallel effect of test-list context on recollection and familiarity ratings, induced by a shift in response bias. We argue that independent ratings are preferable to binary judgments because they allow participants to directly report the co-occurrence of recollection and familiarity for each item. Implications for the measurement of self-reported recognition experiences, and for accounts of recognition memory, are discussed.     

Sensation seeking, recognition memory, and autonomic arousal

Substantial evidence shows that sensation seeking impacts memory; however, research has not examined how sensation seeking impacts automatic familiarity and conscious-controlled recollection memory systems. The present study (N = 80) examined high and low sensation seekers’ familiarity and recollection of high and low arousal images with negative valence using behavioral and skin conductance measures. Low sensation seekers had more accurate familiarity judgments to high than low arousal images, reflecting a heightened aversive motivational system. High sensation seekers showed an opposite pattern with memory enhancement for low arousal images, regardless of old-new status. The lack of any sensation seeking effects in relation to recollection judgments suggests that this personality trait is more influential on automatic than conscious controlled memory systems.     

Self-referencing enhances recollection in both young and older adults

Processing information in relation to the self enhances subsequent item recognition in both young and older adults and further enhances recollection at least in the young. Because older adults experience recollection memory deficits, it is unknown whether self-referencing improves recollection in older adults. We examined recollection benefits from self-referential encoding in older and younger adults and further examined the quality and quantity of episodic details facilitated by self-referencing. We further investigated the influence of valence on recollection, given prior findings of age group differences in emotional memory (i.e., “positivity effects”). Across the two experiments, young and older adults processed positive and negative adjectives either for self-relevance or for semantic meaning. We found that self-referencing, relative to semantic encoding, increased recollection memory in both age groups. In Experiment 1, both groups remembered proportionally more negative than positive items when adjectives were processed semantically; however, when adjectives were processed self-referentially, both groups exhibited evidence of better recollection for the positive items, inconsistent with a positivity effect in aging. In Experiment 2, both groups reported more episodic details associated with recollected items, as measured by a memory characteristic questionnaire, for the self-reference relative to the semantic condition. Overall, these data suggest that self-referencing leads to detail-rich memory representations reflected in higher rates of recollection across age.     

Age-related differences in familiarity and recollection: ERP evidence from a recognition memory study in children and young adults

Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we examined the relative contributions of familiarity and recollection to recognition memory for items and their study contexts in school-aged children and adults. Whereas adults were able to selectively accept target items and to reject familiar nontarget items in an exclusion task, this discrimination was more difficult for children, as was evident in the high false alarm rates to nontargets even when item memory was controlled for. The analysis of the adults’ ERPs revealed more flexible and task-appropriate retrieval mechanisms, as was evident in the correlates of familiarity, recollection, and nontarget retrieval, as well as in postretrieval evaluation. In contrast, children’s ERPs revealed a parietal old/new effect for targets taken as a putative correlate of recollection. These findings suggest that children rely predominantly on recollection during recognition judgments, even in the absence of efficient memory control processes. The latter processes enable adults to monitor and verify the retrieved information and to control nontarget retrieval in the service of adequate source memory performance.     

Recollection in an episodic-like memory task in the rat

Episodic memory in humans is the conscious recollection of a past event. Animal models of episodic-like memory assess the memory for "what"happened, "where" it happened, and either "when" it happened, or in "which" context it happened, although recollection on such tasks is often difficult to measure. Here we present the first evidence of successful recollection of a past event in a rat in a task which is easily performed, requires little training, and is easily adaptable for other commonly used laboratory species.