Generation disrupts memory for intrinsic context but not extrinsic context

Although generation typically enhances item memory, the effect is subject to a number of theoretically important limitations. One potential limitation concerns context memory but there has been debate about whether generation actually enhances or disrupts memory for contextual details. Five experiments assessed the effect of generation on context memory for perceptual attributes of the study stimulus (intrinsic context). The results indicate that despite enhancing item memory, generation disrupts memory for intrinsic context. This result generalized over different intrinsic details (print colour and font), different generation manipulations, and several methodological factors identified in earlier research as potential moderators of this negative generation effect. Despite the negative generation effect on intrinsic context, contextual details external to the target item (extrinsic context) are not disrupted. In a sixth experiment, a visually based generation task (letter transposition) enhanced context memory for the extrinsic detail of location. Coupled with earlier research, the results indicate that generation disrupts context memory for intrinsic details but either does not harm or enhances memory for extrinsic context.     

Developmental patterns in priming and familiarity in explicit recollection

Developmental trajectories of two classes of human memory, implicit and explicit memory, appear to diverge. We examined how developmental differences in perceptual and conceptual priming, two types of implicit memory, coincide with differences between familiarity and recollective responses on explicit memory tests that employ the Remember/Know paradigm ( Tulving, 1985 ). Both types of priming were characterized by developmental invariance in 52 children and adolescents ages 8-19 years. Contrary to Komatsu, Naito, and Fuke (1996) results, few age-group differences in perceptual priming were observed following a levels-of-processing encoding manipulation. In contrast, age group differences were found for "Remember" but not "Know" responses. Neither levels of awareness nor strategies influenced priming. Adult levels of performance appear earlier in development on perceptual and conceptual priming tests compared to explicit memory tests. Similar developmental dissociations exist between explicit and implicit memory performance as between "Remember" and "Know" recollective responses.     

Aging,source memory,and the experience of “remembering”

In a previous study, we found source memory for perceptual features to differentiate between younger but not older adults’ reports of recollective (“remember”; R) and “know” (K) experiences. In two experiments with younger (17–30 years) and older (64–81 years) participants, we examined whether memory for meaningful speaker sources would accompany older adults’ recollective experience. Indeed, memory for male and female speakers (but not partial memory for gender; Experiment 1) as well as bound memory for speakers and their facial expressions (Experiment 2) distinguished between both younger and older adults’ RK reports. Thus, memory for some sources forms a common basis for younger and older adults’ retrieval experience. Nonetheless, older adults still showed lower objective source memory and lower subjective source-attribution confidence than younger adults when reporting recollective experiences, suggesting that source memory is less relevant to their retrieval experience than for younger adults.     

Fact learning: How information accuracy,delay, and repeated testing change retention and retrieval experience

Previous classroom studies have shown that the phenomenology of studied facts changes over time. However, pedagogical needs preclude both the study of errors and the separation of the effects that delay and repeated testing have on retention and retrieval experience. We addressed these issues together in an experiment where participants read stories containing correct and misleading information and provided Remember, Just Know, and Familiar judgements on immediate and delayed general knowledge tests. After 2 days, information learned from the stories shifted from Remembered to Just Known, but repeated testing attenuated this shift. Interestingly, similar patterns of retrieval and phenomenology were observed for correct and misleading information with one important difference—the shift over time to Just Knowing was significantly greater for correct than for misleading information. Together, these findings show the roles of information accuracy, delay, and testing in determining both retention and the subjective experience of retrieval.     

The contribution of familiarity to recognition memory is a function of test format when using similar foils

Patient Y.R., who suffered hippocampal damage that disrupted recollection but not familiarity, was impaired on a yes/no (YN) object recognition memory test with similar foils. However, she was not impaired on a forced-choice corresponding (FCC) version of the test that paired targets with corresponding similar foils (Holdstock et al., 2002). This dissociation is explained by the Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) neural-network model (Norman & O'Reilly, 2003) if recollection is impaired but familiarity is preserved. The CLS model also predicts that participants relying exclusively on familiarity should be impaired on forced-choice noncorresponding (FCNC) tests, where targets are presented with foils similar to other targets. The present study tests these predictions for all three test formats (YN, FCC, FCNC) in normal participants using two variants of the remember/know procedure. As predicted, performance using familiarity alone was significantly worse than standard recognition on the YN and FCNC tests, but not on the FCC test. Recollection in the form of recall-to-reject was the major process driving YN recognition. This adds support to the interpretation of patient data, according to which hippocampal damage causes a recollection deficit that leads to poor performance on the YN test relative to FCC.     

Noncriterial recollection influences metacognitive monitoring and control processes

When retrieving information from memory, temporarily irrelevant material may influence future retrieval endeavours. According to an accessibility account, the amount and intensity of this information can be used to predict the availability of related material. A dual-source paradigm was used to investigate whether information that was not relevant (i.e., noncriterial recollection) to the current memory search would influence metacognitive judgements about a relevant, criterial dimension. In two experiments, participants gave higher feelings-of-knowing judgements for a weakly encoded source dimension when they could subsequently recall the other source dimension later. Furthermore, the influence of the noncriterial information appeared to be driven more so by the subjective state of remembering rather than knowing. Thus, strong memorial information that is temporarily irrelevant influences behaviour.     

The influence of instructions and terminology on the accuracy of remember–know judgments

The remember–know paradigm is one of the most widely used procedures to examine the subjective experience associated with memory retrieval. We examined how the terminology and instructions used to describe the experiences of remembering and knowing affected remember–know judgments. In Experiment 1 we found that using neutral terms, i.e., Type A memory and Type B memory, to describe the experiences of remembering and knowing reduced remember false alarms for younger and older adults as compared to using the terms Remember and Know, thereby increasing overall memory accuracy in the neutral terminology condition. In Experiment 2 we found that using what we call source-specific remember–know instructions, which were intended to constrain remember judgments to recollective experiences arising only from the study context, reduced remember hits and false alarms, and increased know hits and false alarms. Based on these data and other considerations, we conclude that researchers should use neutral terminology and source-specific instructions to collect the most accurate reports of the experiences of remembering and knowing arising from the study context.     

Forgotten but not gone: Context effects on recognition do not require explicit memory for context

Context effects on recognition memory provide an important indirect assay of associative learning and source memory. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that such context effects may obtain even if the contexts themselves are not remembered—for example, in individuals impaired on direct tests of memory for contextual information. In contrast, a recent study indicated that the effects of temporal context reinstatement on visual recognition obtain only when the contextual information itself was explicitly recollected. Here we report that the effects of reinstatement of spatial-simultaneous context on visual object recognition memory obtain irrespective of whether those context stimuli are explicitly recognized. We suggest that spatial-simultaneous context effects might be based on ensemble unitization of target and context stimuli at encoding, whereas temporal context effects may require recollective processes.     

The effect of ageing on recollection: the role of the binding updating process

The aim of this study was to highlight the underlying process responsible for the age-related deficit in recollection. Through two experiments using the Remember-Know-Guess procedure (Gardiner, J. M., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. [2000]. Remembering and knowing. In The Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 229–244). New York, NY: Oxford University Press) in recognition, we manipulated the opportunity to update bindings between target items and their encoding context, in young and older adults. In the first experiment we impaired the binding updating process during the encoding of items, while in the second we supported this process. The results indicated that the “Remember” responses in the younger group were specifically reduced by the impairment of the binding updating process (Exp. 1), suggesting that this ability is useful for them to encode a specific episode. Conversely, only the “Remember” responses in the older group were improved in accuracy by supporting the binding updating process (Exp. 2), suggesting that their weakness in this ability is the source of their failure to improve the accuracy of their memories. The overall results support the hypothesis that the age-related decline in episodic memory is partly due to a greater vulnerability to interference on bindings, impairing the ability to update content-context bindings as and when events occur.     

Conceptual implicit memory and environmental context

Changes in environmental context between encoding and retrieval often affect explicit memory but research on implicit memory is equivocal. One proposal is that conceptual but not perceptual priming is influenced by context manipulations. However, findings with conceptual priming may be compromised by explicit contamination. The present study examined the effects of environmental context on conceptual explicit (category-cued recall) and implicit memory (category production). Explicit recall was reduced by context change. The implicit test results depended on test awareness (assessed with a post-test questionnaire). Among test-unaware participants, priming was equivalent for same-context and different-context groups, whereas for the test-aware, the same-context group produced more priming. Thus, when explicit contamination is controlled, changes in environmental context do not impair conceptual priming. Context dependency appears to be a general difference between implicit and explicit memory rather than a difference between conceptual and perceptual implicit memory. Finally, measures of mood indicated no changes in affect across contexts, arguing against mood mediation for the context effects in explicit recall.     

Episodic future thinking: Linking neuropsychological performance with episodic detail in young and old adults

Episodic future thinking (EFT) has been linked with our ability to remember past events. However, its specific neurocognitive subprocesses have remained elusive. In Experiment 1, a study of healthy older adults was conducted to investigate the candidate subprocesses of EFT. Participants completed a standard EFT cue word task, two memory measures (Verbal Paired Associates I, Source Memory), and two measures of executive function (Trail Making Test, Tower Test). In Experiment 2, healthy young adults also completed an EFT task and neuropsychological measures. The link between neurocognitive measures and five characteristics of EFT was investigated. Specifically, it was found that Source Memory and Trail Making Test performance predicted the episodic specificity of future events in older but not younger adults. Replicating previous findings, older adults produced future events with greater semantic but fewer episodic details than did young adults. These results extend the data and emphasize the importance of the multiple subprocesses underlying EFT.     

The role of recollection in source memory: an examination of schizophrenia patients and their first-degree relatives

Source recognition memory deficits have repeatedly been observed in people with schizophrenia (SZ), and have also recently been observed in their first-degree relatives. These deficits have been hypothesized to result, at least in part, from impairments in the conscious recollection process. Although other processes are clearly also affected in SZ, it has been proposed that impairments in the conscious recollection process could be a parsimonious explanation for the source memory deficits observed in their relatives. Here, we tested 25 patients with SZ and 34 of their non-affected parents, as well as two groups of matched healthy controls, on a short-term associative memory task that shares the characteristics of standard source recognition tasks but minimizes the need for recollection of stored information from memory. This task was administered in order to determine if deficits can still be observed in these people when involvement of the conscious recollection process is minimized. We observed deficits on our short-term source memory task in people with SZ, but their first-degree relatives did not share this deficit. These results support the idea that multiple memory processes supporting associative/source memory are affected in SZ, whereas the source memory deficits previously observed in relatives of SZ seem specific to tasks that rely on the conscious recollection process.     

Effects of resource demanding processing on context memory for context-related versus context-unrelated items

In two experiments, context memory was compared between conditions of higher versus lower cognitive load. The ease of the item–context binding was manipulated using words whose meaning was preexperimentally related versus unrelated to context (colour). Experiment 1 showed that an item generation task may lead to a decrease in memory for font colour without enhancing item recognition. Experiment 2 used a dual-task paradigm, that is, participants performed a concurrent task during the study phase of the memory task. The divided-attention condition decreased both item and context memory. However, in both experiments, the influence of resource demanding conditions on context memory was apparent only when the item–context binding process was not facilitated by preexperimental associations.     

Conscious control and memory awareness when recognising famous faces

We describe an experiment that investigated levels-of-processing effects in recognition memory for famous faces. The degree of conscious control over the recognition decisions was manipulated by using a response deadline procedure, and memory awareness associated with those decisions was assessed using a standard remember-know paradigm. Levels-of-processing effects were found at both short and long response deadlines, and at both deadlines those effects occurred only in remembering. Moreover, knowing, as well as remembering, increased with the greater opportunity for conscious control over recognition decisions at the long deadline. These results have implications for dual-process theories that distinguish between a slower, more controlled recollection process, reflected in remembering, and a faster, more automatic familiarity process, reflected in knowing.     

Exploring the boundaries of memory distrust from repeated checking: increasing external validity and examining thresholds

Checking behavior is among the most common forms of compulsions in OCD. Recent research suggests that repeated checking decreases memory confidence, and supports theoretical models of how repeated checking is maintained. The current paper presents findings from two studies exploring the boundaries of memory distrust from repeated checking. Results of study 1 show that repeated checking of a real stove decreases memory confidence, vividness, and detail (i.e., metamemory), and leads to a greater reliance on knowing as a source of memory, without meaningfully altering memory accuracy. Results of study 2 suggest that these changes in metamemory are observed after performing a relatively low number of checks on one occasion. The findings are considered within the context of theoretical models of checking and future directions are delineated.     

Repeated study of items with and without repeated context: aging effects on memory discriminability

Presenting items multiple times during encoding is a common way to enhance recognition accuracy. Under such conditions, older adults often show an increase in false recognition that counteracts benefits of repeated study. Using a false-memory paradigm with related study items and related lures, we tested whether repetition within the same encoding task or repetition across two different encoding tasks would be more beneficial to older adults’ memory discriminability. Results showed that, compared to items not repeated at study, items repeated in the same context and items repeated across different contexts showed improvements in memory discriminability in both young and older adults. This improvement was primarily reflected in improved recollection responses for both age groups across both repeat study conditions, as compared to no repetition. Importantly, the results demonstrated that repetition can be used to successfully mitigate age-related deficits by increasing memory discriminability and without incurring a cost of false recognition specific to any one age group.     

Phenomenological validity of an OCD-memory model and the remember/know distinction

In earlier experiments using interactive computer animation with healthy subjects, it was found that displaying compulsive-like repeated checking behavior affects memory. That is, checking does not alter actual memory accuracy, but it does affect 'meta-memory': as checking continues, recollections are experienced as less vivid and less detailed while confidence in memory is undermined. This procedure provides a model of OCD checking and suggests that checking is a counterproductive strategy to reduce memory distrust. The present experiment was carried out to specify the phenomenological quality of memory distrust after checking and to see if repeated checking produces a shift in the memory source that is used to decide about the outcome of checking: from 'remembering' to 'knowing' (Tulving, 1985). Using the same interactive computer-animation, the earlier findings on vividness, detail and confidence were replicated. In addition, it was found that checking made participants endorse quotations from OCD patients (Reed, 1985) expressing a specific ambivalence about memory: 'It is as though the memory is there, but is isn't definite enough', 'I remember doing it in a way, but it's all fuzzy....' And 'I can remember that I've done it. But the memory isn't clear somehow'. This finding adds to the validity of the experimental model. Furthermore, after checking subjects' beliefs about the outcome of checking became based on (general) knowing instead of (specific) remembering. It is suggested that OCD checkers feel a general and relatively strong need to be certain about the veracity of recollections and that they have high standards for memory performance. This may explain earlier findings that OCD checkers have a general tendency to distrust their episodic memory. A need for certainty and a critical attitude towards memory performance may not be problematic or abnormal. It is suggested that clinical problems arise when the patient tries to fight memory distrust by repeated checking. The latter does not reduce distrust but rather increases distrust and the patient may get trapped in a spiral of mutually reinforcing checking behavior and memory distrust.