Conscious intention and motor cognition

The subjective experience of conscious intention is a key component of our mental life. Philosophers studying 'conscious free will' have discussed whether conscious intentions could cause actions, but modern neuroscience rejects this idea of mind-body causation. Instead, recent findings suggest that the conscious experience of intending to act arises from preparation for action in frontal and parietal brain areas. Intentional actions also involve a strong sense of agency, a sense of controlling events in the external world. Both intention and agency result from the brain processes for predictive motor control, not merely from retrospective inference.     

Probing folk-psychology: Do Libet-style experiments reflect folk intuitions about free action?

There is an ongoing debate in philosophy and psychology about when one should consider an action to be free. Several aspects are frequently suggested as relevant: (a) a prior intention, (b) a conscious action-related thought, (c) prior deliberation, (d) a meaningful choice, (e) different consequences of the action, and (f) the duration between intention and action. Here we investigated which criteria laypeople adopt and thus probed their intuitions about free actions in three surveys based on daily life scenarios. First, our results indicate that laypeople consider a conscious intention important for an action to be free. Second, laypeople consider spontaneous actions without consequences to be freer than actions with prior deliberation. Third, laypeople consider proximal rather than distal intentions relevant when it comes to judging actions as free. Taken together, these results suggest that simple laboratory experiments on action choices reflect laypeople’s intuitions of free actions to a considerable degree.     

The neural correlates of movement intentions: A pilot study comparing hypnotic and simulated paralysis

The distinct feeling of wanting to act and thereby causing our own actions is crucial to our self-perception as free human agents. Disturbances of the link between intention and action occur in several disorders. Little is known, however, about the neural correlates of wanting or intending to act. To investigate these for simple voluntary movements, we used a paradigm involving hypnotic paralysis and functional magnetic resonance imaging. Eight healthy women were instructed to sequentially perform left and right hand movements during a normal condition, as well as during simulated weakness, simulated paralysis and hypnotic paralysis of the right hand. Right frontopolar cortex was selectively hypoactivated for attempted right hand movement during simulated paralysis while it was active in all other conditions. Since simulated paralysis was the only condition lacking an intention to move, the activation in frontopolar cortex might be related to the intention or volition to move.     

行为执行意向的理论观点及其相关研究

执行意向是指个体以行动目标为导向,通过连接情景线索和目标导向反应,建立行为意向和实际行为之间联系的中介变量。通过梳理执行意向的概念、心理联系及应用研究,发现执行意向主要与行为意向、自我协调、合作性、计划提醒、自觉性、人格等变量产生心理联系;形成执行意向的人具有克服困难,达到既定目标的积极心理状态。然而,执行意向并不总是发挥其积极效应,其与具体情景、个体差异性等有关。最后,文章从四个方面对今后研究的热点与方向进行了展望。     

Subjective agency and awareness of shared actions

Voluntary actions and their distal effects are intimately related in conscious awareness. When an expected effect follows a voluntary action, the experience of the interval between these events is compressed in time, a phenomenon known as ‘intentional binding’ (IB). Current accounts of IB suggest that it serves to reinforce associations between our goals and our intention to attain these goals via action, and that IB only occurs for self-generated (i.e., intentional) actions. We used a novel approach to study IB in the context of shared intentions and actions. Pairs of participants judged the time of occurrence of actions and events attributed either to oneself or to another agent. We found that IB and subjective agency are not mutually predictive when an action can be attributed to only one of two ‘co-intending’ agents. Our results pose a complication for the prevailing view that IB and subjective agency reflect a common mechanism.     

The phenomenology of agency and intention in the face of paralysis and insentience

Studies of perception have focussed on sensation, though more recently the perception of action has, once more, become the subject of investigation. These studies have looked at acute experimental situations. The present paper discusses the subjective experience of those with either clinical syndromes of loss of movement or sensation (spinal cord injury, sensory neuronopathy syndrome or motor stroke), or with experimental paralysis or sensory loss. The differing phenomenology of these is explored and their effects on intention and agency discussed. It is shown that sensory loss can have effects on the focussing of motor command and that for some a sense of agency can return despite paralysis.

材料生态性和性别因素对理解友好与敌对意图的影响

为考察材料生态性、被试性别和角色性别对理解友好与敌对意图的影响,分析了100名被试观察由2名男性或2名女性表演的三类互动意图的照片或卡通时的正确率和反应时。结果：理解真实人物的正确率高于虚拟角色;女性被试理解虚拟角色的反应时长于真实人物,而男性被试却未出现材料生态性差异;理解男性角色敌对意图的反应时短于女性角色的,而理解友好意图时却未出现角色性别差异。研究为负性偏向等理论提供实证证据,揭示材料生态性、角色性别对理解友好和敌对意图的影响机制。     

Career Plateauing and Institutional/Occupational Intention for Taiwanese Career Officers

This study examines regulatory focus as a mediator between the perception of reaching a career plateau and institutional/occupational (I/O) intention in the Taiwanese military. Empirical data were collected from 632 career officers receiving full-time training at the National Defense University. For the identification of military value, we found that Taiwanese career officers’ occupational intentions were higher than their institutional intentions. Additionally, the results indicate that prevention focus completely mediated occupational intention and that promotion focus partially mediating institutional intention. Practical management and research implications are discussed and a direction for future research is suggested.     

理解私人意图与交际意图的ERP证据

已有的意图理解神经成像研究大多关注理解单一个体私人意图的脑功能定位, 而较少涉及两个或更多人的社会性交际意图, 大脑区分私人意图和交际意图的动态时间过程尚不清楚。本研究记录了16名健康被试理解三种不同意图任务时的脑电成分。三种意图分别为: 1)私人意图; 2)交际意图; 3)物理意图。电生理学结果表明在大脑顶区, 私人意图的N250的峰值显著大于交际意图和物理意图。在晚期阶段(300~600 ms), 交际意图的晚期正成分(LPC)的平均波幅要显著大于私人意图和物理意图。在400~600 ms时, 私人意图的LPC的平均波幅要显著大于物理意图。本研究为理解私人意图和交际意图的动态加工过程提供了神经电生理学的初步证据。     

理解双人肢体运动表达的友好和敌对意图的ERP证据

已有的意图理解神经成像研究大多关注理解单一个体的中性或负性意图的脑功能定位, 而大脑理解依靠双人肢体运动表达的友好和敌对意图的动态时间过程尚不清楚。本研究记录了20名健康被试完成三种不同意图推理任务时的脑电成分。三种意图分别为：1)友好意图; 2)敌对意图; 3)中性无互动意图。行为结果发现理解敌对意图的反应时最短。电生理学结果表明, 在额中区的N250 (170~270 ms)上, 中性意图比友好和敌对意图均更负, 且友好意图比敌对意图也更负; 在大脑右半球的P300 (270~450 ms)上, 敌对意图比友好和中性意图均更正, 且友好意图比中性意图也更正。对友好和敌对意图的N250和P300进行溯源分析分别定位于额中回(BA10)和脑岛(BA45)。结果表明大脑在多个阶段对双人肢体运动表达的互动意图进行分类理解, 对负性敌对意图表现出较早的理解且晚期持续性的评价加工。     

The illusionist and the folk: On the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgments

Illusionism is a prominent hypothesis about action control, according to which acts that we consider voluntary are nevertheless caused by unconscious brain events, and thus our subjective experience of consciously willing them is ultimately illusory. Illusionism can be understood as either an ontological thesis or a phenomenological claim, but both versions are vulnerable to a line of attack based on the role of long-term planning (distal intentions) in action control. According to this objection, the evidence upon which illusionism rests is confined to short-term (proximal) intentions, so it is not sufficient to justify broader conclusions on the causal inefficacy of conscious will. In this essay we reconstruct the logic of this objection against illusionism, clarify why surveying folk intuitions on conscious distal intentions is essential to the debate, and present a study in which the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgment is clearly revealed. We also present other relevant findings, such as a gender effect on intentionality attributions, a moral influence on responsibility judgments, and confirmation of mechanistic incompatibilism.     

So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?

In this paper I revisit Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle and propose a novel solution to it. Like some previous accounts, mine postulates a tight link between intentions and reasons but, unlike them, in my account these are motivating rather than normative reasons, i.e. reasons that explain (rather than justify) the intended action. I argue that sensitivity to the absence of possible motivational explanations for the intended action is constitutive of deliberation-based intentions. Since ordinary rational agents display this sensitivity, when placed in the toxin scenario they will believe that there is no motivational explanation for actually drinking the toxin and this is why they can’t form the intention to drink it in the first place. I thus argue that my Motivating-Explanatory Reason Principle correctly explains the toxin puzzle, thereby revealing itself as a genuine metaphysical constraint on intentions. I also explore at length the implications of my account for the nature of intention and rational agency.     

Shaping of Reach-to-Grasp Kinematics by Intentions: A Meta-Analysis

When we reach to grasp something, we need to take into account both the properties of the object we are grasping and the intention we have in mind. Previous research has found these constraints to be visible in the reach-to-grasp kinematics, but there is no consensus on which kinematic parameters are the most sensitive. To examine this, a systematic literature search and meta-analyses were performed. The search identified studies assessing how changes in either an object property or a prior intention affect reach-to-grasp kinematics in healthy participants. Hereafter, meta-analyses were conducted using a restricted maximum likelihood random effect model. The meta-analyses showed that changes in both object properties and prior intentions affected reach-to-grasp kinematics. Based on these results, the authors argue for a tripartition of the reach-to-grasp movement in which the accelerating part of the reach is primarily associated with transporting the hand to the object (i.e., extrinsic object properties), the decelerating part of the reach is used as a preparation for object manipulation (i.e., prepare the grasp or the subsequent action), and the grasp is associated with manipulating the object's intrinsic properties, especially object size.     

Modulating the sense of agency with external cues

We investigate the processes underlying the feeling of control over one’s actions (“sense of agency”). Sense of agency may depend on internal motoric signals, and general inferences about external events. We used priming to modulate the sense of agency for voluntary and involuntary movements, by modifying the content of conscious thought prior to moving. Trials began with the presentation of one of two supraliminal primes, which corresponded to the effect of a voluntary action participants subsequently made. The perceived interval between movement and effect was used as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Primes modulated perceived intervals for both voluntary and involuntary movements, but the modulation was greatest for involuntary movements. A second experiment showed that this modulation depended on prime–movement (temporal) contiguity. We propose that sense of agency is based on a combination of internal motoric signals and external sensory evidence about the source of actions and effects.     

Does retrieval intentionality really matter? Similarities and differences between involuntary memories and directly and generatively retrieved voluntary memories

Theories of autobiographical memory distinguish between involuntary and voluntary retrieval as a consequence of conscious intention (i.e., wanting to remember). Another distinction can be made between direct and generative retrieval, which reflects the effort involved (i.e., trying to remember). However, it is unclear how intention and effort interacts. For example, involuntary memories and directly retrieved memories have been used interchangeably in the literature to refer to the same phenomenon of effortless, non‐strategic retrieval. More recent theoretical advances suggest that they are separate types of retrieval, one unintentional (involuntary), another intentional and effortless (direct voluntary retrieval), and a third intentional and effortful (generative voluntary retrieval). Whether this also entails differing phenomenological characteristics, such as vividness, rehearsal, or emotional valence, has not been previously investigated. In the current study, participants reported memories in an experimental paradigm designed to elicit voluntary and involuntary memories and rated them on a number of characteristics. If intention affects the retrieval process, then we should expect differences between the characteristics of involuntary and directly retrieved memories. The results imply that retrieval intention seems to differentiate how a memory appears in a person's mind. Furthermore, we argue that these differences in part could result from differences in encoding and consolidation.     

主动控制感在大脑表征中的时空标记

主动控制感是主动动作过程中产生的控制自身动作, 进而控制外部环境的主观体验。构成动作主动控制感的核心要素是主观意图与结果反馈。本研究试图通过操控这两个核心要素的不同属性, 借助脑磁图等技术, 探寻主动控制感在大脑额-顶为主的脑网络中前-后馈的作用方式及时空特异性标记, 并建构新的认知神经理论模型。这将有利于理解人类动作的产生及后效、为相关精神类疾病的临床诊断提供更加客观的参照标准。     

Can Conscious Agency Be Saved?

This paper is concerned with the role of conscious agency in human action. On a folk-psychological view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In the last decades, the development of new psychological and neuroscientific methods has made conscious agency an object of empirical investigation and yielded results that challenge the received wisdom. Most famously, the results of Libet’s studies on the ‘readiness potential’ have been interpreted by many as evidence in favor of a skeptical attitude towards conscious agency. It is questionable, however, whether action initiation should be regarded as the touchstone of conscious agency. I shall argue that the traditional folk-psychological view, but also some of the objections leveled against it, rest in part on an over-simplified conception of the structure of agency, that neglects both the role of control processes after action initiation and the role of planning processes before action initiation. Taking these processes into account can lead to a reassessment of the relation between intentions and action and of the role of conscious agency in action production.     

Attention to action and awareness of other minds

We have only limited awareness of the system by which we control our actions and this limited awareness does not seem to be concerned with the control of action. Awareness of choosing one action rather than another comes after the choice has been made, while awareness of initiating an action occurs before the movement has begun. These temporal differences bind together in consciousness the intention to act and the consequences of the action. This creates our sense of agency. Activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex is associated with awareness of our own actions and also occurs when we think about the actions of others. I propose that the mechanism underlying awareness of how our own intentions lead to actions can also be used to represent the intentions that underlie the actions of others. This common system enables us to communicate mental states and thereby share our experiences.     

Libet’s intention reports are invalid: A replication of Dominik et al. (2017)

In the “Libet experiment” the onset of movement-related brain activity preceded the reported time of the conscious intention to move, suggesting that conscious intention may not play a role in initiating voluntary movements (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence that the intention reports employed in the Libet experiment, which Libet et al. (1983) found to precede movement reports, are invalid. In the study by Dominik et al., intention reports preceded movement reports only when participants had prior experience making movement reports. Individuals without such experience reported intention around the same time as movement. These findings suggest that Libet’s intention reports do not reflect experiences of intention, but, rather, inferences based on prior experience with movement reports. Our study replicated the core findings of Dominik et al. We argue that Libet’s intention reports are invalid and explore the phenomenology of intention in the Libet experiment.     

基于成本最小化信息的社会性意图识别：来自脑电和行为的证据

与已有研究着重考察如何识别客体导向性意图(动作以物理对象为目标, 而不涉及其他人)不同, 本研究对人们如何识别社会性意图(动作以指向社会主体为目标以影响对方的交互行为)进行了探讨。基于两交互主体在整体层面应遵循效用最大化的分析, 提出当A协助B达成目标状态所需要的成本小于B单独实现该目标状态所需要的成本时(简称为成本最小化信息), 其可被识别为具有社会性意图。通过在B面前设置栅栏的方法操纵成本最小化信息, 以指示不同意图类型的脑电μ抑制程度、对不同变化的敏感性(辨别力)为指标, 对该假设进行了检验。结果显示, 相比客体导向性意图的控制条件(即A将目标物苹果放置在石头前), 当A将目标物苹果放置在被栅栏挡住的B前, 其动作可减少B单独获取该苹果的动作成本, 即符合成本最小化条件时, μ的抑制程度更高(实验1), 且对结构改变(某两个动画中充当相同角色的智能体互换)的辨别力更强, 但对角色交换(某个动画中两个智能体的角色交换)的辨别力更弱(实验3a); 而当栅栏不存在时, 虽然A的运动路径与实验1相同, 但A将苹果放置在B前的成本大于B自身获取苹果的成本, 即不符合成本最小化条件, 条件间μ抑制的差异消失(实验2), 且对不同动作模式中变化的辨别相当(实验3b)。鉴于已有研究表明社会性意图所诱发的μ抑制强于客体导向性意图, 且人们对存在社会性意图的两个智能体间的结构改变更容易辨别, 而对角色交换不敏感, 故上述结果揭示, 两个个体的行为是否满足成本最小化影响人们对动作意图的识别, 支持成本最小化信息是社会性意图识别线索的观点。