Intentional binding and the sense of agency: a review

It is nearly 10 years since Patrick Haggard and colleagues first reported the 'intentional binding' effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). The intentional binding effect refers to the subjective compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory consequence. Since the first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating array of studies has accumulated. Much of the interest in intentional binding comes from the promise to shed light on human agency. In this review we survey studies on intentional binding, focusing, in particular, on the link between intentional binding and the sense of agency (the experience of controlling action to influence events in the environment). We suggest that, whilst it is yet to be fully explicated, the link between intentional binding and the sense of agency is compelling. We conclude by considering outstanding questions and future directions for research on intentional binding.     

Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action

The experience of causation is a pervasive product of the human mind. Moreover, the experience of causing an event alters subjective time: actions are perceived as temporally shifted towards their effects [Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-385]. This temporal shift depends partly on advance prediction of the effects of action, and partly on inferential “postdictive” explanations of sensory effects of action. We investigated whether a single factor of statistical contingency could explain both these aspects of causal experience. We studied the time at which people perceived a simple manual action to occur, when statistical contingency indicated a causal relation between action and effect, and when no such relation was indicated. Both predictive and inferential “postdictive” shifts in the time of action depended on strong contingency between action and effect. The experience of agency involves a process of causal learning based on statistical contingency.     

The relation between action, predictability and temporal contiguity in temporal binding

Previous studies have documented a subjective temporal attraction between actions and their effects. This finding, named intentional binding, is thought to be the result of a cognitive function that links actions to their consequences. Although several studies have tried to outline the necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional binding, a quantitative comparison between the roles of temporal contiguity, predictability and voluntary action and the evaluation of their interactions is difficult due to the high variability of the temporal binding measurements. In the present study, we used a novel methodology to investigate the properties of intentional binding. Subjects judged whether an auditory stimulus, which could either be triggered by a voluntary finger lift or be presented after a visual temporal marker unrelated to any action, was presented synchronously with a reference stimulus. In three experiments, the predictability, the interval between action and consequence and the presence of action itself were manipulated. The results indicate that (1) action is a necessary condition for temporal binding; (2) a fixed interval between the two events is not sufficient to cause the effect and (3) only in the presence of voluntary action do temporal predictability and contiguity play a significant role in modulating the effect.These findings are discussed in the context of the relationship between intentional binding and temporal expectation.     

Can we model organismic causes of working memory,efficiency and fluid intelligence? A meta-subjective perspective

I critically examine the target paper by Demetriou et al. (2013) noticing that their epistemological perspective is meta-empiricist (i.e., taking the viewpoint of an external observer). This viewpoint is contrasted with to a metasubjective perspective (i.e., that of the subject-matter itself — organismic processes). I explain working memory (whose key developmental determinant is mental – M – attention), as well as processing speed, and Gf from a metasubjective perspective; and I emphasize that difficulty of an item/task is relative to the trade-off level between its item/task mental–attentional demand and the participant's mental–attentional capacity. I list principles of measurement for proper assessment of mental/executive/endogenous attention (M-capacity) and explain some of the results of Demetriou et al. as resulting from inadequate control of this M-demand/M-capacity trade off in their tasks. Demetriou et al. have achieved clear demonstration that WM, Gf, and processing speed are distinct latent variables whose inter-relations change with age. To clarify further their organismic causal determinants they should make a “metasubjective turn” in their theorizing.     

Back through the Looking Glass: On the Relationship between Intentions and Indexicals

Donnellan and Predelli have both responded to accusations that in virtue of involving intentions in their accounts of reference they are committed to ‘Humpty Dumpty’ theories of reference. I examine their responses and argue that they do not succeed in escaping this accusation. Corazza et al. (2002) propose an alternative to Predelli’s account involving linguistic conventions instead of intentions. I argue that Predelli’s responses to Corazza et al. are unsatisfactory and that the intentional theorist is obliged either to accept the Humpty Dumpty conclusion or to adopt the conventional picture, thus relegating intentions to a less significant role in their reference theory.     

Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action–outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress–outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.     

Remembering and imagining: the role of the self

This study investigated whether temporal clustering of autobiographical memories (AMs) around periods of self-development ( [Rathbone et al., 2008] and [Rathbone et al., 2009] ) would also occur when imagining future events associated with the self. Participants completed an AM task and future thinking task. In both tasks, memories and future events were cued using participant-generated identity statements (e.g., I am a student; I will be a mother). Participants then dated their memories and future events, and finally gave an age at which each identity statement was judged to emerge. Dates of memories and future events were recoded as temporal distance from the identity statement used to cue them. AMs and future events both clustered robustly around periods of self-development, indicating the powerful organisational effect of the self. We suggest that life narrative structures are used to organise future events as well as memories.     

Causal Binding of Actions to Their Effects

ABSTRACT— According to widely held views in cognitive science harking back to David Hume, causality cannot be perceived directly, but instead is inferred from patterns of sensory experience, and the quality of these inferences is determined by perceivable quantities such as contingency and contiguity. We report results that suggest a reversal of Hume's conjecture: People's sense of time is warped by the experience of causality. In a stimulus-anticipation task, participants' response behavior reflected a shortened experience of time in the case of target stimuli participants themselves had generated, relative to equidistant, equally predictable stimuli they had not caused. These findings suggest that causality in the mind leads to temporal binding of cause and effect, and extend and generalize beyond earlier claims of intentional binding between action and outcome.     

Time warp: Authorship shapes the perceived timing of actions and events

It has been proposed that inferring personal authorship for an event gives rise to intentional binding, a perceptual illusion in which one’s action and inferred effect seem closer in time than they otherwise would (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Using a novel, naturalistic paradigm, we conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis and examine the relationship between binding and self-reported authorship. In both experiments, an important authorship indicator – consistency between one’s action and a subsequent event – was manipulated, and its effects on binding and self-reported authorship were measured. Results showed that action-event consistency enhanced both binding and self-reported authorship, supporting the hypothesis that binding arises from an inference of authorship. At the same time, evidence for a dissociation emerged, with consistency having a more robust effect on self-reports than on binding. Taken together, these results suggest that binding and self-reports reveal different aspects of the sense of authorship.     

Time in action contexts: learning when an action effect occurs

Action effects do not occur randomly in time but follow our actions at specific delays. The ideomotor principle (IMP) is widely used to explain how the relation between actions and contingently following effects is acquired and numerous studies demonstrate robust action-effect learning. Yet, little is known about the acquisition of temporal delays of action effects. Here, we demonstrate that participants learn that action effects occur at specific delays. Participants responded slower to action effects that occurred earlier than usual. In addition, participants often prematurely responded before the effect when it occurred later than expected. Thus, in contrast to biases of time perception in action contexts (e.g., Haggard, Trends Cogn Sci 9:290–295, 2005; Stetson et al., Neuron 51:651–659, 2006), participants learn and exploit temporal regularities between actions and effects for behavioral control.     

Mild hypoxia disrupts recollection,not familiarity

Yonelinas et al. (2002) found that hypoxic patients exhibited deficits in recollection that left familiarity relatively unaffected. In contrast, Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, and Squire (2003) studied a group of hypoxic patients who suffered severe and equivalent deficits in recollection and familiarity. We reexamine those studies and argue that the discrepancy in results is likely due to differences in the hypoxic groups that were tested (i.e., differences in amnestic severity, subject sampling methods, and patient etiology). Yonelinas et al. examined memory in 56 cardiac arrest patients who suffered a brief hypoxic event, whereas Manns et al. examined a group of severely amnesic patients that consisted of 2 cardiac arrest patients, 2 heroin overdose patients, 1 carbon monoxide poisoning patient, and 2 patients with unknown etiologies. We also consider an alternative explanation proposed by Wixted and Squire (2004), who argued that the two patient groups suffered similar deficits, but that statistical or methodological artifacts distorted the results of each of Yonelinas et al.'s experiments. A consideration of those results, however, indicates that such an explanation does not account for the existing data. All of the existing evidence indicates that recollection, but not familiarity, is disrupted in mild hypoxic patients. In more severe cases of hypoxia, or those with more complex etiologies such as heroin overdose, more profound deficits may be observed.     

智者必怀仁？智慧与美德的关系辨析

智慧与美德是独立但相互作用的心理结构。针对其关系,以往哲学家与心理学家基于个人经验和文化观念进行了大量规范性层面的理论思辨,但仍存在理论分歧（线性论、阈值论、从属论）,且缺少以定量方法为主的描述性层面的实证研究,尤其缺乏基于实验的关于“智”与“仁”双向因果关系的探索。未来研究可以借鉴实验伦理学的范式,着眼于研究特定领域、特定情境下智慧与美德之间的双向因果关系,加强中国文化背景下的智慧与美德关系的研究,并探索其潜在的认知神经机制。如何统一智慧与美德关系的“应然”与“实然”的研究,是接下来需要面临的挑战。     

Mechanisms of predictive and diagnostic causal induction

In predictive causal inference, people reason from causes to effects, whereas in diagnostic inference, they reason from effects to causes. Independently of the causal structure of the events, the temporal structure of the information provided to a reasoner may vary (e.g., multiple events followed by a single event vs. a single event followed by multiple events). The authors report 5 experiments in which causal structure and temporal information were varied independently. Inferences were influenced by temporal structure but not by causal structure. The results are relevant to the evaluation of 2 current accounts of causal induction, the Rescorla-Wagner (R. A. Rescorla & A. R. Wagner, 1972) and causal model theories (M. R. Waldmann & K. J. Holyoak, 1992).     

Dementia with Lewy bodies: a pure case

A pure case of autopsy-confirmed dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) is described. The patient presented with distinctive verbal fluency deficits in the context of mild language impairment, intact recognition memory, and impaired paragraph recall. Neuroimaging (CT and SPECT) showed progressive medial temporal lobe atrophy. Neuropathology revealed Lewy bodies, degeneration in the substantia nigra, nucleus basalis of Meynert (Nakano & Hirano, 1984), and locus ceruleus, but no pathology characteristic of Alzheimer's disease. It is in this sense that the case is "pure" DLB. Early neuropsychological diagnosis of DLB is essential (Salmon et al., 1996) given the potentially fatal hazard of neuroleptics (McKeith et al., 1992) and the difficulties associated with clinical neurological diagnoses (Litvan et al., 1998).     

Evidence for a distinction between judged and perceived causality

Two experiments investigated Michotte's launch event, in which successive motion of two objects appears to evoke an immediate perception that the first motion caused the second, as in a collision. Launching was embedded in event sequences where a third event (a colour change of the second object) was established as a competing predictor of the second motion, in an attempt to see whether subjects' learning of alternative predictive relationships would influence their causal impressions of launch events. In Experiment 1 subjects saw launch events in which temporal contiguity at the point of impact was varied so that an impact was varied so that an impact itself did not reliably predict when the second object would move. Half of these scenes, however, contained a colour change of the second object which did reliably predict when it would move. In accordance with Michotte's theory, subjects' ratings of the degree of perceived causality were not affected by the colour change. In Experiment 2 subjects saw scenes that contained launch events with or without temporal contiguity and a colour change. These were interspersed with events in which a colour change alone did or did not precede the second motion. Thus, movement of the second object was either contingent on or independent of the impact. Subjects repeatedly (a) rated perceived causality in single launch events and (b) judged the necessity of collisions for movement in the overall set of events. These responses dissociated, in that ratings type (a) showed only a substantial contiguity effect, whereas judgements of type (b) showed both a contingency and a much smaller contiguity effect. These results appear to support a distinction between judged and perceived causality and are discussed with respect to Michotte's theory of direct causal perception.     

Time scale similarity and long-term memory for autobiographical events

We examine the extent to which retrieval from very long-term autobiographical memory is similar when participants are asked to retrieve from widely differing periods of time. Three groups of 20 participants were given 4 min to recall autobiographical events from the last 5 weeks, 5 months, or 5 years. Following recall, the participants dated their events. Similar retrieval rates, relative recency effects, and relative lag-recency effects were found, despite the fact that the considered time scales varied by a factor of 52. These data are broadly consistent with the principle of recency, the principle of contiguity (Howard & Kahana, 2002), and scale similarity in the rates of recall (Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Maylor, Chater, & Brown, 2001). These findings are taken as support for models of memory that predict time scale similarity in retrieval, such as SIMPLE (Brown et al., 2007) and TCM (Howard & Kahana, 2002).     

On the origin of personal causal theories

Detecting the causal relations among environmental events is an important facet of learning. Certain variables have been identified which influence both human causal attribution and animal learning: temporal priority, temporal and spatial contiguity, covariation and contingency, and prior experience. Recent research has continued to find distinct commonalities between the influence these variables have in the two domains, supporting a neo-Humean analysis of the origins of personal causal theories. The cues to causality determine which event relationships will be judged as causal; personal causal theories emerge as a result of these judgments and in turn affect future attributions. An examination of animal learning research motivates further extensions of the analogy. Researchers are encouraged to study real-time causal attributions, to study additional methodological analogies to conditioning paradigms, and to develop rich learning accounts of the acquisition of causal theories.     

Covariation and temporal contiguity as principles of causal inference in young children

Four- to seven-year-old children observed a simple physical effect which could be attributed to either a consistent but noncontiguous covariate or a contiguous but inconsistent covariate. When there was a physical rationale for the temporal delay between covariate and effect, children attributed the effect to the consistent but noncontiguous covariate. In the absence of such a rationale, they attributed the effect to the contiguous but inconsistent covariate. It was concluded that neither consistent covariation nor strict temporal contiguity were essential aspects of causal inference for these children.     

施动感研究的意向捆绑范式述评

施动感是自我意识的一个重要部分。意向捆绑即人的动作及动作的感觉结果两者的时间点主观上被感知为相互靠近的现象,为研究人类的施动感提供了一个重要的测量手段。本文综述意向捆绑的实验范式和认知机制,发现目前线索整合理论能最好的解释意向捆绑现象。意向捆绑的范式可以用于临床疾病和跨文化的研究。今后还应深入研究意向捆绑机制及意向捆绑与施动感的关系。     

Mental Causation and Searle’s Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality

In my article I evaluate Searle’s account of mental causation, in particular his account of the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that top-down causation and overdetermination are unsolved problems in Searle’s philosophy of mind, despite his assurances to the contrary. I also argue that there are conflicting claims involved in his account of mental causation and his account of the unconscious. As a result, it becomes impossible to understand how unconscious intentional states can be causally efficacious. My conclusion will be that if Searle’s conception of unconscious intentionality is to play a genuine role in the causal explanation of human action, it needs to be rethought.