Subliminal speech perception and auditory streaming

Current theories of consciousness assume a qualitative dissociation between conscious and unconscious processing: while subliminal stimuli only elicit a transient activity, supraliminal stimuli have long-lasting influences. Nevertheless, the existence of this qualitative distinction remains controversial, as past studies confounded awareness and stimulus strength (energy, duration). Here, we used a masked speech priming method in conjunction with a submillisecond interaural delay manipulation to contrast subliminal and supraliminal processing at constant prime, mask and target strength. This delay induced a perceptual streaming effect, with the prime popping out in the supraliminal condition. By manipulating the prime-target interval (ISI), we show a qualitatively distinct profile of priming longevity as a function of prime awareness. While subliminal priming disappeared after half a second, supraliminal priming was independent of ISI. This shows that the distinction between conscious and unconscious processing depends on high-level perceptual streaming factors rather than low-level features (energy, duration).     

The relationship between the objective identification threshold and priming effects does not provide a definitive boundary between conscious and unconscious perceptual processes

The Objective Threshold/Strategic Model (OT/S) proposes that strong, qualitative inferences of unconscious perception can be made if the relationship between perceptual sensitivity (typically priming effects) and stimulus visibility is nonlinear and nonmonotonic. The model proposes a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold (identification d′ = 0). These predictions were tested with masked semantic priming and repetition priming of a lexical decision task. The visibility of the prime stimuli was systematically varied above and below the objective identification threshold. The obtained relationship between prime visibility and priming facilitation was nonlinear, but the results failed to confirm a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold. We conclude that the objective identification threshold does not necessarily indicate the point where presumably unconscious priming effects might be inhibited by conscious cognitive processes.     

Unconscious semantic priming in the absence of partial awareness

In a recent paper in Psychological Science, Kouider and Dupoux reported obtaining unconscious Stroop priming only when subjects had partial awareness of the masked distractor words (i.e., could consciously perceive subword features that enabled reconstruction of whole words). Kouider and Dupoux conjectured that semantic priming occurs only when such partial awareness is present. The present experiments tested this conjecture in an affective categorization priming task that differed from Kouider and Dupoux’s in using masked distractors that subjects had practiced earlier as visible words. Experiment 1 showed priming from practiced words when subjects had no partial awareness of those words. Experiment 2 showed that, in the absence of partial awareness, practiced words yielded priming but not-practiced words did not. Experiment 3 corroborated Experiment 1 and 2s results using a different test of partial awareness. These results suggest that unconscious processing (rather than partial awareness) of subword elements drives masked semantic priming by practiced words.     

Controlling the unconscious: attentional task sets modulate subliminal semantic and visuomotor processes differentially

Are unconscious processes susceptible to attentional influences? In two subliminal priming experiments, we investigated whether task sets differentially modulate the sensitivity of unconscious processing pathways. We developed a novel procedure for masked semantic priming of words (Experiment 1) and masked visuomotor priming of geometrical shapes (Experiment 2). Before presentation of the masked prime, participants performed an induction task in which they attended to either semantic or perceptual object features designed to activate a semantic or perceptual task set, respectively. Behavioral and electrophysiological effects showed that the induction tasks differentially modulated subliminal priming: Semantic priming, which involves access to conceptual meaning, was found after the semantic induction task but not after the perceptual induction task. Visuomotor priming was observed after the perceptual induction task but not after the semantic induction task. These results demonstrate that unconscious cognition is influenced by attentional control. Unconscious processes in perceptual and semantic processing streams are coordinated congruently with higher-level action goals.     

Latency facilitation in temporal-order judgments: time course of facilitation as a function of judgment type

The paper is concerned with two models of early visual processing which predict that priming of a visual mask by a preceding masked stimulus speeds up conscious perception of the mask (perceptual latency priming). One model ascribes this speed-up to facilitation by visuo-spatial attention [Scharlau, I., & Neumann, O. (2003a). Perceptual latency priming by masked and unmasked stimuli: Evidence for an attentional explanation. Psychological Research 67, 184-197], the other attributes it to nonspecific upgrading mediated by retino-thalamic and thalamo-cortical pathways [Bachmann, T. (1994). Psychophysiology of visual masking: The fine structure of conscious experience. Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers]. The models make different predictions about the time course of perceptual latency priming. Four experiments test these predictions. The results provide more support for the attentional than for the upgrading model. The experiments further demonstrate that testing latency facilitation with temporal-order judgments may induce a methodological problem resulting in fairly low estimates. A method which provides a more exhaustive measure is suggested and tested.     

Working memory can enhance unconscious visual perception

We demonstrate that unconscious processing of a stimulus property can be enhanced when there is a match between the contents of working memory and the stimulus presented in the visual field. Participants first held a cue (a colored circle) in working memory and then searched for a brief masked target shape presented simultaneously with a distractor shape. When participants reported having no awareness of the target shape at all, search performance was more accurate in the valid condition, where the target matched the cue in color, than in the neutral condition, where the target mismatched the cue. This effect cannot be attributed to bottom-up perceptual priming from the presentation of a memory cue, because unconscious perception was not enhanced when the cue was merely perceptually identified but not actively held in working memory. These findings suggest that reentrant feedback from the contents of working memory modulates unconscious visual perception.     

Extending a focused attention paradigm to critically test for unconscious congruency effects

ABSTRACT

In a novel integration of research designs, we tested for unconscious perception effects at an unattended stimulus location using a focused attention paradigm (Lachter, J., Forster, K. I., & Ruthruff, E. 2004. Forty-five years after Broadbent (1958): Still no identification without attention. Psychological Review, 111(4), 880–913. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.880). Target-masked word or nonword prime stimuli were briefly displayed for 14, 28, or 56?ms at an experimentally-defined attended or unattended location, followed by a lexical decision task. At the briefest prime durations (14 and 28?ms), we failed to find any evidence for unattended priming effects, consistent with Lachter et al., but there were some small priming (i.e., congruency) effects at the attended location. The 14?ms primes could not be discriminated above chance, but could be detected. Our results support the claim that perceptual processing is strongest with focal attention. For the 14?ms primes at the attended location, results could support an unconscious perception claim, but the effect was weak and awareness of the primes was unlikely to have been completely eliminated.     

Masked stimuli modulate endogenous shifts of spatial attention

Unconscious stimuli can influence participants’ motor behavior but also more complex mental processes. Recent research has gradually extended the limits of effects of unconscious stimuli. One field of research where such limits have been proposed is spatial cueing, where exogenous automatic shifts of attention have been distinguished from endogenous controlled processes which govern voluntary shifts of attention. Previous evidence suggests unconscious effects on mechanisms of exogenous shifts of attention. Here, we applied a cue-priming paradigm to a spatial cueing task with arbitrary cues by centrally presenting a masked symmetrical prime before every cue stimulus. We found priming effects on response times in target discrimination tasks with the typical dynamic of cue-priming effects (Experiments 1 and 2) indicating that central symmetrical stimuli which have been associated with endogenous orienting can modulate shifts of spatial attention even when they are masked. Prime–Cue Congruency effects of perceptual dissimilar prime and cue stimuli (Experiment 3) suggest that these effects cannot be entirely reduced to perceptual repetition priming of cue processing. In addition, priming effects did not differ between participants with good and poor prime recognition performance consistent with the view that unconscious stimulus features have access to processes of endogenous shifts of attention.     

Subliminal action priming modulates the perceived intensity of sensory action consequences

The sense of control over the consequences of one’s actions depends on predictions about these consequences. According to an influential computational model, consistency between predicted and observed action consequences attenuates perceived stimulus intensity, which might provide a marker of agentic control. An important assumption of this model is that these predictions are generated within the motor system. However, previous studies of sensory attenuation have typically confounded motor-specific perceptual modulation with perceptual effects of stimulus predictability that are not specific to motor action. As a result, these studies cannot unambiguously attribute sensory attenuation to a motor locus. We present a psychophysical experiment on auditory attenuation that avoids this pitfall. Subliminal masked priming of motor actions with compatible prime–target pairs has previously been shown to modulate both reaction times and the explicit feeling of control over action consequences. Here, we demonstrate reduced perceived loudness of tones caused by compatibly primed actions. Importantly, this modulation results from a manipulation of motor processing and is not confounded by stimulus predictability. We discuss our results with respect to theoretical models of the mechanisms underlying sensory attenuation and subliminal motor priming.     

Partial awareness creates the "illusion" of subliminal semantic priming

We argue that the lack of consensus regarding the existence of subliminal semantic processing arises from not taking into account the fact that linguistic stimuli are represented across several processing levels (features, letters, word form) that can independently reach or not reach awareness. Using masked words, we constructed conditions in which participants were aware of some letters or fragments of a word, while remaining unaware of the whole word. Three experiments using the Stroop priming paradigm show that when the stimulus set is reduced and participants are encouraged to guess the identity of the prime, such partially perceived stimuli can nonetheless give rise to "semantic" processing. We provide evidence that this effect is due to illusory reconstruction of the incompletely perceived stimulus, followed by usual semantic processing of the result. We conclude that previously reported unconscious Stroop priming is in fact a conscious effect, but applied to a perceptual illusion.     

Unconscious color priming occurs at stimulus- not percept-dependent levels of processing

Although past studies have shown that visual information can be processed without awareness, the types and levels of this processing have yet to be determined. We used metacontrast masking to explore unconscious priming effects of white, blue, and green stimuli generated on a color video display. We found that a white prime tends to act more like a green than a blue one. Color confusions among unmasked and masked primes and calibrations of the display phosphors show that physical rather than perceptual properties of the stimuli best explain the white prime's effects. We conclude that unconscious color priming in normal observers occurs at early wavelength-dependent levels of processing prior to later color-percept-dependent levels.     

Dynamic variations in affective priming

The present study investigates the dynamics of emotional processing and awareness using an affective facial priming paradigm in conjunction with a multimodal assessment of awareness. Key facial primes are visually masked, and are presented for brief (unconscious) and extended (conscious) durations. Using a preference measure, we examine whether the effects of the primes differ qualitatively (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). We show that: (a) unconscious affective priming with faces emerges strongly in initial presentations and diminishes rapidly with repetition; (b) conscious affective priming also emerges strongly in initial presentations, however it persists in strength with repetition; and (c) in contrast to other reports on the salience of negative stimuli, happy faces appear more salient than sad faces when presented outside awareness. We discuss the limits and extensions of unconscious affective priming with faces, and consider several methodological and conceptual questions concerning emotional processing out of awareness.     

汉语听觉阈下启动效应：来自听觉掩蔽启动范式的证据

使用汉语双字词为实验材料,采用听觉掩蔽启动范式,通过3个实验考察汉语听觉阈下启动效应。结果发现,真词的听觉阈下重复启动效应显著,并且听觉阈下重复启动效应不受启动、目标发音者性别一致性的影响。但真词的阈下语音、语素和语义启动效应及假词的阈下重复和首字启动效应都不显著。这些结果说明,听觉通道阈下呈现的汉语双字词的词汇水平信息可以得到无意识加工。汉语双字词的听觉阈下启动效应可能是基于启动词整词表征的无意识激活。     

Boundary conditions for the influence of unfamiliar non-target primes in unconscious evaluative priming: The moderating role of attentional task sets

Evaluative priming by masked emotional stimuli that are not consciously perceived has been taken as evidence that affective stimulus evaluation can also occur unconsciously. However, as masked priming effects were small and frequently observed only for familiar primes that there also presented as visible targets in an evaluative decision task, priming was thought to reflect primarily response activation based on acquired S–R associations and not evaluative semantic stimulus analysis. The present study therefore assessed across three experiments boundary conditions for the emergence of masked evaluative priming effects with unfamiliar primes in an evaluative decision task and investigated the role of the frequency of target repetition on priming with pictorial and verbal stimuli. While familiar primes elicited robust priming effects in all conditions, priming effects by unfamiliar primes were reliably obtained for low repetition (pictures) or unrepeated targets (words), but not for targets repeated at a high frequency. This suggests that unfamiliar masked stimuli only elicit evaluative priming effects when the task set associated with the visible target involves evaluative semantic analysis and is not based on S–R triggered responding as for high repetition targets. The present results therefore converge with the growing body of evidence demonstrating attentional control influences on unconscious processing.     

Unconscious perception or not? An evaluation of detection and discrimination as indicators of awareness

Most investigations of unconscious perception use a dissociation design in which an awareness variable (e.g., detection) is compared with a perceptual processing variable (e.g., identification). Unconscious perception is inferred when the awareness variable lacks sensitivity to the stimulus but evidence of perceptual processing is still obtained. In two studies we examined the relationship between word identification and detection (Study 1) or discrimination (words vs. nonwords; Study 2) with a variety of techniques. In both studies, dissociations suggestive of unconscious perception occurred when the data were examined with subjective threshold approaches, but these differences disappeared when the variables were compared with techniques derived from signal detection theory (SDT). These results do not support unconscious perception in subjective threshold paradigms. In addition, detection appears to be the most sensitive and appropriate task for assessing stimulus awareness, provided that several SDT assumptions are met.     

Highly correlated stimuli do not necessarily facilitate the measurement of unconscious perception: Exclusion failure is hard to find in forced-choice tasks

Persaud and McLeod (2008) report that unconscious perception is easier to measure with forced-choice exclusion tasks when the stimuli are highly similar, such as choosing between the letters ‘h’ and ‘b’. The high degree of stimulus similarity may decrease conscious awareness of the target stimuli while leaving unconscious cognition intact. The present experiments used forced-choice exclusion tasks (i.e., choosing the opposite of a masked target stimulus) with the aim of replicating these findings. No evidence of relevant perception – either conscious or unconscious – was obtained with short duration targets. The forced-choice exclusion task was correctly performed at longer target durations (25 ms and higher), which suggests conscious perception of the target stimuli. We conclude that increasing stimulus similarity does not reliably produce exclusion failure effects and does not appear to facilitate the measurement of unconscious cognition.     

Unconscious vision and executive control: How unconscious processing and conscious action control interact

Research on unconscious or unaware vision has demonstrated that unconscious processing can be flexibly adapted to the current goals of human agents. The present review focuses on one area of research, masked visual priming. This method uses visual stimuli presented in a temporal sequence to lower the visibility of one of these stimuli. In this way, a stimulus can be masked and even rendered invisible. Despite its invisibility, a masked stimulus if used as a prime can influence a variety of executive functions, such as response activation, semantic processing, or attention shifting. There are also limitations on the processing of masked primes. While masked priming research demonstrates the top-down dependent usage of unconscious vision during task-set execution it also highlights that the set-up of a new task-set depends on conscious vision as its input. This basic distinction captures a major qualitative difference between conscious and unconscious vision.     

Involuntary attention in the absence of visual awareness

ABSTRACT

Previous studies have found a dissociation between voluntary attention and awareness. Here, we examined the relationship between involuntary attention and awareness. We presented a masked cue such that participants were unaware of the cue. This was followed by a search array, for which participants detected the presence of a shape target. Even though the cue was task irrelevant and unconscious, we observed faster reaction times when either the cue’s location or colour was congruent with shape target. We conclude an unconscious stimulus can elicit both space- and feature-based attention. These results provide further evidence for the dissociation between attention and consciousness.     

Time course of free-choice priming effects explained by a simple accumulator model

Unconscious visual stimuli can be processed by human observers and modulate their behavior. This has been shown for masked prime stimuli that influence motor responses to subsequent target stimuli. Beyond this, masked stimuli can also affect participants' behavior when they are free to choose one of two response alternatives. This finding demonstrates that an apparently free-choice between alternative behaviors can be subject to influences that are outside of awareness. We report three experiments which exhibit that the temporal dynamic of free-choice priming effects corresponds to that of forced-choice priming effects. Forced-choice priming effects were relatively robust against variations of prime stimuli but sensitive to physical features of target stimuli. Free-choice priming effects, in contrast, depended largely on the stimulus-response compatibility of the prime. A simple accumulator model which accounts for forced-choice response priming can also explain free-choice priming effects by the assumption that unconscious stimuli can initiate motor responses when participants are engaged in a speeded choice-reaction time task. According to our analyses free-choice priming results from a response selection mechanism which integrates conscious and unconscious information from external, stimulus driven sources and also from internal sources.     

Preferential processing of self-relevant stimuli occurs mainly at the perceptual and conscious stages of information processing

Self-related stimuli, such as one’s own name or face, are processed faster and more accurately than other types of stimuli. However, what remains unknown is at which stage of the information processing hierarchy this preferential processing occurs. Our first aim was to determine whether preferential self-processing involves mainly perceptual stages or also post-perceptual stages. We found that self-related priming was stronger than other-related priming only because of perceptual prime-target congruency. Our second aim was to dissociate the role of conscious and unconscious factors in preferential self-processing. To this end, we compared the “self” and “other” conditions in trials where primes were masked or unmasked. In two separate experiments, we found that self-related priming was stronger than other-related priming but only in the unmasked trials. Together, our results suggest that preferential access to the self-concept occurs mainly at the perceptual and conscious stages of the stimulus processing hierarchy.