The reception of western philosophy in the Lithuanian philosophy of religion

The article examines the reception of Western philosophy in Lithuanian philosophy of religion. The purpose is to show how the discourse of philosophy of religion came about in Lithuania. This branch of philosophy has been not only culturally and socially important in Lithuania, it has been significant as well for the formation and maintenance of national identity. By the same token, it also was the most developed and controversial theoretically. The first part of the article lays out the genesis of the autonomous Lithuanian philosophy of religion, though strongly influenced by the transformations in the broader context of European philosophy. For that reason it will be useful to present the ideas of the most prominent Lithuanian thinkers in the field who have successfully adopted and adapted vital trends in Western philosophy into the Lithuanian cultural and intellectual context. The second part of the article is less historical and more problematic as it deals with specific issues concerning faith, God, anthropological problems as reflected in the works of contemporary Lithuanian philosophers of religion. Only after having explored certain affiliations of Lithuanian philosophy of religion with Western thought can we state that, although the latter was the necessary precondition of the former, Lithuanian philosophy of religion does substantiate its sovereign status while correlating in an original way major cultural transformations with the changes in theoretical context, according to the specific concerns of Lithuanian society. In addition, this historical and philosophical examination aims to look at the formation of Lithuanian identity, mentality, values, their roots in the Christian tradition as well as the capacity to respond at critical historical moments.

On experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy: a reply to Sorell

In this paper, we reply to Tom Sorell’s criticism of our engagement with the history of philosophy in our book, The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy. We explain why our uses of the history of philosophy are not undermined by Sorell’s criticism and why our position is not threatened by the dilemma Sorell advances. We argue that Sorell has mischaracterized the dialectical context of our discussion of the history of philosophy and that he has mistakenly treated our use of the history of philosophy as univocal, when in fact we called on the history of philosophy in several different ways in our text.     

An application of Carnapian inductive logic to an argument in the philosophy of statistics

I claim that an argument from the philosophy of statistics can be improved by using Carnapian inductive logic. Gelman and Shalizi [9] criticise a philosophical account of how statisticians ought to choose statistical models which they call ‘the received view of Bayesian inference’ and propose a different account inspired by falsificationist philosophy of science. I introduce another philosophical account inspired by Carnapian inductive logic and argue that it is even better than Gelman and Shalizi's falsificationist account.     

"中国马克思主义哲学"理论体系的实存应予肯定--兼答徐素华先生

徐素华先生文章把我提出的“中国马克思主义哲学”等同于他所说的“党的指导思想形态”,“在中国的马克思主义哲学”等同于他所说的“学术研究形态”,这不符合我的本意。“马克思主义哲学合法性问题”的讨论确实存在。“中国马克思主义哲学”是在中国实践中学习、运用,在总结实践经验、发扬中国优秀哲学文化、升华人民群众智慧的基础上发展了的马克思主义哲学。它是中国哲学的一个现代形态。它既是一个创新的哲学理论体系,又是党的指导思想的哲学基础。     

The educational theorists, the teachers, and their history of education

The following contribution expands the current discussion on the status and function of the history of education at the methodological, or epistemological, level by introducing the perspective of a history of educational knowledge. This opens up a theoretical option for educational historiography that avoids the identification of history of education with history of a discipline, or the institutionalized knowledge of education and teaching. As a consequence, some history of education topoi – as the history of a discipline – can be called into question and practiced historically rather than educationally or morally.     

冯友兰先生的《中国哲学史》:同情之了解与新儒学

冯友兰先生先以中国哲学史家名于世。两卷本《中国哲学史》是其成名的代表作。《中国哲学史》有很多特点,其中最主要的即是同情之了解与新儒学。同情之了解不仅是冯先生成功写作《中国哲学史》的原则和方法,而且也是我们今后弘扬中国优秀传统文化所不可或缺的原则与方法。冯先生后来又成了一位著名的新儒家。作为中国现代学术思潮中新儒家的一位典型代表,冯先生本人以及一般论者都公认为应以其贞元六书的新理学哲学体系为代表。文章赞同这个共识,但想补充一点,即广而言之,似乎也可以包括冯先生所著的两卷本《中国哲学史》在内。文章从其目录、内容、审查、批评、自觉与自白和贞元六书多方面进行了探索与论述。     

A theory of health science and the healing arts based on the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan

This paper represents a preliminary investigation relating Bernard Lonergan’s thought to health science and the healing arts. First, I provide background for basic elements of Lonergan’s theoretical terminology that I employ. As inquiry is the engine of Lonergan’s method, next I specify two questions that underlie medical insights and define several terms, including health, disease, and illness, in relation to these questions. Then I expand the frame of reference to include all disciplines involved in the cycle of clinical interaction under the heading health science and the healing arts. Finally, I analyze the cycle of clinical interaction in terms of Lonergan’s cognitive theory. I compare and contrast my analysis, based on Lonergan, with that of Pellegrino, Thomasma and Sulmasy as I proceed. In closing, I comment briefly on the next stage of this project regarding Lonergan’s theory of the human good in relation to the practice of the healing arts.

Discussion of Petri Meronen's paper, "The Return of Narcissism: Heinz Kohut in the Context of the History of Ideas"

In the 100-year-old history of the Nobel Prize in medicine or physiology, there are several fields whose practitioners have not received the prize. Among the unlucky candidates for the Nobel Prize, Sigmund Freud (18561939) is probably the most prominent and best known. He is also the one proposed for the prize during the longest period of time, almost a quarter of a century, or more precisely, between 1915 and 1938. In this article I will examine the nominations of Freud and the evaluations of his work by what is perhaps the most science centered of medical institutions, the Nobel Committee for Physiology or Medicine. I will place these in the context of the reception of Freud's work by Swedish psychiatrists. Here the influence of the most prominent psychiatrist at the time, Bror Gadelius, deserves special attention.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Wissenschaftslogik</Emphasis>: The role of logic in the philosophy of science

Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine.     

The Unnatural Nature of Nature and Nurture: Questioning the Romantic Heritage

From a cultural-historical perspective, nature and nurture (and thus education) are contested concepts. The paper focuses on the nature/nurture debate in the work of William Shakespeare (influenced by Montaigne) and in the Romantic tradition (evidenced by Rousseau and Wordsworth), and argues that while our Romantic inheritance (still highly influential in education) problematises nurture, it tends to mystify nature. Given that conceptions of nature are culturally driven, there is an urgent educational challenge to problematise nature as well as nurture.

From a Continental Point of View: The Role of Logic in the Analytic-Continental Divide

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic (and theory of concept) in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first (Sections 1-2), I indicate some aspects of the analytic-continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the second part (Sections 3-6), I give a short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy (see Table 1). I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms.     

Russian postcommunism and the end of history

The article ventures a reading of Russian postcommunist politics from the perspective of the messianic turn in continental political philosophy, specifically Giorgio Agamben’s conception of the ‘end of history’. Taking its point of departure from a retrospective construction in the Russian political discourse of the 1990s as a period of ‘timelessness’, the paper argues that postcommunism may indeed be viewed as a paradoxical ‘time out of time’, a rupture in the ordinary temporality that entirely dispenses with the teleological horizon of politics. While the problematic of the ‘end of history’ has been popularized by Francis Fukuyama’s liberal recasting of Kojève’s reading of Hegel, the Russian experience is entirely contrary to this complacent and self-gratifying account of the triumph of liberalism and accords, instead, with Agamben’s understanding of the end of history as the deactivation of the teleological dimension of politics as such. The effect of this deactivation is not a catastrophic disintegration of the social order but rather the opening of the possibility of an inoperative political praxis that is oriented towards the affirmation of existence in the pure present. The article proceeds with outlining the implications of this reading of Russian postcommunism for understanding the present conjuncture of Russian politics.

中国哲学的认识主体修养论

The epistemology in Chinese philosophy remarkably emphasizes the cultivation of cognitive subjects. According to such epistemology, intelligence arises from benevolence, and thus morality should be valued to gain knowledge. In this way, epistemology is integrated with theories of values and cultivation. The cultivation of cognitive subjects in Chinese philosophy mainly involves a stance, attitudes, ways of thinking and feelings of a cognitive subject. To expatiate and develop the theory of the cultivation of cognitive subjects in Chinese philosophy has much meaning for the construction of a modern Chinese-style Marxist philosophy system. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (8): 49–54     

Natural law and history in Locke's theory of distributive justice

According to the tradition of natural law justice is inherent to, and should always be observed in, all interpersonal relations: the science of natural law is nothing more or less than the expression of such principles of justice. The theoretical peculiarities that crop up regarding the lawfulness of appropriation are determined by the indirect interpersonal relations that take place within the process of appropriation: though appropriation is an action directed not towards another person or his property, but towards tangible external goods, this action may have important consequences for other people. Therefore Locke's theory of appropriation is a theory of justice.Locke's solution is made possible by the methodological improvement which allows a clear separation between the natural law and the historical and empirical conditions of its application: this improvement is a consequence of the distinction between modes and substances established in Locke's Essay.Locke's theory can be considered an extensive re-elaboration, in polemic against Filmer, of the anti-monopolistic principle characteristic of the whole of Scholastic social thought: this principle is intimately connected with the principle of man's natural liberty.Locke maintains a negative and formal conception of justice: justice prohibits interference with others' liberty of appropriation. Alongside the justice is the positive and conditional obligation of charity which prescribes the transfer of some of one's own goods to others who need them in order to survive. But for Locke there are precise limits on the obligation of charity: the application of charity suspends the application of justice only when the immediate physical survival is at stake; in all other cases justice leaves no room for charity.The Lockian negative conception of justice, which allows unlimited liberty of appropriation, is dependent on the empirical and historical condition of the incommensurability of the main resource. The widespread use of money acts as an accelerating element in the process of exhaustion of the incommensurability of land-resources but, at the same time, it renders self-preservation and appropriation almost completely independent of the natural environment. Money creates an infinite number of opportunities for the outlay of labour irrespective of the availability of land, that is, it renders labour the principal resource of the civilized world, and labour is an incommensurable and infinitely reproducible resource. The incommensurability of the labour resource thus supports the Lockian theory of negative distributive justice; but over the Lockian solution already loomed the threatening shadow of pauperism.The subject of this essay is further dealt with in my book on Locke's political and social philosophy Nel crepuscolo della probabilitá, Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1983. There I develop further the interpretation of Locke's theory of justice presented here and analyse his theoretical and historical presuppositions.     

易哲学发展史之一嬗变--陆王心学的易哲学思想探析

陆王心学的易哲学思想的出现,伴随了一定的时代特点,可谓是易哲学史上继王弼义理易之后的一次深刻嬗变.这表现为其以心释易统易、工夫简易直截的鲜明特征,其中蕴涵了心学派易学对象数易及程朱义理易的解构以及为一般易学研究所忽略的易佛沟通问题.从陆王心学的易哲学思想里面,我们可以发现,心学在宋时的诞生以及它最终的衰微,同样不是一个偶然的现象,它在解构"传统"易学的同时也解构了自身.