Memory for action events in the bottlenosed dolphin

We investigated whether a bottlenosed dolphin’s ability to recall and repeat actions on command would immediately generalize to actions performed with specified objects. The dolphin was tested on her ability to repeat 18 novel behaviors performed with potentially interchangeable objects specified using an artificial gestural language. Such “action events” were correctly repeated at above chance levels, indicating that the dolphin had access to memories of those events. Performance levels were, however, lower than in previous tests. The dolphin appeared to have difficulty recalling which object an action was performed with. Previous research has demonstrated that animals can recall features of their environment and features of their actions independently of one another. The results of this study demonstrate (1) that the dolphin’s concept of repeating extends beyond simply accessing memories of movement patterns, and (2) that dolphins’ memories of past events incorporate representations of both self-performed acts and objects, locations, or gestural instructions. Received:10 October 1998 / Accepted after revision: 22 December 1998     

Making treatment effect inferences from multiple-baseline data: The utility of multilevel modeling approaches

Multiple-baseline studies are prevalent in behavioral research, but questions remain about how to best analyze the resulting data. Monte Carlo methods were used to examine the utility of multilevel models for multiplebaseline data under conditions that varied in the number of participants, number of repeated observations per participant, variance in baseline levels, variance in treatment effects, and amount of autocorrelation in the Level 1 errors. Interval estimates of the average treatment effect were examined for two specifications of the Level 1 error structure (σ² I and first-order autoregressive) and for five different methods of estimating the degrees of freedom (containment, residual, between—within, Satterthwaite, and Kenward—Roger). When the Satterthwaite or Kenward—Roger method was used and an autoregressive Level 1 error structure was specified, the interval estimates of the average treatment effect were relatively accurate. Conversely, the interval estimates of the treatment effect variance were inaccurate, and the corresponding point estimates were biased.     

Enjoying goal-directed action: the role of regulatory fit

We propose that the fit between an action's strategic orientation and the actor's regulatory state can influence the amount of enjoyment the action provides. In two studies using different methods of manipulating regulatory states and of gauging action evaluations, high regulatory fit increased participants' anticipations of action enjoyability. In a third study, high regulatory fit increased participants' enjoyment of, perceived success at, and willingness to repeat a novel laboratory task, and these effects were independent of participants' actual success on the task. Across the three studies, participants in a regulatory state oriented toward accomplishment experienced eagerness-related actions more favorably than vigilance-related actions, whereas participants in a regulatory state oriented toward responsibility experienced vigilance-related actions more favorably than eagerness-related actions. These findings' implications for understanding task interest and motivation are discussed.     

Action selection and action awareness

Human actions are often classified as either internally generated, or externally specified in response to environmental cues. These two modes of action selection have distinct neural bases, but few studies investigated how the mode of action selection affects the subjective experience of action. We measured the experience of action using the subjective compression of the interval between actions and their effects, known as ‘temporal binding’. Participants performed either a left or a right key press, either in response to a specific cue, or as they freely chose. Moreover, the time of each keypress could either be explicitly cued to occur in one of two designated time intervals, or participants freely chose in which interval to act. Each action was followed by a specific tone. Participants judged the time of their actions or the time of the tone. Temporal binding was found for both internally generated and for stimulus-based actions. However, the amount of binding depended on whether or not both the choice and the timing of action were selected in the same way. Stronger binding was observed when both action choice and action timing were internally generated or externally specified, compared to conditions where the two parameters were selected by different routes. Our result suggests that temporal action–effect binding depends on how actions are selected. Binding is strongest when actions result from a single mode of selection.

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Did I turn off the gas? Reality monitoring of everyday actions

Failing to remember whether we performed, or merely imagined performing, an everyday action can occasionally be inconvenient, but in some circumstances it can have potentially dangerous consequences. In this fMRI study, we investigated the brain activity patterns, and objective and subjective behavioral measures, associated with recollecting such everyday actions. We used an ecologically valid “reality-monitoring” paradigm in which participants performed, or imagined performing, specified actions with real objects drawn from one of two boxes. Lateral brain areas, including prefrontal cortex, were active when participants recollected both the actions that had been associated with objects and the locations from which they had been drawn, consistent with a general role in source recollection. By contrast, medial prefrontal and motor regions made more specific contributions, with supplementary motor cortex activity being associated with recollection decisions about actions but not locations, and medial prefrontal cortex exhibiting greater activity when remembering performed rather than imagined actions. These results support a theoretical interpretation of reality monitoring that entails the fine-grained discrimination between multiple forms of internally and externally generated information.     

Temporal perception in joint action: This is MY action

Here we investigated the temporal perception of self- and other-generated actions during sequential joint actions. Participants judged the perceived time of two events, the first triggered by the participant and the second by another agent, during a cooperative or competitive interaction, or by an unspecified mechanical cause. Results showed that participants perceived self-generated events as shifted earlier in time (anticipation temporal judgment bias) and non-self-generated events as shifted later in time (repulsion temporal judgment bias). This latter effect was observed independently from the kind of cause (i.e., agentive or mechanical) or interaction (i.e., cooperative or competitive). We suggest that this might represent a mental process which allows discriminating events that cannot plausibly be linked to one’s own action. When an event immediately follows a self-generated one, temporal judgment biases operate as self-serving biases in order to separate self-generated events from events of another physical causality.     

Hierarchical encoding of behavior: translating perception into action

People encode goal-directed behaviors, such as assembling an object, by segmenting them into discrete actions, organized as goal-subgoal hierarchies. Does hierarchical encoding contribute to observational learning? Participants in 3 experiments segmented an object assembly task into coarse and fine units of action and later performed it themselves. Hierarchical encoding, measured by segmentation patterns, correlated with more accurate and more hierarchically structured performance of the later assembly task. Furthermore, hierarchical encoding increased when participants (a) segmented coarse units first, (b) explicitly looked for hierarchical structure, and (c) described actions while segmenting them. Improving hierarchical encoding always led to improvements in learning, as well as a surprising shift toward encoding and executing actions from the actor's spatial perspective instead of the participants' own. Hierarchical encoding facilitates observational learning by organizing perceived actions into a representation that can serve as an action plan.     

Reanalysis of the equation for simple action

De Villiers and Herrnstein (1976) have shown that the equation for simple action, derived from the matching law, predicts change in behavioral output for some 40 experiments in which the value of a single source of reinforcement has been varied. Using only the positive-reinforcement studies they cite that used five or more different reinforcement values, we found the high percentage of variance they report accommodated by this equation (94%) is predicated on instances of averaging rates of behavioral output before making a least-squares fit of the equation. In our reanalysis, which minimizes rate averaging, only 78% of the data variance is accommodated. This diminished data-variance accommodation can be improved by adding parameters that permit the equation's scaling constant to change as a function of reinforcement. Although these parameters permit acceptable levels of accommodation of data variance, they correspond to no obvious psychological processes. These findings support the view that the equation for simple action is an inadequate model for behavioral output.     

Time in action contexts: learning when an action effect occurs

Action effects do not occur randomly in time but follow our actions at specific delays. The ideomotor principle (IMP) is widely used to explain how the relation between actions and contingently following effects is acquired and numerous studies demonstrate robust action-effect learning. Yet, little is known about the acquisition of temporal delays of action effects. Here, we demonstrate that participants learn that action effects occur at specific delays. Participants responded slower to action effects that occurred earlier than usual. In addition, participants often prematurely responded before the effect when it occurred later than expected. Thus, in contrast to biases of time perception in action contexts (e.g., Haggard, Trends Cogn Sci 9:290–295, 2005; Stetson et al., Neuron 51:651–659, 2006), participants learn and exploit temporal regularities between actions and effects for behavioral control.     

Beyond event segmentation: spatial- and social-cognitive processes in verb-to-action mapping

The present article investigates spatial- and social-cognitive processes in toddlers' mapping of concepts to real-world events. In 2 studies we explore how event segmentation might lay the groundwork for extracting actions from the event stream and conceptually mapping novel verbs to these actions. In Study 1, toddlers demonstrated the ability to segment a novel multiaction event by selecting a single action for behavioral reenactment when prompted. In Study 2, a single action embedded in the event sequence was specified as the referent for a novel verb through cues to support intentional inference. As in Study 1, toddlers spontaneously segmented the sequence. In addition, they mapped a novel label to the embedded action specified by the novel label and intentional cues. These data are consistent with current thinking that suggests a convergence of spatial and social cognition in verb learning. In the present research, toddlers built upon event segmentation skills and used intentional inference when mapping verbs to actions embedded in the motion stream.     

The emergence of action

How does the concept of action fit within a scientifically serious world-view? This paper argues that the category of action, with its goal-seeking and orientation to the future, is not a human peculiarity, a perplexing incongruity in an otherwise mechanistic world. Rather, actions pervade the whole biological domain. The concept of action is needed to explicate the continued existence of every biological organism.Systems as primitive as bacteria are autonomous far-from-equilibrium systems, which maintain themselves in existence by their interactions with their environments. That requires recognizing them as performing simple actions. Three criteria are proposed which justify identifying certain behaviour as minimal actions: goal-seeking; possibly being in error; and behaving as a functional whole. Adding further criteria yields richer concepts of action, namely, self-directed and reflective action. Only the last is distinctively human.     

Eighteen-month-olds integrate verbal cues into their action processing: Evidence from ERPs and mu power

Behavioral research has shown that infants use both behavioral cues and verbal cues when processing the goals of others’ actions. For instance, 18-month-olds selectively imitate an observed goal-directed action depending on its (in)congruence with a model’s previous verbal announcement of a desired action goal. This EEG-study analyzed the electrophysiological underpinnings of these behavioral findings on the two functional levels of conceptual action processing and motor activation. Mid-latency mean negative ERP amplitude and mu-frequency band power were analyzed while 18-month-olds (N = 38) watched videos of an adult who performed one out of two potential actions on a novel object. In a within-subjects design, the action demonstration was preceded by either a congruent or an incongruent verbally announced action goal (e.g., “up” or “down” and upward movement). Overall, ERP negativity did not differ between conditions, but a closer inspection revealed that in two subgroups, about half of the infants showed a broadly distributed increased mid-latency ERP negativity (indicating enhanced conceptual action processing) for either the congruent or the incongruent stimuli, respectively. As expected, mu power at sensorimotor sites was reduced (indicating enhanced motor activation) for congruent relative to incongruent stimuli in the entire sample. Both EEG correlates were related to infants’ language skills. Hence, 18-month-olds integrate action-goal-related verbal cues into their processing of others’ actions, at the functional levels of both conceptual processing and motor activation. Further, cue integration when inferring others’ action goals is related to infants’ language proficiency.     

Solving the credit assignment problem: explicit and implicit learning of action sequences with probabilistic outcomes

In most problem-solving activities, feedback is received at the end of an action sequence. This creates a credit-assignment problem where the learner must associate the feedback with earlier actions, and the interdependencies of actions require the learner to remember past choices of actions. In two studies, we investigated the nature of explicit and implicit learning processes in the credit-assignment problem using a probabilistic sequential choice task with and without a secondary memory task. We found that when explicit learning was dominant, learning was faster to select the better option in their first choices than in the last choices. When implicit reinforcement learning was dominant, learning was faster to select the better option in their last choices than in their first choices. Consistent with the probability-learning and sequence-learning literature, the results show that credit assignment involves two processes: an explicit memory encoding process that requires memory rehearsal and an implicit reinforcement-learning process that propagates credits backwards to previous choices.     

Two conceptions of voluntary action in the Nicomachean Ethics

It is nearly universally agreed among commentators that according to Aristotle's account of voluntary action in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), only voluntary actions are blameworthy. I argue for a qualified rejection of this assumption: some actions that Aristotle counts as blameworthy do not meet the criteria for voluntariness set out in NE 3.1. However, in NE 3.5 and elsewhere, one finds a broader conception of voluntary action, and it is true that, for Aristotle, an action must be voluntary on this broader conception in order to be blameworthy. While the narrow conception only counts actions that are under the agent's direct control as voluntary, the broader conception includes also actions that are under the agent's indirect control. The compresence of these two conceptions in the NE is not simply a matter of sloppiness on Aristotle's part. Rather, he has good philosophical reasons for employing both.     

The role of threat,emotions, and prejudice in promoting collective action against immigrant groups

In two studies we assessed the role of distinctiveness threat, group‐based emotions (angst, fear, and anger), and prejudice on people's willingness to engage in collective action against immigrant groups. In Study 1 (N = 222) White British participants were either informed that in the next 40 years the proportion of immigrants in the UK is unlikely to change (control condition) or that there will be more immigrants than White British people living in Britain (threat condition). We obtained support for a sequential multiple mediator model in which threat predicted British people's willingness to engage in collective action via the emotions first and then prejudice. This finding was replicated in Study 2 with an Italian sample (N = 283). These results enhance understanding of when and why advantaged groups undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups by demonstrating that distinctiveness threats and emotions promote such actions.     

Change in action: how infants learn to walk down slopes

A critical aspect of perception–action coupling is the ability to modify ongoing actions in accordance with variations in the environment. Infants’ ability to modify their gait patterns to walk down shallow and steep slopes was examined at three nested time scales. Across sessions, a microgenetic training design showed rapid improvements after the first session in infants receiving concentrated practice walking down slopes and in infants in a control group who were tested only at the beginning and end of the study. Within sessions, analyses across easy and challenging slope angles showed that infants used a ‘braking strategy’ to curb increases in walking speed across increasingly steeper slopes. Within trials, comparisons of infants’ gait modifications before and after stepping over the brink of the slopes showed that the braking strategy was planned prospectively. Findings illustrate how observing change in action provides important insights into the process of skill acquisition.     

Prototypes reflect normative perceptions: implications for the development of reasoned action theory

The reasoned action approach is one of the most successful behavioral theories in the history of social psychology. This study outlines the theoretical principles of reasoned action and considers when it is appropriate to augment it with a new variable. To demonstrate, we use survey data collected from a 4 to 17 year old U.S. adolescents to test how the ‘prototype’ variables fit into reasoned action approach. Through confirmatory factor analysis, we find that the prototype measures are normative pressure measures and when treated as a separate theoretical construct, prototype identity is not completely mediated by the proximal predictors of behavioral intention. We discuss the assumptions of the two theories and finally consider the distinction between augmenting a specific theory versus combining measures derived from different theoretical perspectives.     

Social-cognitive predictors of health behavior: action self-efficacy and coping self-efficacy.

The effects of social-cognitive variables on preventive nutrition and behavioral intentions were studied in 580 adults at 2 points in time. The authors hypothesized that optimistic self-beliefs operate in 2 phases and made a distinction between action self-efficacy (preintention) and coping self-efficacy (postintention). Risk perceptions, outcome expectancies, and action self-efficacy were specified as predictors of the intention at Wave 1. Behavioral intention and coping self-efficacy served as mediators linking the 3 predictors with low-fat and high-fiber dietary intake 6 months later at Wave 2. Covariance structure analysis yielded a good model fit for the total sample and 6 subsamples created by a median split of 3 moderators: gender, age, and body weight. Parameter estimates differed between samples; the importance of perceived self-efficacy increased with age and weight.     

Reasoning's relation to bodily action

Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non-mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out-loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions as constituents, where such bodily actions themselves amount to contentful mental events. Furthermore, the natural lines of resistance to this view trade on type-token errors, or on a questionable common-factor assumption.