What is it to lose hope?

This paper addresses the phenomenology of hopelessness. I distinguish two broad kinds of predicament that are easily confused: ‘loss of hopes’ and ‘loss of hope’. I argue that not all hope can be characterised as an intentional state of the form ‘I hope that p’. It is possible to lose all hopes of that kind and yet retain another kind of hope. The hope that remains is not an intentional state or a non-intentional bodily feeling. Rather, it is a ‘pre-intentional’ orientation or ‘existential feeling’, by which I mean something in the context of which certain kinds of intentional state, including intentional hope, are intelligible. I go on to discuss severe depression, lack of aspiration, demoralisation and loss of trust in the world, in order to distinguish some qualitatively different forms that loss of hope can take.     

Should we design our descendants?

Rapid breakthroughs in genetic research spurred by the Human Genome Project, advances in molecular biology, and new reproductive technologies are raising the prospect that we may eventually have the technical capacity to modify genes that are transmitted to future generations not only to treat or eliminate diseases but also to "enhance" normal human characteristics beyond what is necessary to sustain or restore good health. This paper explores the ethical and justice implications of such genetic modifications. It argues against developing these technologies primarily because it will not be possible to counter the deleterious justice impacts. It recommends the need for public education and public discussion, preferably with the religious community taking an active role, to shape decisions about future genetic research and applications, and for better regulation of genetic technologies with the potential for inheritable genetic alterations.     

Are we losing our mind?

The individual mind of the patient, and how it works, are the central topics of this plenary address. In psychoanalysis we are always dealing with a mind--a mind with its own particular structure--and this is a fact of singular importance in how we listen to, understand, and communicate with patients. Techniques geared to this view are presented. The author reflects on and challenges some contrasting current views of psychoanalysis as primarily coconstructed or as a relational matrix. Technique according to this view highlights the analyst's subjectivity and actions as central to treatment.     

Information search in decisions from experience. Do our patterns of sampling foreshadow our decisions?

Do different patterns of sampling influence the decisions people make, even when the information the decisions are based on is equivalent? Do more and less switching between options correlate with different kinds of decision policies? In past research, the correspondence between search and decision patterns has been difficult to ascertain because the information obtained has often been confounded with its consequences in an exploration-exploitation trade-off. We used a sampling task in which information is explored prior to being exploited. We found that search patterns did reveal decision policies. Individuals who transitioned more frequently between options were more likely to choose options that win most of the time in round-wise comparisons and were more likely to underweight rare, risky events. Less switching between options was associated with choosing options that win in the long run on the basis of summary comparisons--decisions consistent with expected-value maximization and linear weighting of outcomes.     

When objects lose their meaning: what happens to their use?

The 8 patients involved in this study were impaired on tests assessing knowledge of objects and on the demonstration of their use. The patients' success in object use was significantly correlated with their knowledge about the objects, providing further evidence that conceptual knowledge plays a key role in object use. Having a recipient present improved performance in the moderately impaired patients, suggesting that a certain level of conceptual knowledge must remain for the additional information to be beneficial. Although overall accuracy in using the target objects was not related to our measures of affordance, the specific aspects of use afforded by the objects' structures were relatively impervious to semantic impairment, suggesting a role for affordance information when object-specific knowledge is disrupted. The patients' familiarity with the objects was an important predictor of performance. Finally, despite good performance on tests of mechanical problem solving, the patients showed very little evidence of employing these skills in their interactions with real objects.     

Are most of our concepts innate?

Fodor has argued that, because concept acquisition relies on the use of concepts already possessed by the learner, all concepts that cannot be definitionally reduced are innate. Since very few reductive definitions are available, it appears that most concepts are innate. After noting the reasons why we find such radical concept nativism implausible, I explicate Fodor's argument, showing that anyone who is committed to mentalistic explanation should take it seriously. Three attempts at avoiding the conclusion are examined and found to be unsuccessful. I then present an alternative way around Fodor's nativism; I maintain that concepts at a given level of explanation can be semantically primitive, yet at least partially acquired if some of the conditions at a lower level of explanation that are responsible for the concept's presence are themselves acquired.Thanks are due to Jerry Samet and to Bob Shope for detailed and very helpful comments. I am also indebted to Ned Block, Susan Carey, Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Thomas Kuhn, Georges Rey, and Bob Stalnaker for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions on an earlier work, out of which this essay evolved.     

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.     

School in our memory: do we remember our time in middle and high school differently?

ABSTRACT

The present study investigated autobiographical memories of school. While previous works have shown that most memories relating to school are social as opposed to academic, there are still strong theoretical arguments for the presumed prevalence of educationally oriented memories from at least some parts of the school period. The goal of the study was to replicate previous studies while addressing some of their limitations. In our study, only memories of high school were more socially and less educationally oriented. Also, memories of high school were more positive and emotionally intense. We discuss the further implications of these effects.     

Noogenesis—the fundamental problem of our time

The possibility of long wave economic cycles are considered under both market capitalism and command socialism. Capitalist long waves can be generated by a two‐stage multiplier‐accelerator model and socialist long waves can be generated by an equivalent model strictly for investment cycles. Under certain conditions chaotic dynamics can occur at turning points in both cases. It is argued that a systemic crisis leading to a systemic transformation is most likely to occur at such a point.     

Is the History of our Universe Finite?

Modern cosmology indicates that our universe has a finite age. However, it is not understood whether the initial state before the Big Bang is finite in history or not. In this article, I show by simple arguments that the initial state must be finite in history if it is real. If the initial state is not real, a special transition is needed to specify the beginning of the real time. Moreover, if our universe is just one of the many universes, it can be shown that the history of the universe generator must also be finite.     

Resiliency: A shift in our perception?

Abstract

As our clients often underestimate their own resources and potential, do helpers fall victim to the same phenomena? This article contends that helpers are often overly attentive to client deficits and pathology to the detriment of acknowledging family and other client strengths and resources brought into the therapeutic arena. Much of our professional training results in an overreliance upon pathological lenses which is to the disadvantage of both client and helper. Family therapists must remain vigilant to not becoming seduced into the attractive web of “pathologizing.” Experiences that heightened this awareness for the author are described, followed by illustration of the importance and benefit of therapists becoming more sensitive to the study of human resiliency.     

Will managed care change our way of being?

The authors studied psychotherapeutic practices commonly used in managed care settings and the theories and rhetorical strategies that justify them to speculate about if or how they are beginning to influence societywide understandings about the proper way of being human at the turn of the millennium. The practices--and effects--of managed care regulations on the self are interpreted by studying how the patient, the therapist, and the therapeutic relationship come to light in managed care settings. These categories are then used to speculate about the configuration of the newly emerging, 21st-century self. By extending hermeneutic concerns about instrumentalism and technicism, the authors suggest a new way of thinking about psychotherapy modeled less on positivist science and more on moral discourse. Finally, given this more hermeneutic understanding of psychotherapy, the authors speculate about alternative conceptions and arrangements of care.     

Is the map in our head oriented north?

We examined how a highly familiar environmental space--one's city of residence--is represented in memory. Twenty-six participants faced a photo-realistic virtual model of their hometown and completed a task in which they pointed to familiar target locations from various orientations. Each participant's performance was most accurate when he or she was facing north, and errors increased as participants' deviation from a north-facing orientation increased. Pointing errors and latencies were not related to the distance between participants' initial locations and the target locations. Our results are inconsistent with accounts of orientation-free memory and with theories assuming that the storage of spatial knowledge depends on local reference frames. Although participants recognized familiar local views in their initial locations, their strategy for pointing relied on a single, north-oriented reference frame that was likely acquired from maps rather than experience from daily exploration. Even though participants had spent significantly more time navigating the city than looking at maps, their pointing behavior seemed to rely on a north-oriented mental map.     

New frontiers in psychoanalysis – in our international community

The paper discusses what the author calls “The seduction by the father”. It would occur when, in the Oedipus complex, the father reverses his role: instead of being the one who castrates, he seduces. Seduction here is understood in the sense that he does not act as the one who imposes limits to the child. Consequently the child can not project his hostile impulses onto the father.

Based on clinical data, the Author says that, in the male child, the seduction by the father hampers the transformation of the two Oedipal attitudes towards the father into identifications. The consequences of this fact upon the construction of the “nostalgia of the father's protection” are discussed, so as the transformation of this father into the symbolic father.     

Gain face,but lose happiness? It depends on how much money you have

The purpose of the study was to investigate the effects of face consciousness on happiness and the moderating role of financial situation on this relationship. We first examined our hypotheses in study 1 in a particular setting of consumption, and replicated our findings in study 2 in a more generalized setting of interpersonal situations. The two studies produced essentially consistent results. We found individuals high on face consciousness tend to be less happy, and the negative association between face consciousness and happiness is ameliorated by their financial situation. These results revealed the importance of face consciousness as an individual difference in predicting happiness. The implications of these findings for future research are discussed.