Confidence-accuracy calibration in absolute and relative face recognition judgments

Confidence-accuracy (CA) calibration was examined for absolute and relative face recognition judgments as well as for recognition judgments from groups of stimuli presented simultaneously or sequentially (i.e., simultaneous or sequential mini-lineups). When the effect of difficulty was controlled, absolute and relative judgments produced negligibly different CA calibration, whereas no significant difference was observed for simultaneous and sequential mini-lineups. Further, the effect of difficulty on CA calibration was equivalent across judgment and mini-lineup types. It is interesting to note that positive (i.e., old) recognition judgments demonstrated strong CA calibration whereas negative (i.e., new) judgments evidenced little or no CA association. Implications for eyewitness identification are discussed.     

Positive versus negative face recognition decisions: confidence,accuracy, and response latency

A large amount of eyewitness identification and face recognition research has investigated the confidence–accuracy (CA) relationship. One consistent finding is that positive recognition decisions (or choosers) demonstrate superior CA calibration to negative recognition decisions (or non‐choosers). This experiment tested whether an explanation of this difference, based on the information available for confidence judgements, accounted for the pattern of CA calibration in positive and negative face recognition decisions. CA calibration for positive and negative decisions was compared for both item and associative recognition judgements. Significantly greater resolution was observed for positive decisions in both the item and associative conditions. Similarly, for both judgement types, positive decisions evidenced a stronger response latency–accuracy relationship than negative decisions. Implications for diagnosing the accuracy of eyewitness identification are discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Judgments of recency and their relation to recognition memory

Subjects went through a list of 550 high- and low-frequency words (Experiment 1) or concrete and abstract words (Experiment 2) in which individual items were repeated at lags of 5 to 30 other items. They made old versus new recognition decisions on each word and followed each "old" response with a numerical judgment of recency (JOR). Recognition judgments displayed the mirror effect. Conditionalized on recognition, JORs were shorter for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words, and shorter for concrete words than for abstract words. This was true at every lag, suggesting that recognition and JOR may have a common basis. However, recognition confidence ratings obtained in Experiment 3 proved much less sensitive than JOR to test lag. Memory models applicable to multiple judgment tasks will be needed to account for such findings.     

Robustness of the two-dimensional structure of recognition of facial expression: evidence under different intensities of emotionality.

Many studies have indicated that recognition of facial expression is geometrically represented in terms of two underlying bipolar dimensions, pleasure-displeasure and the intensity of arousal. A psychological space defined by these two dimensions has been found under particular conditions using prototype faces: however, the question arises whether this two-dimensional psychological space is also an accurate representation for faces with lower emotional intensity. To test this we prepared four different conditions of emotional intensity (100%, 75%, 50%, and 25% of emotionality) for six basic facial expressions using morphing. Participants (29 for the 100%, 30 for 75%, 35 for 50%, and 34 for the 25% condition) in each condition rated the facial stimuli on a 6-point scale of "not at all" and "very much so". Multidimensional scaling for each condition clearly indicated a two-dimensional representation and multiple correlations showed significant similarity across conditions (p < .001). This shows that the two-dimensional representation of recognition of facial expression is robust.     

Anchoring effects in the judgment of confidence: Semantic or numeric priming?

Over the last decade, researchers have debated whether anchoring effects are the result of semantic or numeric priming. The present study tested both hypotheses. In four experiments involving a sensory detection task, participants first made a relative confidence judgment by deciding whether they were more or less confident than an anchor value in the correctness of their decision. Subsequently, they expressed an absolute level of confidence. In two of these experiments, the relative confidence anchor values represented the midpoints between the absolute confidence scale values, which were either explicitly numeric or semantic, nonnumeric representations of magnitude. In two other experiments, the anchor values were drawn from a scale modally different from that used to express the absolute confidence (i.e., nonnumeric and numeric, respectively, or vice versa). Regardless of the nature of the anchors, the mean confidence ratings revealed anchoring effects only when the relative and absolute confidence values were drawn from identical scales. Together, the results of these four experiments limit the conditions under which both numeric and semantic priming would be expected to lead to anchoring effects.     

Expression intensity, gender and facial emotion recognition: Women recognize only subtle facial emotions better than men

Two experiments were conducted in order to investigate the effect of expression intensity on gender differences in the recognition of facial emotions. The first experiment compared recognition accuracy between female and male participants when emotional faces were shown with full-blown (100% emotional content) or subtle expressiveness (50%). In a second experiment more finely grained analyses were applied in order to measure recognition accuracy as a function of expression intensity (40%-100%). The results show that although women were more accurate than men in recognizing subtle facial displays of emotion, there was no difference between male and female participants when recognizing highly expressive stimuli.     

Can a modified lineup procedure improve the usefulness of confidence?

In a face recognition, mini-lineup experiment we examined two aspects of the use of confidence about lineups. We modified the lineup procedure attempting to eliminate the difference in confidence–accuracy relationship between positive (old or identification) and negative (new or not present) decisions. In the modified procedure, participants: (1) selected the lineup member that best matched their memory of the target; (2) rated their confidence that the best match was indeed the target; and (3) indicated (yes/no) whether the best match was the target. Although the modified procedure produced higher accuracy than a standard simultaneous procedure, there was no evidence that it affected the confidence–accuracy relationship. Additionally, the modified procedure also allowed us to compare the extent to which confidence ratings versus binary recognition decisions better discriminated studied from unstudied faces. The results revealed a clear advantage for confidence, but indicated that binary responses were also a unique predictor.     

The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence

Can people improve the realism of their confidence judgments about the correctness of their episodic memory reports by deselecting the least realistic judgments? An assumption of Koriat and Goldsmith's (Psychol Rev 103:490-517, 1996) model is that confidence judgments regulate the reporting of memory reports. We tested whether this assumption generalizes to the regulation of the realism (accuracy) of confidence judgments. In two experiments, 270 adults in separate conditions answered 50 recognition and recall questions about the contents of a just-seen video. After each answer, they made confidence judgments about the answer's correctness. In Experiment 1, the participants in the recognition conditions significantly increased their absolute bias when they excluded 15 questions. In Experiment 2, the participants in the recall condition significantly improved their calibration. The results indicate that recall, more than recognition, offers valid cues for participants to increase the realism of their report. However, the effects were small with only weak support for the conclusion that people have some ability to regulate the realism in their confidence judgments.     

Confidence and accuracy of lineup selections and rejections: Postdicting rejection accuracy with confidence

Correlation and calibration approaches show meaningful, positive confidence-accuracy relations for witnesses making selections from lineups, but rarely for rejections (Brewer and Wells, 2006, Sauerland and Sporer, 2009). This disparity may reflect the difference between selecting a single photo versus rejecting a set of photos. Participants (N = 101) in two experiments made selections from and rejections of lineups in situations requiring either a single confidence rating about a single face (typical of “choosers”) or a single confidence rating about multiple faces (typical of “nonchoosers”). Mean confidence ratings were significantly higher for accurate versus inaccurate decisions for both selections and rejections when decisions were based on single faces. Single decisions about multiple faces produced no significant difference in confidence between correct and incorrect rejections but a significant difference for selections.     

Evidence for a young adult face bias in accuracy and consensus of age estimates

Adults' face processing may be specialized for the dimensions of young adult faces. For example, young and older adults exhibit increased accuracy in normality judgments and greater agreement in attractiveness ratings for young versus older adult faces. The present study was designed to examine whether there is a similar young adult face bias in facial age estimates. In Experiment 1, we created a face age continuum by morphing an averaged young adult face with an averaged older adult face in 5% increments, for a total of 21 faces ranging from 0 to 100% old. Young and older adults estimated facial age for three stimulus age categories [young (morphs 0–30%), middle‐aged (morphs 35–65%), and older adult (morphs 70–100%)]. Both age groups showed the least differentiation in age estimates for young adult faces, despite showing greater consensus across participants in estimates for young faces. In Experiment 2, young and older adults made age estimates for individual young and older adult identities. Both age groups were more accurate and showed greater consensus in age estimates for young faces. Collectively, these results provide evidence for a bias in processing young adult faces beyond that which is often observed in recognition and normality/attractiveness judgment tasks.     

Repetition priming and face processing: Priming occurs within the system that responds to the identity of a face

A familiar stimulus that has recently been recognized will be recognized a second time more quickly and more accurately than if it had not been primed by the earlier encounter. This is the phenomenon of “repetition priming”. Four experiments on repetition priming of face recognition suggest that repetition priming is a consequence of changes within the system that responds to the familiarity of a stimulus. In Experiment 1, classifying familiar faces by occupation facilitated subsequent responses to the same faces in a familiarity decision task (Is this face familiar or unfamiliar?) but not in an expression decision task (Is this face smiling or unsmiling?) or a sex decision task (Is this face male or female?). In Experiment 2, familiar faces showed repetition priming in a familiarity decision task, regardless of whether a familiarity judgment or an expression judgment had been required when the faces were first encountered. Expression decisions to familiar faces again failed to show repetition priming. In Experiment 3, familiar faces showed repetition priming in a familiarity decision task, regardless of whether a familiarity judgment or a sex judgment had been asked for when the faces were first encountered. Sex decisions to familiar faces again failed to show repetition priming. In Experiment 4, familiarity decisions continued to show repetition priming when a brief presentation time with encouragement to respond while the face was displayed reduced response latencies to speeds comparable to those for sex and expression judgments in Experiments 1 to 3. The results are problematic for theories that propose that repetition priming is mediated by episodic records of previous acts of stimulus encoding.     

Subjective measures of awareness and implicit cognition

In this article, we examine whether artificial grammar learning is implicit according to a subjective criterion of awareness based on confidence ratings. In four experiments, participants discriminated between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences in both the same (Experiment 1) and a novel (Experiments 2-4) vocabulary and indicated their confidence in each decision. Replicating earlier studies, confidence judgments reported on a continuous scale (50%-100%) were only weakly related to accuracy, suggesting that learning was implicit. In contrast, confidence judgments reported on a binary scale (high vs. low) revealed that confidence was related to accuracy. We show that participants are better able to place their phenomenal states on a binary scale, as compared with a continuous scale.     

Response reversals in recognition memory

Using a dynamic sequential sampling model and a recently proposed model for confidence judgments in recognition memory (T. Van Zandt, 2000b), the authors examine the tendency for rememberers to reverse their responses after a primary decision. In 4 experiments, speeded "old"-"new" decisions were made under bias followed by a 2nd response', either a confidence judgment or another simple choice. The data from these experiments showed that participants know when they have made a mistake and that they respond to this knowledge by reversing their responses. Response reversals are thus shown to be important for constructing models of the response-selection process in recognition memory.     

Decision Strategies and the Confidence–Accuracy Relationship in Face Recognition

The decision strategy used to select a choice set from an array of alternative options is known to affect the composition of the final choice set. Specifically, individuals incorporate more answers into their choice set when it is created by eliminating implausible items than when the set is created through the inclusion of plausible options. This difference is accounted for in a decision framework that posits a general reluctance to change the status quo (i.e., actively include or exclude an item). We extended this work to investigate, not only the decisions themselves, but also metacognitive judgments (i.e., confidence in the accuracy of the choice set). In two face recognition experiments, we tested the impact of decision strategy (Experiment 1) and confidence judgment strategy (Experiment 2) on the confidence–accuracy relationship. In Experiment 1, participants completed two blocks of recognition trials, one under inclusion (marking previously seen faces) and one under elimination (marking previously unseen faces) instructions. We observed superior resolution (i.e., discrimination between correct and incorrect) for inclusion trials, but only when they were completed prior to use of the elimination strategy. In Experiment 2, all participants completed face recognition trials under inclusion instructions, but we manipulated the strategy used to assess confidence. Again, we observed a significant impact of strategy on confidence–accuracy resolution. Thus, we observed that both the strategy employed to reach a decision and that employed to assess confidence affected the confidence–accuracy relationship. We discuss theoretical and applied (particularly for eyewitness identification and multiple‐choice testing) implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When false recognition is out of control: The case of facial conjunctions

In three experiments, a dual-process approach to face recognition memory is examined, with a specific focus on the idea that a recollection process can be used to retrieve configural information of a studied face. Subjects could avoid, with confidence, a recognition error to conjunction lure faces (each a reconfiguration of features from separate studied faces) or feature lure faces (each based on a set of old features and a set of new features) by recalling a studied configuration. In Experiment 1, study repetition (one vs. eight presentations) was manipulated, and in Experiments 2 and 3, retention interval over a short number of trials (0\2-20) was manipulated. Different measures converged on the conclusion that subjects were unable to use a recollection process to retrieve configural information in an effort to temper recognition errors for conjunction or feature lure faces. A single process, familiarity, appears to be the sole process underlying recognition of conjunction and feature faces, and familiarity contributes, perhaps in whole, to discrimination of old from conjunction faces.     

Demonstrating the acquired familiarity of faces by using a gender-decision task

We report an experiment in which participants made gender judgments (male or female) to faces. There were three groups of faces: unfamiliar, familiar (celebrities), and a set which had been learned earlier by the participants during the experimental session. The principal purpose of this study was to establish an indirect measure of assessing whether faces have become familiar through learning that does not require overt recognition. Bruce and Young's (1986 British Journal of Psychology 77 305-327) model of face recognition suggests face-processing tasks are independent of one another and so familiarity should have no impact on the time taken to perform gender decisions. However, recent studies have suggested that some face processes are not completely independent. A gender judgment is a simple task which would be useful in face-learning experiments. We examined whether exposure to previously novel faces facilitates a later gender decision to those faces. During a learning stage, participants viewed a set of unfamiliar faces. At test, participants were able to assign gender faster to previously familiar (famous) faces and learned faces than they were to unfamiliar faces. Therefore familiarity can influence the speed at which gender is analysed. We explain our findings with reference to the Burton et al (1990 British Journal of Psychology 81 361-380) interactive activation and competition (IAC) model of face recognition and discuss how the gender judgment might be employed as a means of tracking the acquisition of familiarity in face-learning studies.     

Age differences in accuracy and choosing in eyewitness identification and face recognition

Studies of aging and face recognition show age-related increases in false recognitions of new faces. To explore implications of this false alarm effect, we had young and senior adults perform (1) three eye-witness identification tasks, using both target present and target absent lineups, and (2) and old/new recognition task in which a study list of faces was followed by a test including old and new faces, along with conjunctions of old faces. Compared with the young, seniors had lower accuracy and higher choosing rates on the lineups, and they also falsely recognized more new faces on the recognition test. However, after screening for perceptual processing deficits, there was no age difference in false recognition of conjunctions, or in discriminating old faces from conjunctions. We conclude that the false alarm effect generalizes to lineup identification, but does not extend to conjunction faces. The findings are consistent with age-related deficits in recollection of context and relative age invariance in perceptual integrative processes underlying the experience of familiarity.     

Confidence and Eyewitness Identifications: The Cross‐Race Effect,Decision Time and Accuracy

Participants encountered same‐race and cross‐race faces at encoding, completed a series of line‐up identification tests and provided confidence ratings by using one of nine different confidence scales. Confidence was less well calibrated with identification accuracy when participants selected a cross‐race than a same‐race face because of overconfidence. By contrast, there was no cross‐race effect on confidence–accuracy calibration when participants responded ‘not present’. Whereas confidence was a very strong predictor of accuracy for fast identifications of a line‐up face, this was much less the case for slower decisions. Highly confident identifications showed a dramatic drop in accuracy from faster decisions to slower decisions, whereas there was little change in accuracy between faster and slower decisions for moderately confident or weakly confident identifications. Finally, we observed little influence of the format of the nine different confidence scales: numerical and verbal scales produced comparable calibration scores, as did scales with few or many points. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interfering with memory for faces: The cost of doing two things at once

We inferred the processes critical for episodic retrieval of faces by measuring susceptibility to memory interference from different distracting tasks. Experiment 1 examined recognition of studied faces under full attention (FA) or each of two divided attention (DA) conditions requiring concurrent decisions to auditorily presented letters. Memory was disrupted in both DA relative to FA conditions, a result contrary to a material-specific account of interference effects. Experiment 2 investigated whether the magnitude of interference depended on competition between concurrent tasks for common processing resources. Studied faces were presented either upright (configurally processed) or inverted (featurally processed). Recognition was completed under FA, or DA with one of two face-based distracting tasks requiring either featural or configural processing. We found an interaction: memory for upright faces was lower under DA when the distracting task required configural than featural processing, while the reverse was true for memory of inverted faces. Across experiments, the magnitude of memory interference was similar (a 19% or 20% decline from FA) regardless of whether the materials in the distracting task overlapped with the to-be-remembered information. Importantly, interference was significantly larger (42%) when the processing demands of the distracting and target retrieval task overlapped, suggesting a processing-specific account of memory interference.     

Postidentification feedback effects on face recognition confidence: evidence for metacognitive influences

Information given to witnesses after an identification decision greatly alters their impressions of the original event and importantly, their identification confidence. Two experiments investigated the possibility that the effect of feedback on confidence may be altered according to the strength of the witness's cues to accuracy. Experiment 1 used a manipulation of exposure duration to alter recognition accuracy prior to the delivery of confirming, disconfirming or no feedback. While the feedback effect was not different across exposure duration conditions, decisions that were made more quickly were less likely to show large changes in confidence due to feedback. Experiment 2 manipulated the distinctiveness of faces and showed that the effects of feedback on confidence, and on the resolution of the confidence judgement, were more pronounced when disconfirming feedback was given for distinctive faces and when confirming feedback was given for typical faces. These studies showed that the impressions that participants formed of their likely accuracy might moderate the effects of feedback on decision confidence. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.