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1.
The idea of radical pedagogy is connected to the ideals of social justice and democracy and also to the ethical demands of
love, care and human flourishing, an emotional context that is sometimes forgotten in discussions of power and inequality.
Both this emotional context and also the emphasis on politics can be found in the writings of Paolo Freire, someone who has
provided much inspiration for radical pedagogy over the years. However, Freire did not create any explicit ethical foundation
for radical pedagogy. This paper argues that, when constructing normative grounds for radical pedagogy, Habermas’s discourse
ethics can be an important source, with the caveat that discourse ethics on its own is not sufficient grounding enough where
radical pedagogy is concerned. Habermasian critical theory should be supplemented with Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition,
as Freire’s focus on love and human flourishing corresponds well with Honneth’s theory’s three modes of recognition: love,
rights and respect (solidarity stemming from mutual relations of respect). 相似文献
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Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen 《Philosophia》2011,39(2):207-223
Most commentators working on Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics note that he rejects the very possibility of traditional normative
ethics, that is, a philosophically justified normative guide for right conduct. In this article, Wittgenstein’s view of ethical
reflection as presented in his notebooks from 1936 to 1938 is investigated, and the question of whether it involves ethical
guidance is addressed. In Wittgenstein’s remarks, we can identify three requirements inherent in ethical reflection. The first
two is revealed in the realisation that ethical reflection presupposes both a clear understanding of oneself and a normative
ideal of how one ought to live and reason. The third source of normativity springs from the fact that ethical reflection involves
a relationship with the other, not as judge, but as example and addressee. In this way, ethical reflection is essentially
relational. In the article, we unfold how these three normative sources figure in Wittgenstein’s remarks, especially how the
third requirement, the relationship with the other, shows both a point of conversion and a difference between his view of
ethics and religious faith. It will also be argued that even if Wittgenstein thus presents ethical reflection as a normatively
guided activity, the content of the guidance is personal, springing solely from the reflecting individual. 相似文献
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Sukaina Hirji 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2019,98(3):671-696
It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) virtuous actions are defined as the sorts of actions a virtuous agent reliably performs under the relevant circumstances. I argue that neither of these commitments are features of Aristotle's own view, and I sketch an alternative explanation for the relationship between virtue and happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although, on the interpretation I defend, we do not find in Aristotle a distinctive normative theory alongside deontology and consequentialism, what we do find is a way of thinking about how prudential and moral reasons can come to be aligned through a certain conception of practical agency. 相似文献
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Mike Arons 《Humanistic Psychologist》2013,41(3):296-324
Abstract The author presents, and his thinking passes through, the work of Werner Marx who seeks a non‐metaphysical ethical mooring via compassion, grounded in emotional dimensions of existential‐phenomenology. Through Marx's re‐centered compassion the author inquires if reason and faith cannot be resurrected in intrinsic and holistic form. Marx's ethics is introduced as one of the directions humanistic thinking is taking, suggesting this latter's considerable prospective role as a human vision in the ethical debate in transition between failed modern and ethically vulnerable postmodern paradigms. 相似文献
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Maria Russo 《European Journal of Philosophy》2021,29(1):43-54
Sartre and Kant are not often compared, especially because the former is frequently considered a theorist of a totally arbitrary free will. Nevertheless, this is not a fair interpretation of Sartre. Starting already from Being and Nothingness, he conceived an ethical difference between bad faith and authenticity. More unequivocally, in Notebooks for an Ethics he developed an existentialist ethics, which is more Kantian than expected. In that text, the ethical ideal of authenticity is not so different from the ethical ideal of autonomy in Kant. The aim of this article is to characterize Sartrean authenticity as a radicalization of Kantian autonomy. In both cases, there is a normative criterion, which implies a correct exercise of freedom towards oneself and others. This correct exercise of freedom implies for Kant the exclusion of the will determined by material conditions. For Sartre, this correct exercise means the rejection of bad faith. There is also a similar connection between autonomy and respect in Kant, and between authenticity and generosity in Sartre. Highlighting this little‐known affinity between the two most radical philosophers of freedom could also reveal a non‐ideological Sartre, ready to dialogue with contemporary ethical debate. 相似文献
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Wojciech T. Kaftanski 《The Journal of religious ethics》2020,48(3):557-577
This essay demonstrates the prominence of imitation in Kierkegaard’s ethics. I move beyond his idea of authentic existence modeled on Christ and explore the secular dimension of Kierkegaard’s insights about human nature and imitation. I start with presenting imitation as key to understanding the ethical dimension of the relationship between the universal and individual aspects of the human self in Kierkegaard. I then show that Kierkegaard’s moral concepts of “primitivity” and “comparison” are a response to his sociological and psychological observations about imitation from an ethical point of view. In the final section of this paper, I briefly engage Friedrich Schleiermacher’s “ethics of individuality” and Gabriel Tarde’s “laws of imitation” to explore Kierkegaard’s consideration of ethics and imitation as situated within the context of a broader conversation on imitation. 相似文献
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Alan Cribb 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(4):383-396
In this paper I investigate the theory-practice relationship in ethics by using the lens of theorist-practitioner relationships.
In particular I discuss the contrasts between theorist-practitioner relationship inside and outside the classroom, the ‘extra-mural’
expertise of theorists, and the ethical issues which arise when theorists act as co-practitioners. I argue that understanding
these social and ethical issues is essential to understanding the relationship between theory and practice in ethics, and
shows the need for more emphasis on practice-oriented forms of ethical theorising. 相似文献
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This paper argues for a pluralist perfectionist response to ethical conflict. This sets for states and their public schools the task of helping people adjudicate conflicts between ethical orientations and of promoting or discouraging particular conceptions of a good life. The aim of deliberation is mutual ethical recognition and growth, judged against a thick yet universally shared conception of human flourishing. The political justification of perfectionism is that it provides a better defense against repression and discrimination than state neutrality on issues of the good life. The paper addresses liberal concerns and counters claims that adjudication threatens human relationships. 相似文献
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Glen Pettigrove 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(3):191-207
Thomas Hurka, Simon Keller, and Julia Annas have recently argued that virtue ethics is self-effacing. I contend that these
arguments are rooted in a mistaken understanding of the role that ideal agency and agent flourishing (should) play in virtue
ethics. I then show how a virtue ethical theory can avoid the charge of self-effacement and why it is important that it do
so. 相似文献
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《South African Journal of Philosophy》2013,32(2):87-96
AbstractMartha Nussbaum subscribes to the view that our identity is an evaluative question determined by our common, deeply held beliefs about what is worthwhile in human life. In so doing, she asserts that for an account of ethics to have “philosophical power” it needs to be grounded in an account of human nature that is both evaluative and internal.I focus on Nussbaum’s claim that personal identity has to include the necessary features of practical rationality and sociability. Although Nussbaum puts forward self-validating arguments to prove that we cannot - on pain of pragmatic inconsistency - dispute that practical rationality and sociability are necessary features of human life, it is my claim that her account is flawed. The nature of the relationship between ethics and human nature is the broader context to such debates. This paper raises questions regarding on the one hand, whether it is possible to found ethics in human nature and, on the other, what we are to make of accounts that turn on the assumption that identity is ethical, not metaphysical. 相似文献
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This essay is a critical engagement with recent assessments of comparative religious ethics by John Kelsay and Jung Lee. Contra Kelsay's proposal to return to a neo‐Weberian sociology of religious norm elaboration and justification, the authors argue that comparative religious ethics is and should be practiced as a field of study in active conversation with other fields that consider human flourishing, employing a variety of methods that have their roots in multiple disciplines. Cross‐pollination from a variety of disciplines is a strength of comparative ethics, which has enlivened recent and ongoing research on ethics, not a problem to be resolved by convergence on a single, distinctively comparative project. The authors also argue in response to Lee and Kelsay that while individual comparative studies of virtue and personal formation can be flawed in various ways, this line of research has been productive and at times very compelling. Moreover, attention to comparative virtue ethics shows how scholarship on some ethical topics necessitates drawing on a variety of perspectives and disciplinary backgrounds, a conclusion relevant to all work in religious ethics today. 相似文献
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The project of articulating a theological ethics on the basis of liturgical anthropology is bound to fail if the necessary consequence is that one has to quit the forum of critical modern rationality. The risk of Engelhardt's approach is to limit rationality to a narrow vision of reason. Sin is not to be understood as the negation of human holiness, but as the negation of divine holiness. The only way to renew theological ethics is to understand sin as the anthropological and ethical expression of the biblical message of the justification by faith only. Sin is therefore a secondary category, which can only by interpreted in light of the positive manifestation of liberation, justification, and grace. The central issue of Christian ethics is not ritual purity or morality, but experience, confession and recognition of our own injustice in our dealing with God and men. 相似文献
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Naomi Fisher 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2016,54(4):417-439
In this paper, I argue that ethical normativity can be grounded in the natural normativity of organisms without being reducible to it. Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot both offer forms of neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism; I argue that both accounts have gaps that point toward the need for a constructive virtue ethics grounded in natural normativity. Similarly, Korsgaard's constructivist ethics ignores the ongoing relevance of natural norms in human ethical life. I thus offer an account according to which the self‐shaping activity of human organisms supplements and transforms natural normativity, giving rise to ethical norms. Such an account grounds human ethical distinctiveness in rationality without excluding nonrational humans from the ethical community. In the final section of the paper, I argue that ethical standards can be discovered (or hidden) through human activities, thus allowing for gradual progression (or regression) in ethical knowledge, both on individual and cultural levels. 相似文献
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Pak‐Hang Wong 《Zygon》2015,50(1):28-41
The burgeoning literature on the ethical issues raised by climate engineering has explored various normative questions associated with the research and deployment of climate engineering, and has examined a number of responses to them. While researchers have noted the ethical issues from climate engineering are global in nature, much of the discussion proceeds predominately with ethical framework in the Anglo‐American and European traditions, which presume particular normative standpoints and understandings of human–nature relationship. The current discussion on the ethical issues, therefore, is far from being a genuine global dialogue. The aim of this article is to address the lack of intercultural exchange by exploring the ethics of climate engineering from a perspective of Confucian environmental ethics. Drawing from the existing discussion on Confucian environmental ethics and Confucian ethics of technology, I discuss what Confucian ethics can contribute to the ethical debate on climate engineering. 相似文献
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Since it is now broadly acknowledged that ethics should receive early consideration in discourse on emerging technologies, ethical debates tend to flourish even while new fields of technology are still in their infancy. Such debates often liberally mix existing applications with technologies in the pipeline and far-reaching visions. This paper analyses the problems associated with this use of ethics as “preparatory” research, taking discourse on human enhancement in general and on pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement in particular as an example. The paper will outline and discuss the gap between the scientific and technological state of the art and the ethical debates, pointing out epistemic problems in this context. Furthermore, it will discuss the future role of genuine ethical reflection in discourse on human enhancement, arguing also that such discourse needs to include a technology assessment—in the broad sense of the term—which encompasses, inter alia, anthropological perspectives and aspects of social theory. 相似文献