为属人的幸福而运思——浅析亚里士多德的幸福观

亚里士多德伦理学研究的主要对象是人的幸福.属人的幸福是现实的人在现实的生活中可实现的最高善,即灵魂的合德性的实现活动.灵魂的德性分为理智德性和道德德性,理智德性又包括实践的理智和沉思的理智.以合于沉思的理智的实现活动为目的的生活是沉思的生活,以合于其他德性的实现活动为目的的生活是政治的生活.沉思的生活是最幸福的生活,但它是属神的生活,不是属人的生活,人只能以其神性的部分来过这种生活.政治的生活是第二好的生活,并且它是属人的生活.沉思的生活值得我们追求,但现实中只有部分人能够实现;政治的生活带来的是属人的幸福,它与城邦的善联系在一起.此外,即使一个人过着沉思的生活,也同样需要拥有明智的品质,做符合道德的行为.     

道德德性:人类学以及实践认知的维度

伦理学涉及行为中的人.伦理学是关于善(Guten)的学说.作为自由的、有理性的存在者,我们能够在其中发现幸福.然而,"幸福"并不是简单的,主观上的满足,而是根据理性的尺度实现了理想.因此,伦理学涉及到对"主观真实性"的条件的分析.一种美德伦理学断言:这些条件首先在于拥有德行.根据传统的理解,道德德性是人类人格的表达,因此,在真理和理性中视为好的东西,在主观上也作为好的呈现出来:即道德德性对于行为主体的理性来说是情感上的需要.道德德性针对行为主体对善的情感需求来提高实践理性,特别是在能力方面,也包括认识道德上正确的事情并且有效地实践.因此,道德德性就存在两方面的任务,即人类学和认知实践的二重任务,而没有借此定义道德义务,或过多地对道德原则、规则或规范进行理性地讨论.     

传统德性资源与现代公民德性的培养

亚里士多德指出,德性是那些值得称赞的品质,人的德性就是既使得一个人好又使得他出色地完成他的活动的品质。我们认为,公民德性是指公民为了实现人的价值、追求幸福生活和实现社会的善,正确行使一国宪法规定的基本权利和履行宪法规定的基本义务而应具备的优秀品质和能力,这些品质和能力体现在道德、理智和实践三个方面。中国传统文化中蕴含着丰富的德性资源,这些德性资源对今天的公民道德建设和公民德性培养具有重大的理论和实践价值。     

“同情”的政治哲学诠释:定义、性质与类型

同情,是指看到或想象到他人的不幸经历或处境时,由于感同身受而引起的难过情感。从定义上看,同情与怜悯、同理心、移情、伙伴感等近义词不尽相同。从性质上看,作为一种政治美德的同情是一种善的情感;从类型上看,同情大致能划分为情感的、意志的与德性的三种类型。作为德性的同情,是作为情感与意志的同情的升华。它强调同情的内心私密体验与外在共同道德经验的统一性与完整性,包含了对善的动机与实践的共同考量。作为自然情感与社会道德结合的载体,成为美德的同情具有重要的正义指向。     

批判与建构:规则伦理的问题及亚里士多德德性伦理的启示

西方伦理学中的功利主义和道义论通过压缩和简化,从“人”这里抽出感性或理性,将之归结为人的全部,以此为预设,它们都希望通过构建某种普遍原则一劳永逸地解决道德生活领域的问题,统称为规则伦理.在德性伦理看来,因为对人及其幸福的误解,离开德性论规则,规则伦理知识与伦理生活出现了某种脱节,追寻德性于是成为了解决现代道德问题的出路,而这可以从亚里士多德的德性伦理中寻找智性资源.亚里士多德作为美德伦理系统经典的阐述者,至少可以在三个方面为当代的德性伦理方案提供直接借用的资源:幸福目的论的解释框架为德性伦理学提供了理论基点;对幸福的诠释在一定程度上为德性伦理搭起了生活目的的范式;在德性与规则之间追寻幸福为伦理学把握人类生活、建构德性伦理方案指明了现实途径.     

公正何以为"一切德性的总括"——亚里士多德公正观的内在理路探析

在亚里士多德看来,公正既是道德德性的一个类型,分有道德德性产生及其演变过程的显性特征,也是一切德性的总括;其中,总体的公正通过对法的遵守在规范的来源方面统领着诸道德德性,具体的公正通过对外在善的适度标准的把握从判断标准和目标追求两个方面统领着诸道德德性.亚里士多德对公正与道德德性、公正与适度以及作为守法的公正与作为平等的公正等关系问题的讨论具有内在的逻辑一致性,贯穿其中的是基于幸福生活为目的的德性统一性原则,厘清亚里士多德公正思想的内在理路是呈现该原则的基本途径.     

论德性修养及其与德性教育的关系

修养是指人们为了达到某种人生境界,根据环境和主客观条件所进行的旨在提高自己的综合素质或某种素质的学习和实践活动,也指通过这种活动所达到的综合素质或某种素质的水平.从人的个性特征看,修养可以划分为观念修养、知识修养、能力修养和品质修养.此外,还有为了获得智慧所进行的智慧修养.品质修养的主要目的是使品质成为有德性的,因而品质修养也可以说是德性修养.德性修养是指人们为了提高自己的道德素质所进行的养成和完善自己德性的学习和实践活动.它是道德修养的基础和关键,也是整个人生修养的必要组成部分,并在整个人生修养中具有基础地位,是使人达到更高人生境界的基础.德性教育与德性修养之间必须实现和谐对接和良性互动,只有这样,两种活动的功能才能得以有效发挥,真正取得德性养成和完善的效果.     

道德必然对个体意味着什么

从表面上看,道德自由似乎蕴含有反道德(即选择不道德行为的自由)可能性,但从本质上说,由于反道德不具备道德性,因此,道德自由不具有不道德性.     

德性伦理:人类的自我关怀

在以德性为核心的亚里士多德的伦理学体系中,德性泛指使事物成为完美事物的特性或规定."人的德性就是种使人成为善良,并获得其优秀成果的品质."[1]现代西方德性伦理学进而认为,"德性是人类为了幸福、欣欣向荣、生活美好所需要的特性品质."[2]在中国传统文化中,"德性"一词始见于<中庸>,曰:"故君子尊德性而道问学",认为德性是人的道德本性,是人生而具有的向善的本性.程颐提出"德性之知",将德性看做是人的内在自我认识.王夫之则将德性较为明确地界定为:"德性者,非耳目口体之性,乃仁义礼智之根心而具足者也,常存之于心,而静不忘,动不迷,不倚见闻言论而德皆实矣."又说:"好善恶恶,德性也."德性即好善恶恶之性.可见,中外思想家对德性有相近的看法.概而言之,德性就是让一个人高尚并使其实践活动完美的品质,是人之为人的内在规定,是实现人与自然、人与社会、人与自己相和谐的内在动力.德性伦理就是以个体或共同体品质为核心,以社会关系中的人为本位,以实现人的幸福生活为目的,以和谐为最高范畴的伦理道德体系.它从人的生活实践的内在性、整体性、超越性出发,真正实现了人对自我的伦理关怀.     

简论经济德性

经济德性不是经济和德性或经济和道德之间的简单、机械的相加,经济和德性或经济和道德正如一枚硬币的两面一样,是社会现象的两个方面.经济是人之经济,是人际关系之经济,它必然蕴含着生产责任意识、经营境界、经济行为规范和经济品质等德性内涵.而且,这些德性有着其他经济因素所不可替代的功能.     

Character Education: Christian Education Perspectives

Character is defined broadly by leading authorities, including concepts such as practicing apt behavior and teaching right from wrong. Virtue and moral undertones tend to pervade most experts' use of character, although in secular settings, the notion of ethics is more prominent. Overall, developing in students a desire for the good is how most authorities understand the construct. Implementing character in the public and Christian schools, apart from a Judeo-Christian view of the construct, leaves schools open to values clarification, situational ethics, and other post-modern foundational options. Character development, at least at the conceptual level, is at the heart of all education—Christian or non-Christian.     

A DIALOGUE BETWEEN VIRTUE ETHICS AND CARE ETHICS

A dialogue between virtue and care ethics is formed as a step towards meeting Pellegrino's challenge to create a more comprehensive moral philosophy. It is also a dialogue between nursing and medicine since each practice draws on the Greek Virtue Tradition and the Judeo-Christian Tradition of care differently. In the Greek Virtue Tradition, the point of scrutiny lies in the inner character of the actor, whereas in the Judeo-Christian Tradition the focus is relational, i.e. how virtues are lived out in specific relationships, particularly unequal relationships where vulnerability of one of the members is an issue. In a care ethic relational qualities such as attunement rather than inner qualities are the point of scrutiny. A dialogue between these two traditions makes it possible to consider the relational virtues and skills of openness and responsiveness that are required for a respectful meeting of the other.     

Virtue,Norm, and Moral Practice

Virtue, as a tendency toward goodness, has an interrelated structure made up of a stable disposition of intentions and emotions on the one hand and the ability to make rational analysis and obtain moral knowledge on the other. All these elements of knowing, feeling, and willing in the structure of virtue cannot be fully understood merely from a psychological perspective. Emotion, will, and rationality in virtue always have certain moral content. Virtue, as a structure with good disposition, constitutes a moral agent and consequently an intrinsic foundation for moral practice. Of course, virtue is not a priori. On the contrary, its development is closely associated with an individual’s social and historical background. Because of virtue, an agent goes beyond the rational compulsion and intended efforts into a realm of nature.     

Disunity of Virtue

This paper argues against the unity of the virtues, while trying to salvage some of its attractive aspects. I focus on the strongest argument for the unity thesis, which begins from the premise that true virtue cannot lead its possessor morally astray. I suggest that this premise presupposes the possibility of completely insulating an agent’s set of virtues from any liability to moral error. I then distinguish three conditions that separately foreclose this possibility, concentrating on the proposition that there is more to morality than virtue alone—that is, not all moral considerations are ones to which some virtue is characteristically sensitive. If the virtues are not unified, the situationist critique of virtue ethics also turns out to be more difficult to establish than some have supposed.     

The Practicality of Ancient Virtue Ethics: Greece and China

Virtue ethics has been charged with being unable to provide solutions to practical moral issues. In response, the defenders of virtue ethics argue that normative virtue ethics exists. The debate is significant on its own, yet both sides of the controversy approach the issue from the assumption that moral philosophy has to tell us what we should do. In this essay, I would like to examine the question regarding the practicality of virtue ethics in a different way. Virtue ethics is an ancient approach shared by both ancient Greek philosophers and classic Chinese Confucians, and indeed, ancient Greeks call ethics “practical science.” How, then, do the ancients themselves view the issue of practicality? This essay shows that there is a notion of practicality which is prominent in both ancient Greek and ancient Chinese virtue ethics but is neglected in today’s ethics. According to this notion, ethics is to transform one’s life. The essay also raises a prospect of the revival of this notion.     

VIRTUE AS MASTERY IN EARLY CONFUCIANISM

This essay explores the interrelation of skills and virtues. I first trace one line of analysis from Aristotle to Alasdair MacIntyre, which argues that there is a categorical difference between skills and virtues, in their ends and intrinsic character. This familiar distinction is fine in certain respects but still importantly misleading. Virtue in general, and also some particular virtues such as ritual propriety and practical wisdom, are not just exercised in practical contexts, but are in fact partially constituted by the mastery of certain skills. This has implications for moral psychology, specifically how we might understand the acquisition of virtue, as well as its very nature. To try to make this claim plausible I analyze two case studies from early Confucianism: treatment of ritual propriety as a cardinal virtue, and Mencius's less carefully integrated treatment of excellence at moral discernment. I conclude by revisiting the question of the relations between skill and virtue, and exploring a few of the difficulties implied by my account of early Confucian ethics.     

德性伦理论要

德性伦理强调以人类自身的内在品质作为人的一切生活的出发点,这不仅使德性伦理在人类伦理思想的起源处规避着人类伦理生活的方向,而且在现代人类遭遇道德困境的形势下,又指示着人类伦理生活所应该采取的态度。德性伦理最终的理论指向便是将成就德性与明其规范统一起来,从而真正实现人自身的价值。在现代社会价值多元化的背景下,对传统德性伦理资源的挖掘,显得尤为重要。无论是亚里士多德的德性传统,还是原始儒家的德性传统,都可以为现代伦理理论的建设提供丰富的智性资源。     

论《周易》的道德谱系

《周易》是一部人学著作,也是一部道德著作。《周易》构建了一种特殊的道德谱系,这种道德谱系由本能无意识、文化无意识、社会意识、自我意识道德化四个层面构成。《周易》的道德谱系把“人”与“道”联系起来,从而有了“人道”,也把“道”与“德”联系起来,从而有了“道德”。《周易》在性命之理的基础上探讨了人的形成、演化及人性的内容;又在“人”与“道”的基础上构建了“成人”与“做人”的道德谱系。《周易》的道德谱系把“人”与“道”联接起来是人学,把“道”与“德”联接起来是伦理学。天道、人道等统一于性命之理的命题之中,成为了道德谱系的奇特内容,从而人也就成为了道德谱系的本体。     

Moral philosophy and moral psychology in Mencius

This paper defends both an interpretation of Mencius’ moral theory and that theory itself against alternative interpretive defences. I argue that the ‘virtue ethics’ reading of Mencius wrongly sees him as denying the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Virtue ethics is flawed, because it makes such a denial. But Mencius’ moral theory, in spite of Mencius’ obvious interest in moral psychology, does not have that flaw. However, I argue that Mencius is no rationalist. Instead, I show that he upholds a coherentist moral theory, in which reason and psychology both have a role. The final third of the paper compares my interpretation with the work of various important Mencius scholars. I point out that the issue of the difference between moral philosophy and moral psychology is quite important in contemporary Western moral theory.     

德性与善

从根本上说,德性不仅是完成人们的内在利益所必需的品格,同时也是有益于整体生活的善的品格。德性作为一种品格,它在成就人的至善行为中能稳定和促进人的向善能力。