Economic Utility of Training Programs

In economic terms, training projects represent a major outlay for many corporations. In spite of the growing need to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of training programs in organizations, such cost-benefit analyses are rarely conducted. Moreover, the extant conceptual approaches and mathematical formulas typically used for this purpose produce inaccurate estimates of the economic utility of training programs for organizations.An amended approach to this procedure is elaborated and its benefits demonstrated. The proposed model regards any potential plan as an investment project that should be evaluated in a similar way to the assessment of other investment options. Thus, it is recommended that a training project be considered only if its potential real, post-tax rate of return exceeds the real, post-tax cost of capital to the firm, subject to the unique features of investment in human capital. This process could improve the potential financial benefits to the firm, from investment in training.     

Mispredicting the hedonic benefits of segregated gains

The hedonic benefit of a gain (e.g., receiving $100) may be increased by segregating it into smaller units that are distributed over time (e.g., receiving $50 on each of 2 days). However, if these units are too small (e.g., receiving 1 cent on each of 10,000 days), they may fall beneath the person's hedonic limen and have no hedonic benefit at all. Do people know where their limens lie? In 6 experiments, participants predicted that the hedonic benefit of a large gain would be increased by segregating it into smaller units, and they were right; but participants also predicted that the hedonic benefit of a small gain would be increased by segregating it into smaller units, and they were wrong. Segregation of small gains decreased rather than increased hedonic benefit. These experiments suggest that people may underestimate the value of the hedonic limen and thus may oversegregate small gains.     

医疗安全问题经济后果及构成因素

医疗安全问题导致了严重的经济后果。本文分别从个人、医院、社会三个方面详细阐述了住院病人医疗安全经济后果的构成因素,以及国内外关于医疗安全经济后果的研究现状和研究进展,提出我国的医院管理中致力于医疗安全研究的必要性。     

医疗安全问题经济后果及构成因素

医疗安全问题导致了严重的经济后果.本文分别从个人、医院、社会三个方面详细阐述了住院病人医疗安全经济后果的构成因素,以及国内外关于医疗安全经济后果的研究现状和研究进展,提出我国的医院管理中致力于医疗安全研究的必要性.     

Mispredicting Happiness Across the Adult Lifespan: Implications for the Risky Health Behaviour of Young People

Using data from a 2007 survey in Northern Ireland (representative sample, N = 1036), we replicate and extend the US-based findings of Lacey et al. (Journal of Happiness Studies 7:167–182, 2006). Consistent with Lacey et al., we find that young people mispredict happiness levels in old age, believing—wrongly—that happiness declines with age. We explore the possible implications of this under-estimation of happiness in old age for the risky health behaviours of young people. We find that young male binge drinkers are particularly prone to thinking that happiness declines with age.     

Hope I Die before I Get Old: Mispredicting Happiness Across the Adult Lifespan

The tendency to overestimate the influence of circumstances on well-being has been demonstrated for a range of life events, but the perceived impact of aging on well-being has been largely overlooked. People seem to dread growing old, despite evidence that well-being improves with age. We compared the self-reported happiness of younger adults (mean age = 31) and older adults (mean age = 68) with their estimates of happiness at different ages. Self-reports confirmed increasing happiness with age, yet both younger and older participants believed that happiness declines. Both groups estimated declining happiness for the average person, but only older adults estimated this decline for themselves.     

Mispredicting distress following romantic breakup: Revealing the time course of the affective forecasting error

People evidence significant inaccuracies when predicting their response to many emotional life events. One unanswered question is whether such affective forecasting errors are due to participants’ poor estimation of their initial emotional reactions (an initial intensity bias), poor estimation of the rate at which these emotional reactions diminish over time (a decay bias), or both. The present research used intensive longitudinal procedures to explore this question in the wake of an upsetting life event: the dissolution of a romantic relationship. Results revealed that the affective forecasting error is entirely accounted for by an initial intensity bias, with no contribution by a decay bias. In addition, several moderators of the affective forecasting error emerged: participants who were more in love with their partners, who thought it was unlikely they would soon enter a new relationship, and who played less of a role in initiating the breakup made especially inaccurate forecasts.     

The Utility of Utility Analysis

Recent research on utility analysis that focuses on estimating the dollar value of performance gains was critically reviewed and a case was made that other metrics for expressing utility may be desirable. The need to validate the accu- racy of utility predictions was emphasized, and factors that could adversely affect their accuracy were described in a framework of criteria types and job types. A set of research propositions was offered and implications for future work on utility were discussed. In addition to its traditional role as an aid to decision making, utility analysis as a means to understanding the perform- ance construct was emphasized.     

The illusion of courage in self‐predictions: Mispredicting one's own behavior in embarrassing situations

People exhibit an “illusion of courage” when predicting their own behavior in embarrassing situations. In three experiments, participants overestimated their own willingness to engage in embarrassing public performances in exchange for money when those performances were psychologically distant: Hypothetical or in the relatively distant future. This illusion of courage occurs partly because of cold/hot empathy gaps. That is, people in a relatively “cold” unemotional state underestimate the influence on their own preferences and behaviors of being in a relative “hot” emotional state such as social anxiety evoked by an embarrassing situation. Consistent with this cold/hot empathy gap explanation, putting people “in touch” with negative emotional states by arousing fear (Experiments 1 and 2) and anger (Experiment 2) decreased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distant embarrassing public performances. Conversely, putting people “out of touch” with social anxiety through aerobic exercise, which reduces state anxiety and increases confidence, increased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distance embarrassing public performances (Experiment 3). Implications for self‐predictions, self‐evaluation, and affective forecasting are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mispredicting and misremembering: patients with renal failure overestimate improvements in quality of life after a kidney transplant

OBJECTIVE: People tend to overestimate the impact that future events will have on their quality of life. In the case of a medical treatment like kidney transplant, this should result in biased predictions--overestimates of how much the transplant will benefit quality of life. The authors surveyed kidney transplant patients, both before and after transplant, to test whether they would overestimate the benefits of a successful transplant for their quality of life. DESIGN: The authors interviewed 307 patients on a waiting list for cadaveric renal or renal-pancreatic transplant, and 195 patients one year after a successful transplant. A sub sample of patients were interviewed both before and after transplant. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The survey included measures of quality of life, both in terms of an overall estimate (0-100), and across sub domains, including health, employment, and travel. RESULTS: Cross-sectional results suggested that overall quality of life improved after transplant, but the predictions of pretransplant patients overestimated the magnitude of the improvement (p < .01). In addition, patients predicted large improvements in specific life domains that did not change. These results were confirmed in longitudinal, prospective analyses. Additional analyses showed that posttransplant patients recalled their pretransplant quality of life to be much lower than what they had reported at the time. CONCLUSION: Consistent with an impact bias, patients substantially overestimated the benefits of a successful kidney transplant, both in terms of predictions of life after treatment, and in their memories of QOL before the transplant.     

Consequences of Economic Inequality for the Social and Political Vitality of Society: A Social Identity Analysis

Economic inequality has been found to have pernicious effects, reducing mental and physical health, decreasing societal cohesion, and fueling support for nativist parties and illiberal autocratic leaders. We start this review with an outline of what social identity theorizing offers to the study of inequality. We then articulate four hypotheses that can be derived from the social identity approach: the fit hypothesis, the wealth-categorization hypothesis, the wealth-stereotype hypothesis, and the sociostructural hypothesis. We review the empirical literature that tests these hypotheses by exploring the effect of economic inequality, measured objectively by metrics such as the Gini coefficient as well as subjectively in terms of perceptions of economic inequality, on wealth categorization (of others and the self), the desire for more wealth and status, intergroup hostility, attitudes towards immigrants, prosocial behavior, stereotyping, the wish for a strong leader, the endorsement of conspiracy theories, and collective action intentions. As we will show, this research suggests that economic inequality may have even more far-reaching consequences than commonly believed. Indeed, investigating the effects of economic inequality on citizens' sociopolitical behaviors may be increasingly important in today's turbulent political and social landscape.     

Consequences of schematism

In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach does not mean to buy an ontologically deflationary approach, according to which we have to accept all the intentional objects there apparently are. Being metaphysically deflationary on intentionalia rather means that from the ontological point of view one must really allow only for those intentionalia for which one is entitled to say that there are such things; typically, for which an ontological proof is available. From metaphysical schematism plus conditional, or partial, ontological committment to intentionalia, further interesting consequences follow. First, this theoretical combination allows one to deal with the ‘too-many entities’ problem (may one fail to accept an ontological proof for an entity of a given kind if she thinks that the entity we would have to be committed to is an entity of another kind?). Second, it allows one to deal with the ‘genuinely true report’ problem (how is it that if we exercise mindreading with respect to a somehow deluded person, we want our reports to come out as really, not merely fictionally, true?).     

Comparison Theory in Economic Psychology Regarding the Easterlin Paradox and Decreasing Marginal Utility: a Critique

This paper challenges the assumption within Economics that the relationship between money and subjective wellbeing is determined by processes of cognitive comparison. An alternative explanation for such well known phenomena as the Easterlin Paradox and Decreasing Marginal Utility are provided through a consideration of affect. The theoretical basis for such explanations relies on theory from Psychology usually overlooked by Economists, such as affect heuristics and Subjective Wellbeing Homeostasis. The presented evidence for this alternative source of explanation melds psychological theory with empirical data. It is concluded that affective processes offer a coherent alternative explanation for the phenomena under discussion.     

Utility of Philosophy

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Philosophy is an incredible intellectual enterprise that promotes comprehensive exposure to creative and critical thinking. The paper is...     

Consequences of Ethical Relativism

The aim of this paper is to investigate the temporal content of perceptual experience. I argue for a view according to which we must recognize the existence of perceptions the content of which cannot be spelled out simply by looking at what is the case at an isolated instant. Acts of apprehension can cover a succession of events. Howev er, a subject who has such perceptions can still fall short of having a concept of time. I compare this with arguments which have been put forward to show that a subject who has spatial perceptions can fall short of having a concept of space. In both cases, it is the fact that perception is from a point of view which stands in the way of it constituting an exercise of a concept of how things are objectively. However, I also show that the way in which perception is perspectival takes a different form in each of the two cases.