The relationship between susceptibility to false memories,dissociativity, and paranormal belief and experience

One hundred participants completed a News Coverage Questionnaire concerning personal memories of where they were, what they were doing and who they were with when footage of dramatic news events was first shown on television, as well as asking them to recall details of the footage itself. These news items included four events that are known to have been captured on film and one item concerning non-existent footage of the bombing of a nightclub in Bali. Overall, 36% of respondents reported false memories of the alleged footage of the Bali bombing. Participants reporting false memories were found to score significantly higher than those who did not report such memories on the Australian Sheep–Goat Scale, on various subscales of the Anomalous Experiences Inventory (Belief, Experience and Ability) and on the Dissociative Experiences Scale, supporting the hypothesis that believers in the paranormal may be more susceptible to false memories than non-believers.     

Critical thinking ability and belief in the paranormal

A study was conducted to assess the relationship between critical thinking and belief in the paranormal. 180 students from three departments (psychology, arts, computer science) completed one measure of reasoning, the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), and a scale of paranormal experiences. Half of the subjects filled out the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (Ennis & Millmann, 1985) and the Watson–Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 2002), respectively. The results show no significant correlations between critical thinking and paranormal belief or experiences. Reasoning ability, however, had a significant effect on paranormal belief scores, but not on paranormal experiences. Subjects with lower reasoning ability scored higher on Traditional Paranormal Belief and New Age Philosophy than did subjects with higher reasoning abilities. Results suggest that those who have better reasoning abilities scrutinise to a greater extent whether their experiences are sufficient justification for belief in the reality of these phenomena.     

Cognitive biases explain religious belief,paranormal belief,and belief in life’s purpose

Cognitive theories of religion have postulated several cognitive biases that predispose human minds towards religious belief. However, to date, these hypotheses have not been tested simultaneously and in relation to each other, using an individual difference approach. We used a path model to assess the extent to which several interacting cognitive tendencies, namely mentalizing, mind body dualism, teleological thinking, and anthropomorphism, as well as cultural exposure to religion, predict belief in God, paranormal beliefs and belief in life’s purpose. Our model, based on two independent samples (N = 492 and N = 920) found that the previously known relationship between mentalizing and belief is mediated by individual differences in dualism, and to a lesser extent by teleological thinking. Anthropomorphism was unrelated to religious belief, but was related to paranormal belief. Cultural exposure to religion (mostly Christianity) was negatively related to anthropomorphism, and was unrelated to any of the other cognitive tendencies. These patterns were robust for both men and women, and across at least two ethnic identifications. The data were most consistent with a path model suggesting that mentalizing comes first, which leads to dualism and teleology, which in turn lead to religious, paranormal, and life’s-purpose beliefs. Alternative theoretical models were tested but did not find empirical support.     

Trauma-related and neutral false memories in war-induced Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Recent models of cognition in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) predict that trauma-related, but not neutral, processing should be differentially affected in these patients, compared to trauma-exposed controls. This study compared a group of 50 patients with PTSD related to the war in Bosnia and a group of 50 controls without PTSD but exposed to trauma from the war, using the DRM method to induce false memories for war-related and neutral critical lures. While the groups were equally susceptible to neutral critical lures, the PTSD group mistakenly recalled more war-related lures. Both false and correct recall were related more to depression than to self-rated trauma. Implications for accounts of false memories in terms of source-monitoring are discussed.     

The role of kinematic mental simulation in creating false memories

Our investigation focuses on memory for scenes depicted in photos. According to the mental model theory, the observation of a static scene depicted in a photo which portrays an actor near to perform an action can trigger a kinematic mental simulation of that action unfolding in time. The deriving prediction is that such a kinematic mental model supports the creation of a false memory of the actor performing an advanced phase of the action. We test this prediction in three experiments in which participants are presented with static scenes of actions, and after three days they perform a recognition task in which they assess recognition of old and novel static scenes depicting actions. The results confirm that false memories occur for actions that represent the unfolding over time of the static action initially observed. Our theoretical framework can accommodate also several previous findings in the literature on false memories.     

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.     

Language and false belief in Korean-speaking and English-speaking children

The link between language and false belief (FB) understanding has been the focus of considerable debate regarding which language component (semantics, general language, or complementation) is necessary for FB development. We examined the relative roles of complementation and receptive vocabulary in FB development in Korean-speaking and English-speaking children. FB understanding, memory for complements involving the verbs think, say and want, and receptive vocabulary were measured at three time points in 59 Korean-speaking children and 72 English-speaking children. A multi-level growth model indicated that the development of receptive vocabulary and separately the development of think understanding uniquely predicted the development of FB understanding. Neither say nor want was associated with FB understanding. The same pattern was found for Korean- and English-speaking children. The results provide evidence for the role of general language in FB understanding and against the unique role of sentential complementation.     

Decreased susceptibility to false memories from misinformation in hormonal contraception users

Sex hormones are increasingly implicated in memory formation. Recent literature has documented a relationship between hormones and emotional memory and sex differences, which are likely related to hormones, have long been demonstrated in a variety of mnemonic domains, including false memories. Hormonal contraception (HC), which alters sex hormones, has been associated with a bias towards gist memory and away from detailed memory in women who use it during an emotional memory task. Here, we investigated whether HC was associated with changes in susceptibility to false memories, which may be related to the formation of gist memories. We tested false memory susceptibility using two well-validated false memory paradigms: the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) task, and a story-based misinformation task. We found that hormonal contraceptive users were less susceptible to false memories compared to non-users in the misinformation task, and no differences were seen between groups on the DRM task. We hypothesise that the differences in false memories from the misinformation task may be related to hormonal contraceptive users' memory bias away from details, towards gist memory.     

Prime time news: The influence of primed positive and negative emotion on susceptibility to false memories

We examined the relation between emotion and susceptibility to misinformation using a novel paradigm, the ambiguous stimuli affective priming (ASAP) paradigm. Participants (N = 88) viewed ambiguous neutral images primed either at encoding or retrieval to be interpreted as either highly positive or negative (or neutral/not primed). After viewing the images, they either were asked misleading or non-leading questions. Following a delay, memory accuracy for the original images was assessed. Results indicated that any emotional priming at encoding led to a higher susceptibility to misinformation relative to priming at recall. In particular, inducing a negative interpretation of the image at encoding led to an increased susceptibility of false memories for major misinformation (an entire object not actually present in the scene). In contrast, this pattern was reversed when priming was used at recall; a negative reinterpretation of the image decreased memory distortion relative to unprimed images. These findings suggest that, with precise experimental control, the experience of emotion at event encoding, in particular, is implicated in false memory susceptibility.     

Paranormal belief and errors of probabilistic reasoning: The role of constituent conditional relatedness in believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy

The present study examines the extent to which stronger belief in either extrasensory perception, psychokinesis or life-after-death is associated with a proneness to making conjunction errors (CEs). One hundred and sixty members of the UK public read eight hypothetical scenarios and for each estimated the likelihood that two constituent events alone plus their conjunction would occur. The impact of paranormal belief plus constituents’ conditional relatedness type, estimates of the subjectively less likely and more likely constituents plus relevant interaction terms tested via three Generalized Linear Mixed Models. General qualification levels were controlled for. As expected, stronger PK beliefs and depiction of a positively conditionally related (verses conditionally unrelated) constituent pairs predicted higher CE generation. ESP and LAD beliefs had no impact with, surprisingly, higher estimates of the less likely constituent predicting fewer - not more - CEs. Theoretical implications, methodological issues and ideas for future research are discussed.     

Cortisol response and psychological distress predict susceptibility to false memories for a trauma film

For eyewitness testimony to be considered reliable, it is important to ensure memory remains accurate following the event. As many testimonies involve traumatic, as opposed to neutral, events, it is important to consider the role of distress in susceptibility to false memories. The aim of this study was to investigate whether cortisol response following a stressor would be associated with susceptibility to false memories. Psychological distress responses were also investigated, specifically, dissociation, intrusions, and avoidance. Participants were allocated to one of three conditions: those who viewed a neutral film (N?=?35), those who viewed a real trauma film (N?=?35), and a trauma “reappraisal” group where participants were told the film was not real (N?=?35). All received misinformation about the film in the form of a narrative. Participants provided saliva samples (to assess cortisol) and completed distress and memory questionnaires. Cortisol response was a significant predictor of the misinformation effect. Dissociation and avoidance were related to confabulations. In conclusion, following a stressor an individual may differ with regard to their psychological response to the event, and also whether they experience a cortisol increase. This may affect whether they are more distressed later on, and also whether they remember the event accurately.     

Both associative activation and thematic extraction count,but thematic false memories are more easily rejected

The main aim of this study was to analyse the roles played by associative activation and thematic extraction in the explanation of false memories using the Deese, Roediger, McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Associative lists with two different types of critical items (CIs) were used: one, the associative CI, corresponded to the word most strongly primed by the associates in the list and another, the thematic CI, was the word that best described the theme of the list. Following three different types of encoding instructions (standard, warning or strategic), false recognition for these two types of CIs was analysed in either self-paced or speeded response recognition tests. The results showed considerable levels of false memories for both types of CIs. Even without the quality of being “good themes”, associative CIs produced high levels of false recognition, which suggests that associative activation plays a prominent role in false memory formation. More interestingly, thematic CIs were more prone to be edited out, reinforcing the argument that thematic identifiability has a major role in the rejection of false memories.     

The relationship between DRM and misinformation false memories

This research investigated the relationship between false memories induced by two different paradigms (misinformation and Deese–Roediger–McDermott [DRM]). The misinformation effect refers to the phenomenon that a person’s recollection of a witnessed event can be altered after exposure to misleading information about the event. DRM false memory represents the intrusion of words that are semantically related but not actually presented in the study session. Subjects (N = 432) completed both misinformation and DRM false memory tests. Results showed a small but significant correlation (r = .12, p = .02) between the misinformation and DRM false memories. Furthermore, using signal detection theory, we found that the discrimination ability index (d′) was related to both the misinformation and DRM false memories (r = ?.12 and ?.13, p = .01), while the response bias was related only to DRM false memory (r = ?.46, p < .001). These results suggest that misinformation and DRM false memories generally involve different mechanisms and that their shared mechanism may involve the global discrimination ability.     

The client,the therapist and the paranormal: a response to the special edition on psychotherapy and the paranormal

Abstract

In this paper, I provide a published paper response to the papers in this special edition on the paranormal and psychotherapy articulated largely from my career as a parapsychologist. In the introduction I note the definitional differences between advocates and counter-advocates in terms of what might be ‘paranormal’, although I argue ultimately that definitional differences aside, the therapist’s relationship with the client’s unusual experiences is critical, taking a phenomenological stance which is echoed by at least two of the papers in the special edition. In broad review, the papers make a variety of welcome contributions; historical individually and small sample phenomenological and also more metaphorically in terms of articulations of the haunting nature of collective and intergenerational trauma in the social and cultural sphere. I review the papers from a parapsychological perspective, considering the evidence drawn from parapsychological studies where it supports or adds to the topics of each paper. In concluding this response, it seems clear that therapists often work from first principles when relating to clients’ anomalous experiences, and that the papers of the special edition each offer practising therapists some important evidential and practical insights into working with client presentations of ostensibly paranormal and anomalous experiences.     

Sociolinguistic awareness and false belief in young Cantonese learners of English

In this study, we examined whether sociolinguistic awareness and false belief were uniquely related in 3- and 4-year-old Cantonese-speaking children learning English as a second language. The English-use background of these children varied so that they possessed sociolinguistic awareness to different degrees. Results indicated that sociolinguistic awareness predicted false belief uniquely after controlling for age, nonverbal intelligence, English vocabulary, and family income for both the second language learners and the more balanced bilinguals. The group difference in false belief was adequately explained by the corresponding difference in sociolinguistic awareness over and above the other variables. Such findings provide evidence for the claim that false belief understanding is critically related to sociolinguistic awareness, which in turn is influenced by how a second language is learned.     

Explaining the persistence of false memories: a proposal based on associative activation and thematic extraction

This study aimed to analyse the effect of retention intervals on associative and thematic false memories. Two experiments, using two types of critical items that were either associatively or thematically related to studied material, were conducted. In both experiments, one group of participants performed a recognition test immediately after the presentation of lists, and another group performed the task one week later. In Experiment 1, the recognition test consisted of pairs of items with four response alternatives (both items had been presented, only the left item had been presented, only the right item had been presented or none of the items had been presented). Critical items were also manipulated so that they were either presented in or absent from the list. In Experiment 2, a standard recognition test that differed in the mode of presentation was used: self-paced or speeded response. Both experiments showed that associative critical items were more recognised than thematic critical items in the immediate condition. However, whereas associative critical items decayed after a one-week delay, thematic critical items were similarly recognised at both retention intervals. The findings of the present study suggest that each type of process – associative and thematic – behave differently over time.     

Conscious and unconscious discriminations between true and false memories

When subjects give higher confidence or memory ratings to a test word in a recognition test, do they simply raise their criterion without making better discrimination, or do they raise both criterion and true discrimination between the studied words (SW) and the lures? Given that previous studies found subjects’ false alarm responses to lures slower than to SW, and recognition latency inversely correlated with the confidence rating, can the latency difference between the lures and SW be accounted for by confidence or memory ratings? The present results showed that when subjects gave higher confidence or memory ratings, both their bias and sensitivity were raised, indicating that they could consciously distinguish the lures from the SW. However, a latency difference between true and false recognitions persisted after confidence and memory ratings were held constant, suggesting an unconscious source of discrimination between the two types of memory.     

Counterfactual thinking and false belief: the role of executive function

The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (Cognitive Development, 19 (2004) 53-80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB. Participants were 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 76). Counterfactual thinking statements generated accounted for significant variance in FB performance beyond age and language. Working memory and inhibitory control each partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB performance. The maturation of executive functioning skills is important in children’s developing understanding of counterfactual reasoning and FB.     

听障儿童错误信念理解与谎言理解的关系：情绪理解的调节作用

本研究主要探讨听障儿童自我/他人错误信念理解与谎言理解各层面的关系,以及情绪理解在其中的调节作用。实验1采用错误信念理解和谎言理解来探讨自我/他人错误信念理解与谎言理解各层面的关系。实验2增加了情绪理解任务,并探讨情绪理解在错误信念理解和谎言理解之间关系的机制。结果发现：（1）听障儿童他人错误信念理解、真假信息辨别、谎言意图理解的正确率显著不如典型发展儿童,且他人错误信念理解越好,越容易进行真假信息辨别和谎言意图理解;（2）典型发展儿童自我/他人错误信念理解越准确,谎言意图理解越好;（3）当听障儿童情绪理解得分较高时,自我/他人错误信念理解对谎言行为判断具有正向预测作用;（4）典型发展儿童情绪理解得分较高时,自我错误信念理解对真假信息辨别有正向预测作用,他人错误信念理解对谎言行为判断、真假信息辨别有正向预测作用。这些研究结果不仅表明听障儿童他人错误信念理解对谎言理解具有解释作用,而且表明高情绪理解在谎言理解中有促进作用以及表明高情绪理解在对错误信念理解与谎言理解中的调节作用更加显著。