First Persons: On Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement

Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement offers a subtle and innovative account of self-knowledge that lifts the problem out of the narrow confines of epistemology and into the broader context of practical reasoning and moral psychology. Moran argues convincingly that fundamental self/other asymmetries are essential to our concept of persons. Moreover, the first- and the third-person points of view are systematically interconnected, so that the expression or avowal of one's attitudes constitutes a substantive form of self-knowledge. But while Moran's argument is wide-ranging and compelling, he relies throughout on an overly intellectualized conception of first-person attitudes as attitudes of reflection or deliberation. That conception is at once implausible and unnecessary to the main current of his argument, whose goal is to demonstrate that our self-conception as persons depends on both the distinctness and the interconnectedness of our first- and third-person perspectives on ourselves.     

相遇与疏远——评海德格尔-雅斯贝尔斯书信往来

由维多里奥.克劳斯特曼出版社和R.皮珀尔出版社出版的《海德格尔-雅斯贝尔斯书信往来》[1](P299)属于一份重要文献,它洞察了这个世纪两位思想家的哲学关系史,并且通过这一历史透视了这个时代的某些问题。最初我曾按照汉斯.萨尼尔(系雅斯贝尔斯-书信编者)的意见在前面标上了《相     

医患关系失和与患者道德权利的保护

在分析导致医患关系失和原因的基础上,界定“患者道德权利”内涵,揭示患者道德权利被忽视和遭受侵害是导致医患关系紧张的常见原因,结合患者道德权利的特点,提出强化患者权利保护的措施,即转化患者道德权利为制度性权利,提升权利的权威与效力;提高医务人员人文素质及执业能力;创新患者道德权利保护机制.     

经济能人·政治权威·道德权威——以HH村为个案的苏南村庄领袖权威获得与延续之实证研究

苏南村庄领袖的权威是一种由基于为村庄共同体带来福利的报偿性权威、基于上级任命获得的法理权威和基于个人人格和道德威望的魅力型权威共同组成的"复合型权威"。这一权威的延续,必须基于村庄领袖作为"经济能人"对村庄发展作出的持续贡献和作为"道德楷模"对村庄福利的慷慨回报。在此基础上,村庄领袖的政治权威可以自然获得并不断巩固。相反,一旦失去这两种权威基础,村庄领袖的双重角色则会自然中断。     

判断权威

我们经常被要求去承认某人的话,但是我们如何无误地判断这个人是否是真正的权威呢?过好日子要求我们能够理性地评价外界,像过马路、购物、吃饭、听医生建议等这样简单事,无     

Authority conflicts and personality disorders

We investigated personality disorders (PDs) of young men with chronic authority conflicts using the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-I (MCMI-I; Millon, 1983). PDs occurred considerably more often in the young men with chronic authority conflicts (62%) compared with a clinical control group of young men with acute authority conflicts (39%). The prevalence of PDs in a normal control group was considerably lower (11%). The passive-aggressive PD is over-represented among young men with chronic authority conflicts; there is hardly any antisocial PD. Millon's conceptualization of these disorders could have influenced these results. The high prevalence of passive-aggressive PDs complicates a good psychotherapeutic outcome in young men with chronic authority conflicts. Our results underscore the clinical utility of the controversial PAPD diagnosis.     

Student Spirituality and Educational Authority

This article explores the situation of student spirituality in the secular educational system, and considers some of the philosophical, emotional and practical challenges it presents to educational authority. Students are increasingly interested in spirituality, and yet the secular system finds it hard to absorb, direct or respond to these interests. In the recent past, it has often dealt with this uprising of spiritual interest by dismissing it as 'New Age' activity, not worthy of respect. But we have to move beyond such glib and dismissive assertions to examine the real dynamics at the heart of this revolutionary moment, in which the maps of culture, belief, and knowledge are being redrawn. The post-modern era is one in which 'spirit' demands to be taken seriously, and we can only move forward by listening deeply and attentively to the new impulses stirring in youth and culture. Student spirituality and theoretical Marxism may appear to be diametrically opposed, but closer scrutiny finds that they have much in common and spring from a similar radical source. Educational authority at all levels is challenged to take the challenges of spirituality seriously, to allow it to change what constitutes learning.     

Social Externalism and First-Person Authority

Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”

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