共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Andrew Kania 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(1):65-71
I discuss Gregory Currie’s taxonomy of explanations of the fictional. On the one hand, there is an important kind of relation
between internal and external explanations of some fictional truths that Currie leaves out, where both are salient and yet
in a relation of harmony with each other. On the other hand, I do not see that he has established that there is a genuine relation of tension between some pairs of internal and external explanations, and thus I question the usefulness of the category of collapse. I also consider a further kind of explanation: the exterior explanation.
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Andrew KaniaEmail: |
2.
Richard Fumerton 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):67-76
In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a
foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal
life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of
what we think we know and justifiably believe.
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Richard FumertonEmail: |
3.
Peter J. King 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):327-345
Academic discussion of pornography is generally restricted to issues arising from the depiction of adults. I argue that child-pornography
is a more complex matter, and that generally accepted moral judgements concerning pornography in general have to be revised
when children are involved. I look at the question of harm to the children involved, the consumers, and society in general,
at the question of blame, and at the possibility of a morally acceptable form of child-pornography. My approach involves an
objectivist meta-ethics and a utilitarian view of practical ethics, and I bring out the advantages of these theories to the
consideration of moral issues such as this one.
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Peter J. KingEmail: |
4.
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):157-173
It is tempting to think that multi premise closure creates a special class of paradoxes having to do with the accumulation
of risks, and that these paradoxes could be escaped by rejecting the principle, while still retaining single premise closure.
I argue that single premise deduction is also susceptible to risks. I show that what I take to be the strongest argument for
rejecting multi premise closure is also an argument for rejecting single premise closure. Because of the symmetry between
the principles, they come as a package: either both will have to be rejected or both will have to be revised.
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Maria Lasonen-AarnioEmail: |
5.
Uriah Kriegel 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):357-381
To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case
M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of
ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological
merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism.
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Uriah KriegelEmail: |
6.
Daniel A. Weiskopf 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):359-384
Certain of our concepts are innate, but many others are learned. Despite the plausibility of this claim, some have argued
that the very idea of concept learning is incoherent. I present a conception of learning that sidesteps the arguments against
the possibility of concept learning, and sketch several mechanisms that result in the generation of new primitive concepts.
Given the rational considerations that motivate their deployment, I argue that these deserve to be called learning mechanisms.
I conclude by replying to the objections that these mechanisms cannot produce genuinely new content and cannot be part of
genuinely cognitive explanations.
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Daniel A. WeiskopfEmail: |
7.
Shamik Dasgupta 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(1):35-67
We naturally think of the material world as being populated by a large number of individuals. These are things, such as my laptop and the particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied and related
in various ways when we describe the material world around us. In this paper I argue that, fundamentally speaking at least,
there are no such things as material individuals. I then propose and defend an individual-less view of the material world
I call “generalism”.
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Shamik DasguptaEmail: |
8.
Derek Henry Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):377-394
I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both
stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are
not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges
from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role
this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory
role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the
indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion
is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.
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Derek Henry BrownEmail: |
9.
Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
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Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |
10.
James R. Beebe 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):181-196
The abductivist reply to skepticism is the view that commonsense explanations of the patterns and regularities that appear
in our sensory experiences should be rationally preferred to skeptical explanations of those same patterns and regularities
on the basis of explanatory considerations. In this article I critically examine Laurence BonJour’s rationalist version of
the abductivist position. After explaining why BonJour’s account is more defensible than other versions of the view, I argue
that the notion of probability he relies upon is deeply problematic, that he incorporates an implausible double-standard concerning
a priori and a posteriori justification, and that his view is vulnerable to skepticism about the a priori. I suggest that
some of these problems are due to idiosyncratic commitments BonJour makes and that abductivists would be better off without
them. I conclude with some suggestions about how to improve BonJour’s abductivist response to skepticism.
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James R. BeebeEmail: |
11.
Paul Boghossian 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):111-119
I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis
of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification
for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought
of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities.
I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have
reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue
for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation.
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Paul BoghossianEmail: |
12.
Colin Klein 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):161-177
Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect discoveries about them
to hold of other members of that kind. As such, it looks like MR kinds should have no place in the ontology of the special
sciences. Many resist this conclusion, however, because we lack a positive account of the role that certain realization-unrestricted
terms play in special science explanations. I argue that many such terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation
has many of the features normally associated with explanation by MR kinds. As idealized models are usually mere possibilia, such explanations do not run afoul of the metaphysical problems that plague MR kinds.
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Colin KleinEmail: |
13.
Jakub Čapek 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):453-463
The first part of this essay is basically historical. It introduces the explanation–understanding divide, focusing in particular
on the general–unique distinction. The second part is more philosophical and it presents two different claims on action. In
the first place, I will try to say what it means to understand an action. Secondly, we will focus on the explanation of action
as it is seen in some explanatory sciences. I will try to argue that in some cases these sciences commit what I call an “external
contradiction”.
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Jakub ČapekEmail: |
14.
Michael Veber 《Sophia》2007,46(2):177-187
Recent studies provide some support for the idea that prayer has curative powers. It is argued that even if prayers are effective
in these kinds of cases it cannot be because God is answering them. While many have challenged theological explanations for
the efficacy of prayer on epistemic grounds, the argument presented here concludes that the theological explanation conflicts
with the standard conception of God. In particular, if God answers prayers in these kinds of cases then God is immoral.
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Michael VeberEmail: |
15.
Jonathan Ichikawa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,146(3):435-443
I criticize Timothy Williamson’s characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent
counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.
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Jonathan IchikawaEmail: |
16.
Frank Arntzenius 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):277-297
I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory.
I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
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Frank ArntzeniusEmail: |
17.
Donald W. Bruckner 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):307-324
An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent’s set of feasible options. The fabled fox
in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences
are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy adaptive
preferences from irrational and unworthy ones. The distinction is based on the agent’s own appraisal of the adaptive preference.
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Donald W. BrucknerEmail: |
18.
Anders Schinkel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):267-277
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed
cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only
difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue
that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts,
and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings
from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality
of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.
相似文献
Anders SchinkelEmail: |
19.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
20.
Bas C. van Fraassen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):5-24
The story of how Perrin’s experimental work established the reality of atoms and molecules has been a staple in (realist)
philosophy of science writings (Wesley Salmon, Clark Glymour, Peter Achinstein, Penelope Maddy, …). I’ll argue that how this
story is told distorts both what the work was and its significance, and draw morals for the understanding of how theories
can be or fail to be empirically grounded.
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Bas C. van FraassenEmail: |