Menstrual-cycle synchrony: problems and new directions for research

Since M. K. McClintock (1971) published the 1st study on menstrual synchrony among women, a number of other studies have also reported synchrony using a variety of methods. The most recent reports of synchrony come from A. Weller, L. Weller, and colleagues, and their findings of synchrony have been getting stronger (by their own account). In this article, the author analyzes their new methodology and presents 2 simulation studies that demonstrate how biases and errors can produce synchrony as an artifact. Two mutually reinforcing categories of errors are identified: (a) errors in calculating the expected mean onset difference between cycles when there is cycle variability and (b) errors that may result from allowing participants to fill out menstrual-cycle-onset calendars, including recall biases and the mutual exchange of information. It is suggested that synchrony may be a biological state to be avoided and that cycle variability may facilitate female mate choice.     

Menstrual synchrony can be assessed,inherent cycle variability notwithstanding: commentary on Schank (2001)

J. C. Schank (2001) argued that biases in the calculation of synchrony (due to inherent variability in the menstrual cycle) and in respondents' recall of menstrual dates can produce spurious results. In this commentary, the major flaws in J. C. Schank's arguments regarding the calculation of synchrony are presented. Low standard deviations (< 2.0) of interwomen cycle lengths were found in a reanalysis of the Bedouin family data (A. Weller & L. Weller, 1997). This obviates J. C. Schank's major assumption that a high degree of cycle variability exists and his concern that high variability produces a spurious increase of onset differences over time. Furthermore, research that has used random control groups has found significantly greater levels of synchrony in their experimental groups, refuting J. C. Schank's arguments.     

Human menstrual synchrony in families and among close friends: examining the importance of mutual exposure.

Human menstrual synchrony was examined in a sample of 73 urban households with a relatively high degree of mutual contact and interaction but less than that of a previously studied, possibly unique sample of Bedouin families with an extremely high degree of contact, interaction, and sexual segregation (A. Weller & Weller, 1997). In addition, for the first time, menstrual synchrony was studied among best friends who did not live together and among sisters who did versus did not share a bedroom. A very high degree of synchrony was found among families (51%) and among sisters (51%), and a relatively high degree of synchrony was found among close friends (30%). The results suggest that synchrony can be attained without sleeping in the same bedroom or even in the same house. The findings also suggest that an effective range of mutual exposure is an attribute of human menstrual synchrony; below or above this range, the phenomenon may not occur.     

Negative priming and stimulus repetition: A reply to Neill and Joordens (2002)

Negative priming is reliably obtained with repeated items, but not with novel items. Here, we review why these stimulus repetition effects raise problems for memorybased theories of negative priming. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence casting doubt on Neill and Joordens’s (2002) claim that perceptual facilitation masks the effects of episodic retrieval with novel items. Finally, we discuss several theoretical and methodological issues raised in the reply by Neill and Joordens. We conclude that a more straightforward interpretation of these stimulus repetition effects is one based on activation-sensitive inhibition.     

Context,goal, utility,and relevance: A reply to Evans (2002) considering Oaksford (2002)

Yama (2001) argued that the matching bias effect was an amalgam of a genuine matching effect and a set size effect. However, Evans (2002) pointed out some problems with Yama's argument. One was on the matching index used in Yama (2001). The others concerned a gap between Yama's (2001) interpretation of matching bias and Evans' (1998) recent discussions that had placed emphasis on the problem of implicit negation. I reply to these claims taking Oaksford (2002) into consideration. Further, I propose a framework connecting context, goal, utility, and relevance, and including a hierarchical structure of goals. I argue that theories of reasoning can be developed and extended with the framework.     

A resolution to the interpretive dilemmas created by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2 (MMPI-2)? A reply to Ben-Porath and Graham

In my original article (Strassberg, 1991) I described (1)some of the changes introduced by the MMPI-2, (2) possible interpretive dilemmas created by these changes, and (3) strategies for dealing with these dilemmas. In their reply to my paper, Ben-Porath and Graham (preceding paper) suggest that the differences between the MMPI-2 and the MMPI (1) are to be expected, (2) are less important than I imply, and (3) when they do occur, will almost always reveal the superiority of the MMPI-2. In this reply to Ben-Porath and Graham, I explain why, despite their reassurances, I continue to contend that interpretive dilemmas can exist when using the MMPI-2, but these should not deter us from using this instrument.     

MMPI-2 as a predictor of change in PTSD symptom clusters: a further analysis of the Forbes et al. (2002) data set

In this study, we reanalyzed the Forbes et al. (2002) data set to examine the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) as a differential predictor of change across posttraumatic stress disorder symptom clusters following treatment in 141 Vietnam veterans. A series of partial correlation and linear multivariate regression analyses, controlling for initial symptom severity, identified several scales predictive of symptom change. None of the MMPI-2 scales, however, emerged as predictors of change in reexperiencing symptoms. Social alienation and marital distress were the most potent predictors for avoidance symptoms. Anger, alcohol use, and hypomania were the most potent predictors for the hyperarousal symptoms. Of the personality disorders, borderline personality was the strongest predictor of change in the avoidance and hyperarousal clusters. Further replication of the findings of this article and those reported by Forbes et al. (2002) is required.     

Personal standards and evaluative concerns dimensions of "clinical" perfectionism: a reply to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt et al. (2003)

Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn (2002, 2003) provided a cognitive-behavioral analysis of "clinical" perfectionism, a construct they considered to involve both the determined pursuit of self-imposed standards and extremely vulnerable self-evaluation. They argued against a multidimensional perspective to studying perfectionism. We respond to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt, Flett, Besser, Sherry, and McGee's (2003) reply to Shafran et al. (2002) by considering the theoretical, empirical, and clinical implications of findings identifying two higher-order dimensions of perfectionism reflecting personal standards (PS) and self-critical evaluative concerns. Analyses of data from two diverse study groups, a college student sample (N = 527) and a clinical sample of patients with binge eating disorder (N = 236), revealed that self-criticism accounts for the relation between perfectionism measures and depressive, anxious, and eating disorder symptoms. We conclude that possessing high PS is not by itself maladaptive. Rather, self-critical evaluative tendencies are more relevant than PS to the critical processes Shafran et al. (2002) suggested contribute to the maintenance of clinical perfectionism.     

Autonomic and eyeblink conditioning are closely related to contingency awareness: reply to Wiens and Ohman (2002) and Manns et al. (2002)

S. Wiens and A. Ohman (2002) disputed the conclusion that Pavlovian conditioning is strongly related to contingency awareness (P. F. Lovibond & D. R. Shanks, 2002) on the basis that an inappropriate definition of awareness was used. J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, and L. R. Squire (2002) contended that delay eyeblink conditioning is independent of awareness. The authors of the present article consider these arguments, highlight several problems in the new studies described by the commentators, and conclude that there is still little evidence for unconscious conditioning in either subliminal autonomic conditioning or eyeblink conditioning. The most parsimonious account of existing data is that a single learning process gives rise to both awareness and conditioned responding. Further progress in evaluating the possibility of unconscious conditioning would be facilitated by the development of more completely specified and testable dual-process models.     

Punishment revisited--science,values, and the right question: comment on Gershoff (2002)

In this comment on E. T. Gershoff (2002), the author notes the historical phases of punishment research. Punishment as a disciplinary tactic is best viewed as a packaged variable and therefore needs to be investigated in the context of other socialization practices. The role of parental values in this debate about punishment utilization and effectiveness merits more consideration. New directions in punishment research are also noted. These include the need for a family-systems perspective, a family-typology approach, a transactional model of punishment, the use of innovation observation and self-report methods, and more culturally sensitive paradigms.     

The role of contrast in the perception of achromatic transparency: comment on Singh and Anderson (2002) and Anderson (2003)

M. Singh and B. L. Anderson proposed a perceptual theory of achromatic transparency in which the perceived transmittance of a perceived transparent filter is determined by the ratio of the Michelson contrast seen in the region of transparency to that of the background seen directly. Subsequently, B. L. Anderson, M. Singh, and J. Meng proposed that Michelson contrast should be replaced by perceived contrast in this theory. However, their experimental stimuli were nongeneric (i.e., special cases), and their observers had little choice in their matching strategy. Here, the author shows that both of their ratio-of-contrasts theories are incorrect and that problems with their theoretical analyses and experimental designs led them to conclude that mean luminance does not affect perceived transmittance when contrast is held constant. The author also shows that B. L. Anderson's (2003) transmittance anchoring principle is not valid when a transparent surface is perceived to penetrate rather than overlay another surface. Finally, the author shows that M. Singh's (2004) theoretical proof that the ratio-of-Michelson-contrasts theory accurately predicts lightness matching through transparency is incorrect.     

Conceptualizing Heterosexual Identity Development: Issues and Challenges

This article summarizes the work of R. L. Worthington and J. J. Mohr (2002); R. L. Worthington, H. B. Savoy, F. R. Dillon, and E. R. Vernaglia (2002); and J. J. Mohr (2002) on heterosexual identity development that constituted the Major Contribution section of the July 2002 issue of The Counseling Psychologist. The author provides an overview of the 2 independently developed models of heterosexual identity development presented in these articles and discusses implications for counseling practice, training, and research. The author also offers a personal perspective on aspects of this body of work, including points raised by L. A. Gilbert and J. Rader (2002) and K. J. Bieschke (2002) in their reaction papers that followed these articles.     

Inner Subjective Experiences and Social Constructionism: A Response to Rudes and Guterman (2007)

In an earlier article, the author argued that there had been a devaluation of inner subjective experiences by the counseling profession over the last several decades (J. T. Hansen, 2005). In their reply to this article, J. Rudes and J. T. Guterman (2007) advocated for a social constructionist position for the counseling profession. In the current article, 2 fundamental premises that are inherent in the reply of J. Rudes and J. T. Guterman are examined. Disagreements with 1 of these premises are elaborated, and implications for the counseling profession are discussed.     

Single versus multiple systems of category learning: Reply to Nosofsky and Kruschke (2002)

Nosofsky and Kruschke (2002) argued that the singlesystem ALCOVE model (Kruschke, 1992) can account for the dual-task category learning data reported by Waldron and Ashby (2001). In our reply, we argue that Nosofsky and Kruschke overstated the ability of ALCOVE to account for the Waldron and Ashby results. In fact, ALCOVE has difficulty with these data, and we show that the only versions of ALCOVE that actually fit the Waldron and Ashby accuracy data make incorrect predictions about other previously unreported features of that experiment. We also show that the dual-system COVIS model (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998) naturally predicts these results.     

Cultural psychology, A new look: reply to Bond (2002), Fiske (2002), Kitayama (2002), and Miller (2002)

M. H. Bond (2002), A. P. Fiske (2002), S. Kitayama (2002), and J. G. Miller (2002) joined D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) in highlighting limitations of the individualism-collectivism model of culture. Concern is warranted; nevertheless, individualism-collectivism helps structure discourse on the influence of culture on the mind. To avoid level-of-analysis entanglements, Oyserman et al. propose an integrative model that includes distal, proximal, and situated cultural features of societies and internalized models of these features, highlights the importance of subjective construal, and uses evolutionary perspectives to clarify the basic problems cultures address. Framed this way, it is clear that, depending on situational requirements, both individualism- and collectivism-focused strategies are adaptive; thus, it is likely that human minds have adapted to think both ways.     

Bringing culture to basic psychological theory--beyond individualism and collectivism: comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeir (2002) offered a comprehensive literature review on individualism and collectivism that forwards valuable suggestions for ways to enhance future research conducted within this framework. The author argues that although their criticisms of much contemporary social psychological research on individualism and collectivism are valid, even more fundamental problems need to be recognized as characterizing work within this tradition, such as the insufficiently subtle nature of the views held of culture, the limited attention given to meanings, and the downplaying of contextual variation. The author suggests adopting more nuanced and process-oriented conceptions of culture and more contextually grounded views of its impact on psychological functioning as a way of realizing the promise of cultural psychology to broaden and provide insight into basic psychological theory.     

Commentary on Meehl and Waller's (2002) path analysis and verisimilitude

P. E. Meehl and N. G. Waller's (2002) proposed method may not yield unique solutions for model parameters nor unique solutions for model lack of fit. The author argues from a naturalistic-cognitive philosophy of science that science seeks objective knowledge and that hypothesis testing is central to achieving that goal. It is also argued that P. E. Meehl and N. G. Waller's proposal blurs the distinction between hypothesis testing and explorations of the data seeking an optimal model to serve as a prospective inductive generalization. But it is noted that inductive generalizations are never unique and must be tested to eliminate those that reflect subjective aspects of the researcher's methods and points of view.     

Methodological requirements to test a possible in-group advantage in judging emotions across cultures: comment on Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) and evidence

H. A. Elfenbein and N. Ambady's (2002) conclusions concerning a possible in-group advantage in judging emotions across cultures are unwarranted. The author discusses 2 methodological requirements for studies to test adequately the in-group advantage hypothesis and an additional requirement in reviewing multiple judgment studies and examining variance in judgment effects across those studies. The few studies that Elfenbein and Ambady reported that support the in-group advantage hypothesis need to be examined for whether they meet the criteria discussed; if they do not, their data cannot be used to support any contention of cultural differences in judgments, let alone the in-group advantage hypothesis. Furthermore, the role of signal clarity needs to be explored in possibly moderating effects across studies; however, this was not done.     

Understanding developmental reversals in false memory: Reply to Ghetti (2008) and Howe (2008)

Replies to comments on the current authors' original article. S. Ghetti (2008) and M. L. Howe (2008) presented probative ideas for future research that will deepen scientific understanding of developmental reversals on false memory and establish boundary conditions for these counterintuitive patterns. Ghetti extended the purview of current theoretical principles by formulating hypotheses about how developmental reversals are controlled by the growth of phantom recollection and by the growth of false-memory editing. Some data are available on her hypotheses about phantom recollection, which distinguish phenomenology (vague or vivid) from memory representation (verbatim or gist). Howe introduced alternative theoretical principles that can be traced to the early work of Deese and Underwood. He argued that fuzzy-trace theory is subject to 3 limitations and that his alternative conception makes 3 predictions that contrast with fuzzy-trace theory's predictions. In the current reply, it is shown that the stated limitations do not apply to fuzzy-trace theory, that previously published research runs counter to the 3 predictions, and that the core difference between the 2 approaches is that fuzzy-trace theory is an opponent-processes model whereas the alternative conception is a 1-process model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

Base on balls for the Chapman strategy: Reassessing Brouwer, Brenner, and Smeets (2002)

A true understanding of skilled behavior includes the identification of the information that underlies the perception?Caction cycle at work. Often, observers?? sensitivity to perceptual variables is established in laboratory-situated simulation-based psychophysical experiments. The observers?? sensitivity thus determined is then used to draw conclusions that will generalize the findings to natural behavior. Focusing on the example of running to catch fly balls, the present contribution takes the study of Brouwer, Brenner, and Smeets (Perception & Psychophysics 64:1160?C1168, 2002) to illustrate how common assumptions in the steps from psychophysical experiments to natural behavior can result in ungrounded conclusions. These authors built an argument to reject the use of the Chapman strategy of zeroing out optical acceleration. For this argument, they determined the sensitivity of the visual system to acceleration, assuming that acceleration is detected as a velocity ratio. Next, they showed that catchers started running earlier than could be expected on the basis of sensitivity thresholds for this velocity ratio, concluding that running initiation could not have been based on optical acceleration. In the present study, we argue that important assumptions in the Brouwer et al. (Perception & Psychophysics 64:1160?C1168, 2002) line of argument are incorrect. First, we show how the assumption of parabolic ball flight trajectories, although convenient, biased Brouwer et al.??s (Perception & Psychophysics 64:1160?C1168, 2002) conclusion. Next, we present an experiment revealing that observers do not base their judgments of acceleration on the velocity ratio. Thus, we demonstrate that Brouwer et al.??s (Perception & Psychophysics 64:1160?C1168, 2002) argument that optical acceleration cannot serve as the information for running to catch fly balls does not hold.