On the alleged failure of free will theodicies: A reply to Tierno

In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, but fails to account for the fact that we often do make such choices. However, the argument developed by Tierno, despite its initial appeal, embodies an important misunderstanding of the nature of free will theodicies and in particular the libertarian conception of human freedom customarily employed by these theodicies.     

On what it is to be in a quandary

A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The result is a much simpler and more plausible version of the quandary view.     

Whatever is willed will be: a temporal asymmetry in attributions to will

Why do people neglect or underweight their past failures when thinking about their prospects of future success? One reason may be that people think of the past and future as guided by different causal forces. In seven studies, the authors demonstrate that people hold asymmetric beliefs about the impact of an individual's will on past versus future events. People consider the will to be a more potent determinant of future events than events that happened in the past. This asymmetry holds between- and within-subjects, and generalizes beyond undergraduate populations. The authors contend that this asymmetry contributes to the tendency for people to remain confident about their future performance in domains in which they have largely failed in the past. This research thus contributes to a growing body of literature exploring how thoughts about events in the past differ from thoughts about the same events set in the future.     

Re-evaluating evidence for linguistic relativity: reply to Boroditsky (2001)

Six unsuccessful attempts at replicating a key finding in the linguistic relativity literature [Boroditsky, L. (2001). Does language shape thought?: Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time. Cognitive Psychology, 43, 1-22] are reported. In addition to these empirical issues in replicating the original finding, theoretical issues present in the original report are discussed. In sum, we conclude that Boroditsky (2001) provides no support for the Whorfian hypothesis.     

Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane,Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.     

Who knows what about contempt: A reply to Izard and Haynes

Izard and Haynes question our findings and claims for disovery because they did not consider the difference between a one-to-one and one-to-many relationship between a sign (the facial expression) and what it signifies (a message about emotion). Clarifying this matter not only shows that the disagreement between us is more apparent than real, but more importantly highlights what remains to be discovered about which emotional states are signaled by which facial expressions.     

On scales of sensation: Prolegomena to any future psychophysics that will be able to come forth as science

Sensory scales fall into two classes. Type I scales of sensory intensity can be approximated by metric scaling procedures (magnitude estimation, magnitude production) and nonmetric procedures (conjoint measurement); Type I scales are supported by theoretical consideration of sensory processes. Type II scales of sensory dissimilarity can be approximated by metric scaling procedures (category rating, interval estimation, equisection) and nonmetric procedures (analysis of proximities). The psychophysical functions that relate Type I and Type II scales to their corresponding physical scales are in both cases power functions, but the exponents that govern Type I functions are typically about twice as large. Both Type I scales of sensory intensity and Type II scales of sensory dissimilarity are meaningful measures of perceptual experience, but they are measures of different aspects of perception. The duality of sensory scales helps to explain some apparent contradictions among divergent attempts to validate scales of sensation.     

Episodic future thinking in 3- to 5-year-old children: The ability to think of what will be needed from a different point of view

Assessing children’s episodic future thinking by having them select items for future use may be assessing their functional reasoning about the future rather than their future episodic thinking. In an attempt to circumvent this problem, we capitalised on the fact that episodic cognition necessarily has a spatial format (Clayton and Russell, 2009, Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). Accordingly, we asked children of 3, 4, and 5 to chose items they would need to play a game (blow football) from the opposite side of the table on which they had never before played. The crucial item was the box that was needed by children to reach the table from the other side. Over four experiments, we demonstrated that, while children of 3 perform poorly on future questions and children of 5 generally perform quite well, children of 4 years find a question about what they themselves will need to play in the future harder to answer than a similar question posed about another child. We suggest that this result is due to the ‘growth error’ of over-applying newly-developed Level 2 perspective-taking skills (Flavell et al., 1981), which encourages the selection of non-functional items. The data are discussed in terms of perspective-taking abilities in children and of the neural correlates of episodic cognition, navigation, and theory of mind.     

Conceptualization and measurement of temporal focus: The subjective experience of the past,present, and future

Temporal focus is the attention individuals devote to thinking about the past, present, and future, and the concept is important because it affects how people incorporate perceptions about past experiences, current situations, and future expectations into their attitudes, cognitions, and behavior. However, temporal focus has not been clearly defined nor situated in a nomological network of constructs. In addition, existing measures of temporal focus suffer from various shortcomings. In this paper, we advance the concept of temporal focus by critically examining its conceptualization, developing a new measure of temporal focus (Temporal Focus Scale; TFS), and evaluating the validity (i.e., construct, convergent, discriminant, nomological, and predictive validity) of the TFS across four studies. We conclude that understanding how individuals focus their attention toward the past, present, and future clarifies their responses to explicit and implicit temporal information, which suggests that a variety of research streams would benefit from incorporating the concept of temporal focus.     

Why there might be a moral faculty: A reply to Johnson

Is there a cognitive faculty dedicated to the moral domain? Mark Johnson has developed a number of arguments against the existence of such a faculty. I claim that these arguments are not persuasive and that there may be a moral faculty.     

The will to be known: Toward a pastoral anthropology of the self

Explores the concept of the will to be known as a metaphor for the self as process in relationship. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theological anthropology and Heinz Kohut's self psychology provide the background for a multilingual pastoral anthropology that transcends a narrow focus upon the self as an autonomous unit of meaning. The discussions attends to four dimensions of the will to be known and to dynamics of shame within the emergence and existence of the relational self.