Happiness is an Emotion

Accounts of happiness in the philosophical literature see it as either a judgment of satisfaction with one’s life or as a balance of positive over negative feelings or emotional states. There are sound objections to both types of account, although each captures part of what happiness is. Seeing it as an emotion allows us to incorporate both features of the accounts thought to be incompatible. Emotions are analyzed as multicomponent states including judgments, feelings, physical symptoms, and behavioral dispositions. It is shown that prototypical happiness contains all these components, and each is explicated. The concept of happiness, like the concepts of other emotions, is a cluster concept. The features of such concepts are made clear. Happiness is shown to be similar to other emotions in many respects, including the phenomenon of adaptation, the “paradox of happiness,” and the existence of both paradigm and borderline instances. The account allows us to capture all that was right in earlier accounts while avoiding objections to them.     

Feature integration is not the whole story of the sequence effects of symbolic cueing

ABSTRACT

Sequential modulations in symbolic cueing tasks have been attributed to complete versus partial repetition/alternation of stimulus features between consecutive trials. This feature-integration hypothesis is questioned by recent findings and further investigated in the present study. In the first two experiments, when the cueing axes switched between trials, only complete alternation of cue directions and target locations existed. Nevertheless, significant sequence effects were still found in this condition, which did not support the feature-integration hypothesis. Furthermore, although sequence effects were still significant when stimulus identities were manipulated in Experiment 3, it was abolished when different cue categories (gaze and arrow) were presented as cues in Experiment 4. The findings suggest that the integration of stimulus features is not the only source of the sequential effect and some higher level cognitive mechanisms, possibly as described in the task-file or task organization hypotheses, are involved in the sequential modulations of symbolic cueing.     

When trying is not enough: Emotion regulation and the effort-success gap in bipolar disorder

Bipolar disorder (BD) is presumed to involve difficulties in emotion regulation. Little is known, however, about the specific emotion regulation profile associated with this disorder. The present study examined the use of specific emotion regulation strategies among individuals with BD (n = 37) and healthy controls (n = 38). Participants' spontaneous use of reappraisal and suppression, as well as their associated effort and success at regulating their emotions, was measured in the context of three emotionally evocative films (neutral, happy, sad). Results indicated that the BD participants made greater use of spontaneous suppression and reappraisal across all films compared to the control group. BD participants also reported greater effort, but less success, when spontaneously regulating emotions. These findings suggest that bipolar disorder is associated with less success when regulating emotions despite a widespread engagement of regulatory efforts. Discussion focuses on the disjunction between troubled emotion functioning in bipolar disorder and sustained efforts to modify intense emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Business is not just war. Transferring the principle of double effect from war to business

Abstract

In this article the validity of transferring the Principle of Double Effect from the just war tradition to the domain of business is critically reviewed. If a case can be build for sufficient analogies between war and business, the principle of double effect can legitimately be transferred from war to business. If, on the other hand it can be shown that there are aspects in which business differ substantially from just war, then the transfer to business of a principle developed within the context of war becomes more problematic. After exploring the nature of arguments of analogy and fallacious arguments of weak analogy some important disanalogies between war and business are highlighted. Given these disanalogies it is then contended that the just war background of the Principle of Double Effect had some bearing on both the content and manner of application of the Principle of Double Effect. Finally it is argued that these disanalogies require some revisions to the Principle of Double Effect with regard to both its content and its manner of application before it can be applied meaningfully to foreseeable negative side-effects of business.     

Language is not just for talking: redundant labels facilitate learning of novel categories

In addition to having communicative functions, verbal labels may play a role in shaping concepts. Two experiments assessed whether the presence of labels affected category formation. Subjects learned to categorize "aliens" as those to be approached or those to be avoided. After accuracy feedback on each response was provided, a nonsense label was either presented or not. Providing nonsense category labels facilitated category learning even though the labels were redundant and all subjects had equivalent experience with supervised categorization of the stimuli. A follow-up study investigated differences between learning verbal and nonverbal associations and showed that learning a nonverbal association did not facilitate categorization. The findings show that labels make category distinctions more concrete and bear directly on the language-and-thought debate.     

“天只是以生为道”--明道对生命世界的领悟

不论人们是否在哲学上系统地追问过深度生态学(deep ecology)的存有论基础,有一点似乎是确定无疑的:人与整个自然万物密密涵继、相互长养的关系已愈来愈成为人类的共识。但衡诸当今生态伦理学或环境伦理学之种种论著,其问题意识却似乎无一不在果地上为之因应,乃至使尊重自然、热爱生命等口号沦为功利主义、科学主义和人类中心主义(anthropocentrism)横行后的一种补偿。 对生命意义的领悟不应当在生命世界残损和碎片化之后产生,而应当在人与自然万物在根源上共相牵挂的慧识中落实,这或许是我们钟情于明道的一个深层原因。     

Comparison is not just subtraction: effects of time- and space-order on subjective stimulus difference

In five experiments, participants made comparative judgments of paired successive or simultaneous stimuli. Time- or space-order errors were obtained, which varied with the interstimulus interval (ISI) or stimulus duration, as well as with the stimulus level. The results, in terms of scaled subjective differences, are well described by Hellstr?m's (1979) sensation-weighting model. With successive presentation, in comparisons of line length and tone loudness, the first stimulus had the greater weight in determining the subjective difference for short ISIs, the second for longer ISIs. In comparisons of duration (auditory and visual), the second stimulus had the greater weight. For simultaneously presented line lengths, the left stimulus had the greater weight.     

The development of adaptive competence: Why cultural psychology is necessary and not just nice

I argue that developmental psychologists need to view cultural approaches to cognitive development as necessary and not just nice. Cultural psychology enables one to study problems one otherwise might not be able to study and also to identify solutions to problems that might be obscured or even distorted if one looked only at results within a single culture (usually, one’s own). I describe work my colleagues and I have done around the world addressing specific problems such as what does it mean to be adaptively intelligent in various cultures, how does illness affect intellectual functioning, and what do people even mean by “intelligence” in different cultures. The results show that cognitive development can be fully understood only if one looks beyond one’s own cultural boundaries and preconceptions. The article further argues that a theory of successful intelligence can be a useful way of studying phenomena of intellectual development within a cultural framework.     

Influence of positive affect on the subjective utility of gains and losses: it is just not worth the risk

A modification of the procedure originally used by Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1956) to measure subjective utility was used to study the influence of positive affect on individuals' perceived value (utility) functions. Results indicated, as expected, that persons in whom positive affect had been induced showed a more negative subjective utility for losses than did controls. This indicates that losses seem worse to people who are feeling happy than to those in a control condition. The subjective utility functions of the two groups did not differ as much, however, when people were considering potential gain. Thus, at least in the situation tested in this study, potential gains did not seem to be more appealing (nor less so) for affect subjects than they did for controls. These findings are discussed in relation to theoretical issues in decision making and work suggesting that positive affect can promote increased sensitivity to losses in situations of potential meaningful loss.     

Heart rate deceleration is not an orienting reflex; Heart rate acceleration is not a defensive reflex

Graham and Clifton (1966) proposed an integration of Sokolov’s theory of orienting and defensive reflexes with the stimulus intake/rejection dichotomy of the Laceys. This integration consisted of hypothesizing that heart rate deceleration is a measure of the orienting reflex, and that cardiac acceleration is a measure of the defensive reflex. This article demonstrates that Graham and Clifton failed to establish a valid integration of these two theories. This failure is a consequence of 1) their misconstruing Sokolov’s theory, and 2) an inaccurate and selective review of the research literature then available. Consideration of more recent research would seem to rule out the possibility that their thesis was correct in spite of these flaws in its derivation. Cardiac responding in the OR context thus remains open to further investigation and interpretation.     

Holistic thinking is not the whole story: alternative or adjunct approaches for increasing the accuracy of legal evaluations

There are a number of very helpful, but often underutilized, principles and procedures that can augment decision making in clinical and legal settings. Psychologists often restrict their range of decision-making strategies and options--at the cost of maximizing diagnostic and predictive accuracy--in part as the result of "ontological-epistemological one-worldedness" (O-E O-W). However, no philosophical, logical, or scientific necessity demands strict consistency between views regarding the nature of psychological phenomena and views about how to best assess or learn about those phenomena. Relaxing this unnecessary and largely psychologically-based O-E O-W may promote greater comfort with and utilization of the methods that are discussed in this article for increasing judgmental accuracy.     

The world may not be just for you but you'd better not say it: On the social value of expressing personal belief in a just world

The expression of personal belief in a just world (PBJW) has been discussed as a criterion of excellence in social judgments. In four experimental studies we hypothesized and found that targets who express high versus low PBJW are judged as more: (i) deserving of success and (ii) suited to socio-organizational expectations. The four studies show that suitability to socio-organizational expectations mediates the relation between PBJW expressed and success deservingness, even after controlling for judgments of likability, status, rationality, optimism, and targets as victims. Studies 2 and 3 show this pattern occurs regardless of target performance appraisal. Study 4 indicates that expressing low PBJW decreases the social value of individuals, but expressing high PBJW does not increase it. We discuss the impact of PBJW expression on people's lives, namely on upward social mobility of members of low-status groups, and the influence of the negativity bias on judgments caused by PBJW expression.     

Quality of life is a process not an outcome

Quality improvement mechanisms increasingly use outcome measures to evaluate health care providers. This move toward outcome measures is a radical departure from the traditional focus on process measures. More radical still is the proposal to shift from relatively simple and proximal measures of outcome, such as mortality, to complex outcomes, such as quality of life. While the practical, scientific, and ethical issues associated with the use of outcomes such as mortality and morbidity to compare health care providers have been well rehearsed, the specific concerns associated with the use of quality of life measures in quality of care research have received little attention. As with much research on quality of life there is a tendency to assume that the disadvantages are outweighed by the general virtue of ??listening?? to patients. In this paper we disagree with this assumption and argue that quality of life is a process, not an outcome.     

When a kiss is not just a kiss: Relating violations of consent in kissing to rape myth acceptance

This study examined the relationship rape attitudes have to violations of consent in kissing. We found that the association between rape myth acceptance and responses to violations of consent in kissing was significant regardless of whether these violations took place within the context of a first date, long-term dating, or marriage. We also found that male subjects had higher rape myth acceptance than females and were more supportive of a man's right to violate a woman's consent in kissing. Finally, the association between gender and responses to forced kissing was significant independent of the context in which the forced kiss occurred.