Natural Kinds of Substance

This paper presents an extension of Putnam's account of how substance terms such as ‘water’ and ‘gold’ function and of how a posteriori necessary truths concerning the underlying microstructures of such kinds may be derived. The paper has three aims. (1) I aim to refute a familiar criticism of Putnam's account: that it presupposes what Salmon calls an ‘irredeemably metaphysical, and philosophically controversial, theory of essentialism’. I show how all of the details of Putnam's account—including those that Salmon believes smuggle in such essentialist commitments—can be squared with a rejection of any such essentialist metaphysics. (2) I aim to reveal why Steward is wrong to suppose that, by helping himself to the claim that ‘H₂O’ is a rigid designator of a substance, Kripke, too, presupposes something controversially ‘metaphysical’. (3) I aim to show how my proposed account also sidesteps a variety of objections raised by Needham and others who argue that Kripke's and Putnam's accounts of how ‘water’ and ‘gold’ function founder upon the sheer microstructural complexity of the phenomena in question.     

Gender Essentialism and Responses to Candidates’ Messages

People often form negative attitudes against those who deviate from gender norms. Within the political realm, this has the potential to translate into effects on perceptions of candidate likability and traits. Female candidates who tend to focus on issues stereotypically thought of as feminine are generally more positively evaluated than those who focus on stereotypically masculine domains. The current studies investigate whether these effects vary depending on the extent to which people endorse gender essentialism, which is the tendency to attribute gender differences to relatively more intrinsic, innate, and immutable factors versus believing that gender differences are largely due to cultural and learned factors. Current data with adults across two studies suggest a number of interesting findings: Evaluations of candidates depended on an interaction between respondents’ gender essentialism and whether or not the candidate’s message fit traditional stereotypes. In particular, high essentialist respondents felt significantly more negative toward male candidates with nonstereotypic messages.     

Biological Explanations and Stigmatizing Attitudes: Using Essentialism and Perceived Dangerousness to Predict Antistigma Intervention Effectiveness

ABSTRACT

The theory of essentialism suggests that biological explanations of stigmatized behavior may not be effective at decreasing stigmatizing attitudes. The effects of biological explanations on stigmatizing attitudes were the topic of two experiments. In the first experiment, participants (N = 243) perceived a biological explanation as a less effective in relation to dangerousness and social distancing attitudes about mental illness than about homosexuality. The second experiment (N = 113) compared the effect of biological and free choice explanations on stigmatizing attitudes about abnormal sexual and eating behaviors. The results indicated that a biological explanation increased belief in essentialism and was most effective for attitudes related to anger and blame. These results suggest that the effectiveness of biological explanations as an antistigma tool varies according to the attitude and stigmatized group.     

What kind of kind is intelligence?

The model of human intelligence that is most widely adopted derives from psychometrics and behavioral genetics. This standard approach conceives intelligence as a general cognitive ability that is genetically highly heritable and describable using quantitative traits analysis. The paper analyzes intelligence within the debate on natural kinds and contends that the general intelligence conceptualization does not carve psychological nature at its joints. Moreover, I argue that this model assumes an essentialist perspective. As an alternative, I consider an HPC theory of intelligence and evaluate how it deals with essentialism and with intuitions coming from cognitive science. Finally, I highlight some concerns about the HPC model as well, and conclude by suggesting that it is unnecessary to treat intelligence as a kind in any sense.     

Essentialist theory of ‘hybrids’: From animal kinds to ethnic categories and race

This article presents a theory of the perception of hybrids, resulting from cross‐breeding natural animals that pertain to different species and of children parented by couples with a mixed ethnic or racial background. The theory states that natural living beings, including humans, are perceived as possessing a deeply ingrained characteristic that is called ‘essence’ or ‘blood’ or ‘genes’ in everyday discourse and that uniquely determines their category membership. If, by whatever means, the genes or essences of two animals of different species are combined in a hybrid, the two incompatible essences collapse, leaving the hybrid in a state of non‐identity and non‐belonging. People despise this state and reject the hybrid (Study 1). This devaluation effect holds with cross‐kind hybrids and with hybrids that arise from genetically combining animals from incompatible habitats across three cultures: Austria, India and Japan (Study 2). In the social world, groups and ethnic or racial categories frequently are essentialized in an analogue way. When people with an essentialist mindset judge ethnically or racially mixed offspring, they perceive a collapse of ethnic or racial essence and, consequently, denigrate these children, as compared to children from ‘pure’ in‐group or out‐group parents (Study 3). The findings are discussed in terms of the widespread ‘yuck factor’ against genetically modified animals, in terms of the cultural concepts of monstrosity and of racism and prejudice.