共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 843 毫秒
1.
Aaron Rizzieri 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(3):217-229
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument
against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of
epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant
propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.” 相似文献
2.
Alan Haworth 《Res Publica》2007,13(1):77-100
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’.
I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections
fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the
liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that
Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public
interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit,
if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard
against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. 相似文献
3.
Steven Crowell 《Synthese》2008,160(3):335-354
This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of
semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how
the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that
is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring.
The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic
inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the
representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that
does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by
rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of
‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological
immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for
it. 相似文献
4.
Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou have both recently made central use of set-theoretic results in their political and ontological
projects. As I argue in the paper, one of the most important of these to both thinkers is the paradox of set membership discovered
by Russell in 1901. Russell’s paradox demonstrates the fundamentally paradoxical status of the totality of language itself,
in its concrete occurrence or taking-place in the world. The paradoxical status of language is essential to Agamben’s discussions
of the “coming community,” “whatever being,” sovereignty, law and its force, and the possibility of a reconfiguration of political
life, as well as to Badiou’s notions of representation, political intervention, the nature of the subject, and the event.
I document these implications of Russell’s paradox in the texts of Agamben and Badiou and suggest that they point the way
toward a reconfigured political life, grounded in a radical reflective experience of language. 相似文献
5.
In this article I argue against Chad Hansen’s version of the “White Horse Dialogue” (Baimalun) of Gongsun Longzi as intelligible through writings of the later Moists. Hansen regards the Baimalun as an attempt to demonstrate how the compound baima, “white horse,” is correctly analyzed in one of the Moist ways of analyzing compound term semantics but not the other. I
present an alternative reading in which the Baimalun arguments point out, via reductio, the failure of either Moist analysis; in particular they point out how neither analysis accounts for ordinary, acceptable
inferences like “There is a white horse; therefore there is a horse.” At issue for Gongsun Longzi is a fundamental problem
with atomic terms: none of them seems capable of referring to a particular, “stand-alone” individual. 相似文献
6.
This review essay on three recent books on John Rawls’s theory of justice, by Catherine Audard, Samuel Freeman, and Thomas
Pogge, describes the great boon they offer serious students of Rawls. They form a united front in firmly and definitively
rebuffing Robert Nozick’s libertarian critique, Michael Sandel’s communitarian critique, and more generally critiques of “neutralist
liberalism,” as well as in affirming the basic unity of Rawls’s position. At a deeper level, however, they diverge, and in
ways that, this essay suggests, go astray on subtle questions of interpretation: Freeman overemphasizes reciprocity, Pogge
miscasts Rawls as a consequentialist, and Audard exaggerates the Kantian aspect of Rawls’s core, continuing commitment to
“doctrinal autonomy.” 相似文献
7.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
8.
Nuel Belnap 《Studia Logica》2009,91(3):305-334
The first section (§1) of this essay defends reliance on truth values against those who, on nominalistic grounds, would uniformly
substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse some practical, Carnapian advantages of working with truth values in logic. In the
second section (§2), after introducing the key idea of auxiliary parameters (§2.1), I look at several cases in which logics
involve, as part of their semantics, an extra auxiliary parameter to which truth is relativized, a parameter that caters to
special kinds of sentences. In many cases, this facility is said to produce truth values for sentences that on the face of
it seem neither true nor false. Often enough, in this situation appeal is made to the method of supervaluations, which operate
by “quantifying out” auxiliary parameters, and thereby produce something like a truth value. Logics of this kind exhibit striking
differences. I first consider the role that Tarski gives to supervaluation in first order logic (§2.2), and then, after an
interlude that asks whether neither-true-nor-false is itself a truth value (§2.3), I consider sentences with non-denoting
terms (§2.4), vague sentences (§2.5), ambiguous sentences (§2.6), paradoxical sentences (§2.7), and future-tensed sentences
in indeterministic tense logic (§2.8). I conclude my survey with a look at alethic modal logic considered as a cousin (§2.9),
and finish with a few sentences of “advice to supervaluationists” (2.10), advice that is largely negative. The case for supervaluations
as a road to truth is strong only when the auxiliary parameter that is “quantified out” is in fact irrelevant to the sentences of interest—as
in Tarski’s definition of truth for classical logic. In all other cases, the best policy when reporting the results of supervaluation is to use only explicit
phrases such as “settled true” or “determinately true,” never dropping the qualification. 相似文献
9.
Fabian Wendt 《Res Publica》2011,17(2):175-192
Philip Pettit’s republican conception of freedom is presented as an alternative both to negative and positive conceptions
of freedom. The basic idea is to conceptualize freedom as non-domination, not as non-interference or self-mastery. When compared
to negative freedom, Pettit’s republican conception comprises two controversial claims: the claim that we are unfree if we
are dominated without actual interference, and the claim that we are free if we face interference without domination. Because
the slave is a widely accepted paradigm of the unfree person, the case of a slave with a non-interfering master is often cited
as providing a good argument for the first republican claim and against a negative conception of freedom. One aim of this
article is to raise doubts about whether this is true. The other aim of the article is to show that the prisoner—also a paradigm
of the unfree person—presents a good argument against the second republican claim and in favour of a negative conception of
freedom. This is called the ‘prisoner-argument’. It will be argued that neither Pettit’s distinction between free persons
and free choices nor his distinction between compromising and conditioning factors of freedom can help to rebut the charge
of the prisoner-argument. 相似文献
10.
Christopher A. P. Nelson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2006,39(4):435-464
Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard appears remarkably uninterested in the tradition of Christian mysticism. Indeed, in
the only two places in the authorship where he broaches the topic directly, the discussion is disclaimed in such a way as
to suggest that Kierkegaard really has nothing to say about it at all. However, attending to the successive incarnations of
the character(s) named “Ludvig” throughout the authorship – an appellation that harbors an especially self-referential dimension
for Kierkegaard – the present paper attempts to elucidate what may, with due reservation, be referred to as the mystical element
in Kierkegaard’s thought. The ultimate yield of this endeavor is a vision of “mysticism” that is more act than thought oriented,
and a vision of the author “Kierkegaard” that is more delightful than melancholy. 相似文献
11.
H. E. Baber 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(4):377-392
Critics suggest that without some “objective” account of well-being we cannot explain why satisfying some preferences is,
as we believe, better than satisfying others, why satisfying some preferences may leave us on net worse off or why, in a range
of cases, we should reject life-adjustment in favor of life-improvement. I defend a subjective welfarist understanding of
well-being against such objections by reconstructing the Amartya Sen’s capability approach as a preferentist account of well-being.
According to the proposed account preference satisfaction alone—possible as well as actual—is of value. States of affairs
contribute to well-being because and to the extent that they satisfy actual or nearby possible preferences, and are fruitful,
that is, compatible with a range states that satisfy further actual or nearby possible preferences. The proposed account solves
the problem of adaptive preference. Individuals whose preferences are “deformed” are satisfied with fruitless states of affairs,
which constrain their options so that they are incapable of satisfying a wide range of nearby possible preferences—preferences
they “could easily have had.” Recognizing the value of capabilities as well as actual attainments allows us to explain why
individuals who satisfy “deformed” or perverse preferences may not on net benefit from doing so. More fundamentally, it explains
why some states are, as Sen suggests, bad, awful or gruesome while others are good, excellent or superb without appeal to
any objective account of value. 相似文献
12.
Stephen Mulhall 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,69(1):29-43
This paper critically evaluates the work of Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre by comparing their understanding of the
narrative structure of selfhood with paradigms derived from three other sources: Heidegger’s conception of human being as
Dasein; Rowan Williams’ interpretation of Dostoevsky’s theology of narrative; and Kierkegaard’s project of reading the Old
Testament narrative of Abraham and Isaac as part of the Christian God’s autobiography. These comparisons suggest that Taylor
and MacIntyre’s own narratives of Western culture lack a certain, theologically required openness to a variety of specific
ways in which both individuality and history resist understanding in narrative terms as much as they demand it. 相似文献
13.
Matt Stichter 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(1):73-86
According to Rosalind Hursthouse’s virtue based account of right action, an act is right if it is what a fully virtuous person
would do in that situation. Robert Johnson has criticized the account on the grounds that the actions a non-virtuous person
should take are often uncharacteristic of the virtuous person, and thus Hursthouse’s account of right action is too narrow.
The non-virtuous need to take steps to improve themselves morally, and the fully virtuous person need not take these steps.
So Johnson argues that any virtue based account of right action will have to find a way to ground a moral obligation to improve
oneself. This paper argues that there is an account of virtue that can offer a partial solution to Johnson’s challenge, an
account where virtue is a type of practical skill and in which the virtuous person is seen as having expertise. The paper
references the account of skill acquisition developed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Their research demonstrates that novices
in a skill have to employ different strategies to act well than the strategies used by the experts, and so the ‘virtue as
skill’ thesis provides support for Johnson’s claim that the actions of the non-virtuous will differ from the virtuous. On
the other hand, their research suggests that there is no separating the commitment to improve yourself from the possession
of expertise, and so the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis has the resources for grounding the obligation to improve oneself in an
account of virtue. 相似文献
14.
Stephen Davies 《Sophia》2011,50(2):265-268
I outline Robert Solomon’s Inferiority theory of humor, which he illustrated by reference to the Three Stooges and contrasted
with the Superiority, Incongruity, and Relief theories. And I discuss the status of the catchphrase with reference to ‘He’s
fallen in da water!’ from the Goon Show. Unlike Bob, I don’t think the catchphrase always operates as a set-up, because it
is not always heralded or predictable. The funny catchphrase involves a form of meta-humor that draws attention to the contrivance
of the story. 相似文献
15.
P. Pollard 《Current Psychology》1984,3(1):5-18
Recent investigations of intuitive statistical inference have been far less optimistic regarding man’s ability as an “intuitive
statistician” than were Peterson and Beach in 1967. Work on judgments of variance and central tendency formed a significant
part of Peterson and Beach’s review but is now regarded as peripheral. Work in this area is discussed in this review and it
is concluded that it yields some understanding of the Peterson and Beach view, as subjects appear to be reasonably competent
“intuitive arithmeticians.” However, it is pointed out that these tasks involve a “lower level” type of statistical judgment
and that several nonnormative biases are observed, even at this level.
This review arises from research conducted by the author while employed on a Social Science Research Council grant held by
Dr. J.St.B.T. Evans. 相似文献
16.
Daniel Bischur 《Human Studies》2011,34(4):407-429
Taking up the body turn in sociology, this paper discusses scientific practices as embodied action from the perspective of
Husserl’s phenomenological theory of the “Body”. Based on ethnographic data on a biology laboratory it will discuss the importance
of the scientist’s Body for the performance of scientific activities. Successful researchers have to be skilled workers using
their embodied knowledge for the process of tinkering towards the material transformation of their objects for data production.
The researcher’s body then is an instrument of measuring as well as a kind of archive of knowing. Their body becomes a disciplined
instrument which has its own place and function inside the laboratory. Furthermore, the appresentational apperception of Bodies
(Husserl) is being discussed as a basis for the emotional and ethical concerns towards laboratory-animals. Attitudes towards
animals in the laboratory setting (as well as elsewhere) are highly emotional. Nevertheless, following the literature of the
sociology of the body, those emotional reactions still follow certain cultural patterns which themselves can be understood
as embodied ways of knowing “right” or “wrong”. Besides as an instrument, the scientist’s body can also be understood as a
resource of emotional attachment towards animals. It is an instrument for performing transformation as well as one for caring. 相似文献
17.
Serge Grigoriev 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(3):187-201
This article offers a review of Richard Rorty’s attempts to come to terms with the role of religion in our public and intellectual
life by tracing the key developments in his position, partially in response to the ubiquitous criticisms of his distinction
between private and public projects. Since Rorty rejects the possibility of dismissing religion on purely epistemic grounds,
he is determined to treat it, instead, as a matter of politics. My suggestion is that, in this respect, Rorty’s position is
best construed as that of a humanist rather than a post-modernist. Ultimately, it appears that, in his view, the positive
element of religion—i.e. the idea of religion as a social gospel—has been absorbed and transformed into a utopian striving
which humanists associate with the ideal of democracy. Hence, in this regard, religion can be considered obsolete. Yet, without
explicitly invoking the usual epistemic grounds, Rorty’s arguments for excluding religion from the public sphere remain rather
thin, and an interest in reforming rather than excluding religion would have been more consistent with his general outlook. 相似文献
18.
Igor Douven 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):361-375
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining
in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival
rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis
of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside,
it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
相似文献
Igor DouvenEmail: |
19.
Igor Primoratz 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(4):371-386
Any plausible position in the ethics of war and political violence in general will include the requirement of protection of
civilians (non-combatants, common citizens) against lethal violence. This requirement is particularly prominent, and particularly
strong, in just war theory. Some adherents of the theory see civilian immunity as absolute, not to be overridden in any circumstances
whatsoever. Others allow that it may be overridden, but only in extremis. The latter position has been advanced by Michael
Walzer under the heading of “supreme emergency.” In this paper, I look into some of the issues of interpretation and application
of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” view and some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I argue that Walzer’s
view is vague and unacceptable as it stands, but that the alternatives proposed by critics such as Brian Orend, C.A.J. Coady,
and Stephen Nathanson are also unattractive. I go on to construct a position that is structurally similar to Walzer’s, but
more specific and much less permissive, which I term the “moral disaster” view. According to this view, deliberate killing
of civilians is almost absolutely wrong. 相似文献
20.
Paul Ceruzzi 《Knowledge, Technology, and Policy》2000,13(2):86-102
Beginning around the time of the Sputnik crisis of 1957, a number of specialized, defense-related firms moved to the Washington,
D.C. area. Their primary function was vague: they often defined their work as “systems integration”—but that was not well-defined.
Journalists, not understanding the nature of this activity, called the firms “Beltway Bandits,” a misnomer since nearly all
were located not around the Washington Beltway but rather close by one another in an area known as Tysons Corner, Virginia.
Though little understood and by 1997 all but gone as independent companies, these firms laid the foundation for one of the
most vibrant and economically successful regions of the country: Tysons Corner.
Tysons is now an anchor for Internet activity and probably has more high-technology software activity than anyplace, save
Silicon Valley, in the United States. It is also home to one of the most successful retail centers in the northeastern United
States. Tysons is a classic “Edge City” in the words of urban geographer Joel Garreau: tremendous commercial vitality yet
none of the qualities one associates with a “community.” Tysons Corner has no post office or ZIP code of its own, no political
boundary, no subway or railroad station, no library, public school, park, or town square. Yet is is an easily-recognized “place.”
This study looks at the area, its origins, and its present status, with a view toward some general comments about the place
for such “Edge Cities” in the country’s future. 相似文献