Funny business in branching space-times: infinite modal correlations

The theory of branching space-times is designed as a rigorous framework for modelling indeterminism in a relativistically sound way. In that framework there is room for “funny business”, i.e., modal correlations such as occur through quantum-mechanical entanglement. This paper extends previous work by Belnap on notions of “funny business”. We provide two generalized definitions of “funny business”. Combinatorial funny business can be characterized as “absence of prima facie consistent scenarios”, while explanatory funny business characterizes situations in which no localized explanation of inconsistency can be given. These two definitions of funny business are proved to be equivalent, and we provide an example that shows them to be strictly more general than the previously available definitions of “funny business”.     

列维纳斯面对康德、黑格尔、海德格尔——当代哲学关于"存在论"的争论

Levinas subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology,” and creates a “realm of difference,” the realm of “value,” “ethic,” and “religion,” maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that “being” contains the “other” but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he does not intend to deny “ontology” completely, but reversed the relationship between “ontology (theory of truth)” and “ethics (axiology),” placing the former under the “constraint” of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have “objects,” though. More often than not, the issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into “propositions”; nevertheless, it absolutely has its “theme.” As a discipline, philosophy continuously takes “being” as its “theme” and “object” of thinking. The point is that this “being” should not be understood as an “object” completely. Rather, it is still a “theme-subject.” In addition to an “object,” “being” also manifests itself in an “attribute” and a kind of “meaning” as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free “being” rather than “various beings” that is the “theme-subject” of philosophy. Translated by Zhang Lin from Wen Shi Zhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2007, (1): 61–70     

Some Remarks on “Hearing-as” and its Role in the Aesthetics of Music

Starting from the context in which Wittgenstein thinks of the concepts of “seeing-as” and “hearing-as”, the basic relation is clarified between the question of representation, musical understanding, and the theory of musical expressiveness. The points of views of Wollheim, Scruton, Levinson, and Ridley are discussed, in a re-consideration of the notions of hearing and understanding within Wittgenstein’s “last philosophy”.     

Carne Vale (Goodbye to Flesh?): Caribbean Carnival,Notions of the Flesh and Christian Ambivalence about the Body

This paper interrogates the popular notions of sexuality that lay behind the women’s bodily displays during Trinidad Carnival, the iconic Carnival experience in the region, and contrasts these to some Christian notions of the body and sexuality, which see the body (‘the flesh’) and sexuality, as problematic even sinful, as is captured in the word “carnal”/“fleshly”. Carne Vale, “goodbye to flesh”, plays on the Christian roots of Carnival, the religious festival before the solemnity of Lent when meat is given up. It hints at Christian notions of body which devalue physical being and oftentimes view it as the site of sinfulness and temptation. It argues that Caribbean women have subverted and continue to subvert such negative valuations by engaging in carnivalesque masquerade that revalues bodies, especially colonised female bodies.     

Understanding risk: A guide for the perplexed

Over the course of the past decade, neurobiologists have become increasingly interested in concepts and models imported from economics. Terms such as “risk,” “risk aversion,” and “utility” have become commonplace in the neuroscientific literature as single-unit physiologists and human cognitive neuroscientists search for the biological correlates of economic theories of value and choice. Among neuroscientists, an incomplete understanding of these concepts has, however, led to a growing confusion that threatens to check the rapid advances in this area. Adding to the confusion, notions of risk have more recently been imported from finance, which employs quite different, although formally related, mathematical tools. Of course, the mixing of economic, financial, and neuroscientific traditions can only be beneficial in the long run, but truly understanding the conceptual machinery of each area is a prerequisite for obtaining that benefit. With that in mind, I present here an overview of economic and financial notions of risk and decision. The article begins with an overview of the classical economic approach to risk, as developed by Bernoulli. It then explains the important differences between the classical tradition and modern neoclassical economic approaches to these same concepts. Finally, I present a very brief overview of the financial tradition and its relation to the economic tradition. For novices, this should provide a reasonable introduction to concepts ranging from “risk aversion” to “risk premiums.”     

A deflationary theory of reference

The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S says something about x” are exhaustive of the notions of aboutness and reference. An account of the usefulness of “about” is then given, which, I argue, is superior to that of Horwich. I close with a few considerations about how the advertised theory relates to well-known issues of reference, the conclusions of which is (1) that the issues concern reference and aboutness only insofar as the words “about” and “refer” serve to generalise over the claims that are really at issue, (2) that the theory of reference will not settle the issues, and (3) that it follows from (2) that the issues do not concern the nature of aboutness or reference.     

Normality and naturalness: A comparison of the meanings of concepts used within veterinary medicine and human medicine

This article analyses the different connotations of “normality” and “being natural,” bringing together the theoretical discussion from both human medicine and veterinary medicine. We show how the interpretations of the concepts in the different areas could be mutually fruitful. It appears that the conceptions of “natural” are more elaborate in veterinary medicine, and can be of value to human medicine. In particular they can nuance and correct conceptions of nature in human medicine that may be too idealistic. Correspondingly, the wide ranging conceptions of “normal” in human medicine may enrich conceptions in veterinary medicine, where the discussions seem to be sparse. We do not argue that conceptions from veterinary medicine should be used in human medicine and vice versa, but only that it could be done and that it may well be fruitful. Moreover, there are overlaps between some notions of normal and natural, and further conceptual analysis on this overlap is needed.     

Well-being and Spirituality from a Korean Perspective: Based on the Study of Culture and Subjective Well-being

Criteria for well-being and spirituality are culturally bound. In this article, therefore, the notions of well-being and spirituality were reconsidered from a Korean perspective. Two major conceptual approaches that pertain to “subjective well-being” research in social psychology provide the methodological framework for this study. While “bottom-up” approaches focus on how external events and situations influence happiness, “top-down” approaches center on diverse variables within an individual and his or her culture. Noting the cultural differences between American and Korean self-construals (i.e., independence vs. interdependence), the author argues that Koreans need to construct “top-down” approaches to both well-being and spirituality. Reviewing Robert Emmon’s concept of “spiritual intelligence,” the author also suggests an integrative model for spirituality and well-being in Korea.     

海德格尔在《黑格尔的经验概念》中对辩证法的扭曲

This essay reveals five points in which Heidegger misreads Hegel in “Hegel’s Concept of Experience”: (1) By forcedly introducing the concept of “will”, he interprets Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit into Metaphysics of Presence; (2) interprets concepts such as “statement” and “the road of skeptics” as the process of phenomenological reduction; (3) reduces Hegel’s Sein to Seiende; (4) replaces “Contradiction” with “Ambiguity” so the active Dialectics become passive; (5) exaggerates conscious experience and puts it into a real ontology, regardless of the significance of Logic and Encyclopedia of Philosophy. By an analysis of this misreading we can find the internal connection between Heidegger’s thought and that of his philosophical forerunner, Hegel. Translated by Zhang Lin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (12): 59–66     

Fixing broken masculinity: Viagra asa technology for the production of gender and sexuality

In the twenty-first century, technology is not so easily divorced from the human body. Viagra, the blockbuster drug hailed as the “magic erection pill,” exemplifies the increasingly accepted technologically-enhanced body. After a history of medical experts applying technology to women’s bodies in times of weakness, male bodies are now deemed in need of treatment. As male bodies digress from “normal” (erect and penetrating) sexuality, techno-scientific advances promise to “fix” the problem, and thus the patriarchal “machine.” Thus, Viagra is both a material and cultural technology producing and reshaping gender and sexuality under the guise of techno-scientific progress. Drawing on my own ethnographic data, I explore the use and circulation of techno-scientific advancement and inevitability discourses and the ways in which masculinity and heterosexuality are reproduced, as well as contested, critiqued, and reshaped by those who prescribe, dispense, market, and/or use Viagra. Finally, I argue that Viagra is currently being understood and employed as a “tool” to avert or treat masculinity “in crisis” in the contemporary America. This research would not be possible without help from kind medical practitioners, consumers, and participants in the feminist writing group at UCSB.     

Meaning(fullness) Without Metaphysics: Another Look at Hume’s “Meaning Empiricism”

Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,” which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism” reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his naturalistic “science of human nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas.     

Women’s Porno: The heterosexual female gaze in porn sites “for women”

The article deals with a number of Internet sites claiming to specialize in providing pornography for heterosexual women, as a vehicle to examine the nascent “gaze” and visual parameters of heterosexual female sexuality. The focus here is semiotic—looking at visual coding of website images rather than audience reception (i.e., whether heterosexual women are actually the main consumers of women’s porno). Motivation for this decision is discussed. Theoretically, the article draws from Butler’s performative notions of sexuality in anchoring discussion. The remainder of the article does a comparative textual analysis of nine pornographic Internet sites, three of which label themselves “for women.” Findings are as follows: “Women’s porno” fuses the matter and anti-matter of men’s homo- and heterosexual pornography, in the process engendering an active, sexually interested, heterosexual female gaze and typifying Butler notion of “insurrectionary speech.”     

Some philosophical thoughts on the nature of technology

Much of the effort put into discovering or defining the nature of technology has been along “party lines,” for example, either favoring technology or not. Although there is a clear divergence in the stand that various authors take with respect to this topic, I believe they share a common assumption, namely, that there is such a thing as “the essence” or “nature” of technology. My claim in this paper is that the broad use to which we put the term “technology” is better understood on the model of “family resemblance,” a model put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein, than it is on models that utilize the notion of “essence” or “nature.” Not only does the family resemblance model serve us better in understanding the wide variety of uses of the term, but it also helps to ameliorate the antipathy between the parties that their discussions often invoke.     

Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.     

Philosophie und Geometrie. Zur jüngeren Protophysik-Kritik

The critique of my protophysical approaches to operational foundation of geometry by Lucas Amiras (Journal for General Philosophy of Science Vol. 34 (2003)) concerns my first publication from 1976 but not the further 30 years of work. It does not offer any argument leading from the (erroneous) judgement “lacking success” to the conclusion “impossible”. And it is, in general, based on a philosophical defect: it ignores the principle of methodical order as leading for constructivist protophysics.     

On the Meaning of the Constant “c” in Modern Physics

In modern physics, the constant “c” plays a twofold role. On the one hand, “c” is the well known velocity of light in an empty Minkowskian space–time, on the other hand “c” is a characteristic number of Special Relativity that governs the Lorentz transformation and its consequences for the measurements of space–time intervals. We ask for the interrelations between these two, at first sight different meanings of “c”. The conjecture that the value of “c” has any influence on the structure of space–time is based on the operational interpretation of Special Relativity, which uses light rays for measurements of space–time intervals. We do not follow this way of reasoning but replace it by a more realistic approach that allows to show that the structure of the Minkowskian space–time can be reconstructed already on the basis of a restricted classical ontology (Mittelstaedt, Philosophie der Physik und der Raum-Zeit, Mannheim: BI-Wissenschaftsverlag, 1988 and Mittelstaedt, Kaltblütig: Philosophie von einem rationalen Standpunkt, Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, pp. 221–240, 2003), and that without any reference to the propagation of light. However, the space–time obtained in this way contains still an unknown constant. We show that this constant agrees numerically with “c” but that it must conceptually clearly be distinguished from the velocity of light. Hence, we argue for a clear distinction between the two faces of “c” and for a dualism of space–time and matter.     

A developed nature: a phenomenological account of the experience of home

Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home” is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving.