Resolving arguments by different conceptual traditions of realization

There is currently a significant amount of interest in understanding and developing theories of realization. Naturally arguments have arisen about the adequacy of some theories over others. Many of these arguments have a point. But some can be resolved by seeing that the theories of realization in question fall under different conceptual traditions with different but compatible goals. The arguments I will discuss fit a general pattern. A philosopher argues that one theory of realization is better than another because it provides a better explanation for a particular range of phenomena, say, accounting for common sense cases, or cases within the sciences, when in fact the theories in question are not genuine competitors. I will first describe three different conceptual traditions that are implicated by the arguments under discussion. I will then examine the arguments, from an older complaint by Norman Malcolm against a familiar functional theory to a recent argument by Thomas Polger against an assortment of theories that traffic in inherited causal powers, showing how they can be resolved by situating the theories under their respective conceptual traditions.     

The Moral Oracle’s Test

When presented with a situation involving an agent’s choice between alternative actions, a moral oracle says what the agent is allowed to do. The oracle bases her advice on some moral theory, but the nature of that theory is not known by us. The moral oracle’s test consists in determining whether a series of questions to the oracle can be so constructed that her answers will reveal which of two given types of theories she adheres to. The test can be applied to moral theories in order to determine if they differ in their recommendations for action. Based on this test, a terminology is developed to specify different forms and degrees of distinguishability between moral theories, or types of theories, in terms of their recommendations for action. In conclusion, the test is applied to consequentialism and utilitarianism.     

System-Wide versus Component-Specific Trust Using Multiple Aids

Previous research in operator trust toward automated aids has focused primarily on single aids. The current study focuses on how operator trust is affected by the presence of multiple aids. Two competing theories of multiple-trust are presented. A component-specific trust theory predicts that operators will differentially place their trust in automated aids that vary in reliability. A system-wide trust theory predicts that operators will treat multiple imperfect aids as one “system” and merge their trust across aids despite differences in the aids’ reliability. A simulated flight task was used to test these theories, whereby operators performed a pursuit tracking task while concurrently monitoring multiple system gauges that were augmented with perfect or imperfect automated aids. The data revealed that a system-wide trust theory best predicted the data; operators merged their trust across both aids, behaving toward a perfectly reliable aid in the same manner as they did towards unreliable aids.     

Justifying the Special Theory of Relativity with Unconceived Methods

Many realists argue that present scientific theories will not follow the fate of past scientific theories because the former are more successful than the latter. Critics object that realists need to show that present theories have reached the level of success that warrants their truth. I reply that the special theory of relativity has been repeatedly reinforced by unconceived scientific methods, so it will be reinforced by infinitely many unconceived scientific methods. This argument for the special theory of relativity overcomes the critics’ objection, and has advantages over the no-miracle argument and the selective induction for it.     

Self-awareness and the emotional consequences of self-discrepancies

Several self theories explore the effects of discrepant self-beliefs on motivation and emotion. This research intersected two self theories: self-discrepancy theory and objective self-awareness theory. Self-discrepancy theory predicts that ideal and ought discrepancies cause different negative emotions; objective self-awareness theory predicts that high self-awareness will strengthen the relationship between self-discrepancies and emotions. People (N =112) completed measures of self-discrepancies and emotions (dejection, agitation, positive affect, and negative affect). Self-focused attention was manipulated with a large mirror. When self-awareness was low, self-discrepancies had weak, nonsignificant relations to emotion. When self-awareness was high, however, self-discrepancies strongly predicted emotional experience. These effects were general-ideal and ought discrepancies affected emotions because of their substantial shared variance, not their unique variance. Implications for theories of self-discrepancies and emotions are considered.     

INTERPRETIVE PRAXIS AND THEORY-NETWORKS

Abstract:  I develop the idea of what I call an interpretive praxis as a generalized procedure for analyzing how experimenters can formulate observable predictions, discern real effects from experimental artifacts, and compare predictions with data. An interpretive praxis requires theories – theories not only about instruments and the interpretation of phenomena, but also theories that connect the use of instruments and interpretation of phenomena to high-level theory. I will call all such theories that enable experimentation to work intermediate theories . I offer an account of theory-networks that embrace these intermediate theories and explain their functions.     

Globalisation,society and religion: from mono‐metastructural theory to metatheoretical reflexivity

Examining globalisation theories, Eduardo Mendieta has come to the conclusion that there is a conceptual link between religion and social theory when theorising globalisation. His preference is for metatheoretical reflexivity type theories of globalisation that, in contrast with mono‐metastructural and matrix rearrangement theories, incorporate conceptual reflection on ‘religion’. With this typology in mind, the work of Ninian Smart and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, two authors in the study of religion for whom the era of globalisation was a central element in developing their views on religion and the study of religion, will be compared. Whereas Smart's views do not fundamentally break away from mono‐metastructural type theories, Smith's work, although highly problematic, gives some hints for developing a meta‐theoretical reflexivity type theory of religion, society and globalisation.     

A Comprehensive Picture of the Decidability of Mereological Theories

The signature of the formal language of mereology contains only one binary predicate which stands for the relation “being a part of” and it has been strongly suggested that such a predicate must at least define a partial ordering. Mereological theories owe their origin to Le?niewski. However, some more recent authors, such as Simons as well as Casati and Varzi, have reformulated mereology in a way most logicians today are familiar with. It turns out that any theory which can be formed by using the reformulated mereological axioms or axiom schemas is in a sense a subtheory of the elementary theory of Boolean algebras or of the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras. It is known that the theory of partial orderings is undecidable while the elementary theory of Boolean algebras and the theory of infinite atomic Boolean algebras are decidable. In this paper, I will look into the behaviors in terms of decidability of those mereological theories located in between. More precisely, I will give a comprehensive picture of the said issue by offering solutions to the open problems which I have raised in some of my papers published previously.     

Rational endorsement

It is valuable for inquiry to have researchers who are committed advocates of their own theories. However, in light of pervasive disagreement (and other concerns), such a commitment is not well explained by the idea that researchers believe their theories. Instead, this commitment, the rational attitude to take toward one’s favored theory during the course of inquiry, is what I call endorsement. Endorsement is a doxastic attitude, but one which is governed by a different type of epistemic rationality. This inclusive epistemic rationality is sensitive to reasons beyond those to think the particular proposition in question is true. Instead, it includes extrinsic epistemic reasons, which concern the health of inquiry more generally. Such extrinsic reasons include the distribution of cognitive labor that a researcher will contribute to by endorsing a particular theory. Recognizing endorsement and inclusive epistemic rationality thus allows us to smooth a tension between individual rationality and collective rationality. It does so by showing how it can be epistemically rational to endorse a theory on the basis of the way this endorsement will benefit collective inquiry. I provide a decision theoretic treatment for inclusive epistemic rationality and endorsement which illustrates how this can be accomplished.     

Wofür sprechen die Daten?

What Do the Data Tell Us? Justification of scientific theories is a three-place relation between data, theories, and background knowledge. Though this should be a commonplace, many methodologies in science neglect it. The article will elucidate the significance and function of our background knowledge in epistemic justification and their consequences for different scientific methodologies. It is argued that there is no simple and at the same time acceptable statistical algorithm that justifies a given theory merely on the basis of certain data. And even if we think to know the probability of a theory, that does not decide whether we should accept it or not.     

Embodied Experience in Educational Practice and Research

The intention of this article is to make an educational analysis of Merleau-Ponty??s theory of experience in order to see what it implicates for educational practice as well as educational research. In this way, we can attain an understanding what embodied experience might mean both in schools and other educational settings and in researching educational activities. The analysis will take its point of departure in Merleau-Ponty??s analysis and criticism of empiricist and neokantian theories of experience. This will be followed up by an introduction of some central concepts in Merleau-Ponty??s own understanding of experience with emphasis on their relevance for educational analysis. This way of presenting the theory of embodied experience has the advantage of being able to indicate the difference it makes in the field of theories of experience.     

Complexity Theory: Predictions Based on the Confluence of Science-Wide and Behavioral Theories

Views of behavioral and science wide complexity theories are briefly summarized. Theory-based predictions for human cognition and behavior based on both theories are advanced.
Streufert (in this special issue) has discussed the confluence of science-wide and behavioral complexity theory. Even though the former attempts to find common processes in all the sciences and the latter theory has, to date, limited itself to human behavior, there are many similarities in approach and in explanations of observed phenomena. Differences between the two theories are minor in comparison to their commonalities. Considering the many similarities, it may be useful to confirm (and possibly extend) behavioral complexity theory. A number of theorems, many familiar, some slightly modified, some new, will be provided at the end of this paper.     

Psychoeducational Interventions for Stress Management and Well-Being

The importance of educating students about stress and stress management is emphasized, because students will confront stressors throughout their life span. In this article the author summarizes major stress theories and shows how stress theory and stress management strategies can be integrated into existing school curricula.     

Perceiving Smellscapes

We perceive smells as perduring complex entities within a distal array. However, odor theories have been recently criticized for their conception of the spatiotemporal nature of olfactory perception and the individuation of distal odors. The paper does not aim to dispute these criticisms. Rather, what will be shown is that molecular structure theory, a refinement of odor theory, can be further developed to handle these challenges. The theory is further refined by focusing on distal perception that requires considering the perceptual object as mereologically complex persisting odor against a background scene conceived of as a smellscape.     

论健康伦理学及其基本理论架构——“九大理论”视野中的健康伦理

当代医学道德发展的走向理应是健康道德,后医学伦理学时代理应是健康伦理学。建设健康伦理学需要搭成一个基本理论架构。其组成至少应该有“九大理论”,即生命神圣论、生命质量论、生命价值论,医学人本论、医学功利论、医学公正论,医者美德论、医者义务(患者权利)论、医患和谐论。其间,按顺序由每三论构成一个“统一论”,将第一个“统一论”作为立论前提,将第二个“统一论”作为直接依据,将第三个“统一论”作为应用指南,如此,才能由三个“统一论”共同地更好地阐释全部健康伦理学问题。     

Restoring Continuity in Theory Change: The Kepler-to-Newton Case

In the on-going debate between scientific realism and its various opponents, a crucial role in challenging the realist claim that success of scientific theories must be attributed to their approximate truth is played by the so-called pessimistic meta-induction: Arguing that the history of science boils down to a succession of theories which, though successful at a time, were eventually discarded only to be replaced by alternative theories which in turn met with the same fate, it purports to show that the empirical success of scientific theories cannot have any bearing on claims about their truth-likeness. Yet, the same historical record suggests a possible strategy to counter this argument. Far from being a barren wasteland, it contains cases which point to the need of adopting a selective attitude when passing judgments about truth-likeness of theories. In this vein, Psillos has proposed the so-called divide et impera move. It consists in pointing out that responsibility for the success of a theory should be attributed to an indispensable core element in it, acting in unison with other elements reflecting the concrete historical conditions under which the theory was formulated. In what follows it is argued that the discovery of Kepler’s first two laws and the transition to Newtonian mechanics provides a notable case to exhibit the divide et impera move. All the more so, since—as will be shown—Kepler himself employs a variant of this move, a fact that sheds light on the philosophical implications of his theories. As a result, it will be argued that the appropriate selective attitude towards theories becomes solidly warranted if wedded to the diachronic element in the process of a theory’s development.     

DEFLATIONISM,CONSERVATIVENESS AND MAXIMALITY

We discuss two desirable properties of deflationary truth theories: conservativeness and maximality. Joining them together, we obtain a notion of a maximal conservative truth theory – a theory which is conservative over its base, but can’t be enlarged any further without losing its conservative character. There are indeed such theories; we show however that none of them is axiomatizable, and moreover, that there will be in fact continuum many theories of this sort. It turns out in effect that the deflationist still needs some additional principles, which would permit him to construct his preferred theory of truth.     

The logic of epistemic justification

Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases—predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But these closure principles are only a small sample of the logical principles that we might consider. In this paper, I will outline four further logical principles that plausibly hold for justification and two which plausibly do not. While my primary aim is just to put these principles forward, I will use them to evaluate some different approaches to justification and (tentatively) conclude that a ‘normic’ theory of justification best captures its logic.