辅助生育权:基于夫妻身份的考量

建立在人格权基础上的生育权理论无法解决辅助生育权的基本问题.辅助生育权是人工生殖技术催生的新型权利,其理论基石是夫妻身份权.人类辅助生殖技术以治疗不孕症为惟一目的.辅助生育权专属于夫妻共同体,是生育权的延伸,是不孕症夫妇生育权的医学实现.     

男性不育症诊疗中的伦理学思考

男性不育症是影响男性身心健康的重要疾患.生殖医学,特别是辅助生殖技术突飞猛进的发展,给男性不育症患者带来了福音,同时也给社会带来了许多伦理学问题.在工作中,医生应将伦理学原则与诊疗规范相结合,思考遇到的伦理学问题,自觉遵守医学伦理学规范.唯有这样,才能使生殖医学健康发展,才能保证患者最大程度受益.     

ART伦理委员会构建与作用的探讨

辅助生殖技术(Assisted Reproduction Technique,ART)的飞速发展给社会带来了复杂的伦理难题.实践证明,只有发挥伦理委员会作为一个工作机构的职能,在医患人群中加强ART技术基本原理及相关伦理原则的宣传教育,才能促使医患人群都能够自觉遵守优良的医学伦理道德规范,保证人类辅助生殖技术的健康发展.     

人类辅助生殖技术中的伦理监督与实践

我国人类辅助生殖技术的开展以及相关法律规范的实施为该技术的运用带来伦理管理的新课题.分别阐述辅助生殖技术中伦理监督的重要意义、重点与难点,对我院具体管理工作与实践探索作了介绍,并对该技术伦理监督管理中的几个问题进行了讨论.     

从辅助生殖技术的个案析要论知情同意的完善

结合在人类辅助生殖技术服务过程中发生的案例进行分析,就如何完善知情同意提出了一些见解.认为,医疗技术服务中,知情同意的完善必须注重两个环节,知情同意过程和签署知情同意书.这两个环节必须根据具体情况来进行实施,绝不能敷衍走过场.因此,相关医生对知情同意的认识和伦理监督就显得尤为重要.     

浅论生殖医学伦理委员会的功能

辅助生殖技术的开展为医学伦理带来了新的内容和挑战。我国卫生部于2001年2月20日发布的《人类辅助生殖技术管理办法》中规定,人类辅助生殖技术的应符合有利于患者的原则、知情同意的原则、保护后代的原则、社会公益原则、保密原则、严防商业化的原则和伦理监督的原则。开展辅助生殖技术的条件之一是医疗机构建立生殖医学伦理委员会。伦理委员会是教育性、咨询性、义务性及独立组织。生殖医学伦理委员会应依据上述原则对人类辅助生殖技术的全过程和有关研究进行监督,开展生殖医学伦理宣传教育,并对实施中遇到的伦理问题进行审查、咨询、论证和建议。     

女性选择辅助生殖技术的文化动力

在现代医学的语境中,女性的身体究竟是什么?是被当作肉体还是视作活生生的身体?这在很大程度上影响着女性的地位和命运.辅助生殖技术迎合了社会的主流需要,使女性的身体客观化为肉体,女性作为活生生的身体已被淡漠和遗忘.辅助生殖技术只有成为女性的自主选择才是合理的.     

我国老龄女性行辅助生殖技术生育的伦理反思

老龄女性行辅助生殖技术生育不仅存在其自身生育权与生命健康权的矛盾,还存在其生育权益与子代健康发展权益、配偶健康幸福权益以及人类社会生存发展权益之间的矛盾。考虑到老龄女性生育获益与风险的差距,并出于对各个主体权益的平衡,我国有必要对老龄女性实施辅助生殖技术生育的自由予以权衡和规范,主要措施包括完善辅助生殖技术相关法规,将年龄因素纳入辅助生殖技术适用对象评判标准;生殖伦理委员会在充分讨论、全面考虑、综合衡量基础上指导医疗机构合理决策;生殖医疗机构正确引导老龄女性对辅助生殖技术的认识并辅以心理疏导。     

“八胞胎”事件引发的伦理思考

震惊全国的广州“八胞胎”事件逐渐淡出公众的视野,但它带给我们的思考并未结束.从伦理视角对该事件中暴露出的亲子关系的界定、“子宫”商品化、公平公正、多胎妊娠、代际伦理等问题进行了深入思考,并针对ART技术自身特点,从强化医疗机构和ART技术从业人员的职业道德和法律意识;加强卫生行政部门的监管;加强顶层设计,完善ART技术的法律法规;提高不孕症患者对辅助生殖知识的认知,加强生殖伦理教育等方面提出了探讨性建议.     

山东省人类辅助生殖技术服务利用人群特征调查研究

对山东省人类辅助生殖技术(Assisted Reproductive Techology,ART)服务利用人群特征进行了调查和评价研究.主要包括不孕症门诊病人社会学特征,知情权,不孕症患者意愿,满意度评价等;并建议进一步加大宣传教育的力度,普及ART健康知识,提高对ART的知晓率,树立正确的社会观念,达到充分有效的利用ART的目的.     

Just Sustainability? Sustainability and Social Justice in Professional Codes of Ethics for Engineers

Should environmental, social, and economic sustainability be of primary concern to engineers? Should social justice be among these concerns? Although the deterioration of our natural environment and the increase in social injustices are among today’s most pressing and important issues, engineering codes of ethics and their paramountcy clause, which contains those values most important to engineering and to what it means to be an engineer, do not yet put either concept on a par with the safety, health, and welfare of the public. This paper addresses a recent proposal by Michelfelder and Jones (2011) to include sustainability in the paramountcy clause as a way of rectifying the current disregard for social justice issues in the engineering codes. That proposal builds on a certain notion of sustainability that includes social justice as one of its dimensions and claims that social justice is a necessary condition for sustainability, not vice versa. The relationship between these concepts is discussed, and the original proposal is rejected. Drawing on insights developed throughout the paper, some suggestions are made as to how one should address the different requirements that theory and practice demand of the value taxonomy of professional codes of ethics.     

Social justice and remembering “the personal is political” in counselling and psychotherapy: So,what can therapists do?

This brief contribution argues for the importance of a social justice perspective in counselling and psychotherapy, particularly within the current international socio‐political context. Much has been said about social justice over recent years in the fields of psychology, psychotherapy and counselling. Professionals and academics have expressed some concerns about what it might actually mean, or how difficult it might be in practice to engage with this perspective. In this paper, the activist phrase “the personal is political” (Hanisch, 1970) is used to illustrate the way in which a social justice approach to counselling and psychotherapy does not need to be complicated, but rather a foregrounding of a particular understanding of well‐being and the people we work with. Following this, some concrete and straightforward suggestions for how therapists might begin to act on their social justice values are made.     

社会公正与政治信任：民众对政府的合作行为机制

胡锦涛在中共十八大上提出：必须坚持维护社会公平正义。对社会公正的认知直接决定着民众的政治信任, 进而影响民众对政府的合作。近年来频发的群体性事件即是非合作行为的典型表征。然而, 国内外研究中至今没有直接探讨社会公正与政治信任影响合作行为的实证支持, 更无法进一步揭示其作用于合作行为的过程和条件。鉴于此, 本研究将社会公正分为分配公正和程序公正, 将政治信任分为工具信任和情感信任, 采用实验室研究、现场研究和问卷调查研究相结合的方法, 探讨社会公正对合作行为的过程机制, 建立其通过工具信任和情感信任作用于合作行为的双路径模型; 并进一步分析结果依赖性对这一路径模型的调节作用。本研究有望提出社会公正与政治信任影响合作行为的双路径模型及其调节变量, 一方面在理论上深化和拓展本领域的研究, 另一方面实践中通过提升公正感、强化过程变量(政治信任)、干预调节变量(结果依赖性)等策略促进合作行为。     

Global Inequality and International Institutions

This article considers the links between international institutions and global economic justice: how international institutions might be morally important; how they have changed; and at what those changes imply for justice. The institutional structure of international society has evolved in ways that help to undercut the arguments of those who take a restrictionist position towards global economic justice. There is now a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more securely established. But, at the same time, our major international social institutions continue to constitute a deformed political order. This combination of density and deformity shapes how we should think about international justice in general and has important implications for the scope, character, and modalities of global economic justice. Having laid out a view of normative development and where it leads, the article then examines why international distributive justice remains so marginal to current practice.     

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Social justice (which includes retributive and distributive justice) is most clearly satisfied by a system of Divine rewards and punishments: an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly just Being could determine in each case how much effort was made and effect the appropriate distribution of rewards and punishments. A correct understanding of social justice naturally leads us to suppose that there is an afterlife, a God, a free choice — though it is logically possible at least that social justice could be satisfied in some future (very advanced) human society. There will still be those who have their doubts about the correctness of any view according to which justice cannot be attained by fallible creatures who have an incomplete knowledge of one another's behaviour. But, surely, these doubts are not sufficient to discredit my view. There is no a priori reason for rejecting such a view. There is nothing about our use of the term ‘justice’ and its cognates which implies that such a view is mistaken. (Otherwise the statement “There is no justice in this world’ would be meaningless.) To the contrary, there are widely held religious views, Christian as well as non-Christian, which take this view quite seriously. If there is no a priori reason for rejecting this view, then there must be some independent reason for rejecting it. In other words, we need some independent reasons for believing that social justice can be attained by fallible creatures with limited knowledge. The mere fact that we might feel uncomfortable with my theory is not reason enough to reject it. Finally, those who do experience this discomfort might ask themselves whether such discomfort stems from their moral experience or whether they are simply intent on finding justice in imperfect human institutions.     

The role of standing in the psychology of procedural justice: Towards theoretical integration

In the current chapter, the authors explore the relation between social standing and procedural justice. Standing is an important construct in procedural justice theories and tends to be broadly defined as the position that people have in social groups. It is argued that the standing construct suffers from conceptual ambiguity: In procedural justice literature two distinct interpretations of standing can be distinguished, one defining standing as intragroup status and one defining standing as the extent to which people are included in social groups. Furthermore, it is argued that research findings on the relation between standing and procedural justice are not conclusive. The authors review recent empirical findings that address these concerns, and conceptually integrate these findings. In closing, the authors outline avenues for future research that the procedural justice field may want to take, and discuss implications of the work reviewed here.     

社会公平感、机构信任度与公共合作意向

社会公平从古至今都是人类追求的崇高社会理想。对社会公平的感知即社会公平感直接决定着个体的机构信任,并影响其公共合作参与。本研究将社会公平感分为分配公平和程序公平,将机构信任度分为工具信任和动机信任,采用实验室情境设计的方法,引入最后通牒博弈和免责博弈范式,通过2个实验系统探讨"公正无私,一言而万民齐"的因果机制。研究发现分配公平与程序公平正作用于个体的公共合作态度与意向,在此基础上建立起公共合作的双路径模型:外部路径由分配公平产生工具信任和动机信任,进而触发公共合作;内部路径由程序公平产生动机信任和工具信任,进而触发公共合作;二者结合构成个体参与公共合作的双动力系统。双路径模型的适用性在组织情境和社会情境下均得到了支持。     

休谟的经济正义思想

休谟从分析人类获取生活资料的方式入手,认为正义是一种社会契约,是尊重个人财产权的人为美德;他提出了正义的三大法则,即财产稳定地占有的法则,根据同意转移所有物的法则,履行许诺的法则,并强调政府在落实经济正义三大法则过程中的作用。休谟的经济正义思想反映了市场经济的某些一般特征,对于今天我们研究中国社会的经济正义问题仍有不可替代的借鉴价值。     

Value-based praxis in community psychology: moving toward social justice and social action

The purpose of this paper is to articulate a rationale for value-based praxis in community psychology. Although values need to promote personal, collective, and relational wellness at the same time, it is argued that community psychologists pay more attention to personal and relational wellness than to collective wellness. In order to address this imbalance it is important to promote the value of social justice. While praxis requires that we engage in a cycle of reflection, research, and social action, community psychologists devote more resources to the first two phases of praxis than to the last one. This paper offers a framework for deciding what values and what praxis considerations we should attend to and how we may advance social justice and social action in community psychology.     

DUTIES OF JUSTICE TO CITIZENS WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES

Abstract: Many social practices treat citizens with cognitive disabilities differently from their nondisabled peers. Does John Rawls's theory of justice imply that we have different duties of justice to citizens whenever they are labeled with cognitive disabilities? Some theorists have claimed that the needs of the cognitively disabled do not raise issues of justice for Rawls. I claim that it is premature to reject Rawlsian contractualism. Rawlsians should regard all citizens as moral persons provided they have the potential for developing the two moral powers. I claim that every citizen requires specific Enabling Conditions to develop and exercise the two moral powers. Structuring basic social institutions to deny some citizens the Enabling Conditions is unjust because it blocks their developmental pathways toward becoming fully cooperating members of society. Hence, we have a duty of justice to provide citizens labeled with cognitive disabilities with the Enabling Conditions they require until they become fully cooperating members of society.